REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.309 OF 2001

Dumpala Chandra Reddy …Appellant

Vs.

Nimakayala Balireddy and Ors. …Respondents

(With Crl. Appeal No. 310 of 2001)

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2 These two appeals, one by the complainant Dumpala

Chandra Reddy and other by the State of A.P. question the

correctness of judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court, which, while holding that the

respondents were responsible for causing the death of one

Gangireddigari Kondareddy (hereinafter referred to as the

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`deceased') convicted them in terms of Section 326 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `the IPC') instead of Section

302 IPC as was done by the Trial Court.

3. The respondents, along with one Nimmakayala

Lakshmi Reddy (A-8) s/o Obul Reddy faced trial for alleged

commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 302

IPC and in respect of the deceased A-8, Section 114 IPC. The

Trial Court found the accused persons guilty of offences

punishable under Section 148 IPC and also under Section 302

IPC. For the former offence, they were directed to undergo

sentence of two years while for the latter offence, life

imprisonment was imposed.

4. Substance of the accusations, which led to the trial,

is as follows.

All the accused are residents of Gopalapuram village.

The deceased was a resident of Khajipalli village. PWs 1 and 3

are also the residents of Khajipalli village. PWs 1 and 2 are

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the brother-in-laws of the deceased and PW3 is the brother of

the deceased.

Originally, all the accused were residents of Khajipalli

village. Due to factions with the deceased’s family, the

deceased left the village and migrated to Gopalapuram village.

About 18 years ago, A-8's brother's son by name Pattabhi

Reddy married one Dumpala Munemma, resident of Khajipalli

village. Munemma is related to the family of the deceased. A-

2 and A-4 are brothers of Pattabhi Reddy. Pattabhi Reddy

deserted his wife Munemma, resident of Khajipalli village.

Due to that, there were differences between the accused and

the deceased and also there were criminal cases filed against

each other.

Accused persons were residents of Khajipalli village.

After filing of the criminal cases, the accused left Khajipalli

and settled down at Gopalapuram. About 8 years prior to the

murder of the deceased, A-2, A-4 and Pattabhi Reddy had

stabbed PW3 and the deceased in a lane by the side of

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Sangham Lodge at Cuddapah. One year thereafter

Nimmakayala Gangireddy was murdered in Khajipalli village in

the fields. In that regard, a criminal case was filed against the

deceased family and that criminal case ended in acquittal.

After that incident, the deceased’s family alongwith his

brothers settled down at Hyderabad and was running a motor

rewinding workshop.

On the date of the incident i.e. on 25.12.1995, the

deceased went to his village from Hyderabad in the morning

hours. After sometime the deceased took PW-1 and went to

Patha Cuddapah to fix up the marriage date of his younger

brother. The deceased and PW-1 took Lingamappli bus at the

village at about 8.30 A.M. and reached Cuddapah at 9.30 A.M.

PW-1 and the deceased went to see one Raja Reddy, who

happened to be the proprietor of Sangham Medical Stores,

and they found that Raja Reddy was not available in the

medical shop and then they went to Venkateswara Cloth

Stores. By that time, Venkateswara Reddy, a resident of

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Balisingapalli, was also present in the cloth shop. The

deceased telephoned Raja Reddy. After sometime Raja came

to the cloth shop and they were talking to each other at the

shop. After sometime, the deceased, PW1, Venkata Subba

Reddy and Raja Reddy went to Manasa Hotel situated in

Madras road. At about 2.30 P.M. the deceased along with

others went to the house of Rama Subba Reddy to fix up the

marriage date of the brother of the deceased. The marriage

date was fixed as 31.01.1996. Then all of them went to

Venkateswara Cloth shop and again from there, they went to

the medical shop of Raja Reddy and stayed there for

sometime. Thereafter the deceased, PW-1 and Venkata

Subba Reddy went to Mithen hotel for drinking tea. At that

time, i.e. around 6.00 p.m., Venkata Subba Reddy left the

hotel to go to his village. All of them consumed tea.

Thereafter, the deceased and PW-1 were going to Machupalle

bus stand through Madras road with a view to catch the bus

going to their village at about 6.30 p.m.

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With a view to take the cycle of Chinna Narsimha

Reddy who happened to be the proprietor of Ayyappa

Electricals, situated on the northern side of Madras road, they

went to the said electrical shop. When the deceased and PW-

1 were climbing the steps of the said electrical shop, A-8 who

is no more instigated the other accused and all the accused

surrounded the deceased and took out daggers from their

waists and stabbed the deceased. Finally the deceased fell in

front of Lepakshi Emporium, on the road margin. When the

deceased fell down, all the accused persons again stabbed the

deceased. A-5 raised cries saying that “catch hold of that

fellow”. PW-1 was frightened and ran to the northern lane of

the road. After sometime, PW1 came to the scene of offence

and saw the deceased lying dead with bleeding injuries all

over the body. Thereafter, PW1 went to Cuddapah I Town

Police Station for giving the report.

