As per case facts, the corporate debtor's property was attached under the MPID Act due to an alleged offense committed by another entity, even though the corporate debtor itself was ...
bipin prithiani
1
wp-5272.25.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 5272 OF 2025
Dwarka Iron Industries Pvt. Ltd. … Petitioner
Versus
Competent Authority (under MPID Act, 1999)
& Anr. … Respondents
******
Mr. Ashish Kamat, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. Subir Kumar, Ms.
Vaishnavi Pawar, Ms. Ashita Aggarwal i/by SDS Advocates for
Petitioner.
Mr. B. V. Samant, Addl. G. P., a/w Ms. P. J. Gavhane, AGP for
Respondent Nos.1 and 2-State.
******
CORAM:MANISH PITALE AND
SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
RESERVED ON:17
th
APRIL 2026
PRONOUNCED ON :8
th
JUNE 2026
Judgment (Per Manish Pitale, J.) :
. This petition raises questions pertaining to Section 32A of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) in the context of
the provisions of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of
Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act).
The petitioner is seeking quashing of a notification dated
19.03.2016 issued by the respondent No.1 i.e. the Competent
Authority under the MPID Act in respect of a property belonging
to a corporate debtor. The respondent No.2-State is opposing the
prayer made in the present application, inter alia, on the ground
bipin prithiani
2
wp-5272.25.doc
that the object of enactment of the MPID Act needs to be taken
into consideration by this Court, while determining the effect of
Section 32A of the IBC, in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. In order to properly appreciate the rival contentions
and the questions sought to be raised by the rival parties, it would
be necessary to briefly refer to the chronology of events, leading to
filing of the present writ petition.
2.The corporate debtor in the present case is M/s. Abhirama
Steels Limited and it is represented by the Successful Resolution
Applicant i.e. Dwarka Iron Industries Pvt. Ltd. On 06.09.2008,
much prior to the alleged offence registered in the present case
attracting the provisions of the MPID Act, the corporate debtor
purchased the subject immovable property bearing Survey No.
272/1, Chityala Village, Pargi Mandal, Dist. Rangareddy,
Telangana, by way of registered sale deed. On 29.12.2008, the
corporate debtor was incorporated under the provisions of the
Companies Act and it commenced its business of manufacturing
basic iron and steel. In the year 2010, the Indian Bank sanctioned
various credit facilities to the corporate debtor. In that context,
the corporate debtor created an equitable mortgage over the
subject property in favour of the Indian Bank.
3.On 30.12.2013, the respondent No.2-State through the
Economic Offences Wing (EOW) registered C.R. No. 168 of 2013
under Sections 420, 409, 477A and 120B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) against an entity called Birla Power Solutions
bipin prithiani
3
wp-5272.25.doc
Ltd. The corporate debtor was not named as an accused in the said
FIR. In the year 2014, the investigating agency filed charge-sheet
in the said matter against accused persons, which included the
father of the Managing Director of the corporate debtor. At this
stage also, the corporate debtor was not arraigned as an accused
and the subject property was not shown as having been acquired as
proceeds of crime. On 19.03.2016, the respondent-State of
Maharashtra issued impugned notification under the provisions of
the MPID Act, attaching several properties, including the subject
property belonging to the corporate debtor. Since, the corporate
debtor was neither the financial establishment, in the context of
which the provisions of the MPID Act were invoked, nor was it an
accused in the case, it submitted its objection on 19.08.2016
before the respondent No.1-Competent Authority, challenging the
alleged illegal attachment of the subject property.
4.On 31.03.2017, the Indian Bank classified the loan account
of the corporate debtor as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA). On
03.05.2017, the Indian Bank issued demand notice under Section
13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Securitisation
Act). Thereupon, the Indian Bank took symbolic possession of the
secured asset to initiate steps for e-auction of the subject property.
At this stage, in the year 2017, the corporate debtor filed
Miscellaneous Application No. 1280 of 2017 in the concerned
MPID Case No. 4 of 2014, before the designated Court, where
bipin prithiani
4
wp-5272.25.doc
the MPID case was pending, in order to challenge continuation of
the proceedings under the Securitisation Act. On 25.07.2018, the
designated MPID Court refused to grant stay on the e-auction, but
it is an admitted position that the auction sale did not materialize
in respect of the subject property.
