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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 441 of 2001

Special Leave Petition (crl.) 5373 of 1997

PETITIONER:

E.S.P.RAJARAM & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/01/2001

BENCH:

D.P.Mphapatro, Doraswamy Raju, S.V.Patil

JUDGMENT:

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

Leave granted.

The appellants who were appointed as Traffic

Apprentices in Southern Railway prior to May 15, 1987, have

filed this appeal challenging the judgment of the Madras

Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short the

CAT) dated October 4, 1996 in OA No. 1096 of 1996

dismissing the case with the observation that it would be

appropriate for the applicants to approach the Supreme Court

for any clarification/review of the judgment in the case

titled Union of India and others vs. M. Bhaskar and others

1996 (4) SCC 416. The controversy which arose in that case

was regarding the claim of Traffic Apprentices appointed

prior to 15-5-1987 that they should be given the scale of

pay of Rs.1600-2660, benefit of which was available to

Traffic Apprentices recruited after 15-5-1987. Similar

claims were raised before different benches of the CAT.

There had been divergence of opinion between the different

benches, some accepting the claim of pre 1987 Traffic

Apprentices for the higher scale of pay, some other benches

taking a contrary view. The Ernakulam bench of CAT had

quashed the memorandum dated 15-5-1987 issued by the Railway

Board in which it was provided that the higher scale of pay

would be admissible only to the Traffic Apprentices

recruited after the date of the memorandum. These

conflicting views taken by different benches of the CAT came

up for consideration by this Court in the case of Union of

India and others vs. M. Bhaskar and others (supra), in

which a Bench of three learned Judges held inter alia (i)

that Rule I-A of the Indian Railway Establishment Code which

had come to be made pursuant to the power conferred by the

proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution permitted the

Railway Board to issue necessary instructions regarding

recruitment in the lowest grade and the memorandum dated

15-5-1987 having been issued in exercise of that power, the

Board had valid authority to issue the memorandum; ii) that

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since the recruitment of apprentices under the impugned

memorandum was to man the posts, not of Assistant Station

Masters, Assistant Yard Masters etc. as before, but of

Station Masters and Yard Masters and the standard of

examination for the apprentices to be recruited after

15-5-1987 was required to be higher than that which was

prevailing, giving them higher pay scales or reducing the

period of their training, could not be said to be d

iscriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable. iii) That the cut

off date 15-5-1987 is not arbitrary since the court felt

satisfied that the date is of relevance and the memorandum

as given came to be issued in the circumstances noticed in

the judgment. This Court upheld the validity of the

memorandum. The conclusions arrived at by this Court were

summed up in paragraph 17 of the judgment which reads as

follows:

"17.All the appeals, therefore, stand disposed of by

setting aside the judgments of those tribunals which have

held that the pre-1987 Traffic/Commercial Apprentices had

become entitled to the higher pay scale of Rs.1600-2660 by

the force of memorandum of 15-5-1987. Contrary view taken

is affirmed. We also set aside the judgment of the

Ernakulam Bench which declared the memorandum as invalid;

so too of the Patna Bench in appeal @ SLP (C) No. 15438 of

1994 qua Respondent 1. We also state that cases of

Respondents 2 to 4 in appeals @ SLPs (C) Nos. 2533-35 of

1994 do not stand on different footing."

In paragraph 18 of the judgment this Court considering

the hardship which may be caused to the appellants concerned

directed Union of India and its officers not to recover the

amount already paid. The said paragraph is quoted herein

below: 18. Despite the aforesaid conclusion of ours, we

are of the view that the recovery of the amount already paid

because of the aforesaid judgments of the Tribunals would

cause hardship to the respondents/appellants concerned and,

therefore, direct the Union of India and its officers not to

recover the amount already paid. This part of our order

shall apply (1) to the respondent/appellants who are before

this Court; and (2) to the pre-1987 apprentice in whose

favour judgment had been delivered by any CAT and which had

become final either because no appeal was carried to this

Court or, if carried, the same was dismissed. This benefit

would be available to no other."

