MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 1 of 24

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 09.03.2026

Pronounced on: 29.05.2026

+ MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 & CM Nos. 21038/2023,

34406/2024

GAUTAM KAPOOR .....Appellant

Through: Mr. DK Malhotra, Mr. Rajesh

Malhotra, Mr. Reymon Singh,

Ms. Mahima, Mr. Aditya, Advs.

versus

MRS AAINA KAPOOR .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Ravi Sikri, Sr. Advocate

with Mr. Gaurav, Mr. Deepak

Yadav, Mr. Nishant, Mr. Rohit,

Mr. Vaibhav, Advs. with

respondent in person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

J U D G M E N T

1. The present appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act,

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 2 of 24

1984 read with Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

(hereinafter „HMA‟) assails the common order dated 15.02.2023

passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Rohini in HMA

No. 219/2019 and MT. Case No. 365/2018, whereby the appellant-

husband has been directed to pay pendente lite/interim maintenance of

Rs. 1,00,000/- per month, apportioned equally between the

respondent-wife and the minor child, with effect from 07.06.2018.

2. The essential facts necessary for the disposal of the present

appeal are:

a. The marriage between the parties was solemnised on

16.02.2008 in Delhi according to Hindu rites and ceremonies.

Out of the wedlock, one son was born on 15.01.2009. The

record reflects that when the impugned order came to be passed,

the child was about 14 years of age.

b. The parties began living separately from 26.03.2018 and since

then the minor child has been living in the care and custody of

the wife.

c. Following the separation, multiple proceedings came to be

instituted between the parties. These included proceedings

under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,

2005 (hereinafter „DV Act‟), a petition under Section 125 of

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 3 of 24

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter „CrPC‟) and

subsequently a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the

HMA was filed by the respondent.

d. In both sets of proceedings, the wife‟s case before the Family

Court was that she was not gainfully employed, had no

independent source of income and was maintaining herself and

the child with the assistance of her parents.

e. The husband opposed the claim for interim maintenance. His

case before the Family Court was that the wife was

independently earning from multiple sources, including an

alleged boutique business, tuition/coaching and was also

receiving rental income from properties said to be standing in

her name. He further disputed the wife‟s assertions regarding

his own income and means.

f. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Family Court

directed the parties to file their respective income affidavits and

supporting financial documents. By the common order dated

15.02.2023, the Family Court disposed of both the wife‟s

application under Section 24 HMA and her interim maintenance

application in the proceedings under Section 125 CrPC.

g. The Family Court directed the husband to pay Rs. 1,00,000/-

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 4 of 24

per month as interim maintenance, apportioned as Rs. 50,000/-

to the wife and Rs. 50,000/- to the minor child, from the date of

filing of the earlier maintenance application i.e. 07.06.2018.

Litigation expenses of Rs. 25,000/- were also awarded, with

adjustment of any amount already paid.

3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the husband has preferred

the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS

(on behalf of the appellant)

4. Mr. Malhotra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant submits that the Family Court failed to consider that the

respondent‟s income tax returns reflected that she was gainfully

employed and had income from multiple sources including the

boutique stated to be run under the name „Katyayni‟, as well as from

tuition/coaching and rental receipts. It is submitted that despite such

material being available on record, the Family Court erroneously

observed that there was no document to show that the respondent was

working either during the subsistence of marriage or after separation.

5. It is submitted that the Family Court erred in shifting the burden

upon the appellant to explain banking transactions reflected in

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 5 of 24

accounts standing in respondent‟s own name. In particular, it is

submitted that the Vijaya Bank account stood solely in the

respondent‟s name and, even according to her own income affidavit,

the same did not fall within the category of accounts alleged to have

been operated by the appellant.