5.On 16.11.2021, an operational creditor filed proceedings
under Section 9 of the IBC and National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT), Hyderabad, admitted C.P. (IB) No.525/9/HDB/2019. As a
consequence, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was
initiated in the context of the corporate debtor and an Interim
Resolution Professional was appointed. Upon admission of the
CIRP on 23.11.2021, the resolution professional issued a public
notice in Form A, inviting claims from creditors. Thereupon,
expressions of interest were invited in Form G from prospective
resolution applicants. The order of the NCLT, admitting the
corporate debtor in CIRP was confirmed, when National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) dismissed the
Company Appeal on 08.07.2022. Thereafter, an appeal was filed
before the Supreme Court, wherein status-quo was granted. But,
eventually, on 26.02.2024, the appeal was dismissed and the
interim order was vacated. As a consequence, the CIRP
proceedings continued.
6.On 17.09.2024, the NCLT, Hyderabad, approved the
resolution plan submitted by the successful resolution applicant.
As per the position of law recognized by the Supreme Court in a
bipin prithiani
5
wp-5272.25.doc
series of judgments, the corporate debtor was to now start its
activities on a clean slate. On 09.10.2024, the successful resolution
applicant paid amount of Rs.14.50 crores to the Indian Bank in
full and final settlement of its dues. Consequently, Indian Bank
issued no objection certificate and no charge remained on the
subject property.
7.It is relevant to note that in the meanwhile, the resolution
professional had filed Writ Petition No. 3447 of 2022, before this
Court for challenging the attachment of the subject property of
the corporate debtor. On 26.02.2025, this Court permitted the
said writ petition to be withdrawn, with liberty to file fresh
proceedings in the light of the resolution plan having been
approved.
8.It is in this backdrop that the present writ petition was filed,
relying upon Section 32A of the IBC, for quashing and setting
aside of the impugned notification dated 19.03.2016, so that the
subject property would be released from attachment. On
04.11.2025, this Court after hearing the petitioner and the
respondents, through their respective counsel, granted interim
relief in terms of prayer clause (b). As a consequence, the
attachment of the subject property in terms of notification dated
19.03.2016 was released, subject to the petitioner furnishing bank
guarantee in favour of the Registry of this Court for a sum of
Rs.74.24 lakhs. Subsequently, the time period for furnishing such
bank guarantee was extended and it is an admitted position that
bipin prithiani
6
wp-5272.25.doc
the petitioner indeed furnished the bank guarantee. The pleadings
in the writ petition were completed and it was taken up for
hearing.
9.Mr. Ashish Kamat, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner, invited attention of this Court to Section 32A of the
IBC, to contend that the moment the resolution plan was
accepted, the corporate debtor could not be made subject matter
of any prosecution and its properties became immune from any
action, including attachment, as per the impugned notification
dated 19.03.2016. The learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner relied upon the text of Section 32A of the IBC to submit
that a plain reading of the same would show that no other
interpretation was possible.
10.In order to bolster the aforesaid submission, attention of this
Court was invited to judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Manish Kumar vs. Union of India & Anr., (2021) 5 SCC 1. It was
submitted that criminal liability of the corporate debtor stood
extinguished under Section 32A of the IBC and the property of
the corporate debtor could no longer be subject to such
attachment. It was further submitted that the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited vs.
Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors., (2021)
9 SCC 657 emphasized the position that upon the resolution plan
being accepted, the corporate debtor started on a clean slate,
thereby indicating that the effect of the impugned notification
bipin prithiani
7
wp-5272.25.doc
could no longer survive. He further referred to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan
Power and Steel Ltd. & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093 to
demonstrate that the effect of non-obstante clause at the beginning
of the Section 32A of the IBC clearly demonstrated that no action
could be taken in respect of the subject property of the corporate
debtor in respect of any offence committed prior to the
commencement of the CIRP, particularly when such property was
covered under the resolution plan approved by the adjudicating
authority.
11.It was further submitted that a Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Shiv Charan & Ors. vs. Adjudicating Authority, 2024
SCC OnLine Bom 701 had followed the said position of law. It
was fairly brought to the notice of this Court that in the Special
Leave petition, challenging the said judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court, leave was granted and interim order was
continued.
12.On the basis of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme
Court and this Court, it was asserted that the attachment of the
subject property of the corporate debtor could no longer survive.
On the aspect of the interpretation of the order dated 17.09.2024
passed by the NCLT, Hyderabad, approving the resolution plan, it
was submitted that a proper reading of the same, including
paragraph 8(g), would demonstrate that the logical consequence of
the effect of Section 32A of the IBC clearly inured in favour of the
bipin prithiani
8
wp-5272.25.doc
petitioner. It was submitted that although, the NCLT had granted
liberty to the petitioner to approach the Competent Authority
under the MPID Act for lifting the attachment on the subject
property, the present writ petition was clearly maintainable, as a
pure question of law arose in the matter. Merely because liberty
was granted to approach the designated Court, the same would
not take away the jurisdiction of this Court in considering the
present writ petition. In that context, reliance was placed on
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Godrej Sara Lee
Ltd. vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority &
Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95.
