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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

RSA No. 356 of 2026

CNR No. ODHC01-052993-2026

[In the matter of an appeal under Section 100 read with Order

41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.]

AFR Dr. Satya Narayan Mishra ……… Appellant

Versus

Snigdharani Sarangi @

Mishra & Ors. ………. Respondents

Advocate(s) appeared in this case though hybrid mode:

__________________________________________________________

For Appellant : M/s. B.S. Panigrahi, S. Pradhan &

A.P. Bose, Advocates

For Respondents : Mr. Gopinath Mishra, Sr. Advocate

With M/s. Mohammed Akhter raza

Khan, Pragyan Paramita Mohanty,

S. Samantaray, S. Parida

__________________________________________________________

CORAM:

JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

JUDGMENT

16.10.2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

This is a plaintiff’s appeal against a partly reversing

judgment. The suit for partition was decreed by the trial

Court but partly reversed in appeal preferred by defendant

No.1. The present appeal seeks to assail the judgment passed RSA/356/2026

ODHC010529932026

2026:OHC:210

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by the learned 3

rd Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Cuttack in RFA No. 103 of 2024 on 11.05.2026 followed by

decree on 18.05.2026 in modifying the judgment passed by

learned 2

nd Additional Civil Judge, (Sr. Division), Cuttack on

27.12.2023 and decree passed on 06.01.2024 in C.S. (I)

No.145 of 2002.

2. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per

their respective status in the trial Court.

3. The plaintiff-appellant’s case, briefly stated, is that

one Harihar Panchanan was the common ancestor of the

plaintiff and the defendants. His only son Baman Charan

Mishra died on 11.08.1997 leaving behind the plaintiff and

the defendants as his legal heirs. The plaintiff claims that the

Schedule-B, C and D properties were the ancestral properties

of his father and that the residential house of the family

stands over the Schedule-D property. He further claims that

the Schedule-E to L properties were the self-acquired

properties of his father and his grandfather which were

purchased in the name of his mother and siblings and that

his wife’s dowry articles under Schedule-M were also kept in

the family house. As a result of the disputes that arose

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between the parties over partition and possession of the

above properties and return of dowry articles, the plaintiff

filed the suit for partition and other reliefs.

4. The defendant no.1 to 3 filed a joint written

statement denying the plaintiff’s claims. The defendants

further pleaded that the plaintiff had relinquished his rights

over Schedule-D property in lieu of Rs. 65,000/- pursuant to

a family settlement. The defendants further claimed that

using the said amount, the plaintiff constructed a separate

house and lived apart from the family ever since, thus,

extinguishing his right over the said property on the plea of

ouster.

5. Defendant no.4, the mother of the plaintiff, filed a

separate written statement challenging the maintainability of

the suit and claiming exclusive ownership over the Schedule-

E, G and H properties which she acquired out of her

Streedhan. She further claims that the other defendants

individually own the properties recorded in their names. It is

her further case that the plaintiff relinquished his right over

the Schedule-D property basing on prior settlement and

prayed for dismissal of the suit.

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6. Basing on the rival pleadings the trial court framed

the following issues for determination: -

“(i) Whether the suit is maintainable?

(ii) Whether there is any cause of action for filing of the

suit?

(iii) Whether the plaintiff has any locus-standi to file the

suit for partition?

(iv) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-

joinder of necessary party?

(v) Whether the plaintiff has got any share over the "D"

schedule property?

(vi) To what extent of share the plaintiff is entitled to get

in schedule "B" & "C" property?

(vii) Whether schedule "E" to "H" property are the self-

acquired property of Bimala Devi defendant No.4 and

partiable at the instance of the plaintiff?

(viii) Whether the schedule J to L property have been

acquired by other family members independently and

the plaintiff has got any share in it?

(ix) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim partition of

schedule D to L property?

(x) Whether the family settlement executed on 15.4.88

during the life time of Baman Charan Mishra is binding

on the plaintiff?

(xi) Is the plaintiff entitled to any other reliefs?”

7. The trial court took up issue Nos. (v), (vi), (vii),

(viii), (ix) and (x) for consideration jointly at the outset. After

analysing the oral and documentary evidence on record, the

trial court, inter alia, held that the plaintiff had a claim of

1/6

th share in Schedule- B, C and D properties along with

the existing defendants and their legal heirs basing on the

fact that the property described in the document under Ext-

A (family settlement) did not match the Schedule-D property

under the plaint and that the document did not account for

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the share of the daughters. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to

his share in the above property. The remaining issues were

decided accordingly. The suit was decreed by directing

partition of Schedule-B, C, and D properties among the

parties leaving out the properties of Schedule-E to M in view

of the admitted facts and legal impediments.

