As per case facts, the appellant, Dorik Sao, was convicted for the murder of Chano Sao, with whom he shared a bidi business. Chano Sao went with Dorik Sao to ...
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.266 of 2004
Against the Judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated
09.02.2004 and 10.02.2004, respectively, passed by Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Fast-Track Court No. II, Jamui, in Sessions Trial No. 434 of
1995 (G.R. Case No. 929 of 1993), arising out of JhaJha P.S. Case No. 121 of
1993.
=======================================================
Dorik Sao, son of Late Prabhu Sao, Resident of village - Dumarmoh, P.S.
Jhajha, District – Jamui.
... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar
... ... Respondent
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s: Ms. Smriti Singh, Amicus Curiae
For the Respondent/s: Mr. Bipin Kumar, A.P.P.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR SINHA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR
C.A.V JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR)
Date : 01-09-2026
Heard Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae for
the Appellant and Mr. Bipin Kumar, learned counsel for the
State.
2. The present appeal has been preferred against the
Judgment of Conviction dated 09.02.2004 and Order of
Sentence dated 10.02.2004 passed by the learned Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. II, Jamui, in
Sessions Trial No. 434 of 1995 arising out of Jhajha P.S. Case
No. 121 of 1993, whereby the appellant was convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.
3. The prosecution case, as unfolded in the
fardbayan of the informant, Ramdeo Sao, son of Late Chano
Sao, recorded at Bhadaria (Jamuni Jore) Road by S.I. B. Roy of
Jhajha P.S. on 05.08.1993 at about 2:00 P.M., is that the father
of the informant i.e., Chano Sao (deceased) along with the
accused Dorik Sao had gone to Tarkeshwar (Chhapadanga),
West Bengal and had taken with him a bundle of ‘Bidi'’. As per
the informant Chano Sao had promised to come back on
04.08.1993 and as such the informant waited for the arrival of
his father that day. As his father failed to come back to the house
on 04.08.1993, he started searching for him. It is alleged that,
during the search, the informant came to know that a dead body
is lying at Bhadaria forest on the road situated downwards to
church. Upon receiving the said information, he reached at the
spot and saw the dead body of his father lying on the road. He
saw that his throat was slit, and there were cut wounds on the
right side of stomach and on the head. The informant further
added that his cousin Karu Sao had told him that the accused
Dorik Sao, on being questioned, had revealed that he (Dorik
Sao) had alighted down at Narganzo station alongwith Chano
Sao i.e. the father of the informant at 9.15 AM on 04.08.1993
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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after which Chano Sao told Dorik Sao to go ahead he (Chano
Sao) will catch up to him on the way. The said Dorik Sao
(accused) later reached to his house at 2:00 PM on 04.08.1993.
The Informant has further revealed in his Fard-Beyan that his
father and Dorik Sao (accused) were working under the same
owner and used to deliver 'Bidi' after making the same. About 1
and 1/2 month prior to this occurrence, the said owner had
deducted Rs. two thousand from the amount standing in the
name of the accused Dorik Sao & had directed to hand over
‘SUKHA’ to Chano Sao (deceased) & not to make ‘BIDI’, in
future, because of this the accused Dorik Sao had a strong belief
that the said direction of the owner was the result of the
complaint made by Chano (deceased) to the owner concerned.
The Informant has further revealed that, earlier he had gone to
the house of Dorik Sao(accused) for demanding of ‘SUKHA’ as
per order of his father but Dorik refused to hand over the
‘SUKHA’ to him. Informant has further revealed that it came to
his knowledge that the son of Anwar Hussain (Mukhia of
Baliaddh) had also gotten off at Narganzo station along with his
father and accused Dorik Sao. The Informant then expressed full
suspicion over accused Dorik Sao for getting his father
murdered after hatching a pre-planned conspiracy. It was further
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asserted by the Informant that the ‘owner’ of his father had not
done full payment for ‘BEEDI’ for the last three times and had
assured his father that he will pay all the dues.
4. On the basis of the aforesaid fardbayan, Jhajha
P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993, dated 05.08.1993, was registered
against the present appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao for the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120(b) of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC).
5. Upon completion of the investigation, the police
submitted charge-sheet no. 65/94 dated 16.05.1994 against the
present appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 120(b) of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC).
6. Thereafter, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
took cognizance of the offence and the case was committed to
the Court of Session on 22.08.1995. Upon commitment, charges
under Sections 302 & 120(b) of IPC were framed against the
appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao. The charges were read
over and explained to them in Hindi, to which they pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
7. It is pertinent to note that one of the accused
Dingan Sao died and proceeding against him was dropped vide
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order dated 11.12.2001 passed by the then 3
rd
Additional Session
Judge, Jamui.
8. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case,
has examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited some
documents on its behalf. List of prosecution witnesses and
exhibits are being mentioned hereunder in tabular form.
List of Prosecution Witnesses:
P. W. No. Name of witness Description
1. Babulal Besra Co-Villager
2. Latru Rai Chowkidar No. 2/3
3. Sitaram Pandit Hostile witness
4. Dr. Arun Kumar SinghDoctor
5. Karu Sao Cousin of informant
6. Ramdeo Sao Informant
7. Parth Sarthy MajumdarI.O. who submitted chargesheet
against Dingan Sao
8. Mukesh Kumar Singh Formal Witness
List of Exhibits on behalf of the prosecution:
Exhibit
No.
Description of the Exhibit Date/attested by
1 Post-Mortem Report 30.04.2002
2 Signature of I.O. on the inquest
report
12.06.2002
3 Signature of witness Karu Sao on
Seizure List
12.06.2002
4 Signature of witness on Fardbayan08.08.2002
4/1 Signature of witness Karu Sao on
Fardbayan
08.08.2002
5 Case Diary 13.11.2002
9. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the
statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure on 13.11.2002. The appellant
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denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him in
the prosecution evidence and claimed innocence.