13.It was further submitted that the respondents cannot rely
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of National
Spot Exchange Limited vs. Union of India & Ors., (2025) 8 SCC
393, as the Supreme Court had considered a different controversy
while making observations about the interplay between the
provisions of the IBC and the MPID Act. It was submitted that the
subject property was merely attached under Section 4 of the MPID
Act and its vesting would become absolute only upon the
designated Court passing an appropriate order under Section 7 of
the MPID Act. Since no such order had been passed till date, there
was no question of vesting of the subject property with the
competent authority, thereby showing that the writ petition
deserves to be allowed.
14.On the other hand, Mr. B. V. Samant, learned Additional
bipin prithiani
9
wp-5272.25.doc
Government Pleader (AGP) appearing on behalf of the
respondents-State Authorities, submitted that the petition deserves
to be dismissed. It was submitted that the petitioner could not be
permitted to wriggle out of order of the NCLT, as the adjudicating
authority, when it approved the resolution plan as per order dated
17.09.2024. Attention of this Court was specifically invited to
paragraph 8(g) of the said order, to contend that the NCLT had
clarified that the prayer for lifting of the attachment could be
made before the competent authority and that such a prayer made
while submitting the resolution plan was specifically refused. It
was submitted that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the said
order, it should have challenged the same under the provisions of
the IBC and in absence thereof, the said order had attained finality.
Therefore, the only forum available for the petitioner for seeking
lifting of the attachment of the subject property, was the
designated MPID Court. Instead of approaching the said Court,
the petitioner had filed the present writ petition, which ought not
to be entertained by this Court.
15.It was submitted that although the position of law, regarding
the corporate debtor starting on a clean slate after approval of the
resolution plan has been recognized by the Supreme Court in
various judgments, in the case of National Spot Exchange Limited
vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court had an
occasion to specifically consider the interplay between the
provisions of the IBC and the MPID Act. It was submitted that
bipin prithiani
10
wp-5272.25.doc
upon a proper application of the ratio of the said judgment, it
would become evident that once the impugned notification dated
19.03.2016 was issued, attaching the subject property, it vested in
the competent authority and it was no longer available for the
process of CIRP. Therefore, the subject property could never be
subject matter of the resolution plan, even if it was accepted. On
this basis, it was submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of
the petitioner cannot be accepted and that writ petition deserves
to be dismissed.
16.We have considered the rival submissions in the light of the
provisions of the IBC and MPID Act, as also the aforementioned
judgments upon which reliance has been placed. It would be
appropriate to refer to Section 32A of the IBC and the relevant
provisions of the MPID Act.
17.Section 32A of the IBC reads as follows :
“32A.Liability for prior offences, etc.--(1) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other
law for the time being in force, the liability of a corporate
debtor for an offence committed prior to the commencement
of the corporate insolvency resolution process shall cease, and
the corporate debtor shall not be prosecuted for such an
offence from the date the resolution plan has been approved
by the Adjudicating Authority under section 31, if the
resolution plan results in the change in the management or
control of the corporate debtor to a person who was not–
(a) a promoter or in the management or control of the
corporate debtor or a related party of such a person; or
(b) a person with regard to whom the relevant
investigating authority has, on the basis of material in its
bipin prithiani
11
wp-5272.25.doc
possession, reason to believe that he had abetted or conspired
for the commission of the offence, and has submitted or filed
a report or a complaint to the relevant statutory authority or
Court:
Provided that if a prosecution had been instituted
during the corporate insolvency resolution process against
such corporate debtor, it shall stand discharged from the date
of approval of the resolution plan subject to requirements of
this sub-section having been fulfilled:
Provided further that every person who was a
designated partner as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the
Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), or an
officer who is in default, as defined in clause (60) of section 2
of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), or was in any
manner incharge of, or responsible to the corporate debtor for
the conduct of its business or associated with the corporate
debtor in any manner and who was directly or indirectly
involved in the commission of such offence as per the report
submitted or complaint filed by the investigating authority,
shall continue to be liable to be prosecuted and punished for
such an offence committed by the corporate debtor
notwithstanding that the corporate debtor's liability has
ceased under this sub-section.