6. It is submitted that the Family Court failed to consider the

entries in the respondent‟s Vijaya Bank account which duly reflected

receipts of rent, including amounts received from Smt. Munesh Devi

and Coco Larre Salon in respect of the shop at G-25, Parker Mall,

Kundli, Sonipat, Haryana. According to the appellant, these entries

indicated rental income in the respondent‟s name, and yet the Family

Court drew adverse inferences against the appellant even though he

was neither the owner of that property nor the holder of that bank

account.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the

respondent had, shortly prior to the parties‟ separation, sold the

property namely MIG Flat No. 84A, Jhang Apartment, Rohini for a

sale consideration of Rs. 35 lakhs. It is submitted that the sale

proceeds were deposited in the respondent‟s Vijaya Bank account and

were thereafter withdrawn in cash, which the respondent states, was

taken by her father. According to the appellant, if that was indeed the

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 6 of 24

case, there was no reason why the funds would not have been directly

transferred to him.

8. It is submitted that the Family Court, while passing the

impugned order, failed to take into consideration that the respondent

had not filed complete and updated financial documents along with

her income affidavit dated 29.08.2019 and had thereby concealed her

true financial position. It is submitted that the respondent was

receiving rental income from immovable properties, as reflected in her

bank statements, while the same was not fully disclosed in her income

affidavit.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that,

according to the appellant‟s disclosure, the income derived from the

jewellery shop at Chandni Chowk, Delhi was approximately Rs. 5

lakhs per annum. It is contended that the Family Court erred in not

accepting the said disclosure and instead proceeded on the basis that

the actual income of the appellant was higher. In view thereof, learned

counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned order is

erroneous, arbitrary and liable to be set aside.

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 7 of 24

SUBMISSIONS

(on behalf of the respondent)

10. Per Contra, Mr. Sikri, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondent submitted that the appellant‟s reliance on the

alleged boutique or partnership concern was misplaced. He stated that

prior to the separation of the parties, the respondent had been made a

partner in a concern involving members from the appellant‟s extended

family, namely the appellant‟s cousin sister and her husband, but

when relations deteriorated, she was asked to leave and did so.

According to the respondent, the mere fact that her name had figured

in such a partnership concern did not establish any present income in

her hands.

11. As regards to the property from which rental receipts had earlier

been shown, learned senior counsel submitted that the said shop had

been given to the respondent by her father and that, at the outset of

COVID-19, the tenants vacated the premises, after which the shop had

remained vacant. It is fairly stated that this position had not been

expressly mentioned in the respondent‟s income affidavit. Learned

senior counsel for the respondent nonetheless contended that the

earlier entries could not be treated as proof of any current rental

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 8 of 24

income in respondent‟s hands.

12. On the alleged transactions in respondent‟s account, learned

senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the alleged cash flow

in respondent‟s various accounts was confined to the period when the

parties were residing together. It is submitted that if the respondent

had been, in fact, independently earning in the manner alleged by the

appellant, there would have been a continuing pattern of deposits even

after the parties separated.

13. On the aforesaid basis, learned senior counsel for the

respondent submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from

any illegality warranting interference in the present appeal and that the

same is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit.

14. Though several grounds have been urged in the appeal, no

further submissions, beyond those noted hereinabove, were advanced

before this Court at the time of hearing.

ANALYSIS

15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

on record.

16. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind that the present

appeal arises from an order granting interim maintenance. At this

stage, this Court is not expected to finally determine disputed

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 9 of 24

questions of exact source or character of each transaction reflected in

the bank accounts. The enquiry is narrower, namely, whether the

material placed before the Family Court disclosed such stable and

sufficient independent income in the hands of the respondent as would

justify denial or reduction of interim maintenance or whether there is

something wrong in assessment of income of the appellant.

