Patna High Court, Criminal Appeal, murder, circumstantial evidence, last seen theory, motive, reasonable doubt, acquittal, Dorik Sao, State of Bihar
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Dorik Sao Vs. The State of Bihar

  Patna High Court CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.266 of 2004
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant, Dorik Sao, was convicted for the murder of Chano Sao, with whom he shared a bidi business. Chano Sao went with Dorik Sao to ...

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Document Text Version

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.266 of 2004

Against the Judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated

09.02.2004 and 10.02.2004, respectively, passed by Additional District &

Sessions Judge, Fast-Track Court No. II, Jamui, in Sessions Trial No. 434 of

1995 (G.R. Case No. 929 of 1993), arising out of JhaJha P.S. Case No. 121 of

1993.

=======================================================

Dorik Sao, son of Late Prabhu Sao, Resident of village - Dumarmoh, P.S.

Jhajha, District – Jamui.

... ... Appellant

Versus

The State of Bihar

... ... Respondent

======================================================

Appearance :

For the Appellant/s: Ms. Smriti Singh, Amicus Curiae

For the Respondent/s: Mr. Bipin Kumar, A.P.P.

======================================================

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR SINHA

and

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR

C.A.V JUDGMENT

(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR)

Date : 01-09-2026

Heard Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae for

the Appellant and Mr. Bipin Kumar, learned counsel for the

State.

2. The present appeal has been preferred against the

Judgment of Conviction dated 09.02.2004 and Order of

Sentence dated 10.02.2004 passed by the learned Additional

District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. II, Jamui, in

Sessions Trial No. 434 of 1995 arising out of Jhajha P.S. Case

No. 121 of 1993, whereby the appellant was convicted for the

offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026

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and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

3. The prosecution case, as unfolded in the

fardbayan of the informant, Ramdeo Sao, son of Late Chano

Sao, recorded at Bhadaria (Jamuni Jore) Road by S.I. B. Roy of

Jhajha P.S. on 05.08.1993 at about 2:00 P.M., is that the father

of the informant i.e., Chano Sao (deceased) along with the

accused Dorik Sao had gone to Tarkeshwar (Chhapadanga),

West Bengal and had taken with him a bundle of ‘Bidi'’. As per

the informant Chano Sao had promised to come back on

04.08.1993 and as such the informant waited for the arrival of

his father that day. As his father failed to come back to the house

on 04.08.1993, he started searching for him. It is alleged that,

during the search, the informant came to know that a dead body

is lying at Bhadaria forest on the road situated downwards to

church. Upon receiving the said information, he reached at the

spot and saw the dead body of his father lying on the road. He

saw that his throat was slit, and there were cut wounds on the

right side of stomach and on the head. The informant further

added that his cousin Karu Sao had told him that the accused

Dorik Sao, on being questioned, had revealed that he (Dorik

Sao) had alighted down at Narganzo station alongwith Chano

Sao i.e. the father of the informant at 9.15 AM on 04.08.1993

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after which Chano Sao told Dorik Sao to go ahead he (Chano

Sao) will catch up to him on the way. The said Dorik Sao

(accused) later reached to his house at 2:00 PM on 04.08.1993.

The Informant has further revealed in his Fard-Beyan that his

father and Dorik Sao (accused) were working under the same

owner and used to deliver 'Bidi' after making the same. About 1

and 1/2 month prior to this occurrence, the said owner had

deducted Rs. two thousand from the amount standing in the

name of the accused Dorik Sao & had directed to hand over

‘SUKHA’ to Chano Sao (deceased) & not to make ‘BIDI’, in

future, because of this the accused Dorik Sao had a strong belief

that the said direction of the owner was the result of the

complaint made by Chano (deceased) to the owner concerned.

The Informant has further revealed that, earlier he had gone to

the house of Dorik Sao(accused) for demanding of ‘SUKHA’ as

per order of his father but Dorik refused to hand over the

‘SUKHA’ to him. Informant has further revealed that it came to

his knowledge that the son of Anwar Hussain (Mukhia of

Baliaddh) had also gotten off at Narganzo station along with his

father and accused Dorik Sao. The Informant then expressed full

suspicion over accused Dorik Sao for getting his father

murdered after hatching a pre-planned conspiracy. It was further

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asserted by the Informant that the ‘owner’ of his father had not

done full payment for ‘BEEDI’ for the last three times and had

assured his father that he will pay all the dues.

4. On the basis of the aforesaid fardbayan, Jhajha

P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993, dated 05.08.1993, was registered

against the present appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao for the

offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120(b) of the Indian

Penal Code (IPC).

5. Upon completion of the investigation, the police

submitted charge-sheet no. 65/94 dated 16.05.1994 against the

present appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao for the offences

punishable under Sections 302 and 120(b) of the Indian Penal

Code (IPC).

6. Thereafter, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate

took cognizance of the offence and the case was committed to

the Court of Session on 22.08.1995. Upon commitment, charges

under Sections 302 & 120(b) of IPC were framed against the

appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao. The charges were read

over and explained to them in Hindi, to which they pleaded not

guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. It is pertinent to note that one of the accused

Dingan Sao died and proceeding against him was dropped vide

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order dated 11.12.2001 passed by the then 3

rd

Additional Session

Judge, Jamui.

8. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case,

has examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited some

documents on its behalf. List of prosecution witnesses and

exhibits are being mentioned hereunder in tabular form.

List of Prosecution Witnesses:

P. W. No. Name of witness Description

1. Babulal Besra Co-Villager

2. Latru Rai Chowkidar No. 2/3

3. Sitaram Pandit Hostile witness

4. Dr. Arun Kumar SinghDoctor

5. Karu Sao Cousin of informant

6. Ramdeo Sao Informant

7. Parth Sarthy MajumdarI.O. who submitted chargesheet

against Dingan Sao

8. Mukesh Kumar Singh Formal Witness

List of Exhibits on behalf of the prosecution:

Exhibit

No.