(2) No action shall be taken against the property of the
corporate debtor in relation to an offence committed prior to
the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution
process of the corporate debtor, where such property is
covered under a resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating
Authority under section 31, which results in the change in
control of the corporate debtor to a person, or sale of
liquidation assets under the provisions of Chapter III of Part II
of this Code to a person, who was not–
(i) a promoter or in the management or control of the
corporate debtor or a related party of such a person; or
(ii) a person with regard to whom the relevant
investigating authority has, on the basis of material in its
possession reason to believe that he had abetted or conspired
for the commission of the offence, and has submitted or filed
bipin prithiani
12
wp-5272.25.doc
a report or a complaint to the relevant statutory authority or
Court.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, it is
hereby clarified that,–
(i) an action against the property of the corporate
debtor in relation to an offence shall include the attachment,
seizure, retention or confiscation of such property under such
law as may be applicable to the corporate debtor;
(ii) nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to bar
an action against the property of any person, other than the
corporate debtor or a person who has acquired such property
through corporate insolvency resolution process or
liquidation process under this Code and fulfils the
requirements specified in this section, against whom such an
action may be taken under such law as may be applicable.
(3) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-sections
(1) and (2), and notwithstanding the immunity given in this
section, the corporate debtor and any person who may be
required to provide assistance under such law as may be
applicable to such corporate debtor or person, shall extend all
assistance and co-operation to any authority investigating an
offence committed prior to the commencement of the
corporate insolvency resolution process.”
18.Sections 4 to 7 of the MPID Act, read as follows :
“4. Attachment of Properties on default of return of
deposits.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force,—
(i) where upon complaints received from the depositors
or otherwise, the Government is satisfied that any Financial
Establishment has failed,—
(a) to return the deposit after maturity or on demand
by the depositor; or
(b) to pay interest or other assured benefit; or
(c) to provide the service promised against such
deposit; or
bipin prithiani
13
wp-5272.25.doc
(ii) where the Government has reason to believe that
any Financial Establishment is acting in a calculated manner
detrimental to the interest of the depositors with an intension
to defraud them;
and if the Government is satisfied that such Financial
Establishment is not likely to return the deposits or make
payment of interest or other benefits assured or to provide the
services against which the deposit is received, the Government
may, in order to protect the interest of the depositors of such
Financial Establishment, after recording reasons in writing,
issue an order by publishing it in the Official Gazette,
attaching the money or other property believed to have been
acquired by such Financial Establishment either in its own
name or in the name of any other person from out of the
deposits, collected by the Financial Establishment, or if it
transpires that such money or other property is not available
for attachment or not sufficient for repayment of the deposits,
such other property of the said Financial Establishment or the
promoter, director, partner or manager or member of the said
Financial Establishment as the Government may think fit.
(2) On the Publication of the order under sub-section
(1), all the properties and assets of the Financial Establishment
and the persons mentioned therein shall forthwith vest in the
Competent Authority Appointed by the Government, pending
further order from the Designated Court.
(3) The Collector of a District shall be competent to
receive the complaints from his District under sub-section (1)
and he shall forward the same together with his report to the
Government at the earliest and shall send a copy of the
complaint also to the concerned District Police
Superintendent or Commissioner of Police, as the case may
be, for investigation.
5. Appointment of Competent Authority.— (1) The
Government may while issuing the order under sub-section
(1) of section 4, appoint any of its officers not below the rank
of the Deputy Collector, as the Competent Authority, to
exercise control over the monies and the properties attached
by the Government under section 4, of a Financial
Establishment.
bipin prithiani
14
wp-5272.25.doc
(2) The Competent Authority shall have such other
powers as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of
this Act.
(3) The Competent Authority shall, within thirty days
from the date of the publication of the said order, apply to the
Designated Court, accompanied by one or more affidavits
stating the grounds on which the Government has issued the
said order under section 4 and the amount of money or other
property believed to have been acquired out of the deposits
and the details, if any, of persons in whose name such
property is believed to have been invested or acquired or any
other property attached under section 4, for such further
orders as found necessary.
6. Designated Court.— (1) For the purpose of this Act,
the Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the Bombay High Court by notification in the
Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Court in
the cadre of a District and Sessions Judge for such area or
areas or for such case or class or group of cases, as may be
specified in the notification.
(2) No court including the court constituted under the
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) and the
Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), other than the
Designated Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any
matter to which the provisions of this Act apply.
(3) Any pending case in any other court to which the
provisions of this Act apply shall, on the date of coming into
force of this Act, stand transferred to the Designated Court.
