REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.714 OF 2019

(@ SLP(Criminal) No.5415 of 2017)

DIPAKBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATEL ... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER ... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

K.M. JOSEPH, J.

1.This appeal by special leave granted by this

Court is directed against the judgment of the

High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dismissing

the Special Criminal Application No.1230 of 2009

filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the

1

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Cr.PC’ for short).

2.The petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. was

filed challenging the complaint and the Order

passed by the Sessions Court rejecting the

request of the appellant to discharge him of the

offences under Sections 489B and 489C of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to

as ‘the IPC’ for short).

3.The contents of the FIR dated 10.04.1996 are

as follows:

“The facts of my complaint are that

today ie., on 10.04.1996 at about

13.00, we got information from the

superior officer of the ATS that

Mahamad Rafik Abdul Hamid Kadge of

Mumbai and Salim Mahebub Shaikh of

Ahmedabad Sahalam, both are selling

fake currency note of Arabian country

as original on the road going towards

noble building located at the edge of

2

Nehrubridge, Ashram Road, Ahmedabad

on fair rate and therefore, while

receiving such legal instruction, two

panch persons had been called at the

office of ATS and after informing

them about such information and they

expressed their consent to remain as

panchas therefore, after completing

the first part panchnama at about

14.00 to 14.15 therein, I myself,

panchas and PSI Shri NB Jadeja, Shri

BR Karavadra, Shri PV Rathod, Shri NV

Kapiriya, Shri KK Desai and Police

constable Shri Rameshkumar Sevadas

Lashkari, Bhagwatsingh Madarsinh and

police Constable Amirkhan Rasulkhan

and Dashrathsinh Bhagubha etc reached

in government and private vehicles

opposite the Natraj cinema at Ashram

Road, Stopping their vehicles there

and taking walk reached near Noble

Building as well as on the road

nearby the Petrol pump and found that

three persons were standing nearby

the road and doing some transaction

and while making talk with them, we

stopped them at that place wherein we

introduced ourselves as Police and

panchas and informed them about

personal search and I caught accused

no.1 and while asking his name and

address, he stated his name as

Mahamad Rafik Abdul Hamid Kadge

residing at Sachhvari Dagadichawl

3

Golanji Rahil Road, Mumbai-15 and

during the search, 43 notes of Saudi

Arabian Riyal currency of Rs.500/-

denomination were found and PSI Shri

NB Jadeja caught the accused no.2 and

while asking his name before the

panchas, he stated his name as

Salimbhai Mahemudbhai Shaikh,

residing at inside Shahalam Darwaja,

Rasulibad society, Ahmedabad and

during the search 43 notes of Saudi

Arabian riyal currency of Rs.500/-

denomination were found and police

constable Shri Bhagwatsinh Madarsinh

buckle No. 8927 caught the accused

no.3 and while asking his name and

address, he stated his name is

Usmangani Mahamadbhai Malek residing

at Musamiyani Chali, Rasulabad

Shahalam, Ahmedabad and from his

hand, 2 nos. Saudi Arabian Riyal

currency notes of Rs.500/-

denomination were found and in all

total 88 notes were found. While

asking them one by one before the

panchas regarding such notes, it was

found that no.1 had taken such notes

from Mumbai prior to 15 days and had

stated that he talked with his friend

Jagdishchandra Patel residing at D-2

Aasiyana Flat, Nawa Vadaj, Ahmedabad

to sale him these fake Riyal currency

to as original with fair price and

today, after taking such note from

4

the house of Dipak by the accused

no.1; handed over it to the accused

no.2 and 3 and after preparing the

panchnama of such notes, seized it by

packing it in separate packets and

applying seals. Indian currency notes

found from one or two out of them had

been returned by way of panchnama and

that panchnama was completed at about

(Illegible).

Thus, the aforesaid accused no.1

Mahamad Rafik Abdul Hamid Kagde,

residing at Savri Hagadi Chawl,

Golanji Road, Mumbai-15, accused no.2

Salimbhai Mahemudbhai Shaikha,

residing at inside Shahalam Darwaja,

Rasulabad Society, Ahmedabad, accused

no.3 Usmangani Mahamadbhai Malek

residing at Shahalam, Ahmedabad and

accused no.4 Dipak Jagdish Patel,

residing at B-2 Aashiyana Flat, Nava

Wadaj, Ahmedabad in collusion with

each other, showing the fake Saudi

Arebiya currency Riyal of Rs.500/-

denomination as original and keeping

such notes in their possession to

sale such fake currency notes as

original with fair price, the accused

have committed the offence punishable

under Section 489B, C of the Indian

Penal Code and this is my legal

5

complaint against these accused

persons. The panchas, police persons

and whatever will be come out in the

investigation are my witnesses and

the accused no.1,2,3 are arrested

today ie, on 10.04.1996 at 17.00

o’clock.”

4.Following investigation, the chargesheet

came to be filed against the appellant inter

alia:

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SESSIONS JUDGE

Though the appellant contended before the

Sessions Judge that apart from the statement of

the co-accused, there was no material to proceed

against the accused/appellant and that only on

the basis of the statement by co-accused, no

case could be made out against the appellant,

and still further, it was contended that the

6

statement made by the co-accused was barred by

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,

however, it was found by the Sessions Judge that

the whole recovery procedure was made in the

presence of panchas and, accordingly, the plea

for discharge of the appellant was rejected as

there was some evidence against him, and without

recording evidence, it was not possible to come

to the conclusion that there is no evidence

against the appellant.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT

In the High Court, the learned Single Judge,

after referring to the allegations made against

the accused/appellant, rejected the plea that

the case against the appellant be not continued

as it seemed that from the averments and

arguments of the learned APP, statements of the

7

co-accused were recorded by the police wherein

involvement of the appellant was found

particularly of fake currency notes having been

found at the residence of the appellant. The

Court made reference to the seizure of

counterfeit currency notes from the place of

offence, i.e., residence of the appellant. It is

further found that it is premature to say

anything at this stage in respect of the

credibility of the statement made by the Officer

in the complaint. It can be considered only at

the trial. Currency notes were seized by the

Investigating Officer in the presence of the

witnesses, and therefore, their statements would

also be considered by the trial court, while

they would be examined by the court concerned.