17. The first contention of the appellant that needs to be dealt with

is that the respondent was not entitled to interim maintenance, since,

according to him, the record disclosed independent income in her

hands from multiple sources, including a boutique/partnership

concern, tuition/coaching classes and rental receipts and that the

Family Court failed to appreciate this material and proceeded on an

incorrect assumption that the respondent had no source of income. The

finding of the Family Court on the said issue is reproduced

hereinbelow:

“18. …Nowhere is there a specific assertion on the part of

the respondent / husband that the petitioner/ wife was

gainfully employed or was running her alleged business

that of a boutique under the name and style of 'Katyayni'

during this period. Not a single document, no bill book, no

lease deed of the premises from where the said alleged

boutique was being run, no photograph, no registration

certificate of the said boutique, no mandatory GST

number, which every business is required to have, has

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 10 of 24

been disclosed by the respondent / husband. He has also

not mentioned when was this alleged boutique got

operational or since when the petitioner / wife was

allegedly earning from the said boutique.

***

25. …Furthermore, as regards the boutique 'Katyayni ',

the petitioner has denied running any boutique, and the

respondent has not placed on record any evidence, to

prove his contention. So at this prima-facie stage, it is

accepted that the petitioner/ wife is not having any source

of income.”

18. Assailing the above reasoning, learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that the respondent was associated with a boutique with the

family of the appellant and was earning through such concern. He

relied upon an earlier income tax return of the respondent for the

Assessment Year 2016-17, wherein the nature of business or

profession was described as “coaching centre” and “boutique” to

contend that she was gainfully employed.

19. In reply, learned senior counsel for the respondent pointed out

during the hearing that the respondent had, indeed, at one stage been

made a partner in a concern involving members from the appellant‟s

extended family, but that she had thereafter been asked to leave and

had ceased to be associated with it.

20. We have perused the record. The income tax return for the

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 11 of 24

Assessment Year 2016-17 does indicate that, for the said assessment

year, the respondent had disclosed business activity. At the same time,

we find that it pertains to an earlier period when the parties were still

residing together. By itself, it does not establish that the respondent

continued to have a stable and sufficient independent income from

those sources at the time when the impugned order came to be passed.

21. The mere fact that the respondent‟s name may have figured in a

business arrangement at some point does not, by itself, establish that

she had a present and continuing flow of income therefrom at the

relevant stage. The same is true of the contention that the respondent

was earning by offering tuition or coaching classes. Apart from

reliance on the earlier income tax return, no concrete material was

shown even before us to establish the nature, place, duration or

continuity of such alleged profession at the relevant stage. At the

interim stage and in the absence of any material on record qua the

same, this Court finds that such an allegation could not be accepted as

establishing a current and sufficient regular flow of income merely

because it was asserted. The Family Court was, therefore, justified in

not treating that circumstance alone as a determinative proof of actual

earning in the respondent‟s hands in the event of specific denial by the

respondent.

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 12 of 24

22. Having dealt with the appellant‟s contentions regarding alleged

income from business and coaching activities, it becomes necessary to

examine the next limb of his argument, which is founded on the

financial entries reflected in the respondent‟s bank account.

23. The appellant relied upon the entries in the respondent‟s Vijaya

Bank account to show that she was receiving rent in respect of the

shop property and that such material was inconsistent with the finding

that she had no source of income.

24. In elaboration of the said submission, learned counsel for the

appellant drew the attention of this Court to specific entries in the

respondent‟s Vijaya Bank account statement for the period of

November 2015 till the year 2017 contending that the pattern of

deposits reflected therein was indicative of rental receipts being

credited to the said account.

25. During the course of hearing, learned senior counsel for the

respondent stated that the shop in question had been vacated around

the COVID-19 period and had remained vacant thereafter. It was

therefore, urged that the respondent was not deriving any subsisting

rental income from the said shop, though that position was not

specifically reflected in the income affidavit.

26. Be that as it may, even assuming that the entries pointed out by

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 13 of 24

the appellant for the period between November, 2015 and 2017

reflected rental receipts in the respondent‟s Vijaya Bank account, the

same would not, by itself, carry the appellant‟s case much further.

27. The relevant enquiry, for the purpose of interim maintenance,

was not whether the respondent had received any rental amount

several years earlier, but whether she had a subsisting and regular

income at or around the time when her income affidavit was filed and

when the Family Court considered the application for interim

maintenance.

