F.A. No.206 of 2018

Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:JHHC:32541-DB )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

First Appeal No. 206 of 2018

Dr. Amrit Kejriwal, aged about 48 years, son of Dr. N. L.

Kejriwal, resident of Bakshi Compound, Bariatu, P.O. & P.S.

Bariatu, District Ranchi, at present residing at D-6, Jeevan

Sagar, Sector-II, Kharghar, Navi Mumbai, P.O. & P.S. Navi

Mumbai, District Mumbai (Maharashtra).

... ... ... Appellant

Versus

Dr. Jaya Kejriwal, Wife of Dr. Amrit Kejriwal, Daughter of P.P.

Khemka, Resident of Plot No.88-A, Co-operative Colony,

Bokaro, P.O & P.S. Bokaro Steel City, District Bokaro.

… … ... Respondent

---------

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD

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For the Appellant : Mr Mahesh Tewari, Advocate

Mr Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Advocate

For the Respondent : Mr Srijit Choudhary, Advocate

---------

Reserved On : 06/10/2026 Pronounced On: 05 /11/2026

Per: Manoj Prasad, J.

1. Heard Mr Mahesh Tewari, for the appellant, who appears

with Mr Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Mr Srijit Choudhary, for the

respondent.

2. The present appeal has been filed by the petitioner-

appellant Dr. Amrit Kejriwal, impleading his wife as respondent who

was opposite party before the Court below.

3. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated

28

th

March 2018 and decree dated 05

th

April 2018 passed by the

Court of learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro in Title

2 F.A. No.206 of 2018

(Matrimonial) Suit No. 204 of 2012, which was filed under Sections

13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of

marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The learned Trial

Judge by the impugned Judgment and Decree, dismissed the suit

of the petitioner-appellant, holding that the case of cruelty and

desertion was not made out.

4. Before coming to the facts of the case, it is important to

mention that the application for dissolution of marriage was filed

before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi, registered as

M.T.S. Case No. 112 of 2008. Consequent to an order passed by

this Court in Transfer Petition (C) No.19 of 2008, arising out of

M.T.S. Case No. 112 of 2008 on 07.08.2012. The case was

transferred from the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court,

Ranchi to the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro

and thereafter by order dated 24.08.2012, on receipt of the record

by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro, it was re-registered

as Title Matrimonial Suit No. 204 of 2012 and the suit was

proceeded before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro and

decided by the said Court by the impugned judgment and decree.