In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court in

the judgment, the departmental authorities gave appropriate

placement in the scale of pay to the appellants who were

recruited as Traffic Apprentices prior to 15-5-1987. They

were given the pay of scale of Rs. 455-700 which stood

revised as Rs.1400-2300 on the recommendation of the 4th Pay

Commission and not the scale of Rs.550-750 which was revised

to Rs.1600-2660. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the

appellants filed OA No.1096/96 which was disposed of by the

judgment dated 4th of October, 1996 of the Madras Bench of

the CAT in the manner noted earlier. Thereafter the

appellants filed SLP No. 5373 of 1997 giving rise to this

appeal. In the said SLP a bench of three learned Judges of

this Court by the Order passed on 6-11-1997 directed that

the matter be placed before a constitution bench, since the

judgment in M. Bhaskar's case (supra) was delivered by

co-equal bench. The referral order is quoted hereunder;

"In this special leave petition the grievance of the

petitioners is against the Direction No.2 contained in Para

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18 of the judgment of this court in Union of India & Ors.

Vs. M. Bhaskar & Ors., 1996 (4) SCC 416 passed by the

Bench of Three learned Judges whereby it has been directed

that the order contained in para 18 would apply to pre-1987

apprentices (Traffic) in whose favour judgment has been

delivered by any CAT and which had become final either

because no appeal was carried to this Court or, if carried,

the same was dismissed. The learned counsel for the

petitioners has challenged the correctness of these

directions on the ground that finality of the orders passed

in the case of the petitioners as a result of the special

leave petition filed against the order of the CAT having

been dismissed by this Court, could not be reopened as a

result of the said directions. Since the judgment in M

Bhaskar's case (supra) was delivered by a Bench of three

learned judges of this Court, we consider it appropriate

that the matter be placed before the Constitution Bench. It

is directed that the matter may be placed before the Hon'ble

Chief Justice for directions in this regard.

In the meanwhile, it is directed that the Status quo

with regard to reversion in rank and reduction in pay scales

shall be maintained, as it exists today."

The main thrust of the arguments of learned counsel

appearing for the appellants was that the observations and

directions given by this Court in M. Bhaskar's case (supra)

particularly in paragraph 18 thereof are unsustainable since

it was passed without giving any notice to the appellants

and/or other similarly placed employees who were seriously

prejudiced by such directions. Elucidating the contentions,

the learned counsel submitted that the appellants who had

been given fitment in the higher scale of pay, Rs.1600-2660

and on that basis some of them had got further promotions

should not have been subjected to the directions in the

judgment of this Court particularly when the special leave

petition filed by the Union of India and the Railways

against the judgment of CAT (Madras Bench) dated 4th of

December, 1989 in OA No. 322 of 1988 and 488 of 1987 (the

appellants were applicants in OA 322 of 1988) accepting

their claim for the higher scale of pay had been dismissed

in limine by this Court. In any view of the case, submitted

the learned counsel, the principle of natural justice

required that the appellants should have been given notice

and afforded an opportunity of hearing before the order

prejudicially effecting their interest was passed. The

learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the

respondents on the other hand contended that in the context

of the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of

the controversy raised, this Court rightly passed the order,

issuing the directions in paragraph 18 of M. Bhakar's case

(supra) for the purpose of bringing about uniformity amongst

all the employees similarly placed, that is, those who were

recruited as Traffic Apprentices prior to 15-5-1987. The

further submission of the learned Addl. Solicitor General

was that this Court taking note of the hardship which may be

caused to the appellants and other similarly placed

employees issued the further direction that no recovery

shall be made of the amount which they might have received

in the higher scale of pay. In the submission of the

learned Addl. Solicitor General, the directions in

paragraph 18 of the judgment were issued with a view to do

complete justice between all pre-1987 Traffic Apprentices

and therefore calls for no interference.

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Since, the thrust of the arguments of the learned

counsel appearing for the petitioners and the intending

interveners was that the observations in paragraphs 17 & 18

of the judgment in M.Bhaskar's case (supra) by which they

have been seriously prejudiced were not made without giving

notice to them, we specifically asked the learned counsel to

place their arguments on the merits of the directions

contained in the said paragraphs for the purpose of

satisfying ourselves if a re-look at the said decision is

necessary. The learned counsel could not raise any

contention of substance questioning the correctness of the

decision in the aforementioned case except stating that many

of the persons who were parties in the cases decided by the

Tribunal taking the contra- view and some others had been

given benefit on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal

and some of them have even got further promotions which have

become vulnerable in view of the decision of this Court in

M. Bhaskar case (supra). It was their contention that this

Court should have made it clear that the decision in M.