28. When the Vijaya bank statement is seen for the more proximate

period, namely 2019 to 2021, it does not reflect any regular rental

inflow of the nature suggested by the appellant. The entries during this

period appear to be of a relatively minor character of less than Rs.

3000/- to Rs. 4000/-, including deductions towards recurring deposit

instalments of Rs. 1,000/- per month till June, 2019, a credit of Rs.

3,029/- upon closure of such recurring deposit, small interest credits of

Rs. 108/-, Rs.115/-, Rs.135/- and Rs.144/- every third month and other

routine bank charges or incidental entries. Such entries cannot

reasonably be treated as proof of a continuous rental income in the

hands of the respondent.

29. This aspect also has to be appreciated in the context of the

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 14 of 24

admitted timeline of the parties‟ relationship. The parties separated on

26.03.2018 and therefore, the entries for the period November, 2015

to 2017 pertain to a time when the marriage was still subsisting and

the parties were living together.

30. It should also be kept in mind that the respondent‟s income

affidavit was filed in the year 2021 and the impugned order came to be

passed only on 15.02.2023. Therefore, even if some rental receipts had

existed in the earlier period relied upon by the appellant, the material

placed on record did not establish that such rental income continued

during the relevant period. The Family Court, therefore, cannot be

faulted for declining to treat the earlier bank entries as conclusive

proof of present independent income.

31. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the

appellant is that the Vijaya Bank account stood in the respondent‟s

sole name and that the property-linked transactions, including the

deposits and withdrawals referable to the flat and the rental receipts,

moved through that account and that the Family Court nevertheless

shifted the onus to explain the entries on the appellant.

32. The Family Court noticed that the cash flow in the said account

was not confined to ordinary personal transactions or isolated cash

deposits, but included repeated inflows from other banks, institutions

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 15 of 24

and third parties, including SBI, Parker Management Services,

Munesh Devi, Virender Kumar Manchanda and Praveen Rana.

33. The submission of the appellant must be tested against the

timing and pattern of the entries relied upon. Learning senior counsel

for the respondent rightly submitted that the cash flow in the accounts

was largely during the period when the parties were residing together.

If the respondent was, in fact, independently earning from the sources

alleged by the appellant, one would expect a continuous pattern of

deposits even after the parties separated and particularly around the

time when the income affidavit came to be filed.

34. The absence of such continuous deposits after the separation of

parties substantially weakens the appellant‟s contention that the

entries of Vijaya Bank account represented an independent,

continuous and subsisting source of income of the respondent. Any

deposit entries in the bank account of the respondent prior to the

separation of the parties is not sufficient to conclude that the

respondent is earning or is having sufficient income to maintain her

and the child.

35. Moreso, during the arguments before this Court, it was accepted

by the appellant that the mobile number reflected in the account

details of respondent‟s Axis bank account was his own mobile

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 16 of 24

number, which is, suggestive of appellant‟s control over that account

as well.

36. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the

respondent‟s educational qualifications and her alleged capacity to

work. In light of the same, he submits that the quantum fixed by the

Family Court was excessive.

37. In the opinion of this Court, mere qualification or theoretical

ability to earn is not the same as proof of actual earning. It should also

be kept in mind that the respondent has the custody of the minor child,

whose educational and day-to-day needs are also required to be met.

38. What is required is a realistic assessment of the financial

support necessary to enable the claimant-spouse and the child to

maintain themselves with reasonable dignity, having regard to their

circumstances and the paying capacity of the person against whom the

claim is made. Maintenance, particularly where a minor child is

involved, cannot be reduced to a calculation of bare survival expenses

alone.