5. The petitioner-appellant instituted the suit for dissolution of

marriage on the ground of cruelty, i.e. under Section 13(1) (i-a) of

the Hindu Marriage Act, alleging inter-alia that the respondent lived

with the appellant for about a month and thereafter, left the

appellant and went to Bokaro to stay with her parents. In course of

time, the appellant had to move to Delhi for his education and

subsequently, he joined Escorts Heart Institute at Delhi. In the year

3 F.A. No.206 of 2018

2002, the appellant came to Ranchi to join a family function. The

respondent misbehaved with the parents of the appellant and

despite interference of the appellant, such behavior continued. In

the meantime, the respondent had also completed her internship

and the appellant brought the respondent with him to Delhi and

stayed with the brother’s family but within a few days, finding the

behavior with the other family members not to be compatible, the

appellant along-with his wife shifted to Noida so as to maintain

peace and avoid conflicts in the family. It is stated that the

respondent became ill in the year 2003 and was suffering from

Jaundice and as such, she was hospitalized and when the parents

of the respondent came, allegation was leveled against the

accused-appellant for making their daughter ill, and for not taking

proper care of their daughter. This all caused great mental cruelty

to the present appellant. The appellant further alleges that the

petitioner was scheduled to go to U.K. in May 2003 but before

going abroad when he came to Ranchi and was with his parents,

the respondent also accompanied him but she picked-up quarrel

with her parents and this all caused mental cruelty to the present

appellant. Such behavior of the respondent compelled the appellant

to return from U.K. in November 2003. In December 2003, the

appellant went to Mumbai and joined MGM Medical College as a

Lecturer. The respondent also came to Mumbai with her father and

joined Rajiv Gandhi Medical College but shifted to a hostel and

relationship between the husband and wife became bitter as the

respondent did not allow access to the present appellant and she

4 F.A. No.206 of 2018

continued living in a hostel. In the year 2006, the respondent after

clearing her D.G.O. Examination vacated the hostel and remained

with the appellant, but there was no improvement in her behavior

and attitude. In September 2006, the respondent informed the

appellant of some illness, for which, she was admitted to a hospital

and finally, the appellant brought back the respondent to Ranchi for

better treatment with the help of his family members, particularly his

father, who was also a doctor at Ranchi. Subsequently, the

respondent returned to Bokaro where she also gave birth to a child

with no information to the appellant. On 27.10.2007 the respondent

along with her sister and cousin came to the residence of the

appellant at Mumbai and stayed there for two days to collect some

certificates from the institute. During her stay, her behavior with the

appellant was rude and even during that period, did not maintain

any matrimonial relationship with the appellant and she insisted that

if the appellant want to restore the conjugal life, he has to stay with

the respondent at Bokaro. It is stated that such acts of the

respondent amounted to cruelty and also desertion on the appellant

and hence, cause of action of the suit arose for dissolution of

marriage. Prior to instituting the suit for dissolution of marriage on

the grounds of cruelty and desertion, a notice was sent through the

lawyer of the appellant for dissolution of marriage by mutual

consent on 21.04.2008, but the respondent replied to the said

notice, denying the statements made by the appellant therein and

also threatened the appellant of implication in criminal cases,

resultantly, the present suit was instituted for dissolution of

5 F.A. No.206 of 2018

marriage by a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and

desertion on 9

th

June, 2008.

6. The respondent after appearance filed a written statement,

denying the entire allegations made by the appellant and also

denying the allegations of erratic behavior of present respondent.

On the contrary, she alleges that the appellant along-with his family

members behaved in a very rude manner with the present

respondent. The respondent further states that on account of

negligence by the present appellant, she suffered Jaundice and

other illnesses. It is also stated that with the assistance of the father

of the respondent, the appellant went to U.K., but without

completing his course, he returned from U.K. and the entire other

contrary allegations were denied by this respondent. Further, she

alleges that she studied at Mumbai at the expenses of her father

and the appellant did not bother to pay a single penny towards the

expenses of the present respondent. The respondent admittedly

cleared her DGO examination and vacated the hostel and remained

with the appellant, who neglected to take care of the present

respondent. The appellant deliberately, with an intention to leave

the respondent at Bokaro, but in absence of any direct flight from

Mumbai to Bokaro, came to Ranchi and considering the medical

emergency admitted the respondent in a hospital for a day and on

the very next day, moved the respondent to Bokaro. The entire

allegations of cruelty and desertion are denied. On the contrary,

allegations of cruelty are leveled by the respondent on the present

appellant. It is alleged that the respondent along-with her sister and

6 F.A. No.206 of 2018

cousin had come to Mumbai to the house of the appellant but they

were misbehaved and ousted from the house and other contrary

allegations are denied. The respondent never wanted to live

separately, rather wanted to restore the conjugal life and reply a

was given to the advocate’s notice, given on behalf of the appellant

to the respondent. The prayer was made to dismiss the suit of the

appellant.

TRIAL COURT FINDINGS

7. Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro, based on the

pleadings, framed the following issues: -

(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?

(ii)Whether there is any valid cause of action for filing of the suit?

(iii)Whether after solemnization of marriage, the respondent

treated the plaintiff-petitioner/present appellant and his family

members with cruelty and also deserted the plaintiffs-petitioner

without any reasonable cause?

(iv)Whether the plaintiff petitioner and his family members have

treated the respondent with cruelty and she was driven out of the

matrimonial house in the month of October 2007?

(v)Whether the plaintiff petitioner is entitled to get the relief as

prayed for by him?