Description of the Exhibit Date/attested by

1 Post-Mortem Report 30.04.2002

2 Signature of I.O. on the inquest

report

12.06.2002

3 Signature of witness Karu Sao on

Seizure List

12.06.2002

4 Signature of witness on Fardbayan08.08.2002

4/1 Signature of witness Karu Sao on

Fardbayan

08.08.2002

5 Case Diary 13.11.2002

9. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the

statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure on 13.11.2002. The appellant

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denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him in

the prosecution evidence and claimed innocence.

Submission on behalf of Appellant

10. Learned Amicus Curiae, Ms. Smriti Singh,

appearing on behalf of the appellant, has, at the outset,

submitted that the prosecution’s attempt to rely on the legal

doctrine of “last seen together” completely collapses due to

glaring contradictions in the witness testimonies as PW6, stated

that he was informed by PW5 that the deceased and the

appellant were seen together at the station. At the same time this

claim is fatally contradicted by PW5’s actual court deposition,

in which PW5 is completely silent on this crucial aspect and

utters not a single word to corroborate PW6’s statement.

Consequently, the “last seen theory” remains unproven and

legally baseless. Learned counsel for the Appellant relied upon

the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Venkatesan V/s

State of Tamil Nadu.

11. It was further submitted that the prosecution’s

case is fundamentally crippled by the absolute lack of any

eyewitness to the alleged incident. In the complete absence of

direct evidence, the appellant has been named and implicated

entirely on the basis of mere suspicion and conjecture.

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12. Learned counsel next submitted that the

prosecution has inexplicably failed to produce and examine the

Investigating Officer (I.O.) during the trial. This is a severe,

fatal flaw that causes immense prejudice to the defense. By

withholding the I.O., the defense has been deliberately deprived

of its vital right to cross-examine the officer regarding the

glaring procedural lapses, contradictions, and obvious flaws in

the investigative process.

13. It was further submitted the credibility of the

prosecution's targeted narrative against the appellant is further

diluted by the fact that the co-accused, Dingan Sao, has been

explicitly identified by several witnesses as an individual with a

known criminal nature. This established fact introduces a highly

plausible alternative hypothesis regarding the true perpetrators

of the crime, thereby creating a substantial dent in the

prosecution's specific allegations against the current appellant.

14. It was also been submitted that the prosecution

itself had submitted that there was a dispute pertaining to the

bidi business which was mentioned as the motive behind the

causing of alleged occurrence. However, in a shocking display

of investigative negligence, the police neither investigated nor

examined the owner of the bidi company. Failing to bring the

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central figure of the alleged dispute to the witness stand leaves

the prosecution’s stated motive completely uncorroborated and

hence exposing the superficial and incomplete nature of the

police investigation.

15. Lastly, it was submitted that the prosecution has

failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as

the conviction rests on weak, uncorroborated circumstantial

evidence without forming a complete, unbroken chain pointing

exclusively to guilt, contrary to the settled principle reiterated in

Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State reported in [2021 (5) SCC

626]. The learned Amicus Curiae further relied on Munna Lal

v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 18 SCC 661, wherein the

Apex Court held that evidence must be weighed, not counted—

quality being paramount over quantity—so that a single reliable

witness can sustain a murder conviction, but where testimony

lacks reliability, courts must seek corroboration from reliable

direct or circumstantial evidence as a rule of prudence.

16. Finally, she concluded that the impugned

judgment of conviction and order of sentence is fit to be set

aside as the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case

beyond reasonable doubt.

Submission on behalf of the Respondents

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17. Per contra, learned Additional Public

Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State, while opposing the

appeal submitted that the learned District court, after

considering all the evidences on record and exhibits has rightly

convicted the appellant as the offences alleged against the

appellant appears to be serious in nature. It is contended that the

prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges beyond

reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that any apparent

contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the

prosecution witnesses are minor and trivial in nature, which do

not affect the core of the prosecution case or the overall

credibility of the witness. Such discrepancies, it is urged, are

liable to be disregarded in the interest of justice.

18. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned

judgment of conviction and order of sentence do not suffer from

any legal infirmity, or irregularity warranting interference by

this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is

devoid of any merit and fit to be dismissed.

Discussion

19. Heard the parties and perused the materials

available on records as well as lower court records and

proceedings and also taken note of the arguments canvassed by

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learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

20. It would be apposite to discuss the

oral/documentary evidences as available on record to re

appreciate the evidences for just and proper disposal of the

present appeal.

21. PW–1 (co-villager), in his examination-in-

chief, deposed that the incident had occurred approximately

eight and a half years prior, on a Wednesday around 12:00 noon.

PW1 stated that he was near his hut when the accused, Dorik

Sao, approached him and asked for water to drink. The witness

testified that he provided water to the accused. He further noted

that at the time, Dorik Sao was wearing a pajama and a shirt,

and explicitly pointed out that there were bloodstains on the

garments. After drinking the water, the accused departed from

the location. PW1 additionally testified that on the following

day, a local rumor (hulla) circulated in the area claiming that

Chano Sao had died and that Dorik Sao was responsible for his

murder. Elaborating on the background of the two men, the

witness stated that Dorik Sao and Chano Sao used to do a

business of bidi in Calcutta. He established their usual route by

noting that they would frequently pass right in front of his house

on their way to catch the train at Narganzo station. Finally,

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during the course of his testimony in court, PW1 formally

identified the accused, Dorik Sao.

22. In his cross-examination by the prosecution,

PW–1 stated that he could not recall the exact date or year of the

incident. He stated that his hut was situated in a deserted dohan

(jungle valley), at about half a mile from his village, with no

other houses nearby. On the day of the incident, he had arrived

at the dohan at 8:00 AM to graze cattle. He testified that his

wife, delivered his food around 11:00 AM and then returned

home. He recalled spending about an hour brushing his teeth

with a twig and eating his meal around 12:00 noon. PW1

testified that while the path near his hut was busy during the

day, making it hard to track everyone who passed, he

specifically remembered the accused, Dorik Sao, stopping by

just long enough to drink water. When PW1 asked where he was

coming from, Dorik replied that he was returning from Calcutta.