PW-6, the S.I. of Police, Cuddapah received an oral

statement of the incident from PW1 at about 7.20 p.m. He

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reduced the oral statement into writing and took the signature

of PW1 on the statement. On the strength of the report given

by PW1, PW6 registered the case as Cr. No.207 of 1995

against the accused for offences punishable under Sections

147, 148 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The copies of

first information were sent to all concerned. At about 9.30

p.m. PW-6 visited the scene of offence and recorded the

statements of PWs 1 to 3 and others. PW6 collected MO-1

dagger and MO-2 right leg shoe from the scene of offence.

On 26.12.1995 PW7 the CI of Police, Cuddapah, held

inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of

PW-5 and others. Ex. P-3 is the inquest report.

On 26.12.1995, PW-4, the Civil Assistant Surgeon,

District Headquarters Hospital Cuddapah received a

requisition from the Station House Officer, I Town Police

Station, Cuddapah to conduct autopsy over the dead body of

the deceased. He commenced the autopsy on the dead body

of the deceased at about 12.40 P.M. and opined that the

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deceased died because of multiple injuries and the injuries to

vital organs. According to the observation, he issued post

mortem certificate Ex.P-2.

PW-7, the CI of Police, Cuddapah, arrested the

accused at Padagalapalli bus stop on 04.01.1996 at 10.30

a.m. Thus, on completion of investigation, he filed the charge

sheet on 12.04.1996.

The defence of the accused was of total denial. It is

also suggested by the accused by way of defence that the

incident did not take place in the manner suggested by the

prosecution.

In order to substantiate the accusation, the

prosecution examined PWs 1 to 7. They produced certain

documents and they were marked as Exs. P-1 to P-18,

whereas the accused examined DW-1 and 2 and they

produced certain documents and they were marked as Ex.D1

and D2.

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P.Ws. 1 and 2 are stated to be eye-witnesses to the

occurrence. As noted above, the evidence of the eye-

witnesses was found to be credible, cogent and reliable and on

that basis, conviction was recorded. The respondents filed an

appeal before the High Court. By the impugned judgment, the

High Court found that the respondents were responsible for

the death of the deceased but held that in the absence of

charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, they

could not have been convicted under Section 302 IPC, but

held that each would be liable for conviction for the offence

punishable under Section 326 IPC. Sentence of five years RI

and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulations was

imposed.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant in each case

submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly

erroneous. It is submitted that if the accused persons could

not have been convicted under Section 302 with the aid of

Section 149 IPC, they could not have also been convicted for

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offence punishable under Section 326 IPC simplicitor. It is

pointed out that the charges framed clearly related to the

offence punishable under Section 149, though there was no

specific mention of the provision. It is also submitted that no

prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the non

mention of the provision. In fact, the essence of Section 149

IPC was clearly spelt out while framing charge.

6. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents

supported the impugned judgment of the High Court and

additionally submitted that this is a case for acquittal and the

evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 should not have been acted upon.

7. This Court, in the oft repeated case of Willie (William)

Slaney Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955 (2) SCR 1140) had

highlighted the aspect of prejudice. This decision has been

referred to in a large number of subsequent cases dealing with

the question of prejudice in the background of Section 464 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Code'). In

Ramkishan and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan (1997 (7) SCC

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518), it was noted as follows:

“In view of the findings recorded by the

learned Sessions Judge and the material on

record, we are unable to ascribe to the finding

that the appellants' intention was to cause

death of Bhura deceased. The finding betrays

the observation of the trial court as noticed

above. The medical evidence also does not

support the ultimate finding recorded by the

trial court and upheld by the High Court. The

offence in the established facts and

circumstances of the case in the case of the

appellants would only fall under Section 304

Part II IPC read with Section 149 IPC and not

under Section 302 IPC. Indeed no specific

charge indicating the applicability of Section

149 IPC was framed, but all the ingredients of

Section 149 IPC were clearly indicated in the

charge framed against the appellants and as

held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in

Willie (William) Slaney Vs. State of M.P. the

omission to mention Section 149 IPC

specifically in the charge is only an irregularity

and since no prejudice is shown to have been

caused to the appellants by that omission it

cannot affect their conviction.”

8. Similar view was also taken in B.N. Srikantiah and

Ors. Vs. The State of Mysore (1959 SCR 496) in the

background of Section 34, viz-a-viz Section 149, IPC. In

Dalbir Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2004 (5) SCC 334), it was noted

as follows.

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“15. In Willie (William) Slaney Vs.

State of M.P. a Constitution Bench examined

the question of absence of charge in

considerable detail. The observations made in

paras 6 and 7, which are of general

application, are being reproduced below:(AIR P

121 6)

“6. Before we proceed to set out

our answer and examine the provisions of the

Code, we will pause to observe that the Code

is a Code of procedure and, like all procedural

laws, is designed to further the ends of justice

and not to frustrate them by the introduction

of endless technicalities. The object of the

Code is to ensure that an accused person gets

a full and fair trial along certain well

established and well-understood lines that

accord with our notions of natural justice.