Submission on behalf of Appellant
10. Learned Amicus Curiae, Ms. Smriti Singh,
appearing on behalf of the appellant, has, at the outset,
submitted that the prosecution’s attempt to rely on the legal
doctrine of “last seen together” completely collapses due to
glaring contradictions in the witness testimonies as PW6, stated
that he was informed by PW5 that the deceased and the
appellant were seen together at the station. At the same time this
claim is fatally contradicted by PW5’s actual court deposition,
in which PW5 is completely silent on this crucial aspect and
utters not a single word to corroborate PW6’s statement.
Consequently, the “last seen theory” remains unproven and
legally baseless. Learned counsel for the Appellant relied upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Venkatesan V/s
State of Tamil Nadu.
11. It was further submitted that the prosecution’s
case is fundamentally crippled by the absolute lack of any
eyewitness to the alleged incident. In the complete absence of
direct evidence, the appellant has been named and implicated
entirely on the basis of mere suspicion and conjecture.
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12. Learned counsel next submitted that the
prosecution has inexplicably failed to produce and examine the
Investigating Officer (I.O.) during the trial. This is a severe,
fatal flaw that causes immense prejudice to the defense. By
withholding the I.O., the defense has been deliberately deprived
of its vital right to cross-examine the officer regarding the
glaring procedural lapses, contradictions, and obvious flaws in
the investigative process.
13. It was further submitted the credibility of the
prosecution's targeted narrative against the appellant is further
diluted by the fact that the co-accused, Dingan Sao, has been
explicitly identified by several witnesses as an individual with a
known criminal nature. This established fact introduces a highly
plausible alternative hypothesis regarding the true perpetrators
of the crime, thereby creating a substantial dent in the
prosecution's specific allegations against the current appellant.
14. It was also been submitted that the prosecution
itself had submitted that there was a dispute pertaining to the
bidi business which was mentioned as the motive behind the
causing of alleged occurrence. However, in a shocking display
of investigative negligence, the police neither investigated nor
examined the owner of the bidi company. Failing to bring the
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central figure of the alleged dispute to the witness stand leaves
the prosecution’s stated motive completely uncorroborated and
hence exposing the superficial and incomplete nature of the
police investigation.
15. Lastly, it was submitted that the prosecution has
failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as
the conviction rests on weak, uncorroborated circumstantial
evidence without forming a complete, unbroken chain pointing
exclusively to guilt, contrary to the settled principle reiterated in
Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State reported in [2021 (5) SCC
626]. The learned Amicus Curiae further relied on Munna Lal
v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 18 SCC 661, wherein the
Apex Court held that evidence must be weighed, not counted—
quality being paramount over quantity—so that a single reliable
witness can sustain a murder conviction, but where testimony
lacks reliability, courts must seek corroboration from reliable
direct or circumstantial evidence as a rule of prudence.
16. Finally, she concluded that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence is fit to be set
aside as the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
Submission on behalf of the Respondents
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17. Per contra, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State, while opposing the
appeal submitted that the learned District court, after
considering all the evidences on record and exhibits has rightly
convicted the appellant as the offences alleged against the
appellant appears to be serious in nature. It is contended that the
prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges beyond
reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that any apparent
contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses are minor and trivial in nature, which do
not affect the core of the prosecution case or the overall
credibility of the witness. Such discrepancies, it is urged, are
liable to be disregarded in the interest of justice.
18. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence do not suffer from
any legal infirmity, or irregularity warranting interference by
this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is
devoid of any merit and fit to be dismissed.
Discussion
19. Heard the parties and perused the materials
available on records as well as lower court records and
proceedings and also taken note of the arguments canvassed by
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
20. It would be apposite to discuss the
oral/documentary evidences as available on record to re
appreciate the evidences for just and proper disposal of the
present appeal.
21. PW–1 (co-villager), in his examination-in-
chief, deposed that the incident had occurred approximately
eight and a half years prior, on a Wednesday around 12:00 noon.
PW1 stated that he was near his hut when the accused, Dorik
Sao, approached him and asked for water to drink. The witness
testified that he provided water to the accused. He further noted
that at the time, Dorik Sao was wearing a pajama and a shirt,
and explicitly pointed out that there were bloodstains on the
garments. After drinking the water, the accused departed from
the location. PW1 additionally testified that on the following
day, a local rumor (hulla) circulated in the area claiming that
Chano Sao had died and that Dorik Sao was responsible for his
murder. Elaborating on the background of the two men, the
witness stated that Dorik Sao and Chano Sao used to do a
business of bidi in Calcutta. He established their usual route by
noting that they would frequently pass right in front of his house
on their way to catch the train at Narganzo station. Finally,
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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during the course of his testimony in court, PW1 formally
identified the accused, Dorik Sao.
22. In his cross-examination by the prosecution,
PW–1 stated that he could not recall the exact date or year of the
incident. He stated that his hut was situated in a deserted dohan
(jungle valley), at about half a mile from his village, with no
other houses nearby. On the day of the incident, he had arrived
at the dohan at 8:00 AM to graze cattle. He testified that his
wife, delivered his food around 11:00 AM and then returned
home. He recalled spending about an hour brushing his teeth
with a twig and eating his meal around 12:00 noon. PW1
testified that while the path near his hut was busy during the
day, making it hard to track everyone who passed, he
specifically remembered the accused, Dorik Sao, stopping by
just long enough to drink water. When PW1 asked where he was
coming from, Dorik replied that he was returning from Calcutta.
Dorik further explained that he had not eaten at Narganzo
station because a theft on the train had left him frightened. PW1
reiterated his earlier statement that Dorik was wearing a bright
white shirt and pajamas and carrying a bag. He clarified that he
did not see any physical injuries on Dorik's body, only scattered
bloodstains on his clothing.
