2025 INSC 125 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9289 OF 2019

DR. TANVI BEHL APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHREY GOEL & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9290 OF 2019

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9291 OF 2019

AND

WRIT PETITION (C) NO.1183/2020

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1. The question before this Court is whether residence-based

reservation in Post Graduate (PG) Medical Courses by a State is

constitutionally valid? On this the precise questions formulated by

the Division Bench of this Court, which have now come up for

determination before this Court, are as follows:

2

“1. As to whether providing for

domicile/residence-based reservation in

admission to "PG Medical Courses" within the

State Quota is constitutionally invalid and is

impermissible?

2. (a) If answer to the first question is in the

negative and if domicile/residence -based

reservation in admission to "PG Medical Courses"

is permissible, what should be the extent and

manner of providing such domicile/residence-

based reservation for admission to "PG Medical

Courses" within the State Quota seats?

2.(b) Again, if domicile/residence -based

reservation in admission to "PG Medical Courses"

is permissible, considering that all the admissions

are to be based on the merit and rank obtained in

NEET, what should be the modality of providing

such domicile/residence-based reservation in

relation to the State/UT having only one Medical

College?

3. If answer to the first question is in the

affirmative and if domicile/residence-based

reservation in admission to "PG Medical Courses"

is impermissible, as to how the State Quota seats,

other than the permissible institutional preference

seats, are to be filled up?

2. Before we come to answer these questions, we must state the facts

first in order to get a perspective of the case before us. The case is

from the Union Territory of Chandigarh which has just one Medical

College called ‘The Government Medical College and Hospital ,

Chandigarh’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Medical College’). On

28.03.2019, the process of admissions to PG Medical Course in the

3

said Medical College had started. The Medical College had 64 PG

Medical seats in its State Quota and the relevant clause of the

prospectus, which was challenged before the High Court of Punjab

and Haryana, distributed these seats as follows:

“2. State Quota: 64 seats. In compliance of the

decision of Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High

Court, distribution of 50% State Quota seats are

as below:

Category Total

no. of

seats

Reserved

(SC) 15%

General

1. Institutional

Preference Pool

(IP)

32 5 27

2. UT, Chandigarh

Pool

32 5 27

Total 64 10 54

A. Institutional Preference Pool (IP): Candidates

who have passed their MBBS examination from

Govt. Medical College & Hospital Chandigarh

B. UT Chandigarh Pool: Candidate who fulfil

eligibility criteria as below: This category will

include candidates with background of

Chandigarh. To be eligible for this category

candidate should fulfil any of the following criteria:

i. Studied for a period of 5 years in the Union

Territory of Chandigarh at any time prior to the

last date of the submission of the application.

ii. Candidates whose parents have resided in

Union Territory of Chandigarh for a period of at

least 5 years at any time prior to the last date of

the submission of the application either in

pursuit of a profession or holding a job.

iii. Children of persons who have held/hold

immovable property in Union Territory of

Chandigarh for a period of five years at any time

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prior to the last date of the submission of 11 the

application. The property should be in the name

of the parents or the candidate himself/herself.

Important Note:

a) To be eligible for UT Chandigarh Pool under B(i),

the candidate must submit a certificate to the effect

from Principal of School/College located within the

territory of UT Chandigarh

b) To be eligible under B (ii), the candidate should

submit a certificate issued by the D.C of UT

Chandigarh to the effect that the candidate or his

parents have been residing/have resided in

Chandigarh at least for 5 years

c) To be eligible under B (iii), the candidate must

submit a certificate issued by D.C-cum-Estate

Officer/Tehsildar stating that the

candidate/parents of the candidate have held/are

holding immovable property in UT Chandigarh for

at least for 5 years prior to the submission of

application.”

As it is clear, for the 64 seats falling under the State quota all

are reserved either for the ‘residents’ of Chandigarh or for those who

have done their MBBS from the same Medical College in

Chandigarh.

3. Petitions were filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court

challenging the above provision as it gave reservation on the basis

of residence, which resulted in all 64 seats being filled either by the

residents of Chandigarh or by students who had done their MBBS

from the same Medical College under institutional preference. The

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petitioners therein had argued that the above provision was in direct

conflict with various decisions of the Supreme Court including

Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 , Dr.

Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654 and Saurabh

Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 . The High Court

in its well-considered decision, after taking note of the long line of

decisions of this Court, but primarily the three above-cited

decisions, came to the conclusion that the reservation made for the

PG Medical Course in the Medical College was on the basis of a long-

discarded principle of domicile or residence, was bad, and had

allowed the petitions cancelling the admission of such students.