Statements of the co-accused recorded by the

Investigating Officer show prima facie

8

involvement of the appellant in the offence. It

is not only the evidence available with the

prosecution to involve the appellant to the

alleged offences, other evidences too prima

facie point to the appellant. It was found that

no case was made out to interfere under Section

482 of the Cr.PC.

5.We have heard Mr. Nakul Dewan, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms.

Hemantika Wahi, learned Counsel appearing for

the respondents.

6.The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant

emphasized that the High Court has fallen into

error in holding that recovery of counterfeit

currency was effected from the residence of the

appellant. It was pointed out that counterfeit

currency was recovered not from the residence of

9

the appellant but from near a public road.

Therefore, the basis for continuing the case for

proceeding against the appellant does not exist.

Secondly, it was contended that a person cannot

be proceeded against on the basis of the

statement made by the co-accused, when there is

no material other than statement of the co-

accused. The High Court ought to have exercised

the jurisdiction available under Section 482 of

the Cr.PC and allowed the plea for discharge.

Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would

contend that the co-accused were absconding. He

sought support from the judgment of this Court

in Suresh Budharmal Kalani Alias Pappu Kalani v.

State of Maharashtra

1

. He has drawn our attention

to paragraphs 6 and 7, which read as follows:

“6. Thus said, we may turn our

attention to the confession made by

1 (1998) 7 SCC 337

10

Dr Bansal and Jayawant Suryarao.

Under Section 30 of the Evidence Act,

1872, a confession of an accused is

relevant and admissible against a co-

accused if both are jointly facing

trial for the same offence. Since,

admittedly, Dr Bansal has been

discharged from the case and would

not be facing trial with Kalani, his

confession cannot be used against

Kalani. The impugned order shows that

the Designated Court was fully aware

of the above legal position but,

surprisingly enough, it still decided

to rely upon the confession on the

specious ground that the prosecution

was not in any way precluded from

examining Dr Bansal as a witness in

the trial for establishing the facts

disclosed in his confession. This

again was a perverse approach of the

Designated Court while dealing with

the question of framing charges. At

that stage, the court is required to

confine its attention to only those

materials collected during

investigation which can be legally

translated into evidence and not upon

further evidence (dehors those

materials) that the prosecution may

adduce in the trial which would

commence only after the charges are

framed and the accused denies the

charges. The Designated Court was,

therefore, not at all justified in

11

taking into consideration the

confessional statement of Dr Bansal

for framing charges against Kalani.

7. So far as the confession of

Jayawant Suryarao is concerned, the

same (if voluntary and true) can

undoubtedly be brought on record

under Section 30 of the Evidence Act

to use it also against Kalani but

then the question is: what would be

its evidentiary value against the

latter? The question was succinctly

answered by this Court in Kashmira

Singh v. State of M.P. [AIR 1952 SC

159 : 1952 SCR 526] with the

following words:

“The proper way to approach a

case of this kind is, first, to

marshal the evidence against the

accused excluding the confession

altogether from consideration and

see whether, if it is believed , a

conviction could safely be based

on it. If it is capable of belief

independently of the confession,

then of course it is not

necessary to call the confession

in aid. But cases may arise where

the judge is not prepared to act

on the other evidence as it

stands even though, if believed,

it would be sufficient to sustain

a conviction. In such an event

12

the judge may call in aid the

confession and use it to lend

assurance to the other evidence

and thus fortify himself in

believing what without the aid of

the confession he would not be

prepared to accept.

The view so expressed has been

consistently followed by this Court.

Judged in the light of the above

principle, the confession of Suryarao

cannot be called in aid to frame

charges against Kalani in the absence

of any other evidence to do so.”

7. It is the further case of the appellant

that the ingredients of Section 489B and 489C of

the IPC have not been established. In regard to

Section 489C, he sought support from judgment of

the Lahore High Court in Bur Singh v. The Crown

2

.

Still further, he sought some support from the

judgment of the learned Single Judge of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court, viz., Justice

2(1930) ILR 11 Lah 555 [Criminal Revision No. 1527

of 1929]

13

M.M. Punchhi (as His Lordship then was), in

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab

3

. The Court held

as follows:

“10. In order to sustain the

convictions of Joginder Kaur

appellant, the prosecution has

not only to prove that she had

the possession of counterfeit

note, Exhibit P. 1, ensuring it

or having reason to believe it as

such, but further to prove

circumstances which lead clearly,

indubitably and irresistibly to

her intention to use the notes on

the public as has been held

in Bur Singh v. The Crown, (1930)

ILR 11 Lah 555 : (1931) 32 Cri LJ

351). It has further been held

that such intention could be

proved by a collateral

circumstance that she had palmed

off such notes before, or that

she was in possession of such

notes in such large numbers, that

her possession for any other

purpose was inexplicable. The

facts as found are that she had

on her person only one made-up

note, that she was an illiterate

lady and that anybody as Sh.

3 1981 SCC Online P&H 47

14

Darshan Kumar Ahluwalia, P.W. 2,

would have us believe could be

misled to treat it as a genuine

note. She gave the note to Kundan

Lal, P.W. 2 and he told her that

it was not a genuine note and his

belief was confirmed when he

showed it to others as well. It

has nowhere been asserted that

the note was ever returned to her

and having known fully well or

having reason to believe the same

to be forged for counterfeit she

yet made another attempt to palm

it off. Thus tendering alone such

note to Kundan Lal, P.W., unless

the prosecution could prove that

it was with dishonest intention

so as to cause wrongful loss to

him and wrongful gain to herself

would not make her act to fall

squarely within Section 420/511,

Indian Panal Code, or to have

come within the mischief of

Section 489-B or 489-C, Indian

Penal Code. The inference sought

to be drawn that she must have

known or reason to believe the

note, Exhibit PI, to be

counterfeit because her husband

accompanying her was found to be

in possession of similar notes is

entirely misplaced for no common

intention has been attributed to

15

them and they have not been

charged with the aid of Section

34, Indian Penal Code. For the

individual act of Joginder Kaur

she cannot be convicted for the

above named offences and must be

extended the benefit of doubt.