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Regarding the deceased, Chano Sao, PW1
confirmed they were from the same village. Chano had
previously told him about his bidi business in Calcutta and
would occasionally give PW1 bidis to smoke, though they had
no other prior dealings. PW1 noted that the incident occurred on
a Wednesday and that he had seen Chano the previous Tuesday
morning traveling with a person named Goga. He also brought
up a man named Chhita Sao from a neighboring village who
traveled to Calcutta and was notoriously involved in extortion
(Rangdari).
Addressing the aftermath of the crime, PW-1
deposed that he later heard a rumor (hulla) from the local Teli
community that Chano had died and that Dorik had murdered
him. He also mentioned his understanding that Dorik Sao was a
cousin of Ramdev. About a week after the murder, the police
visited his village to question him, and at that time he informed
the Daroga (Sub-Inspector) about the bloodstains he had seen on
Dorik's clothes.
23. Finally, regarding his presence in court, PW1
admitted that he knew two of Chano's four sons, Ramdev and
Majo, and acknowledged that they had brought him to court to
testify and had paid for his food and drink expenses. However,
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he firmly denied the defense's suggestion that he was giving
false testimony out of greed for money or at the instruction of
Ramdev and Majo.
24. PW-2 (chowkidar no. 2/3), in his examination-
in-chief, deposed that the incident occurred eight years prior, on
a Tuesday or Wednesday. He testified that around 12:00 to 1:00,
he received information that a man was lying dead near a
location called Jamuniya Jor. He went to the spot and saw the
corpse. Following this, he proceeded to the police station to
inform the authorities and subsequently returned to the location
of the body. He noted that at the time of initial discovery, it was
not known whose corpse it was and he later came to know that
the body belonged to Chano Sao. He further testified that the
body was then taken to the Police Station from where it was sent
to Jamui for conducting Post-mortem. PW- 2 also stated that he
saw Ramdeo Sao (PW-6) near the dead body.
25. In his cross-examination PW-2 provided more
precise details regarding the timeline, geography of the area etc.,
and deposed that he first heard the hulla about the dead body
from villagers heading towards the jungle around 10:00 AM. He
arrived at the scene by 10:30 AM and found the corpse lying in
the middle of a north-south road, positioned east-to-west with
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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the head facing west and the feet facing east. He specifically
noted the deceased's clothing i.e., a plain colored dhoti and plain
colored shirt and confirmed there was no luggage near the body.
Furthermore, he testified that upon his initial arrival at 10:30
AM, contrary to his examination-in-chief, no one else was
present near the corpse. He then testified that he traveled on foot
and reached the police station at 11:45 AM. He estimated the
police station to be about 4 to 4.5 kos away from the corpse, he
stated that he stayed at the Police Station for about half an hour
and then came back with the Sub-Inspector (daroga ji). He
clarified that when he first visited the spot where the body was
he did not know to whom the body belonged to and it was
during the second visit that he got to know that it was Chano
Sao. He noted that upon their arrival, Ramdeo Sao was the only
person present near the body. PW-2 stated that he did not have
any conversation with Ramdeo Sao at that time.
26. PW-3, in his examination-in-chief, deposed
that, he had a tea and paan shop in Narganzo. People pass by
this very shop while coming and going to the Narganzo station.
He did not know anything about the incident. The witness was
declared hostile at the request of the prosecution.
27. In his cross-examination, PW-3 deposed that
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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the Sub-Inspector (Daroga ji) had not interrogated him. He
denied having stated that the previous day he was at his tea shop
near the Narganzo station. He further denied stating that Chano
Sao and others take bidis to West Bengal and travel together.
However, he stated that on the previous day he did not see either
of them near his shop, nor did either of them come near his
shop, and that that morning, he heard a commotion that a man's
dead body was lying on the road in the Bhadauria jungle. He
added that his son, Baalmukund Pandit, runs the tea and paan
shop and that he himself has never run the said shop.
28. PW-4, the Medical Officer who had conducted
the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased,
Chano Sao, in line with the case of the prosecution proved the
post-mortem report, asserting that the same was in his
handwriting and bore his signature. The post-mortem report was
accordingly marked as Exhibit-1. According to PW-4, on August
6, 1993, while being posted as a Civil Assistant Surgeon
(C.A.S.) at the Sub-divisional Hospital, Jamui, he conducted the
post-mortem examination on the body of Chano Sao, son of the
late Kalar Sao, resident of Village Dario, Police Station Jhajha,
District Jamui, aged about 55 years. The dead body was
identified and produced before him by Constable No. 20
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Mundrika Singh, Chaukidar 2/3 Latru Rai, and Ramdeo Sao.
PW-4 recorded his findings as follows:: —
(i) Decomposition supervened and maggots crawling
all over, skin peeled off from different parts of body & whole
body swollen.
(ii)Incised wound 8"x3"x deep to cervical vertebra,
cutting the trachea completely, muscles, vessels and nerves in
the anterior compartment of neck and haematoma on the floor of
wound.
(iii)Incised wound 4"x½"x deep to muscles with
haematoma in the floor of wound over right-lower chest. On
dissection no any other injury was found.
PW-4 opined that the aforementioned injuries were
ante-mortem in nature, caused by a sharp-cutting weapon, and
that death was instantaneous due to the severing of the windpipe
and the major vessels of the neck. This witness further opined
that the time elapsed since death prior to the post-mortem
examination was between 48 and 72 hours.
29. In his cross-examination PW-4, stated that apart
from the aforesaid injuries he did not find any other injuries on
the body of the deceased. He further deposed that he had not
mentioned anything about the clothes worn by the deceased in
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the Post-mortem report and that during the summer season,
maggots begin to appear after 48 hours, and the decomposition
process typically starts after 36 hours. He added that
decomposition begins later in the winter season and earlier in
the summer season. Lastly, he deposed that he had not
mentioned any identification mark of the dead body but had
mentioned its gray hair.