4. The eligibilities stated in the prospectus for being a ‘resident’ of

Chandigarh are very wide and have no rationale to the objects

sought to be achieved. These even include a person who studied in

Chandigarh at any time for 5 years or the children of parents who

had property in Chandigarh for a period of 5 years at any point of

time!

Be that as it may, the High Court held that there has been a

violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in granting such

reservations. Consequently, the clause 2B (i), (ii) and (iii) were

declared invalid and unconstitutional and all admissions which

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were made by placing reliance on the above provision were held to

be bad. It was directed that the Medical College should now fill these

seats according to the merit position of candidates which they have

obtained in their NEET Examination.

The decision of the High Court was challenged before this Court and

the following interim order was passed by this Court on 09.05.2019:

“Permission to file special leave petitions is granted.

Application for exemption from filing certified copy of

the impugned order is allowed.

Permission to file additional documents is granted.

Issue notice, returnable on 2nd July, 2019.

Dasti, in addition, is permitted.

Counsel appearing for Medical Council of India

waives notice.

Liberty to the petitioner(s) to implead the students

already admitted to the post-graduate course for the

academic session 2019-2020.

There shall be ad-interim stay of the impugned order

till the next date of hearing.

It is, however, made clear that the admission

process already done on the basis of the stated

provisions governing domicile reservation will be

subject to the outcome of these petitions.”

5. Now, the Division Bench after framing of questions stated above,

referred the matter to this larger Bench. Let us straight away

answer the questions first: So far as question no. 1, which is

whether providing for domicile/residence-based reservation in

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admission to “PG Medical Course s” within the State quota is

constitutionally invalid and impermissible is concerned, our answer

is in the affirmative. Yes, it is constitutionally invalid. In other

words, providing for domicile or residence-based reservation in PG

Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible and cannot be

done. Now, since our answer to the first question is in the

affirmative, we need not answer the next two questions i.e., 2(a) and

2(b). We will answer the third question towards the end of this

judgment.

6. There are three judgments of this Court which have a significant

bearing on the question before us. The three judgments, in the

order of the year when they were delivered, are as follows:

(a) Jagadish Saran v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 768

(b) Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654

(c) Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC 146

Whereas Jagadish Saran and Pradeep Jain are three judge Bench

decisions, Saurabh Chaudri is a Constitution Bench judgment of

five judges.

7. In Jagadish Saran, essentially the question before this Court was

whether institution-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is

constitutionally valid and permissible. The answer which was given

8

by the Court was that it is permissible to a reasonable extent as it

only creates reasonable classification which has a nexus with the

object sought to be achieved and hence it is not violative of Article

14 of the Constitution of India. Although the question in

Jagadish Saran was not directly related to residence-based or

domicile-based reservation, yet while answering the main question

Justice Krishna Iyer in his inimitable manner did touch upon

various other aspects, including residence and its importance, and

most of all the importance of having merit-based reservation in Post

Graduate Medical studies.

8. In Pradeep Jain, the question before this Court was directly

relating to residence-based reservation in PG Medical courses and

whether that is permissible in law, and the answer given by this

Court was that though institution-based reservation is permissible,

as held in Jagadish Saran, but reservation made in PG Medical

seats on the basis of residence is impermissible and would be

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This line of

reasoning and ultimately, the law laid down in Pradeep Jain was

followed by the Constitution Bench of Saurabh Chaudri.

9. Now, once the Five Judge Constitution Bench (Saurabh Chaudri),

has answered the question in affirmative, which is that residence-

9

based or domicile-based reservation in PG Medical courses is

impermissible and constitutionally invalid, we did wonder initially

why these questions were framed at all in this case and referred to

us. One possible reason why this was done perhaps was that

Saurabh Chaudri has to be deciphered as it was dealing with

complex issues and while relying heavily on Pradeep Jain, which

in turn, relies on Jagadish Saran, it becomes difficult to demarcate

where Saurabh Chaudri ends and Pradeep Jain or Jagadish

Saran begins. But then a closer look at Saurabh Chaudri, leaves

one with no doubt that it has followed Pradeep Jain entirely and

therefore what has been held in Saurabh Chaudri is the same what

was earlier held in Pradeep Jain, which is that residence-based

reservation is not permissible in PG Medical Courses.

10. We first have to see the question before the Court in Saurabh Chaudri

and who were the petitioners before the Court? In Saurabh Chaudri, the

petitioners (52 in number), were residents of Delhi, who had joined

various medical colleges outside Delhi for their MBBS under an All-

India quota, and after completing their MBBS from outside now

wanted to join medical colleges in Delhi for their PG Medical Course.