39. This Court in Subhash v. Mamta @ Raksha, MAT.APP.(F.C.)

195/2025, while relying on Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain (2017) 15

SCC 801, reiterated that a claim for maintenance is not defeated

merely because the applicant is educated or theoretically capable of

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 17 of 24

earning, since the relevant enquiry is whether the applicant has

independent income sufficient for her support and for meeting the

expenses of the proceedings.

40. The Supreme Court in Manish Jain (supra) has specifically

held that it is no answer to a claim for maintenance that the wife is

educated and could support herself. Similarly, relying upon Shailja v.

Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199, this Court in Subhash (supra)

emphasised the distinction between being capable of earning and

actually earning, and noted that potential earning capacity cannot be

conflated with actual income received.

41. This Court has considered the said submission in the light of the

material on record and finds no ground to interfere with the quantum

so fixed. No material is placed before the Family Court or even before

this Court to prove that the respondent is actually earning, except, the

bald statement which is not sufficient to reject the claims of the

respondent/wife to the interim maintenance.

42. Another grievance of the appellant is that the Family Court did

not properly accept his disclosed income and, instead, assessed his

means on a broader appreciation of the surrounding material and that

the quantum fixed by the Family Court is excessive and beyond his

means. The appellant‟s case is that his income, as reflected in the

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 18 of 24

record filed by him, only Rs. 5 lakhs per annum and that the impugned

order proceeds on an inflated and unrealistic view of his earning

capacity. The respondent, on the other hand, questioned the credibility

of the appellant‟s projected income and contended that the Family

Court was justified in not treating his disclosure as conclusive.

43. The Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324, while

referring to the principles laid down by this Court in Bharat Hedge v.

Smt. Saroj Hegde 2007 SCC OnLine Del 622 discussed the factors

which are required to be considered while determining maintenance,

in the following terms:

“84. The Delhi High Court in Bharat Hegde v. Saroj

Hegde [Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde, 2007 SCC OnLine

Del 622 : (2007) 140 DLT 16] laid down the following

factors to be considered for determining maintenance :

(SCC OnLine Del para 8)

“1. Status of the parties.

2. Reasonable wants of the claimant.

3. The independent income and property of the

claimant.

4. The number of persons, the non-applicant has to

maintain.

5. The amount should aid the applicant to live in a

similar lifestyle as he/she enjoyed in the matrimonial

home.

6. Non-applicant's liabilities, if any.

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 19 of 24

7. Provisions for food, clothing, shelter, education,

medical attendance and treatment, etc. of the

applicant.

8. Payment capacity of the non-applicant.

9. Some guesswork is not ruled out while estimating

the income of the non-applicant when all the sources

or correct sources are not disclosed.

10. The non-applicant to defray the cost of litigation.

11. The amount awarded under Section 125 CrPC is

adjustable against the amount awarded under

Section 24 of the Act.”

44. In Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde, (supra), this Court observed

that, in the case of self-employed persons or persons employed in the

unorganised sector, truthful income may not always surface, and

therefore the Court has to take a general view while assessing

financial capacity. The relevant portion has been reproduced as under:

“8. Unfortunately, in India, parties do not truthfully reveal their

income. For self employed persons or persons employed in the

unorganized sector, truthful income never surfaces. Tax

avoidance is the norm. Tax compliance is the exception in this

country. Therefore, in determining interim maintenance, there

cannot be mathematical exactitude. The court has to take a

general view…”

45. In the considered view of this Court, no fault can be found with

the approach adopted by the Family Court on this aspect. The

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 20 of 24

appellant is not a salaried employee earning a fixed monthly income

under a formal pay structure. He is carrying on business under the

name Unnati Jewellers at Chandni Chowk, Delhi, and the case

advanced before this Court is that he is, now, the sole proprietor

thereof. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Chandni Chowk is

one of the busiest commercial markets of Delhi and the appellant is

running a jewellery shop in that area for several years.

