2026:HHC:21282

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 290 of 2026

Reserved on: 27.04.2026

Date of Decision: 03.06.2026.

Faizan Khan ...Petitioner

Versus

State of H.P. & another ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner : Mr Gurdev Negi, Advocate, vice

Mr Naveen Kumar, Advocate.

For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,

Additional Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of FIR No. 29 of 2022, dated 10.10.2022, registered for

the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as IPC) at Women

Police Station, Solan, District Solan, H.P., based on the

compromise.

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2

2026:HHC:21282

2. It has been asserted that the informant does not want

to pursue the matter because she has entered into a compromise

with the accused voluntarily, without any influence from any

person. Hence, the present petition.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the petitioner had maintained a sexual relationship

with the victim. The police registered the F.I.R and investigated

the matter. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on

06.12.2022, after the completion of the investigation. The matter

is pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Solan, H.P.

Statements of three witnesses have been recorded, and now the

matter is listed for prosecution evidence on 14.07.2026.

4. I have heard Mr Gurdev Negi, learned vice counsel

representing the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned

Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

5. Mr Gurdev Negi, learned vice counsel representing the

petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has entered into a

compromise with the victim and she does not want to proceed

further with the matter. No fruitful purpose would be served by

continuing with the criminal proceedings. Hence, he prayed that

3

2026:HHC:21282

the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential

proceedings arising out of it be quashed based on the compromise

effected between the parties.

6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

General for the respondent/State, submitted that the offence

punishable under Section 376 of the IPC is heinous and cannot be

quashed based on a compromise between the parties . Hence, he

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the jurisdiction

of the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in

Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and held

that the heinous offences like murder, rape, etc, cannot be

quashed based on a compromise effected between the parties. It

was observed: -

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay

down the following principles by which the High Court

would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the

settlement between the parties and exercising its power

under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the

settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to

4

2026:HHC:21282

accept the settlement with direction to continue with the

criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is

to be distinguished from the power which lies in the

Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of

the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the

High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal

proceedings even in those cases which are not

compoundable, where the parties have settled the

matter between themselves. However, this power is to

be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have settled, and on that basis,

a petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is

filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to

secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power, the High Court is to form

an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those

prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of

mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,

etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a

serious impact on society. Similarly, the offences alleged

to have been committed under special statutes like the

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a

compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having

overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial

relationships or family disputes, should be quashed

when the parties have resolved their entire disputes

among themselves.

5

2026:HHC:21282

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to

examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is

remote and bleak, and continuation of criminal cases

would put the accused to great oppression and

prejudice, and extreme injustice would be caused to

him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the

category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are

to be generally treated as crimes against society and not

against the individual alone. However, the High Court

would not rest its decision merely because there is a

mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is

framed under this provision. It would be open to the High

Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307

IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead

to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this

purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by

the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury

is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the

nature of weapons used, etc. Medical reports in respect

of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the

guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis,

the High Court can examine whether there is a strong

possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction

are remote and bleak. In the former case, it can refuse

to accept the settlement and quash the criminal

proceedings, whereas in the latter case, it would be

permissible for the High Court to accept the plea

compounding the offence based on a complete

settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court

can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement

between the parties is going to result in harmony

between them, which may improve their future

relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power

under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of

settlement play a crucial role. In those cases where the

6

2026:HHC:21282

settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged

commission of an offence and the matter is still under

investigation, the High Court may be liberal in

accepting the settlement to quash the criminal

proceedings/investigation. It is for this reason that at

this stage the investigation is still on, and even the

chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, in those cases

where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to

start, or the evidence is still at the infancy stage, the

High Court can show benevolence in exercising its

powers favourably, but after a prima facie assessment

of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On

the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is

almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence

the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the

High Court should refrain from exercising its power

under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial

court would be in a position to decide the case finally

on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether

the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is

already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at

the appellate stage before the High Court, mere

compromise between the parties would not be a ground

to accept the same, resulting in the acquittal of the

offender who has already been convicted by the trial

court. Here, the charge is proved under Section 307

IPC, and a conviction is already recorded of a heinous

crime; therefore, there is no question of sparing a

convict found guilty of such a crime.” (Emphasis

supplied)