30. PW-5 (nephew of the deceased), in his
examination-in-chief, deposed that the incident had occurred
approximately seven years prior to his deposition, when a
rumour (hulla) had spread in the village that Chano Sao had
been murdered, and it was also being said that the accused
Dorik Sao, along with Dingan Sao, had killed him. He testified
that upon learning that a dead body had been thrown near
Jamunia Jor, he went to the spot and found the said body to be
that of Chano Sao, with the head lying towards the south and the
feet towards the north. He noticed an incised injury on the right
side of the ribcage caused by a sharp-edged weapon, an incised
wound on the throat, and a bone protruding on the right side of
the forehead.
31. PW-5 further deposed that the Sub-Inspector
(Daroga ji), who had reached the spot, prepared the inquest
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report of the dead body before him and Arjun Sao, upon which
he put his signature, the Sub-Inspector also seized blood-
stained, gravelly soil from the spot and prepared a seizure list,
which likewise bore his signature. PW-5 attributed the murder
of Chano Sao to the accused Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao, stating
that it arose out of a dispute concerning dry bidi. He added that
the co-accused, Dingan Sao, had since died, and he further
identified the accused, Dorik Sao, present in court.
32. In his cross-examination, PW-5 stated that he
could not recollect the exact date, month, or year of the
occurrence. He deposed that the deceased, Chano Sao, was his
uncle, and that the informant, Ramdeo Sao, was his brother. He
admitted that he could not recall from whom he first heard that a
dead body was lying at Jamunia Jor, though he stated that a
commotion (hulla) had spread throughout the village; he was
also unable to state who had named Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao
as the assailants, or on which day he came to hear of the
incident. He testified that he was at home when he heard the
commotion, though he could not specify the time, and that he
thereafter proceeded to Jamunia Jor along with several other
villagers. PW-5 admitted that he was illiterate and knew only
how to sign his name; he stated that he had not read the inquest
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report or the seizure list prepared by the Daroga ji, but had
signed both documents on the latter's instruction, without asking
that their contents be read out to him.
33. PW-5 further deposed that a dispute had been
going on between the deceased and the accused for several days
prior to the occurrence, though he was unable to state whose
bidis the deceased and the accused used to sell. He admitted that
Dingan Sao was locally reputed to be a man of
criminal/notorious disposition, and stated that he was unaware
whether Dingan Sao himself had been murdered or what had
befallen him. Lastly, PW-5 denied the suggestion put to him that
he had deposed falsely merely by virtue of being the nephew of
the deceased and the brother of the informant.
34. PW-6 (son of the deceased), in his examination-
in-chief, deposed that on 3.8.1993, the deceased, Chano Sao,
had gone to Tarkeshwar Chapa-danga carrying bidis,
accompanied by the accused, Dorik Sao, and that the two had
boarded the train together at Narganjo station. He stated that his
father had told him he would return the following day but failed
to do so. On the deceased failing to return by 04.08.1993, PW-6
deposed that he began searching for him, and that while
proceeding towards the Uppertola of village Dario, an old man
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informed him that a dead body was lying in the Bhadwaria
jungle, to the south of the church. Upon receiving this
information, he reached the spot near the church and found the
dead body to be that of his father, with the neck cut and injuries
on the right side of the stomach and on the head. He deposed
that his cousin, Karu Sao, was also present at the spot, and that
Karu Sao informed him that he had seen the deceased in the
company of the accused, Dorik Sao, at about 9:15 a.m. at the
station on 4.8.1993. He further deposed that Karu Sao had gone
to the house of the accused and inquired about the deceased,
whereupon the accused had stated that the deceased would
return.
35. PW-6 further deposed that the deceased and the
accused used to get bidis made and deliver them to the same
company (master). He stated that about a month prior to the
occurrence, the deceased and the accused had gone to the master
along with the bidis so prepared, where the bidis made by the
accused were found not to be up to the mark, resulting in a
reduction of their value; the master thereupon directed the
accused to hand over the 'sukha' (raw material) to the deceased
and directed the accused to discontinue the bidi work. PW-6
deposed that when he went to collect the 'sukha' from the
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accused, the accused, in an angry tone, stated that his dues had
been cut on account of the deceased, and that he causes harm to
those who act against his interest. PW-6 further deposed that the
accused was under the impression that the deceased had lodged
a complaint against him, causing him financial loss. He stated,
vide paragraph 11 of his deposition, that he is confident that the
accused, Dorik Sao, has murdered his father, Chano Sao, or has
got him murdered.