Dorik further explained that he had not eaten at Narganzo

station because a theft on the train had left him frightened. PW1

reiterated his earlier statement that Dorik was wearing a bright

white shirt and pajamas and carrying a bag. He clarified that he

did not see any physical injuries on Dorik's body, only scattered

bloodstains on his clothing.

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Regarding the deceased, Chano Sao, PW1

confirmed they were from the same village. Chano had

previously told him about his bidi business in Calcutta and

would occasionally give PW1 bidis to smoke, though they had

no other prior dealings. PW1 noted that the incident occurred on

a Wednesday and that he had seen Chano the previous Tuesday

morning traveling with a person named Goga. He also brought

up a man named Chhita Sao from a neighboring village who

traveled to Calcutta and was notoriously involved in extortion

(Rangdari).

Addressing the aftermath of the crime, PW-1

deposed that he later heard a rumor (hulla) from the local Teli

community that Chano had died and that Dorik had murdered

him. He also mentioned his understanding that Dorik Sao was a

cousin of Ramdev. About a week after the murder, the police

visited his village to question him, and at that time he informed

the Daroga (Sub-Inspector) about the bloodstains he had seen on

Dorik's clothes.

23. Finally, regarding his presence in court, PW1

admitted that he knew two of Chano's four sons, Ramdev and

Majo, and acknowledged that they had brought him to court to

testify and had paid for his food and drink expenses. However,

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he firmly denied the defense's suggestion that he was giving

false testimony out of greed for money or at the instruction of

Ramdev and Majo.

24. PW-2 (chowkidar no. 2/3), in his examination-

in-chief, deposed that the incident occurred eight years prior, on

a Tuesday or Wednesday. He testified that around 12:00 to 1:00,

he received information that a man was lying dead near a

location called Jamuniya Jor. He went to the spot and saw the

corpse. Following this, he proceeded to the police station to

inform the authorities and subsequently returned to the location

of the body. He noted that at the time of initial discovery, it was

not known whose corpse it was and he later came to know that

the body belonged to Chano Sao. He further testified that the

body was then taken to the Police Station from where it was sent

to Jamui for conducting Post-mortem. PW- 2 also stated that he

saw Ramdeo Sao (PW-6) near the dead body.

25. In his cross-examination PW-2 provided more

precise details regarding the timeline, geography of the area etc.,

and deposed that he first heard the hulla about the dead body

from villagers heading towards the jungle around 10:00 AM. He

arrived at the scene by 10:30 AM and found the corpse lying in

the middle of a north-south road, positioned east-to-west with

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026

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the head facing west and the feet facing east. He specifically

noted the deceased's clothing i.e., a plain colored dhoti and plain

colored shirt and confirmed there was no luggage near the body.

Furthermore, he testified that upon his initial arrival at 10:30

AM, contrary to his examination-in-chief, no one else was

present near the corpse. He then testified that he traveled on foot

and reached the police station at 11:45 AM. He estimated the

police station to be about 4 to 4.5 kos away from the corpse, he

stated that he stayed at the Police Station for about half an hour

and then came back with the Sub-Inspector (daroga ji). He

clarified that when he first visited the spot where the body was

he did not know to whom the body belonged to and it was

during the second visit that he got to know that it was Chano

Sao. He noted that upon their arrival, Ramdeo Sao was the only

person present near the body. PW-2 stated that he did not have

any conversation with Ramdeo Sao at that time.

26. PW-3, in his examination-in-chief, deposed

that, he had a tea and paan shop in Narganzo. People pass by

this very shop while coming and going to the Narganzo station.

He did not know anything about the incident. The witness was

declared hostile at the request of the prosecution.

27. In his cross-examination, PW-3 deposed that

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the Sub-Inspector (Daroga ji) had not interrogated him. He

denied having stated that the previous day he was at his tea shop

near the Narganzo station. He further denied stating that Chano

Sao and others take bidis to West Bengal and travel together.

However, he stated that on the previous day he did not see either

of them near his shop, nor did either of them come near his

shop, and that that morning, he heard a commotion that a man's

dead body was lying on the road in the Bhadauria jungle. He

added that his son, Baalmukund Pandit, runs the tea and paan

shop and that he himself has never run the said shop.

28. PW-4, the Medical Officer who had conducted

the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased,

Chano Sao, in line with the case of the prosecution proved the

post-mortem report, asserting that the same was in his

handwriting and bore his signature. The post-mortem report was

accordingly marked as Exhibit-1. According to PW-4, on August

6, 1993, while being posted as a Civil Assistant Surgeon

(C.A.S.) at the Sub-divisional Hospital, Jamui, he conducted the

post-mortem examination on the body of Chano Sao, son of the

late Kalar Sao, resident of Village Dario, Police Station Jhajha,

District Jamui, aged about 55 years. The dead body was

identified and produced before him by Constable No. 20

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Mundrika Singh, Chaukidar 2/3 Latru Rai, and Ramdeo Sao.

PW-4 recorded his findings as follows:: —

(i) Decomposition supervened and maggots crawling

all over, skin peeled off from different parts of body & whole

body swollen.

(ii)Incised wound 8"x3"x deep to cervical vertebra,

cutting the trachea completely, muscles, vessels and nerves in

the anterior compartment of neck and haematoma on the floor of

wound.

(iii)Incised wound 4"x½"x deep to muscles with

haematoma in the floor of wound over right-lower chest. On

dissection no any other injury was found.

PW-4 opined that the aforementioned injuries were

ante-mortem in nature, caused by a sharp-cutting weapon, and

that death was instantaneous due to the severing of the windpipe

and the major vessels of the neck. This witness further opined

that the time elapsed since death prior to the post-mortem

examination was between 48 and 72 hours.