8. After framing of issues, the appellant examined four

witnesses including himself, his brother, sister and one Vimal Kant

Jha. Three documents were marked as exhibit being the legal

7 F.A. No.206 of 2018

notice to Dr. Jaya Kejriwal through the advocate for the appellant

marked as Exhibit-1, Exhibit-2 is the reply to the legal notice and

Exhibit-3 is the certified copy of the complaint case No.372 of 2008

filed by Dr. Jaya Kejriwal against Dr. Amrit Kejriwal and others in

the Court of the C.J.M., Bokaro. On behalf of the respondent, six

witnesses were examined namely Sushil Lachi Ramka ,

Kamleshwar Prasad Choudhary, Nageshwar Singh, Sheela

Khemka, the mother of the respondent, Parmeshwar Prasad

Khemka, the father of the respondent and Dr. Jaya Kejriwal, the

respondent herself. No documentary evidence is there on behalf of

the respondent.

9. The learned Trial Court, thereafter, took up Issue Nos. 3 and

4 for determination, i.e., the issue as to whether the respondent had

meted out cruelty on the appellant and had deserted the appellant

and secondly, whether the appellant and his family members had

treated the respondent with cruelty and the respondent was driven

out of her matrimonial house in the month of October, 2007.

10. The learned Trial Court, after discussing the oral and

documentary evidence on behalf of the parties and considering that

cruelty, though not defined under the Hindu Marriage Act, has

varied dimensions and no straight-jacket definition can be given,

held that, in every case, the aspects of cruelty have to be

examined. After discussing these aspects of the case, the learned

Principal Judge, Family Court, concluded that, in the facts of the

present case, the appellant himself had created such a situation

which compelled the respondent to leave her matrimonial home,

8 F.A. No.206 of 2018

and that the respondent's leaving the matrimonial home under such

circumstances cannot be categorised as either cruelty or desertion.

Regarding Exhibits 1 and 2, the learned Trial Court concluded that,

in the reply notice given by the present respondent, she expressed

her desire to live with the appellant, and instead of making efforts

for restitution of conjugal rights, an application for dissolution of

marriage was filed. The learned Trial Court, therefore, concluded

that no case of cruelty was proved. The appellant failed to prove

that the respondent committed acts of cruelty against the appellant.

11. Considering the ground of desertion, the learned Principal

Judge, Family Court observed that desertion for a continuous

period of two years immediately preceding the presentation of the

petition without reasonable cause and without the consent or

against the wish of the appellant was necessary to be established

to make out a case. It has also been observed that mere physical

act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that

spouse the deserting party. The desertion has to be both actual act

of separation, coupled with an intention, it is the animus deserendi

to live separately with an intention not to cohabit or restore conjugal

life. The party alleging desertion must prove intentional permanent

abandonment of one spouse by the other, without that others

consent and without reasonable cause. Thus, there should be total

repudiation of the obligation of marriage. In the facts of the present

case, it was observed that the parties last resided together till

29.10.2007, which fact is admitted by the present appellant while

the suit for divorce was filed on 09.06.2008 and thus, the statutory

9 F.A. No.206 of 2018

requirement of continuous desertion for a period of not less than

two years was not fulfilled and accordingly, the case of desertion

was also not made out.

12. Thus, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court dismissed

the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by the present appellant,

holding that the appellant failed to make out a case under Section

13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

ARGUMENTS

13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

submits that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the oral and

documentary evidence in the proper perspective. Much reliance is

placed on Exhibit-2, i.e., the respondent’s reply, and it is

emphasised that the language of the reply would predominantly

show the respondent’s intention and the threat meted out by the

respondent to the appellant, which is evidence of cruelty. Apart

from that, other acts of cruelty were also present, which were not

considered by the learned Trial Court. The deposition of the

witnesses on behalf of the appellant supported the appellant’s

contention regarding cruelty, which was not considered by the

learned Trial Court. Similarly, the learned Trial Court failed to

appreciate the ambit and scope of the expression ‘desertion’. It is

true that the respondent came to Mumbai in October 2007, but the

mere physical act of coming to the appellant’s house does not

amount to the restoration of conjugal life when there was no

restitution of conjugal rights; rather, the respondent had come only

10 F.A. No.206 of 2018

to obtain her documents. Learned counsel submits that, in

appropriate cases, desertion can also be considered even where

the husband and wife are living under the same roof, but there is no

restitution of matrimonial obligation between the parties and no

restoration of conjugal life between the parties. The learned Trial

Court has taken a hyper-technical view in holding that merely

because the respondent had come to Mumbai and stayed in the

appellant’s house for two days, the case of desertion was not

proved. Under the circumstances, learned counsel submits that the

impugned judgment and decree are fit to be set aside.