9. This question was again considered in Parbatbhai Aahir

v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017 SCC

OnLine SC 1189 and it was held that the heinous offences like

7

2026:HHC:21282

murder, rape, dacoity, etc, cannot be quashed based on a

compromise between the parties. It was observed:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the

precedents on the subject may be summarised in the

following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the

High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court

or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not

confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves

powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High

Court to quash a first information report or a criminal

proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been

arrived at between the offender and the victim is not

the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the

purpose of compounding an offence. While

compounding an offence, the power of the court is

governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under

Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-

compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal

proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the

exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High

Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would

justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a

wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be exercised (i) to

secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of

the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first

information report should be quashed on the ground

that the offender and victim have settled the dispute

revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of

8

2026:HHC:21282

each case, and no exhaustive elaboration of principles

can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482

and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been

settled, the High Court must have due regard to the

nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious

offences involving mental depravity or offences such as

murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be

quashed, though the victim or the family of the victim have

settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not

private in nature but have a serious impact upon society.

The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is

founded on the overriding element of public interest in

punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there

may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or

predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a

distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent

power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise

from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or

similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour

may, in appropriate situations, fall for quashing where

parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the

criminal proceeding if, in view of the compromise

between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction

is remote and the continuation of a criminal

proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out

in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences

involving the financial and economic well-being of the

State have implications that lie beyond the domain of a

mere dispute between private disputants. The High

Court would be justified in declining to quash where

the offender is involved in an activity akin to financial

or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The

9

2026:HHC:21282

consequences of the act complained of upon the

financial or economic system will weigh in the

balance.” (Emphasis supplied)

10. Similar principles were laid down in State of M.P. v.

Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 320, and it was observed:

“15. Considering the law on the point and the other

decisions of this Court on the point, referred to

hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of

the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the

non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the

Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and

predominantly the civil character, particularly those

arising out of commercial transactions or arising out

of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and

when the parties have resolved the entire dispute

amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those

prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences

of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,

dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and

have a serious impact on society.

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for

the offences under special statutes like the Prevention

of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public

servants while working in that capacity are not to be

quashed merely on the basis of compromise between

the victim and the offender;

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms

Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and

serious offences and therefore are to be treated as

crimes against the society and not against the

individual alone, and therefore, the criminal

10

2026:HHC:21282

proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC

and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact

on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of

powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground

that the parties have resolved their entire dispute

amongst themselves. However, the High Court would

not rest its decision merely because there is a mention

of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed

under this provision. It would be open to the High

Court to examine whether the incorporation of

Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the

prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which,

if proved, would lead to framing the charge under

Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to

the High Court to go by the nature of the injury

sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the

vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons

used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High

Court would be permissible only after the evidence is

collected, after investigation, the chargesheet is

filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial.

Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is

still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate

conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of

this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6

SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54 should be read

harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the

circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of

the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect

of non-compoundable offences, which are private

and do not have a serious impact on society, on the

ground that there is a settlement/compromise

between the victim and the offender, the High Court is

required to consider the antecedents of the accused;

the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the

accused was absconding and why he was absconding,

11

2026:HHC:21282

how he had managed with the complainant to enter

into a compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied)

11. It was laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012)

10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that heinous and serious

offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed based

on the compromise, and only offences which are predominantly

civil in nature can be compromised. It was observed:

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can

be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing

a criminal proceeding or FIR, or complaint in the exercise of

its inherent jurisdiction, is distinct and different from the

power given to a criminal court for compounding the

offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of

wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be

exercised in accordance with the guideline engrafted in such

power, viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent

abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to

quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be

exercised where the offender and the victim have settled

their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of

each case, and no category can be prescribed. However,

before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have

due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous

and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even

though the victim or the victim's family and the offender

have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in

nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any

compromise between the victim and the offender in relation

to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of

Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants

while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide any basis

for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.