29. In his cross-examination PW-4, stated that apart

from the aforesaid injuries he did not find any other injuries on

the body of the deceased. He further deposed that he had not

mentioned anything about the clothes worn by the deceased in

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the Post-mortem report and that during the summer season,

maggots begin to appear after 48 hours, and the decomposition

process typically starts after 36 hours. He added that

decomposition begins later in the winter season and earlier in

the summer season. Lastly, he deposed that he had not

mentioned any identification mark of the dead body but had

mentioned its gray hair.

30. PW-5 (nephew of the deceased), in his

examination-in-chief, deposed that the incident had occurred

approximately seven years prior to his deposition, when a

rumour (hulla) had spread in the village that Chano Sao had

been murdered, and it was also being said that the accused

Dorik Sao, along with Dingan Sao, had killed him. He testified

that upon learning that a dead body had been thrown near

Jamunia Jor, he went to the spot and found the said body to be

that of Chano Sao, with the head lying towards the south and the

feet towards the north. He noticed an incised injury on the right

side of the ribcage caused by a sharp-edged weapon, an incised

wound on the throat, and a bone protruding on the right side of

the forehead.

31. PW-5 further deposed that the Sub-Inspector

(Daroga ji), who had reached the spot, prepared the inquest

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report of the dead body before him and Arjun Sao, upon which

he put his signature, the Sub-Inspector also seized blood-

stained, gravelly soil from the spot and prepared a seizure list,

which likewise bore his signature. PW-5 attributed the murder

of Chano Sao to the accused Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao, stating

that it arose out of a dispute concerning dry bidi. He added that

the co-accused, Dingan Sao, had since died, and he further

identified the accused, Dorik Sao, present in court.

32. In his cross-examination, PW-5 stated that he

could not recollect the exact date, month, or year of the

occurrence. He deposed that the deceased, Chano Sao, was his

uncle, and that the informant, Ramdeo Sao, was his brother. He

admitted that he could not recall from whom he first heard that a

dead body was lying at Jamunia Jor, though he stated that a

commotion (hulla) had spread throughout the village; he was

also unable to state who had named Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao

as the assailants, or on which day he came to hear of the

incident. He testified that he was at home when he heard the

commotion, though he could not specify the time, and that he

thereafter proceeded to Jamunia Jor along with several other

villagers. PW-5 admitted that he was illiterate and knew only

how to sign his name; he stated that he had not read the inquest

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report or the seizure list prepared by the Daroga ji, but had

signed both documents on the latter's instruction, without asking

that their contents be read out to him.

33. PW-5 further deposed that a dispute had been

going on between the deceased and the accused for several days

prior to the occurrence, though he was unable to state whose

bidis the deceased and the accused used to sell. He admitted that

Dingan Sao was locally reputed to be a man of

criminal/notorious disposition, and stated that he was unaware

whether Dingan Sao himself had been murdered or what had

befallen him. Lastly, PW-5 denied the suggestion put to him that

he had deposed falsely merely by virtue of being the nephew of

the deceased and the brother of the informant.

34. PW-6 (son of the deceased), in his examination-

in-chief, deposed that on 3.8.1993, the deceased, Chano Sao,

had gone to Tarkeshwar Chapa-danga carrying bidis,

accompanied by the accused, Dorik Sao, and that the two had

boarded the train together at Narganjo station. He stated that his

father had told him he would return the following day but failed

to do so. On the deceased failing to return by 04.08.1993, PW-6

deposed that he began searching for him, and that while

proceeding towards the Uppertola of village Dario, an old man

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informed him that a dead body was lying in the Bhadwaria

jungle, to the south of the church. Upon receiving this

information, he reached the spot near the church and found the

dead body to be that of his father, with the neck cut and injuries

on the right side of the stomach and on the head. He deposed

that his cousin, Karu Sao, was also present at the spot, and that

Karu Sao informed him that he had seen the deceased in the

company of the accused, Dorik Sao, at about 9:15 a.m. at the

station on 4.8.1993. He further deposed that Karu Sao had gone

to the house of the accused and inquired about the deceased,

whereupon the accused had stated that the deceased would

return.

35. PW-6 further deposed that the deceased and the

accused used to get bidis made and deliver them to the same

company (master). He stated that about a month prior to the

occurrence, the deceased and the accused had gone to the master

along with the bidis so prepared, where the bidis made by the

accused were found not to be up to the mark, resulting in a

reduction of their value; the master thereupon directed the

accused to hand over the 'sukha' (raw material) to the deceased

and directed the accused to discontinue the bidi work. PW-6

deposed that when he went to collect the 'sukha' from the

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accused, the accused, in an angry tone, stated that his dues had

been cut on account of the deceased, and that he causes harm to

those who act against his interest. PW-6 further deposed that the

accused was under the impression that the deceased had lodged

a complaint against him, causing him financial loss. He stated,

vide paragraph 11 of his deposition, that he is confident that the

accused, Dorik Sao, has murdered his father, Chano Sao, or has

got him murdered.