36. PW-6, in his cross-examination, deposed that
03.08.1993 was a Monday. He stated that he was unable to name
the person for whom his father used to make bidis at
Chapadanga, nor could he state the name of the company. He
admitted that he had never gone to the bidi company owner
prior to the occurrence, and that he went there only about two
months after the occurrence, on which occasion too he did not
ask the name of the company or its owner. He stated that the
'sukha' (raw material) used to be supplied by the master, while
all the labour was performed by his father. He stated that he
could not say whether the company's licence stood in his father's
name, adding that his father alone knew all such particulars and
that he himself had no knowledge thereof. He was unable to
state the date on which his father had commenced the bidi
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business, though he stated that his father had been engaged in
the trade for the preceding five to six years. He admitted that his
father and the accused, Dorik Sao, used to deliver bidis at
Chapadanga, but stated that he could not name any other
persons who did so along with them. He admitted that there was
no document relating to his father's bidi business, nor any
document evidencing that his father used to deliver bidis at
Chapadanga. He deposed that he waited for his father till the
night of Tuesday (4.8.1993), and that no information was
received regarding his father on that day. He admitted that Karu
Sao had met his father at Narganjo station on Tuesday, but
stated that he himself had no conversation with Karu Sao at that
time. He stated that when his father did not return on Tuesday,
he made efforts to trace him on Wednesday, whereupon he learnt
that a dead body was lying [in the jungle]. He deposed that he
left home at about 8:00-8:30 a.m. on Wednesday to search for
his father, and went first to Uppertola, where a passer-by told
him that a dead body was lying in the jungle; he stated that he
could not name the said passer-by. He testified that he thereafter
proceeded directly to the Bhadwariya jungle, and that he did not
meet anyone on the way. He deposed that upon reaching the
spot, no one was present there except the dead body of his
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
23/44
father; he stated that he wept there for about ten minutes,
following which some villagers, including Karu Sao, arrived,
and that he thereupon lost consciousness and subsequently
regained it. He stated that although a number of persons had
gathered at the spot, he was unable to name them, as he was in a
state of shock. He deposed that the villagers remained at the
spot for about two to two-and-a-half hours, following which the
chaukidar (village watchman) arrived and reported the matter to
the police station. He stated that he had informed both the
villagers and the Investigating Officer (Daroga ji) as to who had
killed his father and why. With regard to the position of the
body, PW-6 stated that it was lying to the south of the road, at a
distance of about two to three hands (spans), in a supine
position, with the head towards the south. He stated that apart
from the body, he saw blood at the spot and his father's slippers,
but nothing else. He deposed that the chaukidar arrived first, at
about 12:00-1:00 p.m. (though he clarified that he had no watch
with him at the time); that he disclosed nothing to the chaukidar
until he identified the body as that of his father and gave his
own name, whereupon the chaukidar stated that the matter
would have to be reported to the police station. He stated that
the chaukidar remained at the spot for about half an hour before
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
24/44
proceeding to Jhajha, while the villagers stayed on at the spot.
He stated that the place where the body was found was situated
at a distance of five to seven kilometres from the Jhajha police
station, and that the Investigating Officer arrived at the spot
within about half an hour of the chaukidar's departure.
37. PW-6 further deposed that the Investigating
Officer recorded his statement, and also examined Karu Sao and
Rupesh Yadav, though he could not recollect who else had been
examined or whose statements had been recorded, nor could he
state whose signatures, other than his own, had been obtained by
the Investigating Officer. He stated that the Investigating Officer
brought the dead body to Jamui at about 8:00-9:00 p.m., and
that besides himself, the chaukidar and his brother, Balram,
among others, had accompanied the body. He deposed that the
post-mortem examination was conducted at about 8:30-9:00. He
further deposed that the Investigating Officer visited his house
two to three days thereafter and questioned him alone. He stated
that he subsequently had conversations with the villagers,
initially at his own house, though he clarified that he had not
gone from door to door in the village to inform people of the
occurrence; he admitted that no villager, even upon visiting his
house, disclosed anything about the occurrence to him, nor did
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any person of the locality provide any information in that
regard. He stated that his village falls within Vorna Panchayat,
whose Mukhiya (village head) had died at the relevant time.
PW-6 admitted that the chaukidar had informed him that the co-
accused, Dingan Sao, upon being apprehended, had admitted
that he, along with Dorik Sao, had committed the murder. He
denied the suggestion that he had implicated Dingan Sao and
Dorik Sao on the basis of the chaukidar's statement, asserting
that he had already lodged the case prior thereto. He admitted
that Dingan Sao was a man of criminal disposition, and stated
that he could not say whether Dingan Sao himself had been
murdered. He was unable to recollect the exact date on which he
had gone to collect the 'sukha', though he stated that it was about
one-and-a-half months prior to the occurrence. Lastly, PW-6
denied the suggestion that he had given false testimony and had
falsely implicated the innocent accused, Dorik Sao.
38. PW-7, in his examination-in-chief, stated that
on 30.07.1994, he was posted at Jhajha Police Station and, on
that date, he took over the investigation of the present case.
Prior to him, the investigation had been conducted by Sri B. H.
Baitha, the previous Investigating Officer, who had already
submitted a charge-sheet against the accused. He stated that
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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accused Dingan Sah had been arrested by the previous
Investigating Officer and forwarded to jail. PW-7 further stated
that, on the basis of the investigation conducted by the previous
Investigating Officer, he verified the case against accused
Dingan Sah by examining other witnesses. Those witnesses
supported the statements recorded during the earlier
investigation. He also recorded the statements of the informant,
Balram Shah, Rajendra Shah, and other witnesses. After
considering the earlier investigation, the statements recorded by
him, the materials collected during the investigation, and the
directions of his superior police officer, PW-7 submitted a
charge-sheet against accused Dingan Sah.
39. In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that he
had not made any inquiry from the bidi company in relation to
the deceased, Chando Sah. Although the deceased was engaged
in the manufacture of bidis, PW-7 had not investigated whether
the deceased possessed any licence or examined any other
matter connected with the manufacture of bidis. He further
admitted that he had not investigated the allegation that the
deceased had loaded bidis onto a train at Narganzo Railway
Station and transported them by rail. PW-7 further stated that
the previous Investigating Officer had also not conducted any
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
27/44
investigation regarding the accused. He stated that Balram Shah
had informed him that he believed accused Dingan Sah had a
hand in the murder of his father. Other witnesses had also stated
that accused Dingan Sah was a person of antisocial character.
PW-7 stated that he had mentioned the criminal antecedents of
accused Dingan Sah in paragraph 88 of the case diary.
According to him, cases including Jhajha P.S. Case No. 11 of
1983 and Jhajha P.S. Case No. 399 of 1984 had been registered
against the accused. He denied the suggestion that he had not
conducted the investigation fairly and impartially or that he had
submitted a false charge-sheet against accused Dingan Sah.