7. Powers of Designated Court regarding attachment.—
(1) Upon receipt of an application under section 5, the
Designated Court shall issue to the Financial Establishment or
to any other person whose property is attached and vested in
the Competent Authority by the Government under section 4,
a notice accompanied by the application and affidavits and of
the evidence, if any, recorder, calling upon the said
Establishment or the said person to show cause on a date to
be specified in the notice, why the order of attachment should
not be made absolute.
bipin prithiani
15
wp-5272.25.doc
(2) The Designated Court shall also issue such notice, to
all other persons represented to it as having or being likely to
claim, any interest or title in the property of the Financial
Establishment or the person to whom the notice is issued
under sub-section (1), calling upon all such persons to appear
on the same date as that specified in the notice and make
objection if they so desire to the attachment of the property
or any portion thereof, on the ground that they have interest
in such property or portion thereof.
(3) Any person claiming an interest in the property
attached or any portion thereof may, notwithstanding that no
notice has been served upon him under this section, make an
objection as aforesaid to the Designated Court at any time
before an order is passed under sub-section (4) or sub-section
(6).
(4) The Designated Court shall, if no cause is shown
and no objections are made under sub-section (3), on or
before the specified date, forthwith pass an order making the
order of attachment absolute, and issue such direction as may
be necessary for realisation of the assets attached and for the
equitable distribution among the depositors of the money
realised from out of the property attached.
(5) If cause is shown or any objection is made as
aforesaid, the Designated Court shall proceed to investigate
the same and in so doing, as regards the examination of the
parties and in all other respects, the Designated Court shall,
subject to the provisions of this Act, follow the summary
procedure as contemplated under Order 37 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908) and exercise all the powers
of a court in hearing a suit under the said Code and any
person making an objection shall be required to adduce
evidence to show that on the date of the attachment he had
some interest in the property attached.
(6) After investigation under sub-section (5), the
Designated Court shall pass an order either making the order
of attachment passed under sub-section (1) of section 4
absolute or varying it by releasing a portion of the property
from attachment or cancelling the order of attachment:
bipin prithiani
16
wp-5272.25.doc
Provided that the Designated Court shall not release
from attachment any interest, which it is satisfied that the
Financial Establishment or the person referred to in sub-
section (1) has in the property, unless it is also satisfied that
there will remain under attachment an amount or property of
value not less than the value that is required for repayment to
the depositors of such Financial Establishment.”
19.A perusal of Section 32A of the IBC shows that a corporate
debtor cannot be prosecuted for offence committed prior to
commencement of the CIRP, from the date the resolution plan is
approved by the adjudicating authority under Section 31 of the
IBC, if the resolution plan results in change in the management or
control of the corporate debtor. Sub-section (2) of Section 32A
further provides that no action shall be taken against the property
of the corporate debtor in relation to such an offence committed
prior to the commencement of CIRP when such property is
covered under the resolution plan approved by the adjudicating
authority. The explanation to the aforesaid provision clarifies that
action against the property of the corporate debtor in relation to
an offence includes attachment, seizure, confiscation, etc. The
corporate debtor, despite the immunity is required to provide
assistance to the investigating authority in relation to such an
offence. Thus, a bare reading of the above quoted Section 32A of
the IBC makes it abundantly clear that neither can prosecution
against the corporate debtor be continued, nor can any action of
attachment, seizure, confiscation, etc. in respect of property of the
corporate debtor be continued, the moment the resolution plan is
approved by the adjudicating authority.
bipin prithiani
17
wp-5272.25.doc
20.The Supreme Court in the case of Manish Kumar vs. Union
of India & Anr. (supra) while considering the said provision of the
IBC, observed as follows :
“317. Section 32-A has been divided into three parts
consisting of sub-sections (1) to (3). Under sub-section (1),
notwithstanding anything contained, either in the Code or in
any other law, liability of a corporate debtor, for an offence
committed prior to the commencement of the CIRP, shall
cease. Further, the corporate debtor shall not be liable to be
prosecuted for such an offence. Both these immunities are
subject to the following conditions:
317.1. A resolution plan, in regard to the corporate debtor,
must be approved by the adjudicating authority under Section
31 of the Code.
317.2. The resolution plan, so approved, must result in the
change in the management or control of the corporate debtor.
317.3. The change in the management or control, under the
approved resolution plan, must not be in favour of a person,
who was a promoter, or in the management and control of the
corporate debtor, or in favour of a related party of the
corporate debtor.