36. PW-6, in his cross-examination, deposed that

03.08.1993 was a Monday. He stated that he was unable to name

the person for whom his father used to make bidis at

Chapadanga, nor could he state the name of the company. He

admitted that he had never gone to the bidi company owner

prior to the occurrence, and that he went there only about two

months after the occurrence, on which occasion too he did not

ask the name of the company or its owner. He stated that the

'sukha' (raw material) used to be supplied by the master, while

all the labour was performed by his father. He stated that he

could not say whether the company's licence stood in his father's

name, adding that his father alone knew all such particulars and

that he himself had no knowledge thereof. He was unable to

state the date on which his father had commenced the bidi

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business, though he stated that his father had been engaged in

the trade for the preceding five to six years. He admitted that his

father and the accused, Dorik Sao, used to deliver bidis at

Chapadanga, but stated that he could not name any other

persons who did so along with them. He admitted that there was

no document relating to his father's bidi business, nor any

document evidencing that his father used to deliver bidis at

Chapadanga. He deposed that he waited for his father till the

night of Tuesday (4.8.1993), and that no information was

received regarding his father on that day. He admitted that Karu

Sao had met his father at Narganjo station on Tuesday, but

stated that he himself had no conversation with Karu Sao at that

time. He stated that when his father did not return on Tuesday,

he made efforts to trace him on Wednesday, whereupon he learnt

that a dead body was lying [in the jungle]. He deposed that he

left home at about 8:00-8:30 a.m. on Wednesday to search for

his father, and went first to Uppertola, where a passer-by told

him that a dead body was lying in the jungle; he stated that he

could not name the said passer-by. He testified that he thereafter

proceeded directly to the Bhadwariya jungle, and that he did not

meet anyone on the way. He deposed that upon reaching the

spot, no one was present there except the dead body of his

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father; he stated that he wept there for about ten minutes,

following which some villagers, including Karu Sao, arrived,

and that he thereupon lost consciousness and subsequently

regained it. He stated that although a number of persons had

gathered at the spot, he was unable to name them, as he was in a

state of shock. He deposed that the villagers remained at the

spot for about two to two-and-a-half hours, following which the

chaukidar (village watchman) arrived and reported the matter to

the police station. He stated that he had informed both the

villagers and the Investigating Officer (Daroga ji) as to who had

killed his father and why. With regard to the position of the

body, PW-6 stated that it was lying to the south of the road, at a

distance of about two to three hands (spans), in a supine

position, with the head towards the south. He stated that apart

from the body, he saw blood at the spot and his father's slippers,

but nothing else. He deposed that the chaukidar arrived first, at

about 12:00-1:00 p.m. (though he clarified that he had no watch

with him at the time); that he disclosed nothing to the chaukidar

until he identified the body as that of his father and gave his

own name, whereupon the chaukidar stated that the matter

would have to be reported to the police station. He stated that

the chaukidar remained at the spot for about half an hour before

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proceeding to Jhajha, while the villagers stayed on at the spot.

He stated that the place where the body was found was situated

at a distance of five to seven kilometres from the Jhajha police

station, and that the Investigating Officer arrived at the spot

within about half an hour of the chaukidar's departure.

37. PW-6 further deposed that the Investigating

Officer recorded his statement, and also examined Karu Sao and

Rupesh Yadav, though he could not recollect who else had been

examined or whose statements had been recorded, nor could he

state whose signatures, other than his own, had been obtained by

the Investigating Officer. He stated that the Investigating Officer

brought the dead body to Jamui at about 8:00-9:00 p.m., and

that besides himself, the chaukidar and his brother, Balram,

among others, had accompanied the body. He deposed that the

post-mortem examination was conducted at about 8:30-9:00. He

further deposed that the Investigating Officer visited his house

two to three days thereafter and questioned him alone. He stated

that he subsequently had conversations with the villagers,

initially at his own house, though he clarified that he had not

gone from door to door in the village to inform people of the

occurrence; he admitted that no villager, even upon visiting his

house, disclosed anything about the occurrence to him, nor did

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any person of the locality provide any information in that

regard. He stated that his village falls within Vorna Panchayat,

whose Mukhiya (village head) had died at the relevant time.

PW-6 admitted that the chaukidar had informed him that the co-

accused, Dingan Sao, upon being apprehended, had admitted

that he, along with Dorik Sao, had committed the murder. He

denied the suggestion that he had implicated Dingan Sao and

Dorik Sao on the basis of the chaukidar's statement, asserting

that he had already lodged the case prior thereto. He admitted

that Dingan Sao was a man of criminal disposition, and stated

that he could not say whether Dingan Sao himself had been

murdered. He was unable to recollect the exact date on which he

had gone to collect the 'sukha', though he stated that it was about

one-and-a-half months prior to the occurrence. Lastly, PW-6

denied the suggestion that he had given false testimony and had

falsely implicated the innocent accused, Dorik Sao.

38. PW-7, in his examination-in-chief, stated that

on 30.07.1994, he was posted at Jhajha Police Station and, on

that date, he took over the investigation of the present case.

Prior to him, the investigation had been conducted by Sri B. H.

Baitha, the previous Investigating Officer, who had already

submitted a charge-sheet against the accused. He stated that

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accused Dingan Sah had been arrested by the previous

Investigating Officer and forwarded to jail. PW-7 further stated

that, on the basis of the investigation conducted by the previous

Investigating Officer, he verified the case against accused

Dingan Sah by examining other witnesses. Those witnesses

supported the statements recorded during the earlier

investigation. He also recorded the statements of the informant,

Balram Shah, Rajendra Shah, and other witnesses. After

considering the earlier investigation, the statements recorded by

him, the materials collected during the investigation, and the

directions of his superior police officer, PW-7 submitted a

charge-sheet against accused Dingan Sah.

39. In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that he

had not made any inquiry from the bidi company in relation to

the deceased, Chando Sah. Although the deceased was engaged

in the manufacture of bidis, PW-7 had not investigated whether

the deceased possessed any licence or examined any other

matter connected with the manufacture of bidis. He further

admitted that he had not investigated the allegation that the

deceased had loaded bidis onto a train at Narganzo Railway

Station and transported them by rail. PW-7 further stated that

the previous Investigating Officer had also not conducted any

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investigation regarding the accused. He stated that Balram Shah

had informed him that he believed accused Dingan Sah had a

hand in the murder of his father. Other witnesses had also stated

that accused Dingan Sah was a person of antisocial character.

PW-7 stated that he had mentioned the criminal antecedents of

accused Dingan Sah in paragraph 88 of the case diary.

According to him, cases including Jhajha P.S. Case No. 11 of

1983 and Jhajha P.S. Case No. 399 of 1984 had been registered

against the accused. He denied the suggestion that he had not

conducted the investigation fairly and impartially or that he had

submitted a false charge-sheet against accused Dingan Sah.