40. PW-8 in his Examination-in-Chief stated that
the case diary relating to Jhajha P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993 was
in the handwriting of Ram Prasad Singh, who was the
Investigating Officer of the said case from Paragraphs 1 to 58
and Paragraphs 59 to 84 of the case diary were in the
handwriting of Sri B. H. Baitha, which he identified. He also
stated that both of the aforesaid police officers had retired from
service. The case diary was marked as Exhibit-5.
41. In cross-examination, PW-8 stated that he had
seen both of the aforesaid officers writing and reading and was,
therefore, able to identify their handwriting. He further stated
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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that the case diary had not been written in his presence.
Conclusion
42. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
and given our careful consideration to the entire body of oral
and documentary evidence discussed hereinabove, as also the
rival submissions canvassed on behalf of the Appellant and the
State. Before proceeding to re-appreciate the evidence, it is
necessary to isolate what is not seriously in dispute on this
record which is the fact that Chano Sao met a homicidal death,
and that admittedly there is no eyewitness to the actual
commission of the offence. The prosecution's case, as the
learned Trial Court itself acknowledged, rests entirely on a chain
of circumstances. The real and only question for determination,
therefore, is whether that chain is complete and conclusive
enough to rule out any reasonable possibility of the Appellant
Dorik Sao's innocence, and to point clearly to his guilt alone. It
is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that a conviction
for murder under Section 302 of IPC on circumstantial evidence
requires an unbroken, complete chain of circumstances that
points only to the guilt of the accused and excludes any
possibility of innocence.
The five golden principles (Panchsheel of proof)
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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established by the Supreme Court of India, the prosecution must
satisfy these conditions:
(i) Fully established facts, (ii) Consistent with guilt,
(iii) Complete chain, (iv) Exclude innocence (v) Complete proof
of crime.
It is pertinent to mention that there are certain
common links in the chain which need to be established. These
links are: (i) Last seen theory, (ii) Motive, (iii) Recovery of
weapons or property (iv) Medical and forensic evidence, (v)
Conduct of the accused.
43. The first and, in our view, the most fatal
infirmity in the prosecution's chain concerns the “last seen
together” circumstance. PW6 (Ramdeo Sao, the informant and
son of the deceased) deposed that he learnt from his cousin,
Karu Sao (PW5), that the deceased and the accused Dorik Sao
had been seen together at Narganzo station at about 9:15 a.m. on
04.08.1993. However, PW5, when independently examined,
made no such statement; his testimony, as it stands on record,
speaks only of a village rumour (“hulla”) that the deceased had
been murdered by the accused, and is completely silent on
having personally seen the two men together at the station. What
was relied upon by the Trial Court as “last seen together”
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
30/44
evidence is thus, at its highest, hearsay upon hearsay, a
circumstance neither PW5 nor PW6 could speak to from
personal knowledge, and one that consequently collapses for
want of any direct source.
44. Even assuming the “last seen” circumstance
had been proved in its strongest, first-hand form, it is well
settled that this circumstance, by itself, is a weak piece of
evidence incapable of sustaining a conviction. In Kanhaiya Lal
v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 21 held that,
“Where the theory of last seen together is
the singular piece of circumstantial evidence
relied upon, “the conviction of the appellant
cannot be maintained merely on suspicion,
however strong it may be, or on his
conduct.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
This position has been reiterated still further in
Munu Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2026 INSC
780, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside a
conviction founded solely on last-seen testimony, held in terms
that “there can be no conviction merely on the basis of the last-
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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seen theory without any other incriminating circumstance, and
that testimony found not to inspire confidence cannot found a
conviction even where some of the witnesses speaking to it are
themselves less than wholly reliable”.
Applying this line of authority to the present case,
the "last seen" theory, in this case, can be summarized as an
attempt to prove that the deceased was alive in the company of
the Appellant shortly before the death. However, "last seen"
alone is often an unsafe basis for conviction without
corroborating evidence, and even here, the testimony relied
upon is not first-hand but hearsay, being what PW6 claims PW5
told him — a claim which PW5's own deposition does not
support. The "last seen theory" must therefore be held wholly
unproved, and incapable of forming any link, let alone the
principal one, in the chain against the Appellant.
45. The second infirmity concerns the nature of
PW6's testimony. PW6 is not an independent witness rather he
is the deceased’s own son, and in his deposition he admitted he
was "confident" that the Appellant has murdered his father,
Chano Sao, or has got him murdered. It is his account alone
which is uncorroborated by anyone with independent, first-hand
knowledge and that supplies both the motive theory (the dispute
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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over the Rs. 2,000 deduction and the 'sukha') and the alleged
extra-judicial admission of PW-6 attributed to the Appellant. It
is important to note here that the law requires that such a related
witness's testimony be approached with greater caution. In
Esakkimuthu v. State represented by the inspector of police,
reported in 2025 INSC 880, the Supreme Court granted acquittal
after holding that “where the key witnesses are the son and wife
of the deceased, being “very well-interested witnesses in the
case,” their testimonies “shall have to be treated with great
caution” and must meet a stricter standard of proof”.
Applying the same standard to PW6, his testimony find no
independent corroboration whatsoever; whether as to the alleged
last seen, the motive, or the alleged extra-judicial admission and
hence, the absence of corroborating material is what renders his
testimony unsafe and cannot completely form the basis of
conviction.
46. The third infirmity, which compounds the two
discussed above, is the prosecution's failure to examine the
Investigating Officer who initiated the investigation and
submitted the chargesheet. The non-examination of the I.O. is
not a mere technical omission; it has caused serious and
demonstrable prejudice to the defence. The Appellant has
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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thereby been deprived of the valuable right to confront the I.O.
with the material contradictions between the depositions of PW5
and PW6 on the “last seen” aspect, to test the manner in which
the investigation into the alleged motive was (or was not)
conducted, and to probe the circumstances in which the seizure
and inquest proceedings were carried out.