Their claim for admission was based on the fact that they are

‘residents of Delhi’ and therefore they should be granted admission

under the residential quota which was otherwise reserved only for

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students who had done their MBBS from Delhi. Th is Court,

however, declined to grant them relief and their petition was

dismissed for the reason that residence-based reservation is

impermissible. The Court while dismissing their claim in Saurabh

Chaudri followed the reasoning given in a recently decided case of

Supreme Court in Magan Mehrotra & Ors. v. Union of India &

Ors. (2003) 11 SCC 186, which had relied totally on Pradeep Jain

and held that apart from institutional preferences, no other

preferences including reservation on the basis of residence is

envisaged in the Constitution.

11. Interestingly the appellants before this Court too rely on Saurabh

Chaudri and would argue that in Saurabh Chaudri this Court had

held that residence-based reservation is not barred under Article 15

of the Constitution. It is true that Saurabh Chaudri does say that,

which is indeed the correct position in law. But this would not be a

complete reading of Saurabh Chaudri!

12. The question in Saurabh Chaudri was the validity of institutional

preference/reservation as well as reservation based on residence.

The precise questions before the Court, in its own words are as

follows: (SCC p. 155, para 10)

“10. The question which was initially raised in

the writ petition was as to whether reservation

11

made by way of institutional preference is ultra

vires Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of

India; but during hearing a larger issue viz. as

to whether any reservation, be it on residence

or institutional preference, is constitutionally

permissible, was raised at the Bar.”

It answered in the affirmative for institutional preference and

held that to be a reasonable classification permissible under Article

14 of the Constitution of India.

13. While doing so Saurabh Chaudri relies heavily on both Pradeep

Jain and Jagadish Saran. Passages after passages have been

quoted from both Jagadish Saran and Pradeep Jain with

approval. At this stage we must also remember that to a reasonable

degree residence-based reservation in a State is permissible for

MBBS Courses (Pradeep Jain), but the same reservation for PG

Courses is not permissible by a long line of decisions of this Court,

including Pradeep Jain.

14. The difference in the logic in making reservations on the basis of

residence in UG level or MBBS level, and PG level (i.e. MD or MS)

was explained in Jagadish Saran as well as Pradeep Jain. It was

held that at PG level merit cannot be compromised, although

residence- based reservation can be permissible to a certain degree

in UG or MBBS course. While coming down heavily on residence-

12

based reservation in PG medical courses, it referred to the opinion

of the Medical Education Review Committee [relied upon in

Saurabh Chaudri (SCC p. 168, para 48)], which are as follows :-

(SCC p. 690, para 22)

“22. …‘all admissions to the postgraduate

courses in any institution should be open to

candidates on an all-India basis and there

should be no restriction regarding domicile in

the State/Union Territory in which the

institution is located’.”

15. Why residence-based reservation is impermissible is for the

reason that such reservation runs counter to the idea of

citizenship and equality under the Constitution. It was said as

under in Pradeep Jain :- (SCC p. 672, para 10)

“10. … Now, the primary imperative of Article

14 is equal opportunity for all across the nation

for education and advancement and, as pointed

out by Krishna Iyer, J. in Jagadish Saran

(Dr) v. Union of India [(1980) 2 SCC 768 : AIR

1980 SC 820] ‘this has burning relevance to our

times when the country is gradually being

“broken up into fragments by narrow domestic

walls” by surrender to narrow parochial

loyalties’. What is fundamental, as an enduring

value of our polity, is guarantee to each of equal

opportunity to unfold the full potential of his

personality. Anyone anywhere, humble or high,

agrestic or urban, man or woman, whatever be

his language or religion, place of birth or

residence, is entitled to be afforded equal

chance for admission to any secular educational

course for cultural growth, training facility,

speciality or employment. It would run counter

13

to the basic principle of equality before the law

and equal protection of the law if a citizen by

reason of his residence in State A, which

ordinarily in the commonality of cases, would be

the result of his birth in a place situate within

that State, should have opportunity for

education or advancement which is denied to

another citizen because he happens to be

resident in State B. It is axiomatic that talent is

not the monopoly of the residents of any

particular State; it is more or less evenly

distributed and given proper opportunity and

environment, everyone has a prospect of rising

to the peak. What is necessary is equality of

opportunity and that cannot be made dependent

upon where a citizen resides.”

The above passage from Pradeep Jain was relied upon in

Saurabh Chaudri (SCC p. 166, para 46), while coming to the same

conclusion.

16. There is no doubt that Saurabh Chaudri though holds institutional

preference or reservations to a reasonable extent permissible under

the Constitution in PG courses, yet holds reservation in PG Medical

Courses and other higher learning courses, on the basis of

‘residence’ in the State as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution

of India.