40. PW-8 in his Examination-in-Chief stated that

the case diary relating to Jhajha P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993 was

in the handwriting of Ram Prasad Singh, who was the

Investigating Officer of the said case from Paragraphs 1 to 58

and Paragraphs 59 to 84 of the case diary were in the

handwriting of Sri B. H. Baitha, which he identified. He also

stated that both of the aforesaid police officers had retired from

service. The case diary was marked as Exhibit-5.

41. In cross-examination, PW-8 stated that he had

seen both of the aforesaid officers writing and reading and was,

therefore, able to identify their handwriting. He further stated

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that the case diary had not been written in his presence.

Conclusion

42. We have heard learned counsel for the parties

and given our careful consideration to the entire body of oral

and documentary evidence discussed hereinabove, as also the

rival submissions canvassed on behalf of the Appellant and the

State. Before proceeding to re-appreciate the evidence, it is

necessary to isolate what is not seriously in dispute on this

record which is the fact that Chano Sao met a homicidal death,

and that admittedly there is no eyewitness to the actual

commission of the offence. The prosecution's case, as the

learned Trial Court itself acknowledged, rests entirely on a chain

of circumstances. The real and only question for determination,

therefore, is whether that chain is complete and conclusive

enough to rule out any reasonable possibility of the Appellant

Dorik Sao's innocence, and to point clearly to his guilt alone. It

is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that a conviction

for murder under Section 302 of IPC on circumstantial evidence

requires an unbroken, complete chain of circumstances that

points only to the guilt of the accused and excludes any

possibility of innocence.

The five golden principles (Panchsheel of proof)

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established by the Supreme Court of India, the prosecution must

satisfy these conditions:

(i) Fully established facts, (ii) Consistent with guilt,

(iii) Complete chain, (iv) Exclude innocence (v) Complete proof

of crime.

It is pertinent to mention that there are certain

common links in the chain which need to be established. These

links are: (i) Last seen theory, (ii) Motive, (iii) Recovery of

weapons or property (iv) Medical and forensic evidence, (v)

Conduct of the accused.

43. The first and, in our view, the most fatal

infirmity in the prosecution's chain concerns the “last seen

together” circumstance. PW6 (Ramdeo Sao, the informant and

son of the deceased) deposed that he learnt from his cousin,

Karu Sao (PW5), that the deceased and the accused Dorik Sao

had been seen together at Narganzo station at about 9:15 a.m. on

04.08.1993. However, PW5, when independently examined,

made no such statement; his testimony, as it stands on record,

speaks only of a village rumour (“hulla”) that the deceased had

been murdered by the accused, and is completely silent on

having personally seen the two men together at the station. What

was relied upon by the Trial Court as “last seen together”

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evidence is thus, at its highest, hearsay upon hearsay, a

circumstance neither PW5 nor PW6 could speak to from

personal knowledge, and one that consequently collapses for

want of any direct source.

44. Even assuming the “last seen” circumstance

had been proved in its strongest, first-hand form, it is well

settled that this circumstance, by itself, is a weak piece of

evidence incapable of sustaining a conviction. In Kanhaiya Lal

v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 21 held that,

“Where the theory of last seen together is

the singular piece of circumstantial evidence

relied upon, “the conviction of the appellant

cannot be maintained merely on suspicion,

however strong it may be, or on his

conduct.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

This position has been reiterated still further in

Munu Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2026 INSC

780, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside a

conviction founded solely on last-seen testimony, held in terms

that “there can be no conviction merely on the basis of the last-

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seen theory without any other incriminating circumstance, and

that testimony found not to inspire confidence cannot found a

conviction even where some of the witnesses speaking to it are

themselves less than wholly reliable”.

Applying this line of authority to the present case,

the "last seen" theory, in this case, can be summarized as an

attempt to prove that the deceased was alive in the company of

the Appellant shortly before the death. However, "last seen"

alone is often an unsafe basis for conviction without

corroborating evidence, and even here, the testimony relied

upon is not first-hand but hearsay, being what PW6 claims PW5

told him — a claim which PW5's own deposition does not

support. The "last seen theory" must therefore be held wholly

unproved, and incapable of forming any link, let alone the

principal one, in the chain against the Appellant.

45. The second infirmity concerns the nature of

PW6's testimony. PW6 is not an independent witness rather he

is the deceased’s own son, and in his deposition he admitted he

was "confident" that the Appellant has murdered his father,

Chano Sao, or has got him murdered. It is his account alone

which is uncorroborated by anyone with independent, first-hand

knowledge and that supplies both the motive theory (the dispute

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over the Rs. 2,000 deduction and the 'sukha') and the alleged

extra-judicial admission of PW-6 attributed to the Appellant. It

is important to note here that the law requires that such a related

witness's testimony be approached with greater caution. In

Esakkimuthu v. State represented by the inspector of police,

reported in 2025 INSC 880, the Supreme Court granted acquittal

after holding that “where the key witnesses are the son and wife

of the deceased, being “very well-interested witnesses in the

case,” their testimonies “shall have to be treated with great

caution” and must meet a stricter standard of proof”.

Applying the same standard to PW6, his testimony find no

independent corroboration whatsoever; whether as to the alleged

last seen, the motive, or the alleged extra-judicial admission and

hence, the absence of corroborating material is what renders his

testimony unsafe and cannot completely form the basis of

conviction.

46. The third infirmity, which compounds the two

discussed above, is the prosecution's failure to examine the

Investigating Officer who initiated the investigation and

submitted the chargesheet. The non-examination of the I.O. is

not a mere technical omission; it has caused serious and

demonstrable prejudice to the defence. The Appellant has

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thereby been deprived of the valuable right to confront the I.O.

with the material contradictions between the depositions of PW5

and PW6 on the “last seen” aspect, to test the manner in which

the investigation into the alleged motive was (or was not)

conducted, and to probe the circumstances in which the seizure

and inquest proceedings were carried out.