Bhaskar case (supra) will not affect the parties in whose

favour judgments have been delivered by any bench of CAT and

which had become final either because no appeal was carried

to this Court or if carried the same was dismissed and

further the benefit should have been extended to others who

though not parties in any proceeding before any bench of CAT

had been given service benefit on the basis of the judgment

delivered by a bench of the CAT taking the view which was

rejected by this Court in M. Bhaskar case (supra). We have

carefully perused the judgment in M. Bhaskar's case

(supra). The decision in that case has been taken on a

detailed analysis of the relevant provisions of the Indian

Railway Establishment Code and the Indian Railway

Establishment Manual (1968 Edn.), and in the light of

certain general principles of law relating to recruitment

cogent reasons have been given in support of the findings

and conclusions arrived at in the judgment. As noted

earlier no contention was advanced before us pointing out

any serious error in the decision therein. We are satisfied

that in the facts and circumstances of the case placed

before their Lordships the decision is correct and warrants

no interference.

If it is necessary to trace the source of power of

this Court to issue the directions and pass the order as in

paragraph 18 of M Bhaskar's case (supra) one can

straightaway look to Article 142 of the Constitution. The

said provision vests power in the Supreme Court to pass such

decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete

justice in any case or mater pending before it. The

provision contains no limitation regarding the causes or the

circumstances in which the power can be exercised nor does

it lays down any condition to be satisfied before such power

is exercised. The exercise of the power is left completely

to the descretion of the highest court of the country and

its order or decree is made binding on all the Courts or

Tribunals throughout the territory of India. However, this

power is not to be exercised to override any express

provision. It is not to be exercised in a case where there

is no basis in law which can form an edifice for building up

a super structure. This Court has not hesitated to exercise

the power under Article 142 of the Constitution whenever it

was felt necessary in the interest of justice. In the case

of M S Ahlawat vs. State of Haryana and another (2000) 1

SCC 278) a bench of three learned Judges of this Court

considering the power of the Court to recall its own order

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in a criminal case referred to the relevant observations in

Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4

SCC 409) and held that under Article 142 of the Constitution

the Supreme Court cannot altogether ignore the substantive

provisions of a statute and pass orders concerning an issue

which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in

another statute. The following passage from the headnote of

the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India

(supra) was quoted with approval : "However, the powers

conferred on the Court by Article 142 being curative in

nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the

Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while

dealing with a cause pending before it. This power cannot

be used to 'supplant' substantive law applicable to the case

or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142,

even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to

build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring

express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and

thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be

achieved directly. The very nature of the power must lead

the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise

those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory

provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the

equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating

parties by 'ironing out the creases' in a cause or matter

before it. Indeed the Supreme Court is not a court of

restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. The

Supreme Court has always been a law-maker and its role

travels beyond merely dispute settling. It is a

'problem-solver in the nebulous areas' but the substantive

statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a

given case cannot be altogether ignored by the Supreme

Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed,

these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be

controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time

these powers are not meant to be exercised when their

exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been

expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with

the subject."

In the case of R.C.Sahi and others vs. Union of India

and others (1999) 1 SCC 482 concerning applicability of

certain service rules to officers of the CRPF this Court

relying on the power vested in Article 142 "for doing

complete justice in any cause or matter" issued the

following directions: "There are two petitioners in WP(C)

No.211 of 1997. Out of these two, it is stated that one has

already retired from the service. In the light of the

interim orders dated 19.1.1998 and 27.1.1998, the first

petitioner (C.M Bahuguna) is still in service in the

promoted post. In the circumstances, we are of the view

that notwithstanding the dismissal of the writ petition, the

petitioner, viz. C.M Bahuguna who is still in service in

the promoted post, should be allowed to continue in the said

promoted post, if necessary, by creating a supernumerary

post. However, we make it clear that all further promotions

shall be made in the light of this order."

In the case of Gaurav Jain vs. Union of India and

others (1998) 4 SCC 270) considering the petition for

review, a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court

interpreting Article 142(1) held that the provision does not

and cannot override Article 145(5) and observed that the

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decrees or orders issued under Article 142 must be issued

with concurrence of the majority of the Judges hearing the

matter. This Court referred to the following observations

made by the Court in Prem Chand Garg vs. Excise

Commissioner U.P.1963 Supp.(1) SCR 885 : "It does not and

cannot override Article 145(5). The decrees or orders

issued under Article 142 must be issued with the concurrence

of the majority of Judges hearing the matter. In the case

of Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commnr. U.P. a Bench of five

Judges of this Court considered a Rule made by this Court

providing for imposition of terms as to costs and as to

giving of security in a petition under Article 142 were very

wide and could not be controlled by Article 32. Negativing

this contention, this Court said :

"The powers of this Court are no doubt very wide and

they are intended to be and will always be exercised in the

interest of justice. But that is not to say that an order

can be made by this Court which is inconsistent with the

fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the

Constitution. An order which this Court can make in order

to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be

consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the

Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the

substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws.