8. Feeling aggrieved, Defendant No.1(a) carried

appeal being in RFA No. 103 of 2024. The first appellate

Court, after reappreciating the evidence, modified the order

of the trial court in respect of the Schedule-D property by

holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the

partition of Schedule-D property in view the prior family

settlement.

9. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the

present second appeal, which was admitted on the following

substantial question of law: -

“(A) Whether the Family Settlement Deed dtd.15.04.1988

vide Ext.-A requires compulsory registration U/s 17 of the

Registration Act, 1908 to have its legal effect and to make

the same enforceable under law and the leamed lower

appellate Court committed an error in accepting the same as

a valid piece of evidence in the absence of registration

thereof?”

10. Heard Mr. A.P. Bose and Mr. Bhawani Shankar

Panigrahi for the Plaintiff-Appellant and Mr. G.N. Mishra,

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learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Pragyan Paramita

Mohanty, learned counsel for the Defendant-Respondents.

11. Both Mr. Bose and Mr. Panigrahi would submit

that the appellate court completely failed to appreciate the

pleadings and evidence on record in the proper perspective

to hold that the plaintiff had no share in Schedule-D

properties basing on the family settlement deed (Ext.A) dated

15.04.1988. They argue that the said document being an

unregistered one, could not have been accepted as it was

contrary to the provisions of Section-17 of the Registration

Act, 1908. It is further argued that the said deed does not

completely cover the suit properties described under

Schedule-D but the appellate court erred in presuming that

the same had been executed with respect to the said

property. Thus, the appellate court should not have accepted

the same and denied the plaintiff’s claim for partition in

Schedule-D property. They further submit that the Schedule-

D property, which also contains the residential house of the

parties is under the joint possession of the parties and that

an unregistered deed cannot be relied upon to deny partition.

Since, according to the deed, the plaintiff relinquished his

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claim/title over Schedule-D properties upon receipt of

Rs.65,000/-, it amounts to conveyance of title in favour of

the defendant no.1. This, brings it within the mischief of

Section 17. Hence, being unregistered, it could not have been

relied upon.

12. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel, on the other

hand submits that the family settlement deed is not an

instrument of partition inasmuch as the document did not

lead to the partition within the family but is only a record of

a previous arrangement already acted upon by the members

of the family. The plaintiff has admitted such fact in the

plaint as well as in his cross-examination. The property in

question was recorded in favour of defendant No.1 basing on

the concession of the other brothers in the OLR Case acting

on the previous arrangement. Mr. Mishra further argues that

receipt of Rs.65,000/- by the plaintiff cannot be treated as

creation of new interest nor relinquishment of title/interest.

Therefore, the document does not require compulsory

registration.

13. Perusal of the evidence on record and the

judgments and decree of the lower courts reveal that the

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document under Ext.A purports to record a family settlement

between the members, who are siblings including their

father, namely, Baman Charan Mishra. Since, there is some

doubt as regards description of the property under Schedule-

D as compared to Ext-A, it would be better to deal with this

aspect at first.

14. The property is described in Ext-A as follows: -

“

ଭୁ ବନେᚧର ଟାଉେ୍ ମୁକାମନର ଏକର ୦.୩୨ ନେସିମିଲ ᙝଳମାେ ଜରିବ

ବନଦାବᙜ ରହିଅଛି। ଉᘹ ଭୁ ବନେᚧର ଟାଉେ୍ ମୁକାମନର ଏକର ୦.୩୨

ନର ᙝାୟୀ ପᘪା

ଘର କରି ଘରବାଡି ରୂ ନପ ବୟବହାର କରି ଆᙛେ ସମᙜ

ପᙌ ମାନେ ଚଳାଚଳ ନହଉଅଛୁ । ”

A loose translation of the above recitals is

reproduced hereinbelow: -

“An area of Ac. 0.32 decimals of land situated at

Bhubaneswar Town has been settled under JARIB

Bandobast. All of us, being the parties concerned,

have constructed permanent pucca houses over the

said land and have been using the same for

residential purposes.”