If he does, if he is tried by a competent

court, if he is told and clearly understands the

nature of the offence for which he is being

tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly

explained to him and he is afforded a full

and fair opportunity of defending himself,

then, provided there is 'substantial'

compliance with the outward forms of the law,

mere mistakes in procedure, mere

inconsequential errors and omissions in the

trial are regarded as venal by the Code and

the trial is not vitiated unless the accused can

show substantial prejudice. That, broadly

speaking, is the basic principle on which the

Code is based.

7. Now, here, as in all procedural laws,

certain things are regarded as vital. Disregard

of a provision of that nature is fatal to the trial

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and at once invalidates the conviction. Others

are not vital and whatever the irregularity they

can be cured; and in that event the conviction

must stand unless the Court is satisfied that

there was prejudice. Some of these matters

are dealt with by the Code and wherever that

is the case full effect must be given to its

provisions.

15.1After analysing the provisions of Sections

225, 232, 535 and 537 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 which correspond

to Sections 215, 464(2), 464 and 465 of the

1973 Code, the Court held as under in para

44 of the Report: (AIR p.128)

“44.Now, as we have said, Sections 225,

232, 535 and 537(a) between them, cover

every conceivable type of error and

irregularity referable to a charge that can

possibly arise, ranging from cases in

which there is a conviction with no

charge at all from start to finish down to

cases in which there is a charge but with

errors, irregularities and omissions in it.

The code is emphatic that 'whatever' the

irregularity it is not to be regarded as

fatal unless there is prejudice.

It is the substance that we must

seek. Courts have to administer justice and

justice includes the punishment of guilt just

as much as the protection of innocence.

Neither can be done if the shadow is mistaken

for the substance and the goal is lost in a

labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities.

Broad vision is required, a nice balancing of

the rights of the State and the protection of

society in general against protection from

harassment to the individual and the risks of

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unjust conviction.

Every reasonable presumption must

be made in favour of an accused person; he

must be given the benefit of every reasonable

doubt.

The same broad principles of justice and fair

play must be brought to bear when

determining a matter of prejudice as in

adjudging guilt. But when all is said and done

what we are concerned to see is whether the

accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what

he was being tried for, whether the main facts

sought to be established against him were

explained to him fairly and clearly and

whether he was given a full and fair chance to

defend himself.

If all these elements are there and no

prejudice is shown the conviction must stand

whatever the irregularities whether traceable

to the charge or to a want of one.”

16. This question was again examined by

a three Judge Bench in Gurbachan Singh Vs.

State of Punjab in which it was held as under:

(AIR p.626, para 7)

“In judging a question of

prejudice, as of guilt, courts must act

with a broad vision and look to the

substance and not to technicalities, and

their main concern should be to see

whether the accused had a fair trial,

whether he knew what he was being tried

for, whether the main facts sought to be

established against him were explained

to him fairly and clearly and whether he

was given a full and fair chance to defend

himself.”

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17. There are a catena of decisions of this

Court on the same lines and it is not

necessary to burden this judgment by making

reference to each one of them. Therefore, in

view of Section 464 Cr.P.C., it is possible for

the appellate or revisional court to convict an

accused for an offence for which no charge

was framed unless the Court is of the opinion

that a failure of justice would in fact occasion.

In order to judge whether a failure of justice

has been occasioned, it will be relevant to

examine whether the accused was aware of

the basic ingredients of the offence for which

he is being convicted and whether main facts

sought to be established against him were

explained to him clearly and whether he got a

fair chance to defend himself.”

9. The High Court, as has been rightly pointed out by

learned counsel for the appellant, lost sight of the fact that if

its view is accepted in the absence of charge under Section

149, conviction in terms of Section 326 could not have been

done.

10. The High Court appears to have misconstrued the

decision of this Court in Rewa Ram Vs. Teja and Ors. (AIR

1998 SC 2883). In that case, the High Court held that the

accused persons could be held guilty only under Section 326

IPC, particularly, when it was stated in the charge that their

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common object was to assault the deceased and commit

rioting with deadly weapons. The position is entirely different

here. In fact, while framing charge and combined reading of

charge No.1 and charge No.3 makes it clear, that the Court

specified that the accused persons were members of unlawful

assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such

assembly, i.e, in order to commit murder of the deceased,

committed the offence and at that time they were armed with

daggers etc. to bring in the application of Section 148 IPC. In

Charge No.3, there is a specific reference to the transactions,

as mentioned in the first charge, and the object to commit

murder by hacking on the body of the deceased with daggers

and causing his intentional death and thereby committing

offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Therefore, the

charge in relation to offence punishable under Section 149

IPC is not only implicit but also patent in the charges.

11. Apart from the question of prejudice, this aspect has

also been lost sight of by the High Court.

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12. The inevitable result is that the appeals deserve to be

allowed, and we direct so. The judgment of the Trial Court

stands restored and that of the High Court stands set aside.

The respondents shall surrender to custody forthwith to suffer

remainder of sentence, if any.

…………………….....................J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……

……………………...............J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

………

….……….......................J.

(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi,

July 14, 2008

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