Page 1 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2277-2278 OF 2009

DURYODHAN ROUT … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF ORISSA … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

These appeals are directed against the common judgment

dated 8

th

January, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa at

Cuttack in Death Reference Case No.2 of 2007 and J. Crl.

A.No.12 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the High Court

upheld the conviction of the appellant for the offence under

Section 376, 302 and 201 IPC. However, taking into

consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the

age of the appellant, his family background and the fact

that the appellant had no criminal antecedent, the capital

sentence for the offence under Section 302 IPC has been

commuted to life imprisonment; and rest of sentence remain

unaltered.

2. The case of the prosecution is that on 11

th

September,

2004, at about 3 p.m. accused Duryodhan Rout, on the pretext

Page 2 2

that the deceased, Subhasini, a minor girl aged about 10

years would talk over phone with his brother, Bamodev Bhoi

took her on a bicycle. When the evening set in, the accused

alone returned to the village and on enquiry about

Subhasini, by Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), father of the deceased, he

told that she had gone with a woman of Ranibandha to her

house. On the next day, as she did not return Mulia Boi (PW-

5) again questioned the accused regarding the where about of

the deceased. The accused confessed in presence of Rabi

Biswal (PW-3), Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) and Subashini Bhoi that

he killed the deceased by pressing her neck. With the help

of these three witnesses, Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) took the accused

to Thakurgarh P.S. got the FIR scribed by one Laxman Senapti

and lodged it before Udit Narayan Pany, Officer-in-charge of

the said Police Station. A P.S. Case No.51 dated 12

th

September, 2004 under Section 302/201 IPC was instituted.

The accused was arrested, his statement was recorded under

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of which

he went to the spot made recovery of the dead body of the

deceased, held inquest over it, seized the Chadi

(underwear) of the victim lying near the spot, prepared

seizure list in respect thereof and sent the dead body to

Adhamalik Hospital for autopsy. He also seized the wearing

apparels of the accused, forwarded to the Court on 13

th

December, 2004 and handed over charge of investigation of

Page 3 3

the case to the C.I. of Police. After completion of

investigation, Investigating Officer (I.O.) submitted charge

sheet against the accused under Sections 376/302/201 IPC.

3. Learned Session Judge secured the presence of the

accused, framed charges u/s 376/302/201 I.P.C. The accused

pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. In order to establish its case, the prosecution

examined 8 witnesses. The accused examined himself as DW-1

besides examined DW-2, his father to prove his stand. After

assessing the evidence on record, the Trial Court found the

accused guilty for the offence under Sections 376(f)/302/201

IPC convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to death for

the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Session

Judge also sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to

pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under

Section 376(f)IPC and RI for one year and to pay a fine of

Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC.

It was further ordered that in default of payment of fine,

the convict would suffer imprisonment for one year for the

offence punishable under Section 376(f) IPC and three months

for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and the

substantive sentences would run consecutively.

5. The High Court, as noticed above in Reference,

converted the capital sentenced to life imprisonment but

ordered that rest of the sentence remain unaltered.

Page 4 4

6. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the occurrence,

the order of conviction was based on the circumstantial

evidence only. From the evidence of Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and

Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2), it transpires that on the date

occurrence at about 4 p.m. while they were making chips by

braking boulders by the side of road, they saw the accused

carrying the deceased on a cycle and at about 5 p.m. they

saw him returning alone. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) and Kalpana Bhoi

(PW-6), the father and the mother of the deceased

respectively, stated that the accused took the deceased on a

cycle on the pretext that the later would talk to her

brother, working at Bargarh, over phone from the house of

Bijaya Bhoi of village Anandpur. While the accused was in

Police custody, he confessed his guilt which was recorded

under Ext.7. The Ext.7 reflects that on 11

th

September, 2004

afternoon he took the deceased near Arakhkuda Salabani

Jungle, undraped her and then committed rape on her. When

she cried. He strangulated her to death and left the dead

body covering it with branches of trees. On the basis of

statement of the accused the I.O recovered the dead body and

the Chadi (underwear) of the deceased lying nearby, from

Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle. The statement of the accused made

before the Police Officer which distinctly relates to the

facts of recovery is admissible under the law.