The property under Schedule-D of the plaint is

described as follows: -

SCHEDULE ‘D’

District — Khurda, Tahasil — Bhubaneswar,

Mouza — Bhubaneswar Sahar

Unit No.28 — Goutam Nagar

Khatian No. 750

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Plot

No.

Area Value

477 A0.303

decimal

Rs.35,000/-

(Rupees Thirty-Five thousand)

only including buildings are

standing thereon”

The descriptions, when compared, reveal minor

discrepancies in the area. However, read as a whole including

the place where it is situated, it is seen that the property

described in the plaint schedule and in the document under

Ext.A are the same. Thus, the trial court’s reasoning that

there is mismatch of description is factually incorrect.

15. Now, the principal question that remains to be

answered is, whether Ext.A compulsorily requires

registration under Section-17 of the Registration Act to be

admissible. For reference, Section-17 is reproduced

hereinbelow: -

“S.17- Documents of which registration is

compulsory.

(1)The following documents shall be registered, if the

property to which they relate is situate in a district in

which, and if they have been executed on or after the

date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian

Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act,

1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act

came or comes into force, namely,

(a)instruments of gift of immovable property;

(b)other non-testamentary instruments which purport or

operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,

whether in present or in future, any right, title or

interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of

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one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable

property;

(c)non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge

the receipt or payment of any consideration on account

of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or

extinction of any such right, title or interest; and……..

xx xx xx xx ”

16. Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908,

requires registration of non-testamentary instruments which

purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or

extinguish rights in immovable property of the prescribed

value. Section 17(1)(c), concerning instruments

acknowledging receipt or payment of consideration on

account of the creation or extinguishment of such rights,

must also be considered in light of the terms and legal effect

of the document. The requirement of registration must

therefore be determined by examining the substance of Ext.

A and the circumstances in which it was executed.

17. Perusal of the document under Ext-A reveals that

during the time of its preparation, the parties i.e., the

members of the family were possessing separate properties

as per the schedules appended, though initially, they were

residing jointly in the residential house at Bhubaneswar,

which corresponds to Schedule-D property. It further states

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that the plaintiff received a sum of Rs. 65,000/- from his

parents, specifically his father, (Party no.5 in the said family

settlement deed) because he had extinguished his right in the

Schedule-D property. However, the mere recital of payment

of consideration does not, by itself, establish that the

relinquishment had been completed before the document

was executed. The question is, whether the evidence on

record establishes that the family arrangement had already

been acted upon and Ext. A was drawn up only to record the

arrangement, or whether the document itself was intended to

effect the relinquishment.

18. Perusal of Ext. A, particularly page-3 thereof,

reveals that Baman Charan Mishra, described as Party No.5

in the family settlement, stated that the plaintiff, described

as Party No.1, was being paid a sum of ₹65,000 for building

a separate house in the place of his liking because he was

not given a share in the family house situated at

Bhubaneswar i.e. Schedule-D property. The recital thus

refers to the payment of the agreed amount to the plaintiff.

19. The aforesaid recital, read in the context of the

document as a whole, supports the defendants' case that the

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family arrangement had already been given effect to at and

that Ext. A was intended to record the arrangement, rather

than to effect it. This interpretation must, however, be

considered alongside the other recitals in Ext. A and the

evidence on record concerning the circumstances in which

the arrangement was arrived at and the payment was made.

The relevant recitals from Ext.A are reproduced hereinbelow:

“xxxxxxxxxx

ଏହିକି ᙛେ ଜି:କଟକ, ଥାନା: ଆଠଗଡ ନ୪୭୍ବର ᙛ୍ୌ: ନିଜଗଡ

ଏନ. ଏ. ସି., ୱାଡଡ ନ୬୍ବର ରାଧାନାଥପୁର ଶାସନᙛର ଓ ହାଲᙛର ଜି:ପୁରୀ,

ଭୁବᙛନᙫର ଟାଉନ ୍ୁକା୍ᙛର ଆେ୍ାନᘮର ବାସଽାନ ଅᙛଟ । ଆᙛେ ନ୫-୬

୍ବର ପᙌ ଉଭୟ ᙭ା୍ୀ ଼ୀ ଅଟୁ । ନ ୧, ୨, ୩, ୪୍ବର ପᙌ୍ାᙛନ ଆ୍ବ ୍ାନᘮର

ᙛ୍ୌ:ନିଜଗଡ ରକବାᙛର ଏକ.୮୨ ᙛଡସି୍ିଲ ଉଵ ଥାନାର ନ୩୬୍ବର

ᙛ୍ୌ:ବିରକିᙛଶାରପୁର ରକବାᙛର ଏ୦.୩.୫୮ ᙛଡସି୍ିଲ ଜି: ପୁରୀ ଟାଉନ: ପୁରୀ

ପᙐି୍ ᙛାର ବାᙛଶଳି ସାହି ଏ୦.୦୩.୦୨ ଜି:ପୁରୀ ଭୁବᙛନ᙭ର ଟାଉନ ୍ୁକା୍ᙛର

ଏ୦.୩୨ ᙛଡସି୍ିଲ ଽଳ ୍ାନ ଜରିବ ବᙛଦାବ଼ ରହିଅଛି, ଉଵ ଭୁବᙛନଶବର ଟାଉନ

୍ୁକା୍ ଏ୦.୩୨ ᙛର ଽାୟୀ ପକାଘର କରି ଘରବାରୀ ରୂᙛପ ବୟବହାର କରି ଆᙛେ

ସ଼୍ ପᙌ୍ାᙛନ ଚଳାଚଳ ᙛହଉଅଛୁ । ୧, ୨, ୩, ୪୍ବର ପᙌ୍ାନᘮୁ େଥାଶଵି

ଶିᙌା ᙚଧାନ କରାଇ ଉପାଜଡନ ᙌ୍ କରାଇ ପାରି ଅଛୁ। ଭବି୍ୟତ ସୁଖ ସୁବିଧା

ନିଜପଦᙛର ᙛଭାଗ ଦାଖଲ କରି ଆସୁଅଛୁ।

xxxxxxxxxx

A loose translation of the above recitals is reproduced

hereinbelow: -

“xxxxxxxxxx That our residence is at District: Cuttack,

Police Station: Athagarh, Khata No. 47, Mouza:

Nijagada N.A.C., Ward No. 6, Radhanathpur Shasan,

and presently at Bhubaneswar Town, District: Puri. We,

Party Nos. 5 and 6, are husband and wife. Party Nos.

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1, 2, 3 and 4 are our sons and heirs. There are lands

measuring Ac. 0.82 decimals at Mouza: Nijagada,

Khata No. 47, Police Station: Athagarh; Ac. 0.3.58

decimals at Mouza: Birakishorepur, Khata No. 36 of the

said police station; Ac. 0.03.02 at Baseli Sahi, Puri

Paschim Dwar, Puri Town, District: Puri; and Ac. 0.32

decimals at Bhubaneswar Town, District: Puri, in the

name of Party No. 5, which have been surveyed and

settled. On the said Ac. 0.32 decimals at Bhubaneswar

Town, we have constructed a permanent pucca house

and have been using it as a homestead, and all of us

parties have been residing and carrying on our affairs

there. We have provided Party Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 with

education to the best of our ability and made them

capable of earning. For future happiness and

convenience, we, the parties, have jointly executed a

mutual partition deed, and have been possessing and

enjoying in our own rights the respective shares of the

property described in the schedule. xxxxxxxxx”

A plain reading of the recitals show that the

members of the family were already possessing their

respective shares, more fully described in the different

schedules appended to Ext.A, which militate against the

argument that such arrangement was intended to be given

effect to for the first time upon execution of the document.

20. Now, the question is, whether such a deed requires

registration compulsorily. It would be apposite in this context

to refer to the judgment of the supreme court in the case of

Tek Bahadur Bhujil Vs. Debi Singh Bhujil and Ors., AIR

1966 SC 292, where the following was held: -

“12. The next contention for the appellant is that the

agreement Exhibit 3 required registration and is of no

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effect as it was not registered under the Indian

Registration Act. The trial Court and the first

appellate Court held that the Registration Act was not

in force in the area where the agreement was

executed at the time of its execution in 1942. The High

Court, on the basis of fresh evidence, was of opinion

that the matter required further elucidation and that

it was not necessary to remand the case for a finding

on the point as in its opinion this agreement did not

require registration even if the Registration Act was

in force in that area at the time of its execution. We

need not say therefore anything further about the

applicability of the Registration Act in that area, but

we have, however, still to consider the contention for

the appellant that the agreement Exhibit 3 did require

registration. If we agree with him on this point, it

would be necessary for the final disposal of the ease

that a clear-cut finding on the question of the

applicability of the Registration Act in that area be

recorded by the trial Court or the first appellate Court.