46. In matters concerning a person carrying on business or in cases

involving self-employment, the Court is not bound to mechanically

accept the income projected in the affidavit or even the figures

reflected in the income tax returns as the final word on actual financial

capacity. Such material is undoubtedly relevant, but it is not always

decisive. The Court is entitled to examine the nature of the vocation,

the surrounding circumstances, and the overall probabilities emerging

from the record while making a prima facie assessment for the

purpose of determination of interim maintenance.

47. The scepticism regarding the appellant‟s projected income also

cannot be said to be without basis. During the course of hearing, an

arrangement was explored under which the respondent would take the

shop in question on rent and pay the appellant a sum of Rs.5 lakhs per

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 21 of 24

annum. The appellant, however, did not accept that course.

48. This Court does not treat the said choice as conclusive proof of

the appellant‟s actual income. However, it does support the view that

the income or financial worth of the shop could not be accepted

strictly on the basis of the figure disclosed by the appellant. In a case

involving business income, such surrounding circumstances can

legitimately be taken into account while making a prima facie

assessment of earning capacity.

49. It is often noticed that, in matrimonial proceedings, one party

tends to suppress income while the other tends to inflate it, and the

Court is therefore required to assess financial capacity on the basis of

the overall material and surrounding circumstances.

50. In Jayant Bhargava v. Priya Bhargava, 2011 SCC OnLine Del

1651, this Court, relying upon Jasbir Kaur Sehgal (Smt.) v. District

Judge, Dehradun & Others, (1997) 7 SCC 7, recognised that spouses

do not always truthfully disclose their real income in maintenance

proceedings and that, where rival claims are made with one side

inflating and the other suppressing income, some element of

guesswork necessarily enters the exercise, which cannot be undertaken

with mathematical precision.

51. The record reflects that the minor child was studying in G.D.

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 22 of 24

Goenka Public School, Sector 22, Rohini, and that the respondent had

placed before the Family Court, the educational and other expenses

being incurred by her in relation to the child. The impugned order also

notes that the school fee, at the relevant time was around Rs.15,000/-

per month, apart from other expenses relating to education, transport,

food, clothing, and daily upkeep.

52. Even if each item set out by the respondent was not to be

accepted at face value, the Family Court was still required to take a

broad and practical view of the costs involved in maintaining a school-

going child. In that context, the grant of Rs.50,000/- per month for the

child cannot be said to be so excessive or wholly disassociated from

the record in order to justify appellate interference.

53. A spouse who is not shown to be in settled employment and

who is looking after a school-going child cannot be expected to

sustain herself and the child without interim support merely on the

basis of assumptions regarding earning capacity. It is settled law that a

wife and a child is entitled to live in the same standard of living to

which they were accustomed to prior to the date of their separation.

The Family Court was therefore justified in awarding an amount

which was intended to secure reasonable maintenance and not mere

subsistence.

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 23 of 24

54. The appellant also referred, during the course of submissions, to

the fact that he had not been able to meet the minor child despite

paying maintenance. This Court is of the view that the said aspect

does not fall for adjudication in the present appeal. The subject matter

of the appeal is the correctness of the order granting interim

maintenance under Section 24 of the HMA.

55. The obligation to maintain the spouse and minor child cannot be

made contingent upon the grant or denial of visitation. Likewise,

payment of maintenance does not, by itself, translate into an

enforceable right to compel access to the child in proceedings where

no such substantive relief is under consideration.

56. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no merit in the

present appeal. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the

impugned order suffers from such perversity, patent illegality, or

material misappreciation of the record as would warrant interference

by this Court. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed, along with

pending applications, if any. The common order dated 15.02.2023

passed by the Family Court in HMA No. 219/2019 and MT No.

365/2018 is upheld. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

57. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2023 Page 24 of 24

the submissions advanced before us as noted above and for the

adjudication of the present appeal against the order of interim

maintenance and shall not be construed as final findings on the merits

of the disputes pending between the parties before the Family Court or

any other competent forum.

VIVEK CHAUDHARY

(JUDGE)

RENU BHATNAGAR

(JUDGE)

MAY 29, 2026/ka/kp/sm