47. The fourth infirmity concerns the alleged
motive. The prosecution's own case is that the motive for the
murder lay in a business dispute over 'bidi', specifically, the
deduction of Rs. 2,000 from the accused's dues and the master's
direction to hand over 'sukha' to the deceased. It is quite strange
that the police neither investigated nor examined the owner of
the bidi company, who alone could have given the true picture
of the dispute. It is well settled that while motive assumes real
importance in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, it alone
cannot sustain a criminal conviction and must be well
corroborated by independent, concrete evidence linking the
accused to the crime.
In case of Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 626, the Supreme
Court held that “motive plays an important link to complete the
chain of circumstances” in a case of circumstantial evidence,
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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and went on to acquit the accused therein precisely because the
alleged motive remained unproved. Further, in the case of
Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported
in (2020) 10 SCC 166, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
follows;
“24. Now so far as the submission on
behalf of the accused that in the present case the
prosecution has failed to establish and prove the
motive and therefore the accused deserves
acquittal is concerned, it is true that the absence of
proving the motive cannot be a ground to reject the
prosecution case. It is also true and as held by this
Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar
1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 that if motive is proved that
would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial
evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a
ground to reject the prosecution case. However, at
the same time, as observed by this Court in Babu
[Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189],
absence of motive in a case depending on
circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in
favour of the accused. In paras 25 and 26, it is
observed and held as under: [Babu v. State of
Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189], SCC pp. 200-01)”
“25. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal,
(2008) 16 SCC 73, this Court examined the
importance of motive in cases of circumstantial
evidence and observed: (SCC pp. 87-88, paras 38-
39)”
“38. … the motive is a thing which is
primarily known to the accused themselves and it is
not possible for the prosecution to explain what
actually promoted or excited them to commit the
particular crime.”
The motive may be considered as a
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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circumstance which is relevant for assessing the
evidence but if the evidence is clear and
unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt
of the accused, the same is not weakened even if
the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled
law that the motive loses all its importance in a
case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is
available, because even if there may be a very
strong motive for the accused persons to commit a
particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the
evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the
same way, even if there may not be an apparent
motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is
clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of
motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.'
This Court has also held that the
absence of motive in a case depending on
circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in
favour of the accused. (Vide Pannayar v. State of
T.N., (2009) 9 SCC 152."
(Emphasis Supplied)
The same infirmity afflicts the present case: the
prosecution's stated motive rests entirely on the uncorroborated
word of a related witness (PW6), and the one person capable of
giving true picture was never examined or brought to the
witness box. This lapse can be viewed as a weakness in the
prosecution’s proof.
48. It is also important to note the distinction the
Supreme Court has drawn between “normal discrepancies” and
“material discrepancies” in the testimony of a witness — a
distinction that determines whether a contradiction merely
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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reflects the ordinary fallibility of human memory or instead
strikes at the credibility of the witness's account. Not every
contradiction is fatal; what matters is whether the discrepancy
touches the core of the witness's version or is merely incidental
to it. On perusal of the deposition of PW-2, it is quite clear that
at least one contradiction goes well beyond what can be
classified as normal or natural, namely, the difference between
the timing of his coming to know of the body as stated in his
examination-in-chief (where he spoke of receiving the
information at around 12:00 to 1:00 p.m.) and as stated in his
cross-examination (where he deposed to first hearing the “hulla”
at around 10:00 a.m. and reaching the spot by 10:30 a.m.).
49. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v.
Kalki, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 752, has held that discrepancies
arising from normal errors of observation, normal errors of
memory due to lapse of time, and mental disposition such as
shock at the time of the occurrence are to be treated as natural
and do not affect credibility, but drew a clear line for
discrepancies that are not normal and not expected of a normal
person. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“Material discrepancies are those which are not
normal, and not expected of a normal person. In
the depositions of witnesses there are always some
normal discrepancies however honest and truthful
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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the witnesses may be. These discrepancies are due
to normal errors of observation, normal errors of
memory due to lapse of time, due to mental
disposition such as shock and horror at the time of
the occurrence, and the like.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
The contradiction in PW-2's account of the timing
of the discovery of the body does not appear to be a normal
discrepancies attributable to lapse of memory, and it therefore
falls outside the protective umbrella carved out in Kalki. This
contradiction is, in our view, amounts to material discrepancies,
sufficient to cast serious doubt on the reliability of PW-2's
account of the discovery of the body, and his testimony on this
aspect cannot be accepted without independent corroboration —
corroboration which, for the reasons already discussed, is
conspicuously absent from this record.
50. Further, It is well settled that Indian law does
not treat circumstantial evidence as inherently inferior to direct
testimony, but it does insist on a considerably stricter standard
where there is no eyewitness to the act itself. The foundational
test was laid down by the Supreme Court in Hanumant v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1952 SCR 1091, where it was
held that “the circumstances from which guilt is sought to be
inferred must be fully established, and must form “a chain of
evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused”,
such that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused and none other.” This test was crystallised
into the five-fold “Panchsheel” principles in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984)
4 SCC 116, which require, among other things, that the
circumstances relied upon “must be” and not merely “may be”
established, that they be consistent only with the guilt of the
accused, and that they exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis.
51. Measured against this standard, the chain relied
upon by the learned Trial Court falls apart at more than one link.
The “last seen” circumstance is unproved, being hearsay
contradicted by its own purported source. The motive is
unproved, the one independent witness capable of establishing it
having never been examined. The star witness, PW6, is a related
witness whose uncorroborated account cannot by itself close
these gaps, and the non-examination of the I.O. has foreclosed
the defense’s ability to test the investigation itself. What remains
principally is the recovery of blood-stained clothing spoken to
by PW1, is at best, suggestive and falls well short of the
“conclusive nature and tendency” that the Panchsheel test
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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demands. As held in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, reported
in (2006) 12 SCC 254, suspicion, however strong, cannot take
the place of proof — a caution that applies with particular force
where, as here, there is no eyewitness at all to anchor the case.