11. With regard to the case

of Bachan Singh it is to be noted

that he was found in possession

of 13 counterfeit ten rupee

notes. He is an iron-smith by

profession and barely literate.

How could he have the knowledge

or reason to believe the same to

be counterfeit is one part but

the other important part is

whether he intended to use the

same as genuine or that they may

be used as genuine has further to

be proved by the prosecution. It

was held in Bur Singh v. The

Crown, ((1931) 32 Cri LJ 351)

(Lah) (supra), that mere

possession of a forged note is

not an offence under the Indian

Penal Code and in order to bring

a case within the purview of

Section 489-C, Indian Penal Code,

it was not only necessary to

prove that the accused was in

possession of forged notes but it

16

should further be established

that:

(a) at the time of his possession

he - knew the notes to be forged

or had the reason to believe the

same to be forged or counterfeit;

and

b) he intended to use the same

as; genuine. No further

collateral circumstances in the

case have been brought forth such

as the accused had palmed off

such notes before, or that he was

in possession of such and similar

notes in such large numbers, that

his possession for any other

purpose was inexplicable.”

8.Finally, he also drew out attention to the

judgment of this Court in Umashanker v. State of

Chhatisgarh

4

wherein he emphasised on paragraphs

7 and 8, which read as follows:

“7. Sections 489-A to 489-E

deal with various economic

offences in respect of forged or

4 (2001) 9 SCC 642

17

counterfeit currency notes or

banknotes. The object of the

legislature in enacting these

provisions is not only to protect

the economy of the country but

also to provide adequate

protection to currency notes and

banknotes. The currency notes

are, in spite of growing

accustomedness to the credit card

system, still the backbone of the

commercial transactions by the

multitudes in our country. But

these provisions are not meant to

punish unwary possessors or

users.

8. A perusal of the provisions,

extracted above, shows that mens

rea of offences under Sections

489-B and 489-C is “knowing or

having reason to believe the

currency notes or banknotes are

forged or counterfeit”. Without

the aforementioned mens rea

selling, buying or receiving from

another person or otherwise

trafficking in or using as

genuine forged or counterfeit

currency notes or banknotes, is

not enough to constitute offence

under Section 489-B IPC. So also

possessing or even intending to

use any forged or counterfeit

18

currency notes or banknotes is

not sufficient to make out a case

under Section 489-C in the

absence of the mens rea, noted

above. No material is brought on

record by the prosecution to show

that the appellant had the

requisite mens rea. The High

Court, however, completely missed

this aspect. The learned trial

Judge on the basis of the

evidence of PW 2, PW 4 and PW 7

that they were able to make out

that the currency note alleged to

have been given to PW 4 was fake,

“presumed” such a mens rea. On

the date of the incident the

appellant was said to be an

eighteen-year-old student. On the

facts of this case the

presumption drawn by the trial

court is not warranted under

Section 4 of the Evidence Act.

Further it is also not shown that

any specific question with regard

to the currency notes being fake

or counterfeit was put to the

appellant in his examination

under Section 313 of the Criminal

Procedure Code. On these facts,

we have no option but to hold

that the charges framed under

Sections 489-B and 489-C are not

proved. We, therefore, set aside

the conviction and sentence

19

passed on the appellant under

Sections 489-B and 489-C IPC and

acquit him of the said charges

(see: M. Mammutti v. State of

Karnataka [(1979) 4 SCC 723 :

1980 SCC (Cri) 170 : AIR 1979 SC

1705] ).”

9.Learned Counsel for the State drew our

attention to the statement made by the appellant

himself wherein the appellant has stated inter

alia that he was told by the co-accused that he

left a bag containing the counterfeit notes at

his residence.

10.Learned Counsel for the State submits that

the Court may also bear in mind that the case is

only at the stage of framing of the charge. A

case has not been made out for interference

under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, and hence, she

supported the Order of the High Court.

20

11.Appellant would submit that as regards the

extra judicial confessional statement relied

upon by the State dated 11.04.1996 made by the

appellant that it was not the basis on which the

chargesheet had been framed. It is secondly the

case of the appellant that the statement has

been subsequently retracted.

12.Sections 489B and 489C of the IPC read as

follows:

“489B. Using as genuine, forged

or counterfeit currency-notes or

bank-notes.—Whoever sells to, or

buys or receives from, any other

person, or otherwise traffics in

or uses as genuine, any forged or

counterfeit currency-note or

bank-note, knowing or having

reason to believe the same to be

forged or counterfeit, shall be

punished with imprisonment for

life, or with impris onment of

either description for a term

which may extend to ten years,

and shall also be liable to fine.

21

489C. Possession of forged or

counterfeit currency-notes or

bank-notes.—Whoever has in his

possession any forged or counter -

feit currency-note or bank-note,

knowing or having reason to

believe the same to be forged or

counterfeit and intending to use

the same as genuine or that it

may be used as genuine, shall be

punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term

which may extend to seven years,

or with fine, or with both.”

LAW RELATING TO FRAMING OF CHARGE AND DISCHARGE

13.We may profitably, in this regard, refer to

the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v.

Ramesh Singh

5

wherein this Court has laid down

the principles relating to framing of charge and

discharge as follows:

“Reading SS. 227 and 228 together

in juxtaposition, as they have

got to be, it would be clear that

5 AIR 1977 SC 2018

22

at the beginning and initial

stage of the trial the truth,

veracity and effect of the

evidence which the prosecutor

proposes to adduce are not to be

meticulously judged. Nor is any

weight to be attached to the

probable defence of the accused.

It is not obligatory for the

Judge at that stage of the trial

to consider in any detail and

weigh in a sensitive balance

whether the facts, if proved,

would be incompatible with the

innocence of the accused or not.

The standard of test and judgment

which is to be finally applied

before recording a finding

regarding the guilt or otherwise

of the accused is not exactly to

be applied at the stage of

deciding the matter under S.227

or S.228 of the Code. At that

stage the Court is not to see

whether there is sufficient

ground for conviction of the

accused or whether the trial is

sure to end in his conviction.