17. Article 14 of the Constitution of India speaks of Right to equality

and declares that “the State shall not deny to any person equality

before the law or the equal protection of law within the territory of

14

India”. Other Articles such as Article 15, 16, 17 and 18 are only

different facets of Right to equality.

18. Article 15 as it existed in the original Constitution declares that the

State shall not discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, caste,

sex or place of birth, though clause 3 is in the nature of a proviso

leaving it open for the State to make any special provision for women

and children. Later, clauses 4, 5 and 6 were added by way of

amendments to Article 15, creating similar enabling provisions for

other classes of citizens such as socially and educationally

backward classes, Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and

Economically Weaker Section of citizens in educational institutions.

We are primarily concerned here with Articles 14 and 15 of the

Constitution of India and we have to determine whether these

provisions prohibit residence-based reservations in PG Medical

courses. But before we do that, we must settle one question, which

is the concept of ‘domicile’, and domicile being equated to residence

or permanent residence, by the State machinery or by educational

institutions in a loose/casual manner. These concepts needs to be

clarified.

19. Domicile in normal parlance denotes ‘the place of living’ or

permanent residence. The legal concept is, however, different.

15

Domicile as stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England

1 is “the legal

system which invokes that system as his personal law”. The purpose

for which domicile is used by Governments is like a substitute for

‘permanent residence’ or a ‘permanent home’. Yet ‘domicile’ is

primarily a legal concept for the purposes of determining what is the

‘personal law’ applicable to an individual. Therefore, even if an

individual has no permanent residence or permanent home, he is

still invested with a ‘domicile’ albeit by law or implication of law.

Consequently, the concept of domicile acquires importance only

when within a country there are different laws or more precisely

different systems of law operating. But this is not the case in India.

Each citizen of this country carries with him or her, one single

domicile which is the ‘Domicile of India’. The concept of regional or

provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. The seminal

decision on this subject is Pradeep Jain. The aspect of domicile is

fully explained and elaborated, and needs to be referred to here.

Firstly, paragraph 8 of the said judgment would be relevant, which

reads as follows: (SCC p.668 para 8)

“8. Now it is clear on a reading of the Constitution

that it recognises only one domicile, namely,

domicile in India. Article 5 of the Constitution is

clear and explicit on this point and it refers only

1

HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4

th

ed.), Vol-8, para 421.

16

to one domicile, namely, “domicile in the territory

of India.” Moreover, it must be remembered that

India is not a federal State in the traditional

sense of that term. It is not a compact of sovereign

States which have come together to form a

federation by ceding a part of their sovereignty to

the federal State. It has undoubtedly certain

federal features but it is still not a federal State

and it has only one citizenship, namely, the

citizenship of India. It has also one single unified

legal system which e xtends througout the

country. It is not possible to say that a distinct

and separate system of law prevails in each

State forming part of the Union of India. The legal

system which prevails throughout the territory of

India is one single indivisible system with a

single unified justicing system having the

Supreme Court of India at the apex of the

hierarchy, which lays down the law for the entire

country. It is true that with respect to subjects set

out in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the

Constitution, the States have the power to make

laws and subject to the overriding power of

Parliament, the State can also make laws with

respect to subjects enumerated in List III of the

Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but the

legal system under the rubric of which such laws

are made by the States is a single legal system

which may truly be described as the Indian legal

system. It would be absurd to suggest that the

legal system varies from State to State or that the

legal system of a State is different from the legal

system of the Union of India, merely because with

respect to the subjects within their legislative

competence, the State have power to make laws.

The concept of ‘domicile’ has no relevance to the

applicability of municipal laws, whether made by

the Union of India or by the States. It would not,

therefore, in our opinion be right to say that a

citizen of India is domiciled in one State or

another forming part of the Union of India. The

domicile which he has is only one domicile,

17

namely, domicile in the territory of India. When a

person who is permanently resident in one State

goes to another State with intention to reside

there permanently or indefinitely, his domicile

does not undergo any change : he does not

acquire a new domicile of choice. His domicile

remains the same, namely, Indian domicile. We

think it highly detrimental to the concept of unity

or integrity of India to think in terms of State

domicile...”

20. This Court also took note of the common misconception with the

State Governments on domicile and had observed that it is not

uncommon for the State Governments to use the term ‘domicile’

when what they actually intend to mean is ‘permanent residence’,

or even ‘residence’.