Therefore, we do not think it would be possible to hold that

Article 142(1) confers upon this Court powers which can

contravene the provisions of Article 32."

Similarly, powers conferred by Article 142(1) also

cannot contravene the provisions of Article 145(5). Article

142 would not entitle a Judge sitting on a Bench of two

Judges, who differs from his colleague to issue directions

for the enforcement of his order although it may not be the

agreed order of the Bench of two Judges. If this were to be

permitted, it would lead to conflicting directions being

issued by each Judge under Article 142, directions which may

quite possibly nullify the directions given by another Judge

on the same Bench. This would put the Court in an untenable

position. Because if in a Bench of two Judges, one Judge

can resort to Article 142 for enforcement of his directions,

the second Judge can do likewise for the enforcement of his

directions. And even in a larger Bench, a Judge holding a

minority view can issue his order under Article 142 although

it may conflict with the order issued by the majority. This

would put this Court in an indefensible situation and lead

to total confusion. Article 142 is not meant for such a

purpose and cannot be resorted to in this fashion."

In the case of State of Punjab and others vs.

Bakshish Singh (1998) 8 SCC 222) concerning a departmental

proceeding against a police constable this Court rejecting

the contention raised by the appellant that the Supreme

Court could not cure inconsistency because the respondent

had not filed any cross appeal, this Court removed the

inconsistency by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution

and by referring to Order 41, Rule 33 and Section 107(1)(a)

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This Court referring

to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court

Bar Association case (supra) reiterated the position that

while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution

the Court cannot ignore the substantive right of a litigant

while dealing with a cause pending before it and can invoke

its power under Article 142. The power cannot however be

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used to supplant substantive law applicable to a case. This

Court further observed that Article 142 even with the width

of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice

where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory

provisions dealing with a subject and thereby achieve

something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. In

the case of Spencer & Company Ltd. and another vs.

Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and others (1995)1

SCC 259 this Court dealing with the binding nature of the

orders issued by the Supreme Court to the High Court

referring to the provisions of the Articles 141, 142 and 144

of the Constitution made the significant observations: "The

afore-narrated words, we think, presently, are enough to

assert the singular constitutional role of this Court, and

correspondingly of the assisting role of all authorities,

civil or judicial, in the territory of India, towards it,

who are mandated by the Constitution to act in aid of this

Court. That the High Court is one such judicial authority

covered under Article 144 of the Constitution is beyond

question. The order dated 14.1.1994 of this Court was

indeed a judicial order and otherwise enforceable throughout

the territory of India under Article 142 of the

Constitution. The High Court was bound to come in aid of

this Court when it required the High Court to have its order

worked out. The language of request oftenly employed by

this Court in such situations is to be read by the High

Court as an obligation, in carrying out the constitutional

mandate, maintaining the writ of this Court running large

throughout the country."

In the case of Ram Krishna Verma and others vs. State

of U.P. and others (1992) 2 SCC 620 a case relating to

grant of permit to private operators on nationalised routes,

this Court referring to Articles 136, 142 and 226 of the

Constitution held that the Court should endeavour to

neutralise any undeserved and unfair advantage gained by a

party invoking its jurisdiction. Therein it was observed by

this Court (at p.630):

"This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO held that

the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226

the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or

unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction

of the court must be neutralised. It was further held that

the institution of the litigation by it should not be

permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party

responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of

the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this

Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete

justice and neutralise the unfair advantage gained by the 50

operators including the appellants in dragging the

litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route

or area or portion thereof and forfeited their right to

hearing of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme

dated February 26, 1959."

In the case of Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995)2 SCC

584) relating to a proceeding for criminal contempt a Bench

of three learned Judges of this Court dealing with the

priliminary objection raised on behalf of the contemner and

the State Bar Council held that this Court is not only the

highest court of record, but under various provisions of the

Constitution, is also charged with the duties and

responsibilities of correcting the lower courts and

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tribunals and or protecting them from those whose misconduct

tends to prevent the due performance of their duties.