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7. Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9) stated that on 12

th

September,

2004 he was attached to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Athamallik

as a Specialist in O and G. On that date at 5 p.m. on Police

requisition, he conducted autopsy over the dead body of the

deceased-Subhasini Bhoi aged about 10 years and found as

follows:

"(i)Bleeding from nostrils and mouth and both the ears

with small clotting of blood.

(ii)Eyes were half opened.

(iii)Bloody froth present in the nostrils and mouth.

(iv)Stool had been discharged from anus.

(v)Thumb marks were present on the front of the

neck.

(vi)Two linear abrasions of size 3” x 4” on the front of

the neck due to scratching by some sharp weapon

like human nail.

(vii)Finger marks were present on both sides of the

neck and back of the neck.

(viii)Extravasation of blood in to the sub-cutaneous

tissues under the thumb and finger marks and

adjacent muscles of the neck.

(ix)Muscles of neck corresponding to the thumb and

finger marks were mildly lacerated.

(x)Multiple abrasions (linear) of size varying from 2”

and 3” on both sides of scapular region. Most

probably caused by weapon like human nails.

(xi)Multiple abrasions on the back of both buttocks due

to friction on a rough surface, like rough ground

and the abrasions were associated with very mild

bleeding. The size of multiple abrasions varies from

½” x ½” to ¾” x ½”.

(xii)Laceration of the vagina with bleeding with clots,

most probably because of attempt to introduce the

penis-forcibly. The penis most probably was large

in size and the vaginal orifice of the deceased girl,

aged about 10 years was very narrow. The

laceration appears to have been caused by several

attempts to introduce the penis into the vagine.

(xiii)All the injuries were ante mortem in nature. The

throttling was also ante mortem in nature. There

was no evidence of seminal fluid in or around

vagina or on any part of the body of anywhere in

the clothings of the victim.

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According to Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9), the cause of

death was due to throttling and probably homicidal in

nature. He further stated that the accused might have

attempted three to four times to introduce his penis into

the vaginal orifice of the deceased. From his evidence, it

further transpires that on 13

th

September, 2004, he examined

the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his pant. He

also found one linear abrasion of size ¼ on the postero-

lateral aspect of the left elbow and another linear abrasion

of the same size on the medial aspect of his right knees.

According to him, those injuries might have been caused 12

hours earlier to the alleged incident. Therefore, it is not

safe to hold that in course of rape and murder of deceased,

the accused sustained those injuries. Dr. Narayan Udgata

(PW-9),however, could not notice any sign of recent sexual

intercourse on the private part of the accused.

8. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), stated that the accused confessed

before him and Rabindra Biswal (PW-3) and Dasarathi Bhoi

(PW-4) that he killed the deceased. Rabindra Biswal (PW-3)

and Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) turned hostile and did not support

the prosecution. However, Kalpana Bhoi (PW-6) corroborated

this part of evidence of Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). When asked by

Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) regarding the whereabout of the deceased,

accused told that she went with a woman of Ranibandha, which

was found to be incorrect.

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9. The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of

the chain of circumstantial evidence available against the

accused. It was found that the accused carried on the

deceased in his cycle at about 4 p.m. but returned alone at

5 p.m. He confessed to have murdered the deceased before

Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). On the basis of the statement of the

accused recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the

I.O. discovered the dead body; the opion of the Doctor was

that the deceased was raped and murdered. The Doctor

examined the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his

pant. The accused gave false statement that the deceased

went with a woman of Ranibandha. Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and

Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2)saw the accused carried the

deceased on a cycle at about 4 p.m. and returned alone one

hour thereafter. Thus, the accused was last seen with the

deceased. There is nothing to indicate that within one hour,

there was any scope for anybody else, other than the accused

to commit rape and murder of the deceased. The chain of

circumstances of the case thereby leads to the hypothesis

that the accused and the accused alone was the author of the

crime, and therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted the

accused under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.