21. In Pradeep Jain, the argument that domiciliary requirement for

admission to medical colleges and other colleges situated within the

State territory is used not in its legal sense but in a popular sense

denoting residence or an intention to reside permanently, was also

discussed, and this practice of wrongly using the nomenclature

‘domicile’ was condemned. This is what was said: (SCC p.669 para

8)

“8…We think it is dangerous to use a legal

concept for conveying a sense different from that

which is ordinarily associated with it as a result

of legal usage over the years. When we use a

word which has come to represent a concept or

idea for conveying a different concept or idea, it

is easy for the mind to slide into an assumption

18

that the verbal identity is accompanied in all its

sequences by identity or meaning. The concept of

domicile if used for a purpose other than its

legitimate purpose may give rise to lethal

radiations which may in the long run tend to

break up the unity and integrity of the country.

We would, therefore, strongly urge upon the State

Governments to exercise this wrong use of the

expression ‘domicile’ from the rules regulating

admissions to their educational institutions and

particularly medical colleges and to desist from

introducing and maintaining domiciliary

requirement as a condition of eligibility for such

admissions.”

The judgment at another place speaks as under: (SCC pp.664-665

para 3, 4)

“3… Now if India is one nation and there is only

one citizenship, namely, citizenship of India, and

every citizen has a right to move freely throughout

the territory of India and to reside and settle in

any part of India, irrespective of the place where

he is born or the language which he speaks or the

religion which he professes and he is guaranteed

freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse

throughout the territory of India and equal

protection of the law with other citizens in every

part of the territory of India, it is difficult to see

how a citizen having his permanent home in

Tamilnadu or speaking Tamil language can be

regarded as an outsider in Uttar Pradesh or a

citizen having his permanent home in

Maharashtra or speaking Marathi language be

regarded as an outsider in Karnataka. He must

be held entitled to the same rights as a citizen

having his permanent home in Uttar Pradesh or

Karnataka as the case may be. To regard him as

an outsider would be to deny him his

constitutional rights and to derecognize the

19

essential unity and integrity of the country by

treating it as if it were a mere conglomeration of

independent states.

4. But, unfortunately, we find that in the last few

years, owing to the emergence of narrow

parochial loyalties fostered by interested parties

with a view to gaining advantage for themselves,

a serious threat has developed to the unity and

integrity of the nation and the very concept of

India as a nation is in peril. The treat is obtrusive

at some places while at others it is still silent and

is masquerading under the guise of apparently

innocuous and rather attractive clap-trap. The

reason is that when the Constitution came into

operation, we took the spirit of nationhood for

granted and paid little attention to nourish it,

unmindful of the fact that it was a hardwon

concept. We allowed ‘sons of the soil’ demands to

develop claiming special treatment on the basis

of residence in the concerned State, because

recognizing and conceding such demands had a

populist appeal. The result is that ‘sons of the

soil’ claims, though not altogether illegitimate if

confined within reasonable bounds, are breaking

as under the unity and integrityof the nation by

fostering and strengthening narrow parochial

loyalties based on language and residence

within a State. Today unfortunately, a citizen

who has his permanent residence in a State

entertains the feeling that he must have a

preferential claim to be appointed to an office or

post in the State or to be admitted to an

educational institution within the State vis-à-vis

a citizen who has his permanent residence in

another State, because the latter is an outsider

and must yield place to a citizen who is a

permanent resident of the State, irrespective of

merit. This, in our opinion, is a dangerous feeling

which, if allowed to grow, indiscriminately, might

one day break up the country into fragments...”

20

22. Much before Pradeep Jain, a full bench of the Bombay High Court

had an occasion to examine the concept of domicile. In this

judgment, delivered by Chief Justice M.C. Chagla in The

State v. Narayandas Mangilal Dayame reported in AIR 1958

Bombay 68 (FB), the Full Bench stated as under:

“7. Now in our opinion, it is a total

misapprehension of the position in law in our

country to talk of a person being domiciled in a

province or in a State. A person can only be

domiciled in India as a whole. That is the only

country that can be considered in the context of

the expression “domicile” and the only system of

law by which a person is governed in India is the

system of law which prevails in the whole

country and not any system of law which

prevails in any province or State. It is hardly

necessary to emphasize that unlike the United

States of America, India has a single citizenship.

It has a single system of Courts of law and a

single judiciary and we do not have in India the

problem of duality that often arises in the

American Law, the problem which arises because

of a federal citizenship and a State citizenship.

Therefore, in India we have one citizenship, the

citizenship of India. We have one domicile—the

domicile in India and we have one legal system -

the system that prevails in the whole country.