14. Learned counsel, during the course of the arguments, has

also submitted that an interlocutory application has been filed for

the maintenance of the daughter. The present appellant proposed

to pay one-time maintenance towards the daughter's educational

and other expenses to the tune of Rs.15 Lakhs, but this was not

agreed upon. The appellant has also filed salary documents

showing the salary received by him. However, learned counsel

submits that, as no settlement was arrived at, no order was passed

in the said petition.

15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent submits that since no decree for dissolution of marriage

was passed, no order of alimony was required to be passed, qua

the present respondent, but the daughter was entitled to interim

maintenance and surprisingly, a meager amount of Rs.15 Lakhs

was offered, which was not settled between the parties. Thus,

prayer is made to pass appropriate order on the interlocutory

11 F.A. No.206 of 2018

application for interim maintenance of the daughter, for which, I.A.

No.702 of 2021 was filed and is pending.

16. However, on the merits of the appeal, learned counsel

submits that, except for a vague allegation of cruelty and desertion,

no material has been brought on record to substantiate the same. It

has been stated that the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,

Bokaro, has discussed at length the evidence of the parties and the

documents brought on record by the present appellant, and has

also considered the mandate of law. Learned counsel further

submits that the protection of marriage is the mandate of law, and

marriage can be dissolved only on the grounds contained in the

provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. Though cruelty has no

standard definition, to dissolve the marriage on the ground of

cruelty, the appellant was bound to establish such acts on the part

of the respondent that made the continuation of matrimonial life

impossible.

17. Under the circumstances, the finding of the learned Trial

Court that no ground of cruelty is made out does not require any

interference. Similarly, the basic requirement for instituting a suit on

the ground of desertion was not met, and therefore the dismissal of

the suit for want of a cause of action for dissolution of marriage on

the ground of desertion was rightly decided by the learned Trial

Court. The prayer is made to dismiss the present appeal.

18. Written arguments have also been filed on behalf of the

appellant, which are on record, reiterating the oral arguments made

12 F.A. No.206 of 2018

earlier. They state that on 25. 02. 25.02.2001, the marriage was

solemnised, and in February 2002, the respondent began

misbehaving with the present appellant. In March 2003, due to the

respondent' s jaundice, she was admitted to hospital for treatment,

but subsequently her parents brought her back to Bokaro. In May

2003, the appellant went to England for education. In December

2003, the appellant joined MGM Medical College, Mumbai, as a

lecturer, and the respondent was working at Rajiv Gandhi Medical

College, Mumbai, but was residing in the college hostel. In 2006,

after completing her education, the respondent came to the

appellant' s residence, and they lived together. In September 2006,

the respondent became pregnant. Thereafter, they came to Ranchi,

stayed with the appellant' s parents, and she was admitted to

hospital on 12. 10. 2006. She then went to Bokaro with her parents

and stayed at her parents’ house, where she gave birth to a female

child. On 27. 10. 27.10.2007, the respondent came to Mumbai to

the appellant' s house to collect her educational certificates. She

stayed there for two days, but her behaviour towards the appellant

remained rude and cruel, and during this period there was no

restoration of conjugal life between the parties. In April 2008, a

legal notice was sent by the appellant' s advocate seeking

dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. A reply was sent to the

said legal notice, withdrawing the notice with a threat of filing a

criminal case, and on 09. 06. 09.06.2008, the present matrimonial

suit was instituted for dissolution of marriage on the ground of

cruelty and desertion. On 14. 07. 14.07.2008, Complaint Case No.