Strong suspicion against the

accused, if the matter remains in

the region of suspicion, cannot

take the place of proof of his

23

guilt at the conclusion of the

trial. But at the initial stage

if there is a strong suspicion

which leads the Court to think

that there is ground for

presuming that the accused has

committed an offence then it is

not open to the Court to say that

there is no sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused.

The presumption of the guilt of

the accused which is to be drawn

at the initial stage is not in

the sense of the law governing

the trial of criminal cases in

France where the accused is

presumed to be guilty unless the

contrary is proved. But it is

only for the purpose of deciding

prima facie whether the court

should proceed with the trial or

not.

If the evidence which the

prosecutor proposes to adduce to

prove the guilt of the accused

even if fully accepted before it

is challenged in cross-

examination or rebutted by the

defence evidence, if any, cannot

show that the accused committed

the offence, then there will be

24

no sufficient ground for

proceeding with the trial.

If the scales of pan as to the

guilt or innocence of the accused

are something like even at the

conclusion of the trial, then, on

the theory of benefit of doubt

the case is to end in his

acquittal. But if, on the other

hand, it is so at the initial

stage of making an order under

S.227 or S.228, then in such a

situation ordinarily and

generally the order which will

have to be made will be one under

S.228 and not under S.227.”

14.In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal

and another

6

, after survey of case law, this is

what the Court has laid down:

“10. Thus, on a consideration of

the authorities mentioned above,

the following principles emerge:

(1) That the Judge while

considering the question of

framing the charges under Section

227 of the Code has the undoubted

6 AIR 1979 SC 366

25

power to sift and weigh the

evidence for the limited purpose

of finding out whether or not a

prima facie case against the

accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed

before the Court disclose grave

suspicion against the accused

which has not been properly

explained the Court will be fully

justified in framing a charge and

proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a

prima facie case would naturally

depend upon the facts of each

case and it is difficult to lay

down a rule of universal

application. By and large however

if two views are equally possible

and the Judge is satisfied that

the evidence produced before him

while giving rise to some

suspicion but not grave suspicion

against the accused, he will be

fully within his right to

discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his

jurisdiction under Section 227 of

the Code the Judge which under

the present Code is a senior and

experienced court cannot act

merely as a Post Office or a

mouthpiece of the prosecution,

26

but has to consider the broad

probabilities of the case, the

total effect of the evidence and

the documents produced before the

Court, any basic infirmities

appearing in the case and so on.

This however does not mean that

the Judge should make a roving

enquiry into the pros and cons of

the matter and weigh the evidence

as if he was conducting a trial.”

15.It is the case of the State that the

appellant had knowledge that the notes were

counterfeit and fake notes and was in conscious

possession of the fake notes for 15 days. For

framing charges, what is required is prima facie

satisfaction. Offence relating to counterfeit

notes is a grave offence and not to be viewed

lightly.

16.In the statement by the first accused, he

has stated that he had come to Ahmedabad 15 days

earlier. At that time, he had told the appellant

27

that the fake notes are to be sold at cheap

price and at present he may keep those notes

with him. He further states that he had brought

these notes from the residence of the appellant

and that he had been caught while he was selling

the notes at cheap price.

17.In the first statement given by the

appellant dated 11.04.1996 relied upon by the

State, the appellant is credited with knowledge

of the fact that the bag contained counterfeit

notes was left by the first accused at

appellant’s residence and they were to be sold

at cheap price and it was kept at his residence

for some days.

18.Subsequently, his statement was again

recorded on 10.07.1996. Therein, he inter alia

states that the first accused told him that the

28

bag contains files relating to land deals and it

contained valuables.

19.In further questioning on 30.08.1996, he

inter alia states that because of his

acquaintance with Ravi, he became acquainted

with the first accused and that he had left the

bag at his residence saying that the bag

contained important documents.

20.These are the materials in short which were

relied on by the State to sustain the Order

framing the charge against the appellant. That

is to say, the statements given by the appellant

under Section 161 and the statement also given

by the co-accused.

21.At the stage of framing the charge in

accordance with the principles which have been

29

laid down by this Court, what the Court is

expected to do is, it does not act as a mere

post office. The Court must indeed sift the

material before it. The material to be sifted

would be the material which is produced and

relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is

not to be meticulous in the sense that the Court

dons the mantle of the Trial Judge hearing

arguments after the entire evidence has been

adduced after a full-fledged trial and the

question is not whether the prosecution has made

out the case for the conviction of the accused.

All that is required is, the Court must be

satisfied that with the materials available, a

case is made out for the accused to stand trial.

A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong

suspicion must be founded on some material. The

material must be such as can be translated into

30

evidence at the stage of trial. The strong

suspicion cannot be the pure subjective

satisfaction based on the moral notions of the

Judge that here is a case where it is possible

that accused has committed the offence. Strong

suspicion must be the suspicion which is

premised on some material which commends itself

to the court as sufficient to entertain the

prima facie view that the accused has committed

the offence.

22.Undoubtedly, this Court has in Suresh

Budharmal Kalani Alias Pappu Kalani (supra),

taken the view that confession by a co-accused

containing incriminating matter against a person

would not by itself suffice to frame charge

against it. We may incidentally note that the

Court has relied upon the judgment of this Court

31

in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

7

. We

notice the observations, which have been relied

upon, were made in the context of an appeal

which arose from the conviction of the appellant

therein after a trial. The same view has been

followed undoubtedly in other cases where the

question arose in the context of a conviction

and an appeal therefrom. However, in Suresh

Budharmal Kalani Alias Pappu Kalani (supra), the

Court has proceeded to take the view that only

on the basis of statement of the co-accused, no

case is made out, even for framing a charge.

23.The first and the foremost aspect is whether

the appellant is justified in contending that

the High Court fell into error in holding that

the recovery was effected of the counterfeit

currency from the residence of the appellant.

7 AIR 1952 SC 159

32

This constituted an important consideration in

the court rejecting the petition filed by the

appellant.

24.The learned Counsel for the State, in fact,

did not seriously dispute the fact that there

was no recovery of counterfeit currency effected

from the residence of the appellant.