The most that one can say about a person in a

State is that he is permanently resident in a

particular State. But as Halsbury points out, to

which we have just made reference, the mere fact

that a man's home maybe fixed at a particular

spot within the country does not make him

domiciled in that spot but makes him domiciled in

the whole country, and therefore, whether a man

permanently resides in Bombay or Madras or

Bengal or anywhere does not make him

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domiciled in Bombay, Madreas or Bengal but

makes him domiciled in India; Bombay, Madras

and Bengal being particular spots in India as a

country.”

23. In the same judgment it was also explained that merely because a

State legislature makes laws on certain subject matters, it will not

ipso facto mean that persons residing in that State have a provincial

domicile:

“8…The competence of the Legislature is not

limited to passing of laws which would only

apply to persons domiciled within the State. Any

law passed by a State Legislature can be applied

to any person within the State, and therefore the

expression ‘domicile’ has no relevancy whatever

in constructing the competency of the State

Legislature. If the State Legislature is legislating

on a topic within its competence, that law can be

made applicable to anyone in the State of

Bombay whether he is a resident or not or even if

he is a foreigner passing through the State of

Bombay. Therefore, it is fallacious to suggest that

the doctrine of domicile is introduced in our law

by person of the fact that the State or the

Provincial Legislature has been given the power

to legislate with regard to certain subject-matters

within its territorial ambit. It, therefore, seems to

us that the expression ‘domicile’ used in any

State or Provincial law is a misnomer and it does

not carry with the implications which that

expression has when used in the context of

international law…”

24. In short, the very concept of a provincial or state domicile in India

is a misconception. There is only one domicile in India, which we

22

refer to as domicile in the territory of India as given under Article 5

2.

All Indians have only one domicile, which is the Domicile of India.

25. Permanent residence or residence have a meaning which is different

from that of ‘domicile’. Article 15 speaks of ‘place of birth’, whereas

Article 16 states that no citizen shall be discriminated, inter alia, on

the ground of ‘residence’. State cannot grant reservation in public

employment on the basis of residence in that State. The exception

carved out under Clause 3 of Article 16, enables only the Parliament

to make a law prescribing a requirement of residence for State

employment. And there is a reason behind it.

26. During the Constituent Assembly debates a question arose whether

residence in a State should be a criterion for appointment in

government service of that State. The overwhelming opinion was

that it should not. Since there is one citizenship, a citizen should

have a right to reside anywhere in the country and similarly seek a

job anywhere in the country, this was the dominant feeling. For

those who had doubts on this, Dr. Ambedkar had a solution, which

he explained as follows:

2

Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution: At the commencement of this

Constitution, every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and—

(a) who was born in the territory of India; or

(b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or

(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately

preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India.

23

“It is the feeling of many persons in this House

that, since we have established a common

citizenship throughout India, irrespective of the

local jurisdiction of the provinces and the Indian

States, it is only a concomitant thing that

residence should not be required for holding a

particular post in a particular State because, in

so far as you make residence a qualification,

you are really subtracting from the value of a

common citizenship which we have established

by this Constitution or which we propose to

establish by this Constitution. Therefore in my

judgment, the argument that residence should

not be a qualification to hold appointments

under the State is a perfectly valid and a

perfectly sound argument. At the same time, it

must be realised that you cannot allow people

who are flying from one province to another,

from one State to another, as mere birds of

passage without any roots, without any

connection with that particular province, just to

come, apply for posts and, so to say, take the

plums and wa lk away. Therefore, some

limitation is necessary. It was found, when this

matter was investigated, that already today in

very many provinces rules have been framed by

the provincial governments prescribing a certain

period of residence as a qualification for a post

in that particular province. Therefore the

proposal in the amendment that, although as a

general rule residence should not be a

qualification, yet some exception might be made,

is not quite out of the ordinary. We are merely

following the practice which has been already

established in the various provinces. However,

what we found was that while different

provinces were laying down a certain period as

a qualifying period for posts, the periods varied

considerably. Some provinces said that a person

must be actually domiciled. What that means,

one does not know. Others have fixed ten years,

some seven years and so on. It was therefore

24

felt that, while it might be desirable to fix a

period as a qualifying test, that qualifying test

should be uniform throughout India.

Consequently, if that object is to be achieved,

viz., that the qualifying residential period should

be uniform, that object can be achieved only by

giving the power to Parliament and not giving it

to the local units, whether provinces or States.

That is the underlying purpose of this

amendment putting down residence as a

qualification.”3

27. It was ultimately decided that residence cannot be a ground for

discrimination in matters relating to employment, but in situations

which necessarily demand prescription of residence within any

State or UT as an essential qualification, it should be the Parliament

(and not State legislatures) which should be empowered to make a

law for that purpose, so that there is a uniformity throughout India

on this.