13 F.A. No.206 of 2018

372 of 2008 was filed by the respondent before the Court of the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, with allegations under Section

498 A of the IPC, and on 25. 11. 25.11.2008, cognizance was taken

of the said offence against the present appellant and his parents.

He alleges that the present appellant' s parents died during the

pendency of the said criminal case due to shock caused by the

criminal case. He further alleges that the complaint was dismissed

for non- filing of necessary requisites. On 07. 08. 07.08.2012, the

case was transferred from the Court of the Principal Judge, Family

Court, Ranchi, to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro.

Thereafter, the written arguments mention the oral evidence

examined on behalf of the parties.

FINDINGS

19. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties in the rival

contentions raised therein, the following points for determination fall

for our consideration.

Whether the appellant had proved a case for cruelty

or desertion by the respondent so as to entitle him to

a decree of divorce under Sections 13(1) (ia) & (ib) of

the Hindu Marriage Act.

20. Before coming to the facts of the present case, we would like

to mention that there is no standard definition of cruelty under the

Hindu Marriage Act. Even if some definition is provided in certain

judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is subject to the rider that

such aspects of cruelty were considered in the facts of those cases,

14 F.A. No.206 of 2018

and therefore, cruelty for the purpose of divorce has to be

determined on the basis of the facts of each case itself.

21. In Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi, reported in (1988) 1

SCC, 105, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that cruelty is conduct

in relation to or in respect of the matrimonial relationship,

disregarding the matrimonial obligations. Such conduct should

adversely affect the other spouse; it can be mental or physical,

intentional or unintentional. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and

more a question of fact and degree of cruelty, while mental cruelty

has to be determined on the respective conduct of the parties.

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijaykumar Ramchandra

Bhate Vs. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, reported in (2003) 6 SCC

334, observed that an allegation of ‘unchaste’ and indecent

familiarity with a person outside wedlock may constitute cruelty.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar Vs. Bharti Jaiswal

Majumdar, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 742, held that, in order to

judge whether conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is

whether that conduct is sustained over a period of time and renders

the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to

live with the other.

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya

Ghosh, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511, while making certain

illustrative but not exhaustive aspects of cruelty at Para-101 of the

Judgment, observed as hereunder: -

15 F.A. No.206 of 2018

“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for

guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some

instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in

dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The instances

indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative

and not exhaustive.

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the

parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as

would not make possible for the parties to live with each

other could come within the broad parameters of mental

cruelty.

(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial

life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that

situation is such, that the wronged party cannot

reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and

continue to live with other party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to

cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of

manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a

degree that it makes the married life for the other

spouse absolutely intolerable.

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep

anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse

caused by the conduct of other, for a long time may

lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating

treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render

miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one

spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of

the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the

16 F.A. No.206 of 2018

resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave,

substantial and weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,

indifference or total departure from the normal standard

of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or

deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental

cruelty.

(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,

selfishness, possessiveness, which causes

unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset

may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground

of mental cruelty.

(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of

the married life which happens in day-to-day life would

not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of

mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a

few isolated instances over a period of years will not

amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for

a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has

deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and

behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it

extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer,

may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of

sterilization without medical reasons and without the

consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife

undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical

reason or without the consent or knowledge of her

husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental

cruelty.

17 F.A. No.206 of 2018

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for

considerable period without there being any physical

incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental

cruelty.

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after

marriage not to have child from the marriage may

amount to cruelty.

(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous

separation, it may fairly be concluded that the

matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage

becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By

refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases does

not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it

shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the

parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental

cruelty.”