317.4. The change in the management or control of the
corporate debtor must not be in favour of a person, with
regard to whom the relevant investigating authority has
material which leads it to entertain the reason to believe that
he had abetted or conspired for the commission of the offence
and has submitted or filed a report before the relevant
authority or the Court. This last limb may require a little
more demystification. The person, who comes to acquire the
management and control of the corporate person, must not be
a person who has abetted or conspired for the commission of
the offence committed by the corporate debtor prior to the
commencement of the CIRP. Therefore, abetting or
conspiracy by the person, who acquires management and
control of the corporate debtor, under a resolution plan,
which is approved under Section 31 of the Code and the filing
of the report, would remove the protective umbrella or
bipin prithiani
18
wp-5272.25.doc
immunity erected by Section 32-A in regard to an offence
committed by the corporate debtor before the commencement
of the CIRP. To make it even more clear, if either of the
conditions, namely, abetting or conspiring followed by the
report, which have been mentioned as aforesaid, are present,
then, the liability of the corporate debtor, for an offence
committed prior to the commencement of the CIRP, will
remain unaffected.
318. The first proviso in sub-section (1) declares that if there
is approval of a resolution plan under Section 31 and a
prosecution has been instituted during the CIRP against the
corporate debtor, the corporate debtor will stand discharged.
This is, however, subject to the condition that the
requirements in sub-section (1), which have been elaborated
by us, have been fulfilled. In other words, if under the
approved resolution plan, there is a change in the
management and control of the corporate debtor, to a person,
who is not a promoter, or in the management and control of
the corporate debtor, or a related party of the corporate
debtor, or the person who acquires control or management of
the corporate debtor, has neither abetted nor conspired in the
commission of the offence, then, the prosecution, if it is
instituted after the commencement of the CIRP and during its
pendency, will stand discharged against the corporate debtor.
Under the second proviso to sub-section (1), however, the
designated partner in respect of the liability partnership or the
officer in default, as defined under Section 2(60) of the
Companies Act, 2013, or every person, who was, in any
manner, in charge or responsible to the corporate debtor for
the conduct of its business, will continue to be liable to be
prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the
corporate debtor. This is despite the extinguishment of the
criminal liability of the corporate debtor under sub-section
(1). Still further, every person, who was associated with the
corporate debtor in any manner, and, who was directly or
indirectly involved in the commission of such offence, in
terms of the report submitted and report filed by the
investigating authority, will continue to be liable to be
prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the
corporate debtor.
bipin prithiani
19
wp-5272.25.doc
319. Thus, the combined reading of the various limbs of sub-
section (1) would show that while, on the one hand, the
corporate debtor is freed from the liability for any offence
committed before the commencement of the CIRP, the
statutory immunity from the consequences of the commission
of the offence by the corporate debtor is not available and the
criminal liability will continue to haunt the persons, who were
in charge of the assets of the corporate debtor, or who were
responsible for the conduct of its business or those who were
associated with the corporate debtor in any manner, and who
were directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the
offence, and they will continue to be liable.
320. Coming to sub-section (2) of Section 32-A, it declares a
bar against taking any action against property of the corporate
debtor. This bar also contemplates the connection between
the offence committed by the corporate debtor before the
commencement of the CIRP and the property of the
corporate debtor. This bar is conditional to the property being
covered under the resolution plan. The further requirement is
that a resolution plan must be approved by the adjudicating
authority and, finally, the approved plan, must result in a
change in control of the corporate debtor not to a person,
who is already identified and described in sub-section (1). In
other words, the requirements for invoking the bar against
proceeding against the property of the corporate debtor in
relation to an offence committed before the commencement
of the CIRP, are as follows:
320.1. There must be resolution plan, which is approved by
the adjudicating authority under Section 31 of the Code.
320.2. The approved resolution plan must result in the
change in control of the corporate debtor to a person, who
was not — (a) a promoter; (b) in the management or control
of the corporate debtor; or (c) a related party of the corporate
debtor; (d) a person with regard to whom the investigating
authority, had, on the basis of the material, reason to believe
that he has abetted or conspired for the commission of the
offence and has submitted a report or a complaint. If all these
aforesaid conditions are fulfilled then the law giver has
provided that no action can be taken against the property of
the corporate debtor in connection with the offence.
bipin prithiani
20
wp-5272.25.doc
321. The Explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 32-A has
clarified that the words “an action against the property of the
corporate debtor in relation to an offence”, would include the
attachment, seizure, retention or confiscation of such
property under the law applicable to the corporate debtor.
Since the word “include” is used under sub-clause (i) of the
Explanation, the word “action” against the property of the
corporate debtor is intended to have the widest possible
amplitude. There is a clear nexus with the object of the Code.