Therein this Court distinguished the decisions in Prem Chand

Garg (supra) and relied on the decisions in Delhi Judicial

Service Association vs. State of Gujarat (1991)4 SCC 406

and Union Carbide Corporation.etc. vs. Union of India

(1991) 4 SCC 584, and this Court made the following relevant

observations in connection with the power vested under

Article 142 :

"Apart from the fact that these observations are made

with reference to the powers of this Court under Article 142

which are in the nature of supplementary powers and not with

reference to this Court's power under Article 129, the said

observations have been explained by this Court in its later

decisions in Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of

Gujarat and Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India. In

para 51 of the former decision, it has been, with respect,

rightly pointed out that the said observations were made

with regard to the extent of this Court's power under

Article 142(1) in the context of fundamental rights. Those

observations have no bearing on the present issue. No

doubt, it was further observed there that those observations

have no bearing on the question in issue in that case as

there was no provision in any substantive law restricting

this Court's power to quash proceedings pending before

subordinate courts. But it was also added there that this

Court's power under Article 142(1) to do complete justice

was entirely of a different level and of a different

quality. Any prohibition or restriction contained in

ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the

constitutional power of this Court. Once this Court is in

seisin of a matter before it, it has power to issue any

order or direction to do complete justice in the matter. A

reference was made in that connection to the concurring

opinion of Justice A.N.Sen in Harbans Singh v. State of

U.P. where the learned Judge observed as follows: (SCC

pp.107-08, para 20):

"Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court

for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from

the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under

Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion

that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power

and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary

situation in the larger interests of administration of

justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done.

This power must necessarily be sparingly used only in

exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of

justice."

The Court has then gone on to observe there that no

enactment made by Central or State legislature can limit or

restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the

Constitution, though the Court must take into consideration

the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute.

What would be the need of complete justice in a cause or

matter, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of

each case.

In the case of Union Carbide Corporation and others

Vs. Union of India and others (supra), a Constitution Bench

of this Court dealing with the power of the Apex Court to

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withdraw unto itself cases pending in the district court at

Bhopal,considered the scope and ambit of the power vested in

the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. In para 60

of the judgment it was observed :

"Any limited interpretation of the expression "cause

or matter" having regard to the wide and sweeping powers

under Article 136 which Article 142(1) seeks to effectuate,

limiting it only to the short compass of the actual dispute

before the Court and not to what might necessarily and

reasonably be connected with or related to such matter in

such a way that their withdrawal to the apex Court would

enable the court to do "complete justice", would stultify

the very wide constitutional powers. Take, for instance, a

case where an interlocutory order in a matrimonial cause

pending in the trial court comes up before the apex Court.

The parties agree to have the main matter itself either

decided on the merits or disposed of by a compromise. If

the argument is correct this Court would be powerless to

withdraw the main matter and dispose it of finally even if

it be on consent of both sides. Take also a similar

situation where some criminal proceedings are also pending

between the litigating spouses. If all disputes are

settled, can the court not call up to itself the connected

criminal litigation for a final disposal? If matters are

disposed of by consent of the parties, can any one of them

later turn around and say that the apex Court's order was a

nullity as one without jurisdiction and that the consent

does not confer jurisdiction? This is not the way in which

jurisdiction with such wide constitutional powers is to be

construed. While it is neiehter possible nor advisable to

enumerate exhaustively the multitudinous ways in which such

situations may present themselves before the Court where the

Court with the aid of the powers under Article 142(1) could

bring about a finality to the matters, it is common

experience that day in and day out such matters are taken up

and decided in this Court. It is true that mere practice,

however long, will not legitimize issues of jurisdiction.

But the argument, pushed to its logical conclusions, would

mean that when an interlocutory appeal comes up before this

Court by special leave, even with the consent of the

parties, the main matter cannot be finally disposed of by

this Court as such a step would imply an impermissible

transfer of the main matter. Such technicalities do not

belong to the content and interpretation of constitutional

powers.

In para 83 of the judgment this Court rejected as

unsound and erroneous the proposition that a provision in

any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the

public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the

powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1).

In paragraph 214 of the judgment summing up the

conclusions reached this Court observed :

(i) The contention that the apex Court had no

jurisdiction to withdraw to itself the original suits

pending in the District Court at Bhopal and dispose of the

same in terms of the settlement and the further contention

that, similarly, the Court had no jurisdiction to withdraw

the criminal proceedings are rejected.

It is held that under Article 142(1) of the

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Constitution, the Court had necessary jurisdiction and power

to do so.

Accordingly, contentions (A) and (B) are held and

answered against the petitioners.