24. With the mandate of the law in the background, we would like

to examine the oral and documentary evidence on record,

particularly the appellant's evidence. The appellant has been

examined as the first witness, and in his examination-in-chief on

affidavit, he has reiterated the case as pleaded. In his cross-

examination at Para-42, he admits that he saw his daughter for the

first time in October 2007, when his wife came to Mumbai with her

sister and cousin brother, while his daughter was admittedly born in

May 2007. Admittedly, from May 2007 to October 2007, he had not

bothered to see his daughter. The remaining facts that have come

up in the deposition are as per the respective parties' pleadings

regarding illness, hospital admission, etc. In her evidence in

examination-in-chief, the respondent once again reiterates the facts

18 F.A. No.206 of 2018

as per the pleadings. She says that at present she is working at

BGH and has been a regular employee there since 2010. She

admits to having replied to the notice received from her husband.

After receiving the notice, she tried to contact her husband and

even spoke with him on the telephone. Efforts were made by all the

family members and even common friends, as mentioned at Para

24 of the cross-examination, and then she denied the suggestions

of having meted out cruelty or deserted her husband. Exhibits 1 and

2 are significant. In the notice sent to the present respondent

through the advocate of the present appellant, the allegation of

misbehaviour with the family members since February 2002 is set

out. The notice also alleges desertion and cruelty and demands a

decree for divorce by mutual consent. In the reply notice, which is

marked Exhibit-2, it is categorically stated that the allegations of

cruelty and desertion are false, and that the respondent was treated

with cruelty by the husband and other family members. The date of

birth of the child mentioned in the notice is also stated to be wrong,

which shows his apathy for the family.

25. The allegation of dowry demand is also there, and it is stated

that, for non-fulfilment of the dowry demand, she was tortured by

the husband and his family members. The allegation of ousting the

respondent from the appellant's house in Mumbai along with her

sister is also stated. Despite this, no legal action was taken, and the

respondent still desired to restore conjugal life. The allegation of

taking away the jewellery and other belongings of the respondent is

also denied, and finally it is stated that, if such a legal notice is not

19 F.A. No.206 of 2018

withdrawn, the respondent would be compelled to file an

appropriate case before a Court of competent jurisdiction. It was

categorically stated that the respondent was not ready to take any

divorce and would contest any such application made by the

present appellant.

26. On evaluation, we agree with the learned trial court’s view

that no case of cruelty was made out by the appellant to be entitled

to a decree of divorce. With the facts and the mandate of law, the

Filing of a complaint cannot be considered to be an act of cruelty,

and the allegation that the parents of the appellant died due to

shock on account of a complaint filed by the respondent is also

misplaced. No evidence regarding cause of death of the parents of

the appellant has been brought on record. It is admitted that in the

said complaint filed by the present respondent, cognisance of the

offence was taken, which prima facie establishes the correctness of

the allegation.

27. The complaint was dismissed not on the allegation that it was

false or unsubstantiated; rather, it was dismissed for non-filing of

requisites, i.e., on account of non-prosecution. Thus, mere filing of

a complaint and its dismissal for non-filing of requisites under

Section 204(4) of the Cr.P.C. will not amount to cruelty on the

husband. As the aspects of cruelty have not been proved, we are of

the considered view that no interference with the findings qua

cruelty, as returned by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,

Bokaro, is required. Hence, it is concluded that no case of cruelty

was established by the appellant-husband.

20 F.A. No.206 of 2018

28. Coming to the case of desertion, since the Trial Court record

is available before us and on perusal of the same, it appears that

the suit was not instituted on the ground of desertion, rather it was

instituted only on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1) (i-a) of

the Hindu Marriage Act. However, in the application for dissolution

of marriage, the ground of desertion was also taken, but there was

no specific pleading as to when the respondent had deserted the

appellant; still, the trial Court framed the issue, and evidence was

taken on behalf of the parties. The learned Trial Court concluded

that sufficient evidence showed the respondent had lived with the

appellant till October 2007; thus, the cause of action for filing an

application for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion

was premature.

29. We are of the considered view that the learned Trial Court's

findings on these aspects also do not require any interference.

Moreover, if Exhibit-2, as brought on record on behalf of the

appellant, is considered, it is apparent that the respondent, in her

reply to the notice issued by the appellant's advocate, categorically

stated that she was still desirous of restoring conjugal life. Thus, the

Animus Deserendi was completely lacking.