25.Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Evidence Act’

for short) renders inadmissible a confession

made to a Police Officer. It declares in fact

that no confession made to a Police Officer

shall be proved as against a person accused of

any offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act on

the other hand reads as follows:

“26. Confession by accused while

in custody of police not to be

proved against him.—No confession

made by any person whilst he is

33

in the custody of a police

officer, unless it be made in the

immediate presence of a

Magistrate, shall be proved as

against such person. "

Explanation.—In this section

“Magistrate” does not include the

head of a village discharging

magisterial functions in the

Presidency of Fort St. George or

elsewhere, unless such headman is

a Magistrate exercising the

powers of a Magistrate under the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882

(10 of 1882).”

26.Section 27 of the Evidence Act carves out an

exception.

27.In Law of Evidence by M. Monir, 17

th

Edition,

page 555, we notice the following discussion

regarding the distinction between Section 25 on

the one hand and Section 26 other hand:

“… The section deals with

confessions which are made not to

Police Officers but to persons

other than Police Officers, e.g.,

34

to a fellow prisoner, a doctor or

a visitor, and makes such

confessions inadmissible if they

were made whilst the accused was

in the custody of a Police

Officer. In section 25 the

criterion for excluding a

confession is the answer to the

question. “To whom was the

confession made?” If the answer

is that it was made to a Police

Officer, the confession is

absolutely excluded from

evidence. On the other hand, the

criterion adopted in section 26

for excluding a confession is the

answer to the question. “Under

what circumstances was the

confession made?” if the answer

is that it was made whilst the

accused was in the custody of a

Police Officer, the law lays down

that such confession shall be

excluded from evidence, unless it

was made in the immediate

presence of a Magistrate.”

28.Section 30 of the Evidence Act read as

follows:

35

“30. Consideration of proved

confession affecting person

making it and others jointly

under trial for same offence.—

When more persons than one are

being tried jointly for the same

offence, and a confession made by

one of such persons affecting

himself and some other of such

persons is proved, the Court may

take into consideration such

confession as against such other

person as well as against the

person who makes such confession.

Explanation.—“Offence”, as used

in this section, includes the

abetment of, or attempt to commit

the offence.”

29.While on confession, it is important to

understand as to what will amount to a

confession. The Privy Council in Pakala Narayana

Swami v. Emperor

8

:

“… Moreover, a confession must

either admit in terms the

offence, or at any rate

substantially all the facts which

8(1939) PC 47 (20.01.1939)

36

constitute the offence. An

admission of a gravely

incriminating fact, even a

conclusively incriminating fact

is not of itself a confession,

e.g. an admission that the

accused is the owner of and was

in recent possession of the knife

or revolver which caused a death

with no explanation of any other

man's possession. Some confusion

appears to have been caused by

the definition of 'confession' in

Article 22 of Stephen's "Digest

of the Law of Evidence" which

defines a confession as a

admission made iafc ( sic) any

time by a person charged with a

crime stating or suggesting the

inference that he committed that

crime. If the surrounding

articles are examined it will be

apparent that the learned author

after dealing with admissions

generally is applying himself to

admissions in criminal cases, and

for this purpose defines

confessions so as to cover all

such admissions, in order to have

a general term for use in the

three following articles,

confession secured by inducement,

made upon oath, made under a

promise of secrecy. The

37

definition is not contained in

the Evidence Act, 1872: and in

that Act it would not be

consistent with the natural use

of language to construe

confession as a statement by an

accused "suggesting the inference

that he committed" the crime.”

30.This view of the Privy Council has gained

acceptance of this Court in many decisions. They

include Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab

9

and

Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra

10

.

31.A Full Court of this Court, in the decision

in M.P. Sharma and 4 others v. Satish Chandra,

Distt. Magistrate, Delhi and 4 others

11

,

considered the scope of the expression contained

in Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India

which mandates that no person accused of any

9 AIR 1952 SC 354

10 AIR 1976 SC 1167

11 AIR 1954 SC 300

38

offence shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself:

“Broadly stated the guarantee in

Art.20(3) is against “testimonial

compulsion”. But there is no

reason to confine it to the oral

evidence of a person standing his

trial for an offence when called

to the witness-stand. The

protection afforded to an accused

in so far as it is related to the

phrase “to be a witness” is not

merely in respect of testimonial

compulsion in the Court room but

may well extend to compelled

testimony previously obtained

from him. It is available,

therefore, to a person against

whom a formal accusation relating

to the commission of an offence

has been levelled which is the

normal course may result in

prosecution.

Considered in this light, the

guarantee under Article 20(3)

would be available to person

against whom A First Information

Report has been recorded as

accused therein. It would extend

to any compulsory process for

production of evidentiary

documents which ae reasonable

39

likely to support a prosecution

against them.”

(Emphasis supplied)

32.In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad

12

, a

Bench of 11 learned Judges of this Court had an

occasion to consider the true width of the

expression “person accused of an offence”.

Speaking on behalf of the majority, Sinha, C.J.,

held as follows:

“14. In this connection the

question was raised before us

that in order to bring the case

within the prohibition of clause

(3) of Article 20, it is not

necessary that the statement

should have been made by the

accused person at a time when he

fulfilled that character; it is

enough that he should have been

an accused person at the time

when the statement was sought to

be proved in court, even though

he may not have been an accused

person at the time he had made

that statement. The correctness

12 AIR 1961 SC 1808

40

of the decision of the

Constitution Bench of this Court

in the case of Mohamed

Dastagirv. State of

Madras [(1960) 3 SCR 116] was

questioned because it was said

that it ran counter to the

observations of the Full Court

in Sharma case [(1954) SCR 1077].

In the Full Court decision of

this Court this question did not

directly arise; nor was it

decided. On the other hand, this

Court, in Sharma case [(1954) SCR

1077] held that the protection

under Article 20(3) of the

Constitution is available to a

person against whom a formal

accusation had been levelled,

inasmuch as a First Information

Report had been lodged against

him. Sharma case [(1954) SCR

1077] therefore, did not decide

anything to the contrary of what

this Court said in Mohamed

Dastagir v. State of

Madras [(1960) 3 SCR 116]. The

latter decision in our opinion

lays down the law correctly.