10.During the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant

mainly argued on the question of consecutive sentence as

passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. It

Page 8 8

was contended that Trial Court and the High Court wrongly

held that the sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC to

run consecutively.

11.The question arises whether the judgment passed by the

Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court, that the

sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC are to run

consecutively is contrary to the proviso to sub Section (2)

of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).

12.According to the learned Counsel for the respondent-

State of Orissa proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of

the Cr.P.C. cannot be made applicable to a conviction for

life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.

13.It was submitted that imprisonment can be rigorous or

simple (Section 60 of the Indian Penal Code). As far as life

imprisonment is concerned, there is no such classification.

The first classification was attempted by the Law Commission

of India through its 39

th

report to qualify it as rigorous

but the same was never translated into legislation. But such

submission is not based on any reasoning.

14.In order to fully appreciate the question involved in

the present case it is desirable to notice the relevant

provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code.

15.Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases

of conviction of several offences at one trial. Under

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proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no

case a person can be sentenced to imprisonment for a period

longer than fourteen years and the aggregate punishment

shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the

Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. Section

31 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:

“31. Sentences in cases of conviction of sev -

eral offences at one trial.

(1) When a person is convicted at one trial

of two or more offences, the Court may, sub -

ject to the provisions of section 71 of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), sentence him

for such offences, to the several punishments

prescribed therefor which such Court is com -

petent to inflict; such punishments when con -

sisting of imprisonment to commence the one

after

the expiration of the other in such order as

the Court may direct, unless the Court di -

rects that such punishments shall run con -

currently.

(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it

shall not be necessary for the Court by rea -

son only of the aggregate punishment for the

several offences being in excess of the pun -

ishment which it is competent to inflict on

conviction of a single offence, to send the

offender for trial before a higher Court:

Provided that-

(a) in no case shall such person be

sentenced to imprisonment for longer pe -

riod than fourteen years;

(b) the aggregate punishment shall not

exceed twice the amount of punishment

which the Court is competent to inflict

for a single offence.

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(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted

person, the aggregate of the consecutive

sentences passed against him under this sec -

tion shall be deemed to be a single sen -

tence.”

16.Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code defines life as

“The word “life” denotes the life of a human being, unless

the contrary appears from the context”.

The word “imprisonment” has not been defined either in

the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code.

As per the General Clauses Act, 1897 under Section

3(27) – “imprisonment” shall mean imprisonment of either

description as defined in the Indian Penal Code. The

definition of imprisonment under the General Clauses Act

would, therefore, in case of life imprisonment mean

imprisonment for life/imprisonment for the remainder of the

convict’s life.

We are not in agreement with submission made on behalf

of the State that imprisonment for life has not been

included in the definition of term ‘imprisonment’ under

Section 3(27) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

17.Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years of

imprisonment. A reading of Section 55 IPC and Section 433

and 433A Cr.P.C. would indicate that only the appropriate

Government can commute the sentence for imprisonment of life

for a term not exceeding fourteen years or exceeds the

Page 11 11

release for such person unless he has served at least

fourteen years of imprisonment.

Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code merely relates to

calculating fractions of terms of punishment by providing a

numerical value of 20 years to life imprisonment.

Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code lists the

punishments to which offenders are liable under the Code

which reads as follows:

“First-Death;

Secondly-Imprisonment for life;

Fourthly-Imprisonment, which is of two

Descriptions, namely:-

(1)Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;

(2)Simple

Fifty-Forfeiture of property;

Sixthly-Fine.”

Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is

bound to serve the remainder of his life in prison unless

the sentence is commuted by the appropriate Government in

terms of the Section 55, 433 and 433A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.