We, however, do not agree with the contention of the

appellant that the agreement Exhibit 3 required

registration

13. Family arrangement as such can be arrived at

orally. Its terms may be recorded in writing as a

memorandum of what had been agreed upon

between the parties. The memorandum need not be

prepared for the purpose of being used as a document

on which future title of the parties be founded. It is

usually prepared as a record of what had been

agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it

in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family

arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that

writing as proof of what they had arranged and,

where the arrangement is brought about by the

document as such, that the document would require

registration as it is then that it would be a document

of title declaring for future what rights in what

properties the parties possess. The document Exhibit

3 does not appear to be of such a nature. It merely

records the statements which the three brothers

made, each referring to others as brothers and

referring to the properties as joint property. In fact,

the appellant, in his statement, referred to

respondents 1 and 2 as two brother co-partners; and

the last paragraph said:

“We, the three brothers, having agreed over the above

statement and having made our own statements in

Page 15 of 17

the presence of the Panch called by us, and signed

and kept a copy of each of this document as proof of

it.” The document would serve the purpose of proof or

evidence of what had been decided between the

brothers. It was not the basis of their rights in any

form over the property which each brother had agreed

to enjoy to the exclusion of the others. In substance it

records what had already been decided by the

parties. We may mention that the appellant and

respondent No. 1, even under this arrangement, were

to enjoy the property in suit jointly and it is this

agreement of theirs at the time which has later given

rise to the present litigation between the two. The

document, to our mind, is nothing but a memorandum

of what had taken place and, therefore, is not a

document which would require compulsory

registration under S. 17 of the Registration Act.”

[Emphasis added]

21. In the present case, the plaintiff had already given

up his rights over the Schedule-D property before 15.4.1988

and Ext.A merely recorded the plaintiff's relinquishment of

his rights in the Schedule-D property in a written form. The

document, therefore, did not itself operate to extinguish

those rights. This is supported by the admission of the

plaintiff’s father within the settlement deed itself that the

plaintiff had given up his rights prior to creation of the

document under Ext-A as quoted hereinbelow: -

“xxxxx

ନିᚚଡାରିତ ୍ᙛତ ନ୧୍ବର ପᙌ ଭୁବନᙫର ଽିତ ବାସ ଗୃହᙛର ଅଂଶ ପାଉ ନିବାରୁ

ତାᘮର ସୁବିଧା ୍ୁତାବକ ଽାନᙛର ବାସଗୃହ ତୟାର କରିବା କାରଳ ନଗଦ

xxxxx”

Page 16 of 17

A loose translation of the above portion is reproduced

hereinbelow: -

“xxxxxxxx. By executing this partition deed, we hereby

declare that, as determined by Party No 5, since Party

No 1 will not receive a share in the residential house

situated in Bhubaneswar, he shall receive cash of

Rs.65,000/- (Sixty-five thousand rupees only) for

constructing a residential house at a place convenient to

him. xxxxxxxxx”

Thus, the document doesn’t fall within the purview

of section-17 (1)(b) of the Registration Act.

22. Similarly, on page-3 of the document, Party No.5

stated that the consideration of Rs.65,000/- was being paid

to the plaintiff for constructing a house in a place of his liking

because he was not getting any share from the Schedule-D

property and not because of his relinquishment of his rights

itself. This Court is therefore, not inclined to accept the

contention raised that the document came into force on the

date of receipt of the amount of Rs.65,000/- as proof of

relinquishment of title. It was a sort of compensation paid to

the plaintiff for depriving him of a share of Schedule-D

property as per an arrangement already acted upon. For the

above reasons also, Ext-A cannot be treated as a document

compulsorily required to be registered.

Page 17 of 17

23. For the foregoing reasons, this court holds that the

requirement of compulsory registration under Section

17(1)(b) and (c) of the Registration Act, 1908 is not attracted

to Ext-A, the same being a memorandum of a family

arrangement already arrived at and acted upon by the parties

and not an instrument by which the plaintiff’s rights over the

Schedule-D property were extinguished for the first time.

24. Consequently, this Court finds no ground to

interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the learned

first appellate Court in respect of the Schedule-D property.

25. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

………………………..

Sashikanta Mishra

Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack

The 16

th October, 2026/ A.K. Rana, P.A.