The other part of the clarification, under the Explanation, is
found in the second sub-clause of Explanation (ii).
322. Under the second limb of the Explanation to Section 32-
A(2), the law giver has clearly articulated the point that as far
as the property of any person, other than the corporate
debtor or any person who had acquired the property of the
corporate debtor through the CIRP or liquidation process
under the Code and who otherwise fulfils the requirement
under Section 32-A, action can be taken against the property
of such other person.
323. Thus, reading sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of
Section 32-A together, two results emerge:
323.1. Subject to the requirements embedded in sub-section
(1) of Section 32-A, the liability of the corporate debtor for
the offence committed under the CIRP, will cease.
323.2. The property of the corporate debtor is protected from
any legal action again subject to the safeguards, which we
have indicated.
323.3. The bar against action against the property, is
available, not only to the corporate debtor but also to any
person who acquires property of the corporate debtor under
the CIRP or the liquidation process. The bar against action
against the property of the corporate debtor is also available
in the case of a person subject to the same limitation as
prescribed in sub-section (1) and also in sub-section (2), if he
has purchased the property of the corporate debtor in the
proceedings for the liquidation of the corporate debtor.”
21.In its judgment in the case of Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons
bipin prithiani
21
wp-5272.25.doc
Private Limited vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company
Limited & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the position
that upon approval of the resolution plan, the corporate debtor
starts on a clean slate. Subsequently, in its judgment in the case of
Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. & Ors. (supra),
the Supreme Court further referred to Section 32A of the IBC and
observed as follows :
“117. It can thus be seen that section 32A of the IBC which
begins with a non obstante clause provides that the liability of
the corporate debtor for an offence committed prior to the
commencement of the CIRP shall cease, and the corporate
debtor shall not be prosecuted for such an offence from the
date the resolution plan has been approved by the
Adjudicating Authority under section 31 of the IBC, if the
resolution plan results in the change in the management or
control of the corporate debtor or if the erstwhile promoter
or any other person who has been retained has not been
found to have abetted or conspired in the commission of the
offence. It further provides that no action shall be taken
against the properties of the corporate debtor in relation to an
offence committed prior to the commencement of the CIRP
of the corporate debtor, where such property is covered under
a resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority
under section 31 of the IBC.”
22.This Court followed the said position of law in its judgment
in case of Shiv Charan & Ors. vs. Adjudicating Authority (supra).
In the said judgment, it was observed as follows :
“20. Therefore, as a matter of law, once the resolution plan is
approved with the attendant conditions set out in Section 32A
being met, further prosecution against the corporate debtor
and its properties, would cease. Section 32A(3) enjoins the
corporate debtor to continue to cooperate with the
enforcement agencies in the continued prosecution against the
bipin prithiani
22
wp-5272.25.doc
individuals in question.”
23.We are of the opinion that even if leave has been granted in
the Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment and
interim order has been granted, the purport of Section 32A of the
IBC is made abundantly clear by the Supreme Court in the
aforementioned judgments in the cases of Manish Kumar vs.
Union of India & Anr. (supra) and Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan
Power and Steel Ltd. & Ors. (supra).
24.Much emphasis was placed on behalf of the respondents-
State on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
National Spot Exchange Limited vs. Union of India & Ors.
(supra). A perusal of the said judgment shows that the questions
framed for consideration in the said judgment concerned the effect
of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC in respect of execution
of decrees against judgment debtors, where the properties of the
judgment debtors were attached under the provisions of the MPID
Act. The Supreme Court was not considering the effect of Section
32A of the IBC and the discussion with respect to the interplay
between the provisions of the IBC and the MPID Act was not in
the context of Section 32A of the IBC. Yet, the learned AGP
emphasized that the Supreme Court had made observations about
the effect of an order of attachment under Section 4 of the MPID
Act, indicating that the property had vested in the competent
authority. On this basis, it was contended that once the property
stood vested with the competent authority under the MPID Act,
bipin prithiani
23
wp-5272.25.doc
there was no question of the said property being part of the
resolution plan and that it could not be considered as a property
of the corporate debtor for attracting the provisions of Section
32A of the IBC.