47. The fourth infirmity concerns the alleged

motive. The prosecution's own case is that the motive for the

murder lay in a business dispute over 'bidi', specifically, the

deduction of Rs. 2,000 from the accused's dues and the master's

direction to hand over 'sukha' to the deceased. It is quite strange

that the police neither investigated nor examined the owner of

the bidi company, who alone could have given the true picture

of the dispute. It is well settled that while motive assumes real

importance in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, it alone

cannot sustain a criminal conviction and must be well

corroborated by independent, concrete evidence linking the

accused to the crime.

In case of Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of

Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 626, the Supreme

Court held that “motive plays an important link to complete the

chain of circumstances” in a case of circumstantial evidence,

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and went on to acquit the accused therein precisely because the

alleged motive remained unproved. Further, in the case of

Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported

in (2020) 10 SCC 166, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as

follows;

“24. Now so far as the submission on

behalf of the accused that in the present case the

prosecution has failed to establish and prove the

motive and therefore the accused deserves

acquittal is concerned, it is true that the absence of

proving the motive cannot be a ground to reject the

prosecution case. It is also true and as held by this

Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar

1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 that if motive is proved that

would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial

evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a

ground to reject the prosecution case. However, at

the same time, as observed by this Court in Babu

[Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189],

absence of motive in a case depending on

circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in

favour of the accused. In paras 25 and 26, it is

observed and held as under: [Babu v. State of

Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189], SCC pp. 200-01)”

“25. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal,

(2008) 16 SCC 73, this Court examined the

importance of motive in cases of circumstantial

evidence and observed: (SCC pp. 87-88, paras 38-

39)”

“38. … the motive is a thing which is

primarily known to the accused themselves and it is

not possible for the prosecution to explain what

actually promoted or excited them to commit the

particular crime.”

The motive may be considered as a

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circumstance which is relevant for assessing the

evidence but if the evidence is clear and

unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt

of the accused, the same is not weakened even if

the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled

law that the motive loses all its importance in a

case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is

available, because even if there may be a very

strong motive for the accused persons to commit a

particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the

evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the

same way, even if there may not be an apparent

motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is

clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of

motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.'

This Court has also held that the

absence of motive in a case depending on

circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in

favour of the accused. (Vide Pannayar v. State of

T.N., (2009) 9 SCC 152."

(Emphasis Supplied)

The same infirmity afflicts the present case: the

prosecution's stated motive rests entirely on the uncorroborated

word of a related witness (PW6), and the one person capable of

giving true picture was never examined or brought to the

witness box. This lapse can be viewed as a weakness in the

prosecution’s proof.

48. It is also important to note the distinction the

Supreme Court has drawn between “normal discrepancies” and

“material discrepancies” in the testimony of a witness — a

distinction that determines whether a contradiction merely

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reflects the ordinary fallibility of human memory or instead

strikes at the credibility of the witness's account. Not every

contradiction is fatal; what matters is whether the discrepancy

touches the core of the witness's version or is merely incidental

to it. On perusal of the deposition of PW-2, it is quite clear that

at least one contradiction goes well beyond what can be

classified as normal or natural, namely, the difference between

the timing of his coming to know of the body as stated in his

examination-in-chief (where he spoke of receiving the

information at around 12:00 to 1:00 p.m.) and as stated in his

cross-examination (where he deposed to first hearing the “hulla”

at around 10:00 a.m. and reaching the spot by 10:30 a.m.).

49. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v.

Kalki, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 752, has held that discrepancies

arising from normal errors of observation, normal errors of

memory due to lapse of time, and mental disposition such as

shock at the time of the occurrence are to be treated as natural

and do not affect credibility, but drew a clear line for

discrepancies that are not normal and not expected of a normal

person. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

“Material discrepancies are those which are not

normal, and not expected of a normal person. In

the depositions of witnesses there are always some

normal discrepancies however honest and truthful

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the witnesses may be. These discrepancies are due

to normal errors of observation, normal errors of

memory due to lapse of time, due to mental

disposition such as shock and horror at the time of

the occurrence, and the like.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

The contradiction in PW-2's account of the timing

of the discovery of the body does not appear to be a normal

discrepancies attributable to lapse of memory, and it therefore

falls outside the protective umbrella carved out in Kalki. This

contradiction is, in our view, amounts to material discrepancies,

sufficient to cast serious doubt on the reliability of PW-2's

account of the discovery of the body, and his testimony on this

aspect cannot be accepted without independent corroboration —

corroboration which, for the reasons already discussed, is

conspicuously absent from this record.

50. Further, It is well settled that Indian law does

not treat circumstantial evidence as inherently inferior to direct

testimony, but it does insist on a considerably stricter standard

where there is no eyewitness to the act itself. The foundational

test was laid down by the Supreme Court in Hanumant v. State

of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1952 SCR 1091, where it was

held that “the circumstances from which guilt is sought to be

inferred must be fully established, and must form “a chain of

evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground

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for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused”,

such that within all human probability the act must have been

done by the accused and none other.” This test was crystallised

into the five-fold “Panchsheel” principles in Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984)

4 SCC 116, which require, among other things, that the

circumstances relied upon “must be” and not merely “may be”

established, that they be consistent only with the guilt of the

accused, and that they exclude every other reasonable

hypothesis.

51. Measured against this standard, the chain relied

upon by the learned Trial Court falls apart at more than one link.

The “last seen” circumstance is unproved, being hearsay

contradicted by its own purported source. The motive is

unproved, the one independent witness capable of establishing it

having never been examined. The star witness, PW6, is a related

witness whose uncorroborated account cannot by itself close

these gaps, and the non-examination of the I.O. has foreclosed

the defense’s ability to test the investigation itself. What remains

principally is the recovery of blood-stained clothing spoken to

by PW1, is at best, suggestive and falls well short of the

“conclusive nature and tendency” that the Panchsheel test

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demands. As held in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, reported

in (2006) 12 SCC 254, suspicion, however strong, cannot take

the place of proof — a caution that applies with particular force

where, as here, there is no eyewitness at all to anchor the case.