15. In order to bring the

evidence within the inhibitions

of clause (3) of Article 20 it

must be shown not only that the

41

person making the statement was

an accused at the time he made it

and that it had a material

bearing on the criminality of the

maker of the statement, but also

that he was compelled to make

that statement. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

33.The Court also laid down its conclusions in

paragraph-16:

”16. In view of these

considerations, we have come to

the following conclusions:

(1) An accused person cannot be

said to have been compelled to be

a witness against himself simply

because he made a statement while

in police custody, without

anything more. In other words,

the mere fact of being in police

custody at the time when the

statement in question was made

would not, by itself, as a

proposition of law, lend itself

to the inference that the accused

was compelled to make the

statement, though that fact, in

conjunction with other

circumstances disclosed in

42

evidence in a particular case,

would be a relevant consideration

in an enquiry whether or not the

accused person had been compelled

to make the impugned statement.

(2) The mere questioning of an

accused person by a police

officer, resulting in a voluntary

statement, which may ultimately

turn out to be incriminatory, is

not “compulsion”.

(3) “To be a witness” is not

equivalent to “furnishing

evidence” in its widest

significance; that is to say, as

including not merely making of

oral or written statements but

also production of documents or

giving materials which may be

relevant at a trial to determine

the guilt or innocence of the

accused.

(4) Giving thumb impressions or

impressions of foot or palm or

fingers or specimen writings or

showing parts of the body by way

of identification are not

included in the expression “to be

a witness”.

(5) “To be a witness” means

imparting knowledge in respect of

relevant facts by an oral

statement or a statement in

43

writing, made or given in court

or otherwise.

(6) “To be a witness” in its

ordinary grammatical sense means

giving oral testimony in court.

Case law has gone beyond this

strict literal interpretation of

the expression which may now bear

a wider meaning, namely, bearing

testimony in court or out of

court by a person accused of an

offence, orally or in writing.

(7) To bring the statement in

question within the prohibition

of Article 20(3), the person

accused must have stood in the

character of an accused person at

the time he made the statement.

It is not enough that he should

become an accused, any time after

the statement has been made. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

34.Section 161 of the Cr.PC has the following

marginal note:

“Examination of witnesses by

police”

44

35.Can a person, who is accused of an offence,

be examined under Section 161 of the Cr.PC? As

we have seen, when a person is named as an

accused in First Information Report, he would

stand in the shoes of an accused person. Does

not the marginal note of Section 161 of the

Cr.PC confine the power to the Police Officer to

examine the witnesses and will it be denied to

him qua a person who is already named as an

accused? These questions are no longer res

integra. In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and

another

13

, a Bench of three learned Judges was

dealing with a case which arose from proceedings

initiated against the appellant therein under

Section 179 of the IPC. In the course of the

judgment, speaking on behalf of the Bench, this

is what Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer had to say:

13 AIR 1978 SC 1025

45

“32. We will now answer the

questions suggested at the

beginning and advert to the

decisions of our Court which set

the tone and temper of the

“silence” clause and bind us

willy-nilly. We have earlier

explained why we regard Section

161(2) as a sort of parliamentary

commentary on Article 20(3). So,

the first point to decide is

whether the police have power

under Sections 160 and 161 of the

CrPC to question a person who,

then was or, in the future may

incarnate as, an accused person.

The Privy Council and this Court

have held that the scope of

Section 161 does include actual

accused and suspects and we

deferentially agree without

repeating the detailed reasons

urged before us by counsel. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

36.Thereafter, after referring to Pakala

Narayana Swami (supra), regarding the scope of

the word ‘confession’ the Court held inter alia

as follows:

46

“33. …We hold that “any person

supposed to be acquainted with

the facts and circumstances of

the case” includes an accused

person who fills that role

because the police suppose him to

have committed the crime and

must, therefore, be familiar with

the facts. The supposition may

later prove a fiction but that

does not repel the section. Nor

does the marginal note

“examination of witnesses by

police” clinch the matter. A

marginal note clears ambiguity

but does not control meaning.

Moreover, the suppositions

accused figures functionally as a

witness. “To be a witness”, from

a functional angle, is to impart

knowledge in respect of a

relevant fact, and that is

precisely the purpose of

questioning the accused under

Section 161 CrPC. …”

37.Thus, quite clearly, a person who stands in

the shoes of the accused being named in the

First Information Report, can be examined by the

47

Police Officer under Section 161 of the Cr.PC.

The next question however is, as to whether the

statement given by a person who stands in the

shoes of an accused and who gives a statement,

whether the statement is admissible in law? It

is here that Section 162 of the Code comes into

play:

“162. Statements to police not to

be signed: Use of statements in

evidence.

(1) No statement made by any

person to a police officer in the

course of an investigation under

this Chapter, shall, if reduced

to writing, be signed by the

person making it; nor shall any

such statement or any record

thereof, whether in a police

diary or otherwise, or any part

of such statement or record, be

used for any purpose, save as

hereinafter provided, at any

inquiry or trial in respect of

any offence under investigation

48

at the time when such statement

was made: Provided that when any

witness is called for the

prosecution in such inquiry or

trial whose statement has been

reduced into writing as

aforesaid, any part of his

statement, if duly proved, may be

used by the accused, and with the

permission of the Court, by the

prosecution, to contradict such

witness in the manner provided by

section 145 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872 );

and when any part of such

statement is so used, any part

thereof may also be used in the

re- examination of such witness,

but for the purpose only of

explaining any matter referred to

in his cross- examination.

(2) Nothing in this section shall

be deemed to apply to any

statement falling within the

provisions of clause (1) of

section 32 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), or to

affect the provisions of section

27 of that Act. Explanation.- An

omission to state a fact or

circumstance in the statement

referred to in sub- section (1)

49

may amount to contradiction if

the same appears to be

significant and otherwise

relevant having regard to the

context in which such omission

occurs and whether any omission

amounts to a contradiction in the

particular context shall be a

question of fact.”