18.In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra &

Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600 , the Constitution Bench of this Court

while dealing with the question as to whether there is any

provision of law whereunder a sentence for life

imprisonment, without any formal remission by the

Page 12 12

appropriate Government can be automatically treated as one

for a definite period. In the said case this Court held:

“5. If so, the next question is whether

there is any provision of law where under a

sentence for life imprisonment, without any

formal remission by appropriate Government,

can be automatically treated as one for a

definite period. No such provision is found

in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal

Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Gov -

ernment of India stated before the Judicial

Committee in the case cited supra that, hav -

ing regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal

Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent

to a sentence of transportation for life, the

Judicial Committee did not express its final

opinion on that question. The Judicial Com -

mittee observed in that case thus at p. 10:

“Assuming that the sentence is to be

regarded as one of twenty years, and

subject to remission for good conduct,

he had not earned remission sufficient

to entitle him to discharge at the time

of his application, and it was there -

fore rightly dismissed, but in saying

this, Their Lordships are not to be

taken as meaning that a life sentence

must in all cases be treated as one of

not more than twenty years, or that the

convict is necessarily entitled to re -

mission.”

Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no

real bearing on the question raised before

us. For calculating fractions of terms of

punishment the section provides that trans -

portation for life shall be regarded as

equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.

It does not say that transportation for life

shall be deemed to be transportation for

twenty years for all purposes; nor does the

amended section which substitutes the words

“imprisonment for life” for “transportation

for life” enable the drawing of any such all

embracing fiction. A sentence of transporta -

Page 13 13

tion for life or imprisonment for life must

prima facie be treated as transportation or

imprisonment for the whole of the remaining

period of the convicted person's natural

life.”

19.In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors.,

(1976) 3 SCC 470 , this Court held that sentence of

imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the

end of 20 years. This Court held:

“9. From a review of the authorities and

the statutory provisions of the Code of Crim -

inal Procedure the following propositions

emerge:

“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for

life does not automatically expire at the end

of 20 years including the remissions, because

the administrative rules framed under the

various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act

cannot supersede the statutory provisions of

the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of impris -

onment for life means a sentence for the en -

tire life of the prisoner unless the appro -

priate Government chooses to exercise its

discretion to remit either the whole or a

part of the sentence under Section 401 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure;”

20.This Court in Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj & Ors.,

(1983) 2 SCC 454 , relying upon the judgment made by the

Privy Council in ‘Kishor Lal’ and Constitution Bench

decision of this Court in ‘Gopal Vinayak Godse’ held that

the appellant in the said case was liable to serve the

sentence until the remainder of his life in prison.

21.In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC

498, this Court held that the expression “life imprisonment”

Page 14 14

must be read in the context of Section 45 of the Indian

Penal Code which would mean imprisonment for the full or

complete span of life. This Court further held that the

provisions in Section 57 that imprisonment for life shall be

reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years is for

the purpose of working out the fraction of the terms of

punishment.

22.This Court endorsed the view taken by this Court in the

case of Niab Singh, the Privy Council judgment in Kishori

Lal and the judgment in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse in

Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1992) 4 SCC 172 .

23.In Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC

458, this Court held that life imprisonment means

imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the

convicted person’s natural life unless the appropriate

Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit

either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401

Cr.P.C.

Similar was the view taken by this Court in Shri

Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296 .

24.This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not

equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd.

Munna vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 417 . The Court

held that the life imprisonment means imprisonment for whole

of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural

Page 15 15

life. There is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code

or in the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment

could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without

there being of formal remission by the appropriate

Government.

25.In Swamy Shraddananda vs.State of Karnataka, (2008) 13

SCC 767, this Court while substituting the sentence of death

to life imprisonment held that the prisoner shall not be

released from prison till the rest of his life.

Similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet & Anr.

vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 . In the said case

this Court held that a prisoner serving a life sentence has

no indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14

years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life

imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end

of his life subject to any remission granted by the

appropriate Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C.

26. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,

it is clear that a sentence of imprisonment for life means

a sentence for entire life of the prisoner unless the

appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to

remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under the

provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

27.Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of

conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub

Page 16 16

Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the

aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer

than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment

means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the

question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for

several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in

case a person is sentenced of conviction of several

offences, including one that of life imprisonment, the

proviso to Section 31(2) shall come into play and no

consecutive sentence can be imposed.

28.In the case of Kamalanantha and others vs. State of

T.N., (2005) 5 SCC 194, this Court held:

“75. Regarding the sentence, the trial court

resorted to Section 31 CrPC and ordered the sen -

tence to run consecutively, subject to proviso ( a)

of the said section.