In the case of Ved Prakash and others vs. Union of

India and others (1994) 1 SCC 45 taking note of the piquant

situation caused due to inordinate delay in payment of

compensation for the property acquired under section 4 of

the Land Acquisition Act, this Court made the following

observation:

"The petitioners because of the delay and inaction on

the part of the respondents are in a great predicament. Any

amount determined as market value of their lands acquired,

with reference to the dates of issuance of notifications

under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act i.e. at the

rate prevalent 15-21 years prior to the dates of the making

of the award, cannot be held to be compliance of the mandate

regarding payment of market value of the land so acquired

under the Constitution and the Act. This Court faced with

such a situation, where proceedings have remained pending

for years after issuance of declarations under Section 6, in

order to protect the petitioners concerned from irreparable

injury i.e. getting compensation for their lands acquired

with reference to the date of notification under sub-section

(1) of Section 4, which may be more than a decade before the

date of the making of the award, has advanced the date of

notification under sub-section (1) of Section, so that

market value of the land so acquired is paid at a just and

reasonable rate. Reference in this connection may be made

to the cases of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri

(1992) 1 SCC 328; Akhara Brahm Buta, Amritsar v. State of

Punjab, (1992) 4 SCC 243 and Bihar State Housing Board v.

Ram Bihari Mahato, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2134. This Court

has advanced the date of notification under sub-section (1)

of Section 4 of the Act, in the cases referred to above,

without assigning any reason, as to how the date fixed by

Sections 11 and 23 of the Act, can be altered for

ascertainment of the market value of land. The power of

this Court under Article 142 is very wide and can be

exercised in the ends of justice. The scope of the said

Article was recently examined in the case of Union Carbide

Corpn. v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584 (Emphasis

supplied)

In the case of N.A. Mohammed Kasim (Dead) and another

vs. Sulochana and others (1995) Supp(3) SCC 128 which arose

from a civil suit this Court in the facts and circumstances

of the case considered it fit for invoking Court's power

under Article 142 for giving equitable relief to the

plaintiff-respondents, not on ground on which they claimed

relief in the suit but on the ground of promissory estoppel

equity and fair play.

From the conspectus of the views expressed in the

decided cases noted above it is clear that this Court has

invoked the power vested under Section 142 of the

Constitution in different types of cases involving different

fact situations for doing complete justice between the

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parties.

In the case on hand the controversy relates to the

scale of pay admissible for Traffic Apprentices in the

Railways appointed prior to the cut-off date. The

controversy in its very nature is one which applies to all

such employees of the Railways; it is not a controversy

which is confined to some individual employees or a section

of the employees. If the judgment of the tribunal which had

taken a view contrary to the ratio laid down by judgment of

this Court in M. Bhaskar's case (supra) was allowed to

stand then the resultant position would have been that some

Traffic Apprentices who were parties in those cases would

have gained an unfair and undeserved advantage over other

employees who are or were holding the same post. Such

enviable position would not only have been per se

discriminatory but could have resulted in a situation which

is undesirable for a cadre of large number of employees in a

big establishment like that of the Indian Railways. To

avoid such a situation this Court made the observations in

paragraph 17 of the judgment. At the cost of repetition we

may reiterate that since the main plank of argument of the

appellants was that since they were not parties in the case

they had no opportunity to place their case before this

Court made the observations in paragraph 17 of the judgment

as aforementioned we specifically asked learned counsel

appearing for the parties to place the argument in support

of their challenge to the observations made by this Court on

merits. No point of substance assailing the observations on

merits could be placed by them. The only contention made in

that regard was some of the employees who were given benefit

in the judgments of the CAT have got further promotions and

they may lose the benefit of such promotion in case the

observations made in paragraph 17 of the judgment are

allowed to stand as it is. We are not impressed by the

contention raised. If some employees were unjustly and

improperly granted a higher scale of pay and on that basis

were given promotion to a higher post then the basis of such

promotion been on a non-existent; the superstructure built

on such foundation should not be allowed to stand; This is

absolutely necessary for the sake of maintaining equality

and fair play with the other similarly placed employees.

However, in our considered view, it will be just and fair to

clarify that any amount drawn by such employees either in

the basic post (Traffic Apprentice) or in a promotional post

will not be required to be refunded by the employee

concerned as a consequence of this judgment. This position

also follows as a necessary corolary from the observations

made by this Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment in

M.Bhaskar's case (supra).

On the discussions made and the reasons set forth in

the preceeding paragraphs the appeal is dismissed but in the@@

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

circumstances of the case without any order for costs.

(G.B.PATTANAIK)

J. (S.RAJENDRA BABU)

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