38.A Bench of three learned Judges of this

Court in Mahabir Mandal and others v. State of

Bihar

14

, had this to say:

“39. Coming to the case of Kasim,

we find that there is no reliable

evidence as may show that Kasim was

present at the house of Mahabir on

the night of occurrence and took

part in the disposal of the dead

body of Indira. Reliance was placed

by the prosecution upon the

statement alleged to have been made

by Kasim and Mahadeo accused at the

police station in the presence of

Baijnath PW after Baijnath had

lodged report at the police

station. Such statements are

legally not admissible in evidence

and cannot be used as substantive

14 AIR 1972 1331

50

evidence. According to Section 162

of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

no statement made by any person to

a police officer in the course of

an investigation shall be signed by

the person making it or used for

any purpose at any enquiry or trial

in respect of any offence under

investigation at the time when such

statement was made. The only

exception to the above rule is

mentioned in the proviso to that

section. According to the proviso,

when any witness is called for the

prosecution in the enquiry or

trial, any part of his statement,

if duly proved, may be used by the

accused and with the permission of

the court by the prosecution, to

contradict such witness in the

manner provided by Section 145 of

the Indian Evidence Act and when

any part of such statement is so

used, any part thereof may also be

used in the re-examination of such

witness for the purpose only of

explaining any matter referred to

in his cross-examination. The above

rule is, however, not applicable to

statements falling within the

provisions of Clause 1 of Section

32 of the Indian Evidence Act or to

affect the provisions of Section 27

of that Act. It is also well

51

established that the bar of

inadmissibility operates not only

on statements of witnesses but also

on those of the accused

(see Narayan Swami v. Emperor [AIR

1939 PC 47]). Lord Atkin, in that

case, while dealing with Section

162 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure observed:

“Then follows the section in

question which is drawn in the

same general way relating to ‘any

person.’ That the words in their

ordinary meaning would include

any person though he may

thereafter be accused seems

plain. Investigation into crime

often includes the examination of

a number or persons none of whom

or all of whom may be suspected

at the time. The first words of

the section prohibiting the

statement if recorded from being

signed must apply to all the

statements made at the time and

must therefore apply to a

statement made by a person

possibly not then even suspected

but eventually accused.”

Reference may also be made to

Section 26 of the Indian Evidence

Act, according to which no

confession made by any person

52

whilst he is in the custody of a

police officer, unless it be made

in the immediate presence of a

Magistrate, shall be proved against

such person. There is nothing in

the present case to show that the

statements which were made by Kasim

and Mahadeo accused on September

18, 1963, at the police station in

the presence of Baijnath resulted

in the discovery of any

incriminating material as may make

them admissible under Section 27 of

the Indian Evidence Act. As such,

the aforesaid statements must be

excluded from consideration.”

(Emphasis supplied)

39.Therefore, the combined effect of these

provisions can be summarized as follows:

Unless a person is accused of an offence, he

cannot claim the protection of Article 20(3) of

the Constitution of India.

40.Such a person, viz., person who is named in

the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes

of law, can indeed be questioned and the

53

statement is taken by the Police Officer. A

confession, which is made to a Police Officer,

would be inadmissible having regard to Section

25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is

vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act

would also be inadmissible. A confession unless

it fulfills the test laid down in Pakala

Narayana Swami (supra) and as accepted by this

Court, may still be used as an admission under

Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however,

is subject to the bar of admissibility of a

statement under Section 161 of the Cr.PC.

Therefore, even if a statement contains

admission, the statement being one under Section

161, it would immediately attract the bar under

Section 162 of the Cr.PC.

41.Bar under Section 162 Cr.PC, no doubt,

operates in regard to the statement made to a

54

Police Officer in between two points of time,

viz., from the beginning of the investigation

till the termination of the same. In a case

where statement containing not a confession but

admission, which is otherwise relevant and which

is made before the investigation commences, may

be admissible. We need not, however, say

anything more.

42.In Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C.

Shukla and others

15

, a Bench of three learned

Judges, after approving Pakala Narayana Swami

(supra), had occasion to consider the

distinction between confession and admission.

This Court went on to hold as follows:

“45. It is thus seen that only

voluntary and direct

acknowledgement of guilt is a

confession but when a confession

falls short of actual admission of

15 AIR 1998 SC 1406

55

guilt it may nevertheless be used

as evidence against the person who

made it or his authorised agent as

an “admission” under Section 21.

The law in this regard has been

clearly — and in our considered

view correctly — explained

in Monir's Law of Evidence (New Edn.

at pp. 205 and 206), on which Mr

Jethmalani relied to bring home his

contention that even if the entries

are treated as “admission” of the

Jains still they cannot be used

against Shri Advani. The relevant

passage reads as under:

“The distinction between

admissions and confessions is of

considerable importance for two

reasons. Firstly, a statement

made by an accused person, if it

is an admission, is admissible in

evidence under Section 21 of the

Evidence Act, unless the

statement amounts to a confession

and was made to a person in

authority in consequence of some

improper inducement, threat or

promise, or was made to a Police

Officer, or was made at a time

when the accused was in custody

of a Police Officer. If a

statement was made by the accused

in the circumstances just

56

mentioned its admissibility will

depend upon the determination of

the question whether it does not

amount to a confession. If it

amounts to a confession, it will

be inadmissible, but if it does

not amount to a confession, it

will be admissible under Section

21 of the Act as an admission,

provided that it suggests an

inference as to a fact which is

in issue in, or relevant to, the

case and was not made to a Police

Officer in the course of an

investigation under Chapter XIV

of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. Secondly, a statement

made by an accused person is

admissible against others who are

being jointly tried with him only

if the statement amounts to a

confession. Where the statement

falls short of a confession, it

is admissible only against its

maker as an admission and not

against those who are being

jointly tried with him .

Therefore, from the point of view

of Section 30 of the Evidence Act

also the distinction between an

admission and a confession is of

fundamental importance.””

(Emphasis supplied)

57

43.Section 21 of the Evidence Act provides as

follows:

”21. Proof of admissions against

persons making them, and by or on

their behalf.—Admissions are

relevant and may be proved as

against the person who makes

them, or his representative in

interest; but they cannot be

proved by or on behalf of the

person who makes them or by his

representative in interest,

except in the following cases:—

(1)An admission may be proved by

or on behalf of the person

making it, when it is of such

a nature that, if the person

making it were dead, it would

be relevant as between third

persons under section 32.