52. The bloodstain evidence spoken to by PW1
requires separate mention, as it is the only material circumstance
that survives independently of PW6. PW1 deposed to have seen
bloodstains on the Appellant's clothes on the day of the
occurrence, but this identification is that of a lay witness, made
visually, with no seizure of the garments and no forensic or
serological examination of any kind connecting the stains to the
deceased. Even where a weapon or article is seized and
forensically tested, the Supreme Court has held that a positive
finding is not, by itself, sufficient to sustain a murder
conviction. In Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in
(2024) 3 SCC 481, it was held that “mere recovery of a blood-
stained weapon even bearing the same blood group as that of
the victim is not enough to sustain a conviction for murder”,
hence a lay witness’s account without seizure and examination
of disputed articles can be fatal to the prosecution if the
remaining evidence lacks strong corroboration or independent
reliability.
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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53. Because of the nature of evidence, which is
available on record, the least, which ought to have been done by
the learned Trial Court, was to accord the benefit of reasonable
doubt to the appellant inasmuch as I am clearly of the view that
in the light of the evidence on record, which I have discussed
above, it was not proper to convict the appellant. The benefit of
such a situation ought to have been given to the appellant. The
Infirmities in the Prosecution’s Case which lead to Reasonable
Doubt are flaws that fail to meet the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard. “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the ultimate
standard of proof in the legal system. It means that the
prosecution must prove guilt conclusively, such that no
reasonable or rational person could arrive at another explanation
based on the evidence.
54. The ultimate benchmark of “beyond a
reasonable doubt” upholds the presumption of innocence in the
legal system that we follow. The presumption of innocence is
the absolute bedrock of a fair criminal justice system. It protects
individuals from wrongful, arbitrary imprisonment by requiring
the State to bear the burden of proof and to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than placing the burden on
the accused to prove his innocence. It is pertinent to discuss here
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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the landmark judgment of Kali Ram v. State of Himachal
Pradesh, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 808, which is a cornerstone
of Indian criminal jurisprudence for its emphasis on the
‘presumption of innocence’ and ‘the strict standard of proof in
criminal trials’, and hence one of the most celebrated judgments
on the ‘benefit of doubt’ and the ‘presumption of innocence’ in
Indian legal history. The said judgment was rendered by a three-
Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein, in para 25, the
Court held that:
“Another golden thread which runs through the
web of the administration of justice in criminal
cases is that if two views are possible on the
evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,
the view which is favourable to the accused should
be adopted. This principle has a special relevance
in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought
to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule
has accordingly been laid down that unless the
evidence adduced in the case is consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court
should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of
the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case
the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding
the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the
benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt
regarding the guilt of the accused should be
reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is
either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching
a firm conclusion or so timid that is hesitant and
afraid to take things to their natural consequences.
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does
not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to
surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As
mentioned by us recently in the case of State of
Punjab v. Jagir Singh 1974 3 SCC 227 a criminal
trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to
give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It
concerns itself with the question as to whether the
accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the
offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event
in real life and is the product of interplay of
different human emotions. In arriving at the
conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged
with the commission of a crime, the Court has to
judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities,
its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses.
Every case in the final analysis would have to
depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of
every reasonable doubt should be given to the
accused, the Courts should not at the same time
reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on
grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of
conjectures”.
(Emphasis Supplied)
55. Having examined the evidence as a whole, this
Court finds that the prosecution case suffers from a number of
defects, each significant in itself and, when taken together, fatal
to the conviction: (i) the "last seen together" circumstance rests
not on direct testimony but on hearsay attributed by PW6 to
PW5, a claim which PW5's own deposition does not bear out;
(ii) PW6 — the sole substantive witness, whose account alone
supplies both the motive theory and the alleged extra-judicial
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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admission — is a related witness, being the deceased's own son,
and his assertions find no independent corroboration
whatsoever; (iii) the testimony of PW-2 discloses a material and
unexplained discrepancy as to the timing of the discovery of the
body (iv) neither the Investigating Officer who conducted the
investigation nor the owner of the bidi company i.e., the one
person capable of independently verifying the alleged motive —
has been examined, without any explanation whatsoever; and
(v) the sole surviving physical circumstance, the blood-stained
clothing spoken to by PW1, rests on nothing more than a lay
witness's visual identification, unsupported by any forensic or
serological report connecting the stains to the deceased.
56. In the facts and attending circumstances of the
present case, the appellants ought to have been accorded benefit
of reasonable doubt in as much as the prosecution had failed, in
the light of the discussion of the evidence on record, to bring
home the charges against the appellant beyond all reasonable
doubt.
57. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this
appeal is allowed. The impugned conviction of the appellant and
the sentence passed against him by the judgment and order,
under appeals are hereby set aside. The Appellants are not found
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026
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guilty of the offence, which they stand convicted of, and they
are hereby acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt.
58. Since, the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds
are hereby cancelled and his sureties shall stand discharged.
59. I put on record words of appreciation for the
able assistance rendered by Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus
Curiae, to this Court in arriving at the proper conclusion for
deciding the instant appeal. We direct the High Court Legal
Services Authority to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to Ms.
Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae, for service rendered by
her.
60. The Registry shall, forthwith, send a copy of
this Judgment and order to the learned Trial Court along with
the Lower Court’s Records.
Manish Kumar
(Alok Kumar, J.)
Anil Kumar Sinha, J.:- I agree
(Anil Kumar Sinha, J.)
AFR/NAFR A .F. R.
CAV DATE 07.07.2026
Uploading Date01.09.2026
Transmission Date01.09.2026
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