30. It is reiterated that no specific averment of the date of

desertion has been made and merely arguing that the respondent

joining the appellant in the month of October 2007 still did not

amount to breaking of the period of desertion, as such living

together, was without any intent to restore the conjugal life, is

insufficient pleading and evidence on the point of desertion. The

21 F.A. No.206 of 2018

child was born in May 2007, while the present suit for dissolution of

marriage was instituted in June 2008. These facts negate the plea

of desertion. We are therefore of the considered view that no

ground of desertion is made out and the finding of the learned Trial

Court on this aspect is also affirmed.

31. In view of the findings made hereinabove, the point for

determination formulated by this Court is decided in favour of the

respondent and against the appellant and it is held that no case of

cruelty by the respondent on the appellant or desertion by the

respondent as alleged by the appellant was made out, sufficient for

the purpose of granting a decree for dissolution of marriage under

Section 13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

I.A. No.702 of 2021

32. This I. A is still pending, which was filed under Section 24 of

the Hindu Marriage Act for maintenance pendentilite for the

respondent and her daughter, Baby Khushi, represented by the

present respondent.

33. Rejoinder has also been filed to this I.A, where once again

similar plea has been taken, as taken in course of arguments i.e.

filing of a complaint case No.372 of 2008 and subsequent dismissal

of the said case for non-filing of requisites, transfer of the case etc.

The allegations are that such demand is arbitrary and excessive.

34. The affidavit in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Rajnish Vs Neha, reported in

(2021) 2 SCC 324, has also been filed, which is on record. The

22 F.A. No.206 of 2018

present record also reveals that on several occasions, efforts for

settlement were made, but to no effect. Even the Coordinate Bench

of this Court, while hearing this matter, had made efforts for

reconciliation, having sittings in the chamber, but finally, all such

efforts failed and the possibility of reconciliation in this case has

come to an end.

35. Subsequently, the matter of alimony was also discussed, and

maintenance for the daughter was also under consideration. The

record shows that the directions were given to file salary statements

by both the parties. In compliance thereof, the affidavits were also

filed. The order No.42 dated 29

th

April 2025, shows that the

appellant-husband was ready for settlement on payment of Rupees

Fifteen Lakhs for the proper upbringing of the daughter and the cost

which will be incurred in her marriage and education.

36. For the sake of convenience, the same is quoted a s

hereunder: -

Order No.42 / Dated : 29

th

April, 2025

1. Heard Mr. Mahesh Tewari, the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant-husband and Mr. Srijit

Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-wife.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has

submitted that the husband is ready for settlement on

payment of Rs.15 Lakhs for proper upbringing of the

daughter and the cost which will be incurred in her

marriage and education.

23 F.A. No.206 of 2018

3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife

has not agreed for the same, however, he has submitted

that he will come forth with the proposal of the

respondent-wife on the next date of hearing.

4. Considering the same, let this matter be listed on

08.05.2025.

37. Since no consensus was arrived at, on the point of

pendentilite maintenance to be paid for the daughter and also

considering the proposal made by the husband, we are of the

considered view, that while reserving the right to the parties to file

proper application for maintenance which the daughter has against

her father, the present appellant is directed to deposit Rupees

Fifteen Lakhs before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro,

which shall be deposited in her account to be opened in the name

of minor daughter through her mother to be used for the education

and other expenses of the minor daughter.

38. This is without prejudice to the right of the child to claim

maintenance under the appropriate provisions of law. However, any

such final order of maintenance, if passed by a court of competent

jurisdiction, shall consider the payment of Rupees Fifteen Lakhs,

which shall be deposited by the present appellant in the name of his

minor daughter. The respondent has not claimed any expenses for

herself at this stage. Accordingly, with the above direction, I.A.

No.702 of 2021 stands disposed of.

24 F.A. No.206 of 2018

39. In view of the findings given above, it is held that the present

appeal is meritless and the same is accordingly dismissed, without

any costs.

40. Other I.As, if any pending, do not survive and also stand

disposed of.

(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Manoj Prasad, J.)

November, 5

th

, 2026

BS/-

A.F.R.