25.We find the said argument to be fallacious for the reason
that a proper reading of Sections 4 to 7 of the MPID Act, quoted
hereinabove, would show that ‘vesting’ of the properties occurs
only after the designated Court passes an order under Section 7 of
the MPID Act, making absolute the order of attachment passed
under Section 4(1) thereof. It is pertinent to note that sub-section
(2) of Section 4 of the MPID Act specifically records that the
property made subject matter of the order of attachment under
sub-section (1) vests in the competent authority ‘pending further
orders from the designated Court’. Thus, the process of vesting is
still inchoate and it achieves finality only upon the designated
Court passing an order under Section 7 of the MPID Act, for
making absolute the order of attachment issued under Section 4(1)
thereof. Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents-
State that upon issuance of the impugned notification dated
19.03.2016, attaching the subject property, it vested in the
competent authority under the MPID Act, is rejected.
26.Once this finding is reached, we find that there is no
substance in the contention raised on behalf of the respondents-
State that the subject property was not available with the
corporate debtor at the stage of approval of the resolution plan.
bipin prithiani
24
wp-5272.25.doc
We also do not find much substance in the contention raised on
behalf of the respondents that, in view of paragraph 8(g) of the
order dated 17.09.2024 passed by the NCLT, approving the
resolution plan, the subject property could not be said to be part
of the resolution plan. A proper reading of the said order,
including paragraph 8 thereof, shows that the NCLT thought it fit
to call upon the successful resolution applicant to approach the
competent authority i.e. the designated Court under the MPID Act
for lifting of the attachment. When as a matter of law and by
operation of Section 32A of the IBC, the attachment could no
longer continue, particularly in the absence of any order being
passed by the designated Court under Section 7 of the MPID Act,
making the order of attachment absolute, there was no question of
the subject property not being part of the resolution plan or the
full effect of Section 32A of the IBC not coming into play.
27.Since the effect of Section 32A of the IBC, on a bare reading
of the said provision and the position of law being elaborately
clarified by the Supreme Court, is essentially a pure question of
law, we find that the petitioner is clearly entitled to press for relief
in this writ petition itself. Merely because the NCLT in the said
order dated 17.09.2024 reserved liberty for the successful
resolution applicant to approach the competent authority under
the MPID Act for lifting of attachment, would not adversely affect
the power of this Court under writ jurisdiction to entertain the
present writ petition. In this context, we find substance in reliance
bipin prithiani
25
wp-5272.25.doc
placed on behalf of the petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. Excise and Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. (supra). In paragraph 8 of
the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed as follows :
“8.That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions
of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of U. P. v.
Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union
of India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading
of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls
within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of
law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the High
Court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even
though the alternative remedy was not availed of ; and, unless
exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse,
this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this
court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely
legal requiring determination by the High Court without
putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in
the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that
where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not
involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law,
then it should be decided by the High Court instead of
dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative
remedy being available.”
28.We further find that in the present case, it is an admitted
position that neither at the stage of the registration of the FIR nor
at the filing of the charge-sheet was the corporate debtor ever
made an accused in the criminal proceedings that led to issuance
of the order of attachment dated 19.03.2016 under the MPID Act.
The respondents-State admitted the position that the corporate
debtor is not an accused. It was also conceded that the designated
Court has not passed any order under Section 7 of the MPID Act,
making absolute the order of attachment of the subject property.
bipin prithiani
26
wp-5272.25.doc
The corporate debtor upon approval of the resolution plan
satisfies all the requirements of Section 32A of the IBC and there
can be no dispute about the same. Therefore, the logical
consequence thereof must follow and there ought to be no
impediment in releasing the subject property from attachment, so
that the corporate debtor proceeds on a clean slate, in line with
the objects and reasons of enactment of the IBC. Although, the
learned AGP sought to indicate that the objects and reasons for
enactment of the MPID Act were clearly distinct from those of the
IBC and that the protection of investors ought to be given higher
priority by this Court, we are not impressed with the said
contention in the light of the facts and circumstances of the
present case, wherein the corporate debtor is not even an accused
in the said offences and Section 32A of the IBC must apply in full
force in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court.
29.As noted hereinabove, by interim order dated 04.11.2025,
the attachment of the property was already released by way of
interim order, subject to the petitioner furnishing bank guarantee
of Rs.74.24 lakhs with this Court. Since we have reached the
conclusion that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the
attachment cannot continue in the light of the operation of
Section 32A of the IBC, the interim order is made absolute and the
impugned notification dated 19.03.2016, to the extent that it
applies to the subject property, is quashed and set aside.
30.Consequently, the Registry of this Court is directed to return
bipin prithiani
27
wp-5272.25.doc
the bank guarantee to the petitioner, in the light of the writ
petition being allowed in the above terms.
31.The writ petition is disposed of. Pending applications also
stand disposed of.
(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)
Legal Notes
Add a Note....