(2)An admission may be proved by

or on behalf of the person

making it, when it consists of

a statement of the existence

of any state of mind or body,

relevant or in issue, made at

or about the time when such

state of mind or body existed,

and is accompanied by conduct

58

rendering its falsehood

improbable.

(3)An admission may be proved by

or on behalf of the person

making it, if it is relevant

otherwise than as an

admission.”

44.Thus, what amounts to an admission can be

used against the maker of the admission or his

representative in interest. As to what

constitutes an admission is to be found in

Section 17 of the Evidence Act, which defines

admission as follows:

“17. Admission defined.—An

admission is a statement, oral or

documentary or contained in

electronic form, which suggests

any inference as to any fact in

issue or relevant fact, and which

is made by any of the persons,

and under the circumstances,

hereinafter mentioned.”

59

45.In Bharat Singh and others v. Mst.

Bhagirathi

16

, the true nature of the evidentiary

value of admission, and whether without

confronting the maker of the admission, it could

be used, has been referred to and this is what

this Court had to say:

“19. Admissions have to be

clear if they are to be used

against the person making them.

Admissions are substantive

evidence by themselves, in view

of Sections 17, and 21 of the

Indian Evidence Act, though they

are not conclusive proof of the

matters admitted. We are of

opinion that the admissions duly

proved are admissible evidence

irrespective of whether the party

making them appeared in the

witness box or not and whether

that party when appearing as

witness was confronted with those

statements in case it made a

statement contrary to those

admissions. The purpose of

contradicting the witness under

Section 145 of the Evidence Act

16 AIR 1966 SC 405

60

is very much different from the

purpose of proving the admission.

Admission is substantive evidence

of the fact admitted while a

previous statement used to

contradict a witness does not

become substantive evidence and

merely serves the purpose of

throwing doubt on the veracity of

the witness. What weight is to be

attached to an admission made by

a party is a matter different

from its use as admissible

evidence.”

(Emphasis supplied)

46.From the statement of the law contained in

V.C. Shukla and others (supra), it becomes clear

as to what constitutes confession and how if it

does not constitute confession, it may still be

an admission. Being an admission, it may be

admissible under the Evidence Act provided that

it meets the requirements of admission as

defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act.

61

However, even if it is an admission, if it is

made in the course of investigation under the

Cr.PC to a Police Officer, then, it will not be

admissible under Section 162 of the Cr.PC as it

clearly prohibits the use of statement made to a

Police Officer under Section 161 of the Cr.PC

except for the purpose which is mentioned

therein. Statement given under Section 161, even

if relevant, as it contains an admission, would

not be admissible, though an admission falling

short of a confession which may be made

otherwise, may become substantive evidence.

47.A confession made to a Police Officer is

clearly inadmissible. The statement relied on by

respondent is dated 11.04.1996 and the appellant

was arrested on 11.04.1996. This is pursuant to

the FIR registered on 10.04.1996. The statement

dated 11.04.1996 is made to a Police Officer.

62

This is clear from the statement as also letter

dated 10.08.1996 (Annexure R/6) produced by the

respondent. It is clearly during the course of

the investigation. Even if it does contain

admissions by virtue of Section 162 and as

interpreted by this Court in V.C. Shukla and

others (supra), such admissions are clearly

inadmissible.

48.If the statement made by the appellant on

11.04.1996 is inadmissible, then, there will

only be the statement of the co-accused

available to be considered in deciding whether

the charge has to be framed against the

appellant or not. It is here that the law laid

down by this Court in Suresh Budharmal Kalani

Alias Pappu Kalani (supra)becomes applicable.

63

49.We also notice the following statement in

judgment rendered by Bench of seven learned

Judges in Haricharan Kurmi v. Sate of Bihar

17

:

“As a result of the provisions

contained in S.30, Evidence Act,

the confession of a co-accused

has to be regarded as amounting

to evidence in a general way,

because whatever is considered by

the Court is evidence;

circumstances which are

considered by the Court as well

as probabilities do amount to

evidence in that generic sense.

Thus, though confession may be

regarded as evidence in that

generic sense because of the

provisions of S.30, the fact

remains that it is not evidence

as defined by S.3 of the Act. The

result, therefore, is that in

dealing with a case against an

accused person, the Court cannot

start with the confession of a

co-accused person; it must begin

with other evidence adduced by

the prosecution and after it has

formed its opinion with regard to

the quality and effect of the

said evidence, then it is

17 AIR 1964 SC 1184 (quoted portion at page 1184)

64

permissible to turn to the

confession in order to receive

assurance to the conclusion of

guilt which the judicial mind is

about to reach on the said other

evidence.

Thus, the confession of a co-

accused person cannot be treated

as substantive evidence and can

be pressed into service only when

the Court is inclined to accept

other evidence and feels the

necessity of seeking for an

assurance in support of its

conclusions deducible from the

said evidence. In criminal cases

where the other evidence adduced

against an accused person is

wholly unsatisfactory and the

prosecution seeks to rely on the

confession of a co-accused

person, the presumption of

innocence which is the basis of

criminal jurisprudence assists

the accused person and compels

the Court to render the verdict

that the charge is not proved

against him, and so, he is

entitled to the benefit of

doubt.”

65

50.Proceeding on the basis that it is a

confession by a co-accused and still proceeding

further that there is a joint trial of the

accused and that they are accused of the same

offences (ignoring the fact that other accused

are absconding and appellant appears to be

proceeded against on his own) and having found

that there is no recovery from the residence of

the appellant of the counterfeit notes and that

there is no other material on the basis of which

even a strong suspicion could be aroused, we

would find that the mandate of the law requires

us to free the appellant from being proceeded

against. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and

the petition filed under Section 482 of the

Cr.PC. The Order impugned passed by the Sessions

Judge framing the charge against the appellant

66

will stand set aside and the appellant will

stand discharged.

…………………………………………………

[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

…………………………………………………

[K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 24, 2019.

67