76. The contention of Mr Jethmalani that the

term “imprisonment” enjoined in Section 31 CrPC

does not include imprisonment for life is unac -

ceptable. The term “imprisonment” is not defined

under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 31

of the Code falls under Chapter III of the Code

which deals with power of courts. Section 28 of

the Code empowers the High Court to pass any sen -

tence authorised by law. Similarly, the Sessions

Judge and Additional Sessions Judge may pass any

sentence authorised by law, except the sentence of

death which shall be subject to confirmation by

the High Court. In our opinion the term “impris -

onment” would include the sentence of imprison -

ment for life.”

29.The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by this Court in

Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 37 , and held:

Page 17 17

“9. Although, the power of the court to impose

consecutive sentence under Section 31 of the

Criminal Procedure Code was also noticed by a

Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Prab-

hakaran v. P. Jayarajan2, but, therein the ques-

tion of construing proviso appended thereto did

not and could not have fallen for consideration.

10. The question, however, came up for consid -

eration in Zulfiwar Ali v. State of U.P.3 wherein

it was held: (All LJ p. 1181, para 25)

“25. The opening words ‘In the case of con -

secutive sentences’ in sub-section (2) of

Section 31 make it clear that this sub-sec -

tion refers to a case in which ‘consecutive

sentences’ are ordered. After providing

that in such a case if an aggregate of pun -

ishment for several offences is found to be

in excess of punishment which the court is

competent to inflict on a conviction of

single offence, it shall not be necessary

for the court to send the offender for trial

before a higher court. After making such a

provision, proviso ( a) is added to this

sub-section to limit the aggregate of sen -

tences which such a court pass while making

the sentences consecutive. That is this

proviso has provided that in no case the

aggregate of consecutive sentences passed

against an accused shall exceed 14 years.

In the instant case the aggregate of the

two sentences passed against the appellant

being 28 years clearly infringes the above

proviso. It is accordingly not liable to be

sustained.”

11. In view of the proviso appended to Section

31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the

opinion that the High Court committed a manifest

error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years’

rigorous imprisonment. The maximum sentence im -

posable being 14 years and having regard to the

fact that the appellant is in custody for more

than 12 years. Now, we are of the opinion that

interest of justice would be subserved if the ap -

pellant is directed to be sentenced to the period

already undergone.”

Page 18 18

30.In the recent judgment in Ramesh Chilwal alias

Bambayya vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 11 SCC 629 , this

Court held:

“4. Since this Court issued notice only to

clarify the sentence awarded by the trial

Judge, there is no need to go into all the

factual details. We are not inclined to mod -

ify the sentence. However, considering the

fact that the trial Judge has awarded life

sentence for an offence under Section 302, in

view of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, we make it clear that all

the sentences imposed under IPC, the Gang -

sters Act and the Arms Act are to run concur -

rently.”

31.In view of the aforesaid discussions and decisions

rendered by this Court, we hold that the Trial Court was not

justified in imposing the sentence under Section

376(f)/302/201 IPC to run consecutively. The High court

failed to address the said issue.

32.For the reasons stated above, while we are not inclined

to interfere with the order of conviction and the sentence,

considering the fact that the accused has been awarded life

imprisonment for the offence under Section 302, we direct

that all the sentences imposed under Indian Penal Code are

to run concurrently. The judgment passed by the Session

Judge as affirmed by the High Court stands modified to the

extent above. The appeals are allowed in part with the

aforesaid observations.

Page 19 19

…………………………………………………………………………… J.

(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

…………………………………………………………………………… J.

(DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI,

JULY 01, 2014.

Page 20 ITEM NO.1D COURT NO.6 SECTION IIB

(For Judgment)

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2277-2278/2009

DURYODHAN ROUT Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF ORISSA Respondent(s)

Date : 01/07/2014 These appeals were called on for pronouncement

of Judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. T. N. Singh ,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Shibashish Misra ,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya pronounced

the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable

judgment.

Page 21 (MEENAKSHI KOHLI) (USHA SHARMA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]