12

2026:HHC:21282

But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and

predominately civil flavour stand on a different footing for

the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising

from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership

or such like transactions or the offences arising out of

matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes

where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and

the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category

of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings

if in its view, because of the compromi se between the

offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is

remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case

would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and

extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the

criminal case despite full and complete settlement and

compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court

must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the

interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or

continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to

abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise

between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure

the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is

put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in

the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its

jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

12. Therefore, it is apparent that it is impermissible to

quash the F.I.R. for the commission of rape based on the

compromise effected between the parties.

13. The status report shows that the charges have been

framed and statements of three witnesses have been recorded. It

was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Minakshi Bala v.

Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the

13

2026:HHC:21282

Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved

may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should

not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,

except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145: -

“7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240

CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out

— as has been done in the instant case — the person

arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional

jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to

contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173

CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any

ground to presume that he had committed any offence for

which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied

can quash the charges framed against him. To put it

differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC,

the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be

justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to

in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in

invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic

exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course.

We hasten to add, even in such exceptional cases, the High

Court can look into only those documents which are

unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant

evidence.” (Emphasis supplied)

14. This Court also held in Reena Devi vs State of H.P. (2019)

3 Sml.LC 1773 states that a petition for quashing the F.I.R. based on

compromise cannot be filed after the charges have been framed or

notice of accusation has been put. It was observed:

“9. Before arriving at any conclusion to ascertain the

appropriate remedy for an accused, against whom a notice

14

2026:HHC:21282

of accusation has been issued, or the charge has been

framed, and who wants to challenge the same, the tour of

the following stages will give the required exposure.

Stage-1 The most prominent and the earliest provision,

which ignites the engine of criminal law and brings it

into motion, is the registration of FIR, under Section

154 of the CrPC. Needless to say, this provision confines

itself to cognizable offences. After the investigation, if

in the opinion of the Station House Officer, a case for

the prosecution is made out, then he files a report

under Section 173 of the CrPC. Any person arraigned as

an accused in such an FIR can seek its quashing from

the High Court having jurisdiction, by filing a petition

under section 482 CrPC.

Stage-2 Section 190 of the CrPC, envisages three

situations, upon which the Magistrate can take

cognizance of offence, namely, (a) Upon receiving a

complaint of facts which constitutes such offence; (b)

Upon a Police Report of such facts; (c) Upo n

information received from any person other than a

Police Officer or upon his own knowledge that such an

offence has been committed. Exercising powers under

Section 204 of CrPC, the Magistrate taking cognisance

of offences, may proceed against an accused, if he

believes in the existence of sufficient grounds for

proceeding. Any person who has been arraigned as an

accused and is aggrieved either by registration of FIR,

filing of charge-sheet, taking cognisance, or issuance

of the process can seek adjudication under Section 482

of the CrPC. Order taking cognisance can also be

challenged by filing a revision petition in the Sessions

Court or High Court. There will be a situation where,

after the filing of the petition for quashing of FIR, in

the meantime, the charge-sheet is filed; the law is no

more res Integra that in all those cases, FIR and all

consequential proceedings can be quashed. An accused

cannot approach a Sessions Court till this stage because

the only available statutory remedy is by invoking the

15

2026:HHC:21282

inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of

the CrPC.

Stage-3 The next stage in criminal proceedings is

similar to the transformation of a caterpillar emerging

as a butterfly, and it begins on the framing of charges

under Sections 211 and 228 of the CrPC or on the

issuance of notice of accusation under Section 251 of

the CrPC. If not challenged, it shall culminate under

section 229, 241 or 248 of the CrPC only by a judgment

of acquittal or conviction. Once charges stand framed

or the notice of accusation stands issued, as the case

may be, then the appropriate remedy to challenge the

same is only by filing a Criminal Revision Petition in

the Court where it lies and not by filing a petition under

section 482 CrPC.

Stage 4: The next stage is post-conviction or acquittal.