28. But all this was again on Article 16, which deals with the matters of

service and employment under a State. As compared to Article 16,

Article 15 is a general provision having a wider application

(including the issue of reservation to college admissions), and it does

not contain ‘residence’ as one of the prohibitory grounds, and

apparently one can say that Article 15 does not bar the State from

making ‘residence’ as a requirement, for admission in medical

3

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, VOL-VII, pgs.700-701.

25

colleges or like matters. We must, however, remember that both

Article 15 and Article 16 are different facets of the concept of

equality, embodied in Article 14 and therefore, a legislation can still

be struck down if it creates an unjustifiable classification, such as

between residents of a State and all others. Article 15 does not

speak of ‘residence’, it only speaks of ‘place of birth’ and the two

concepts are different (D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR

1955 SC 334). Article 16 does speak of residence but then it is in

the context of employment under a State , with which we are

presently not concerned. Yet the residence requirement has still to

pass muster Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

29. It is now necessary to refer to the detail reasoning given in Pradeep

Jain as to why residence-based reservation in PG Medical courses

is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, though to

maintain a balance and for consideration of local needs such

reservation may be permissible in MBBS courses. The reasoning

given was that it is the State which spends money on creating the

infrastructures and bears the expenses for running a medical

college, and therefore some reservation at the basic level of a medical

course i.e. MBBS can be permissible for the residents of that State.

The classification between residents and others here can be justified

26

as the classification seeks to maintain a balance as it considers local

needs, backwardness of the area, the expense borne by the State in

creating the infrastructure, etc.

The reason as to why residence -based reservation is

permissible for MBBS Course and not for higher courses i.e.

starting from PG Course in medicine, is given in Jagadish Saran

as well as Pradeep Jain. It is extremely well articulated by Justice

Krishna Iyer in Jagadish Saran. Therefore the reasoning given for

this classification must be reproduced in order to get a better

understanding as to why it was done. Firstly, the fundamental

reason as to why reservation must be given in educational

institution was stated as follows :- (SCC p. 785 para 40)

“40. … The class which enjoys reservation must

be educationally handicapped. The reservation

must be geared to getting over the handicap.

The rationale of reservation must be in the case

of medical students, removal of regional or class

inadequacy or like disadvantage. The quantum

of reservation should not be excessive or

societally injurious, measured by the overall

competency of the end-product viz. degree-

holders. A host of variables influence the

quantification of the reservation. But one factor

deserves great emphasis. The higher the level of

the speciality the lesser the role of reservation.

Such being the pragmatics and dynamics of

social justice and equal rights, let us apply the

tests to the case on hand.”

27

For this reason, reservations at MBBS level was justified :- (SCC

p. 785 para 42)

“42. MBBS is a basic medical degree and

insistence on the highest talent may be relaxed

by promotion of backward groups, institution-

wise chosen, without injury to public welfare. It

produces equal opportunity on a broader basis

and gives hope to neglected geographical or

human areas of getting a chance to rise.

Moreover, the better chances of candidates from

institutions in neglected regions setting down

for practice in these very regions also warrants

institutional preference because that policy

helps the supply of medical services to these

backward areas. After all, it is quite on the

cards that some out of these candidates with

lesser marks may prove their real mettle and

blossom into great doctors. Again, merit is not

measured by marks alone but by human

sympathies. The heart is as much a factor as the

head in assessing the social value of a member

of the profession. Dr Samuel Johnson put this

thought with telling effect when he said:

“Want of tenderness is want of parts,

and is no less a proof of stupidity than

of depravity.”

We have no doubt that where the human

region from which the alumni of an institution

are largely drawn is backward, either from

the angle of opportunities for technical

education or availability of medical services

for the people, the provision of a high ratio of

reservation hardly militates against the

equality mandate viewed in the perspective of

social justice.”

28

But then the same principle will not be applicable when we talk

of higher level of education like PG Medical Courses and the reason

given in Jagadish Saran is in para 23 :- (SCC pp. 778-79, para

23)

“The basic medical needs of a region or the

preferential push justified for a handicapped

group cannot prevail in the same measure at the

highest scales of speciality where the best skill

or talent, must be handpicked by selecting

according to capability. At the level of PhD, MD,

or levels of higher proficiency, where

international measure of talent is made, where

losing one great scientist or technologist in-the-

making is a national loss, the considerations we

have expanded upon as important lose their

potency. Here equality, measured by matching

excellence, has more meaning and cannot be

diluted much without grave risk. The Indian

Medical Council has rightly emphasised that

playing with merit for pampering local feeling will

boomerang. Midgetry, where summitry is the

desideratum, is a dangerous art. We may here

extract the Indian Medical Council's

recommendation, which may not be the last word

in social wisdom but is worthy of consideration:

Students for post-graduate training should be

selected strictly on merit judged on the basis of

academic record in the under-graduate course.