52. The bloodstain evidence spoken to by PW1

requires separate mention, as it is the only material circumstance

that survives independently of PW6. PW1 deposed to have seen

bloodstains on the Appellant's clothes on the day of the

occurrence, but this identification is that of a lay witness, made

visually, with no seizure of the garments and no forensic or

serological examination of any kind connecting the stains to the

deceased. Even where a weapon or article is seized and

forensically tested, the Supreme Court has held that a positive

finding is not, by itself, sufficient to sustain a murder

conviction. In Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in

(2024) 3 SCC 481, it was held that “mere recovery of a blood-

stained weapon even bearing the same blood group as that of

the victim is not enough to sustain a conviction for murder”,

hence a lay witness’s account without seizure and examination

of disputed articles can be fatal to the prosecution if the

remaining evidence lacks strong corroboration or independent

reliability.

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53. Because of the nature of evidence, which is

available on record, the least, which ought to have been done by

the learned Trial Court, was to accord the benefit of reasonable

doubt to the appellant inasmuch as I am clearly of the view that

in the light of the evidence on record, which I have discussed

above, it was not proper to convict the appellant. The benefit of

such a situation ought to have been given to the appellant. The

Infirmities in the Prosecution’s Case which lead to Reasonable

Doubt are flaws that fail to meet the “beyond a reasonable

doubt” standard. “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the ultimate

standard of proof in the legal system. It means that the

prosecution must prove guilt conclusively, such that no

reasonable or rational person could arrive at another explanation

based on the evidence.

54. The ultimate benchmark of “beyond a

reasonable doubt” upholds the presumption of innocence in the

legal system that we follow. The presumption of innocence is

the absolute bedrock of a fair criminal justice system. It protects

individuals from wrongful, arbitrary imprisonment by requiring

the State to bear the burden of proof and to establish guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than placing the burden on

the accused to prove his innocence. It is pertinent to discuss here

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the landmark judgment of Kali Ram v. State of Himachal

Pradesh, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 808, which is a cornerstone

of Indian criminal jurisprudence for its emphasis on the

‘presumption of innocence’ and ‘the strict standard of proof in

criminal trials’, and hence one of the most celebrated judgments

on the ‘benefit of doubt’ and the ‘presumption of innocence’ in

Indian legal history. The said judgment was rendered by a three-

Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein, in para 25, the

Court held that:

“Another golden thread which runs through the

web of the administration of justice in criminal

cases is that if two views are possible on the

evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the

guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,

the view which is favourable to the accused should

be adopted. This principle has a special relevance

in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought

to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule

has accordingly been laid down that unless the

evidence adduced in the case is consistent only

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and

is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court

should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of

the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case

the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding

the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the

benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt

regarding the guilt of the accused should be

reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is

either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching

a firm conclusion or so timid that is hesitant and

afraid to take things to their natural consequences.

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The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does

not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to

surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As

mentioned by us recently in the case of State of

Punjab v. Jagir Singh 1974 3 SCC 227 a criminal

trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to

give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It

concerns itself with the question as to whether the

accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the

offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event

in real life and is the product of interplay of

different human emotions. In arriving at the

conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged

with the commission of a crime, the Court has to

judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities,

its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses.

Every case in the final analysis would have to

depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of

every reasonable doubt should be given to the

accused, the Courts should not at the same time

reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on

grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of

conjectures”.

(Emphasis Supplied)

55. Having examined the evidence as a whole, this

Court finds that the prosecution case suffers from a number of

defects, each significant in itself and, when taken together, fatal

to the conviction: (i) the "last seen together" circumstance rests

not on direct testimony but on hearsay attributed by PW6 to

PW5, a claim which PW5's own deposition does not bear out;

(ii) PW6 — the sole substantive witness, whose account alone

supplies both the motive theory and the alleged extra-judicial

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admission — is a related witness, being the deceased's own son,

and his assertions find no independent corroboration

whatsoever; (iii) the testimony of PW-2 discloses a material and

unexplained discrepancy as to the timing of the discovery of the

body (iv) neither the Investigating Officer who conducted the

investigation nor the owner of the bidi company i.e., the one

person capable of independently verifying the alleged motive —

has been examined, without any explanation whatsoever; and

(v) the sole surviving physical circumstance, the blood-stained

clothing spoken to by PW1, rests on nothing more than a lay

witness's visual identification, unsupported by any forensic or

serological report connecting the stains to the deceased.

56. In the facts and attending circumstances of the

present case, the appellants ought to have been accorded benefit

of reasonable doubt in as much as the prosecution had failed, in

the light of the discussion of the evidence on record, to bring

home the charges against the appellant beyond all reasonable

doubt.

57. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this

appeal is allowed. The impugned conviction of the appellant and

the sentence passed against him by the judgment and order,

under appeals are hereby set aside. The Appellants are not found

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.266 of 2004 dt.01-09-2026

44/44

guilty of the offence, which they stand convicted of, and they

are hereby acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt.

58. Since, the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds

are hereby cancelled and his sureties shall stand discharged.

59. I put on record words of appreciation for the

able assistance rendered by Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus

Curiae, to this Court in arriving at the proper conclusion for

deciding the instant appeal. We direct the High Court Legal

Services Authority to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to Ms.

Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae, for service rendered by

her.

60. The Registry shall, forthwith, send a copy of

this Judgment and order to the learned Trial Court along with

the Lower Court’s Records.

Manish Kumar

(Alok Kumar, J.)

Anil Kumar Sinha, J.:- I agree

(Anil Kumar Sinha, J.)

AFR/NAFR A .F. R.

CAV DATE 07.07.2026

Uploading Date01.09.2026

Transmission Date01.09.2026

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