A judgment of conviction can only be challenged under

Chapter-29 of the CrPC (Sections 372 to 394). During

the pendency of such an appeal, the parties may file an

application for compounding of the offences, but such

applications in appeal would be within and not without.

A convict cannot bypass Chapter 29 and , instead of

filing a statutory appeal before the First Appellate

Court, cannot straightaway resort to Sections 397, 401

and 482 of the CrPC.

Stage-5 The next stage is challenging the dismissal of

the appeals of the convicts, and that can be done by

approaching the Courts under its Revisionary

Jurisdiction, under sections 397-401 CrPC. During the

pendency of such Revision Petitions, if parties

compound the offences, then the process is similar to

that in the appeals.

10. The other stages, if any, would also tread a similar path

and cross similar obstacles.

11. The above survey leads to an irresistible conclusion that

once charges have been framed, then the remedy is not to

file a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC but to invoke

16

2026:HHC:21282

the revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 & 401 CrPC.

However, in the present petition, what is sought to be

quashed is the FIR and all consequential proceedings,

based upon the out-of-court compromise entered between

the victim and the accused, and the challenge is not on the

merits of charges or accusations.”

15. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. 2025 SCC Online HP 6561, wherein it was observed:

13. Note submitted by the petitioner mentions that out of

forty witnesses, seventeen witnesses have been examined.

The charge-sheet was filed on 22.12.2023, and the

supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 30.08.2024.

There is nothing in the petition as to why the petitioner

has approached this Court after the lapse of two years from

the date of filing of the charge-sheet. The petition is also

silent as to why the order of framing charge was not

challenged by the petitioner and why the prosecution was

permitted to examine the prosecution's witnesses. The

jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. is extraordinary and should

be exercised sparingly. It was laid down by the Delhi High

Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC

OnLine Del 4545, that the Court should not entertain the

belated petitions for quashing the FIR. It was observed:

“43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission

made by the learned counsel for the Complainant that

the present set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on

the ground of delay and laches, as also for the failure

of the petitioners to avail of their alternate efficacious

remedy in the form of Revision Petitions under

Section 397 of the Cr. P.C.

44. It need not be emphasised that powers under

Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.s are discretionary in nature,

and though there may not be a total ban on the

exercise of such power where the situation so

warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of

self-restraint that are recognised and followed by the

17

2026:HHC:21282

Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such

limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate

efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the

same within the period of limitation and thereafter

filed the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to

overcome the objection of limitation. Similarly, the

Courts have refused to entertain a petition under

Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where it is filed with

unexplained delay and laches and in the meantime,

the trial has proceeded.”

14. In the present case, the petitioner has a remedy of

challenging the order framing charge, but he did not do so

within the limitation. He filed the present petition to

circumvent the period of limitation prescribed for

challenging the order of framing the charges.

15. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar,

(1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the

Competent Court has framed the charges, the aggrieved

person may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the

High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., except in rare cases. It was

observed on page 145:—

“7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section

240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been

made out — as has been done in the instant case — the

person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions

Judge to contend that the charge -sheet submitted

under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did

not disclose any ground to presume that he had

committed any offence for which he is charged and the

revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges

framed against him. To put it differently, once charges

are framed under Section 240 CrPC, the High Court in its

revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying

upon documents other than those referred to in Sections

239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the

18

2026:HHC:21282

same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies

and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We

hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High

Court can look into only those documents which are

unimpeachable and can be legally translated into

relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied)

16. In the present case, the trial has sufficie ntly

progressed. Statements of seventeen witnesses have been

recorded. Since the petitioner has approached this Court

belatedly, this Court declines to exercise the inherent

jurisdiction and relegates the petitioner to avail the

remedies in the ongoing trial. It is not necessary to discuss

the judgments cited at Bar and to comment whether the

F.I.R. and subsequent proceedings disclose the commission

of an offence or not.

16. Therefore, the present petition cannot be allowed on

this consideration as well.

17. No other point was urged.

18. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is

dismissed.

19. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the

disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on

merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

03

th

June, 2026

(ravinder)