All selection for post-graduate studies should

be conducted by the universities.”

30. It was reiterated further : (SCC p. 785 para 39)

“39. If equality of opportunity for every person in

the country is the constitutional guarantee, a

candidate who gets more marks than another is

entitled to preference for admission. Merit must

29

be the test when choosing the best, according to

this rule of equal chance for equal marks. This

proposition has greater importance when we

reach the higher levels of education like post-

graduate courses. After all, top technological

expertise in any vital field like medicine is a

nation's human asset without which its advance

and development will be stunted. The role of high

grade skill or special talent may be less at the

lesser levels of education, jobs and disciplines of

social inconsequence, but more at the higher

levels of sophisticated skills and strategic

employment. To devalue merit at the summit is to

temporise with the country's development in the

vital areas of professional expertise. In science

and technology and other specialised fields of

developmental significance, to relax lazily or

easily in regard to exacting standards of

performance may be running a grave national

risk because in advanced medicine and other

critical departments of higher knowledge, crucial

to material progress, the people of India should

not be denied the best the nation's talent lying

latent can produce. If the best potential in these

fields is cold-shouldered for populist

considerations garbed as reservations, the

victims, in the long run, may be the people

themselves. Of course, this unrelenting strictness

in selecting the best may not be so imperative at

other levels where a broad measure of efficiency

may be good enough and what is needed is

merely to weed out the worthless.”

These findings in Jagadish Saran have been approved and

followed in Saurabh Chaudri (SCC p.168 para 48).

31. We are all domiciled in the territory of India. We are all residents of

India. Our common bond as citizens and residents of one country

gives us the right not only to choose our residence anywhere in

30

India, but also gives us the right to carry on trade & business or a

profession anywhere in India. It also gives us the right to seek

admission in educational institutions across India. The benefit of

‘reservation’ in educational institutions including medical colleges

to those who reside in a particular State can be given to a certain

degree only in MBBS courses, for which we have assigned reasons

in the preceding paragraphs. But considering the importance of

specialists doctors’ in PG Medical Course, reservation at the higher

level on the basis of ‘residence’ would be violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. This has been explained with pronounced

clarity both in Jagadish Saran and Pradeep Jain. If such a

reservation is permitted then it would be an invasion on the

fundamental rights of several students, who are being treated

unequally simply for the reasons that they belong to a different State

in the Union! This would be a violation of the equality clause in

Article 14 of the Constitution and would amount to a denial of

equality before the law.

32. The law laid down in Jagadish Saran and Pradeep Jain has been

followed by this Court in a number of decisions including the

Constitution Bench decision in Saurabh Chaudri. We may also

refer here judgments such as Magan Mehrotra and Ors. v. Union

31

of India (UOI) and Ors. (2003) 11 SCC 186, Nikhil Himthani vs.

State of Uttarakhand and Others (2013) 10 SCC 237 , Vishal

Goyal and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (2014) 11

SCC 456 and Neil Aurelio Nunes (OBC Reservation) and Others

v. Union of India and Others (2022) 4 SCC 1 , which have all

followed Pradeep Jain. Thus, residence-based reservations are not

permissible in PG medical courses.

33. Having made the above determination that residence -based

reservation is impermissible in PG Medical courses, the State quota

seats, apart from a reasonable number of institution-based

reservations, have to be filled strictly on the basis of merit in the All-

India examination. Thus, out of 64 seats which were to be filled by

the State in its quota 32 could have been filled on the basis of

institutional preference, and these are valid. But the other 32 seats

earmarked as U.T. Chandigarh pool were wrongly filled on the basis

of residence, and we uphold the findings of the High Court on this

crucial aspect.

34. We make it clear though that our declaration of impermissibility of

residence-based reservation in PG Medical courses will not affect

such reservations already granted, and students are undergoing PG

courses or have already passed out in the present case, from

32

Government Medical College, Chandigarh . We do this simply

because now there is an equity in favour of such students who must

have already completed the course. Logically, therefore, the present

appellants who were granted admission under the residence

category and were undergoing their course, & also by virtue of the

interim order of this Court dated 09.05.2019, will not be affected by

our judgment.

35. The present appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. The

connected appeals and writ petition stand decided in the light of our

order in the present case.

36. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

……...……….………………….J.

[HRISHIKESH ROY]

……...……….………………….J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

..….....………………………….J.

[S.V.N. BHATTI]

New Delhi.

January 29, 2025.