Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

REVISION APPLICATION NO. 298 OF 2005

Mr. Gautam Khandjua,

Age: 33 Yrs., Occ: Business, 

R/at. 71-C, Land Breeze, 52, Pali Hill,

Bandra (West), Mumbai - 400 050. ...Applicant

                  Versus

1. State of Maharashtra,

(Inspector of Police, Versova Police Station, 

Mumbai).

2.Nirmal Joseph,

(of Banglore, Indian Inhabitant residing at 40 

Ferns Meadows, Hennur Road, Byrathi, Banglore-

562 149.) ...Respondents

****

Mr. Ashok Mundargi, Senior Advocate a/w  Mr. Dipesh Mehta, Ms. Rumi

Mirza, Mr. Kaushal Thakker & Ms. Sonea Kanal i/b Dipesh Mehta &

Associates for the Applicant.

Ms. Manisha R. Tidke, APP for Respondent/State.

None for the Respondent No.2.

****

  CORAM :M.M. SATHAYE,  J.

    DATE   :10

th 

SEPTEMBER, 2026

JUDGMENT :

1. Invoking Section 397 read with 401 of the Criminal Procedure

Code,   1973   ('CrPC'   for   short),   the   Applicant-Original   Accused  is

challenging an order dated 24.08.2005 passed by Learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Mumbai in Misc. Application No. 625 of 2005, by which

his application for discharge has been rejected, refusing to discharge

him from the offence punishable under Section 306 of Indian Penal

Code, 1860 ('IPC' for short).

Navnath Waghmare 1

NAVNATH

SITARAM

WAGHMARE

Digitally signed by

NAVNATH SITARAM

WAGHMARE

Date: 2026.09.10

19:33:21 +0530

Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

BRIEF BACKGROUND

2. The Applicant met deceased Ms. Nafisa Joseph in 2003 and

became friends. The deceased took Applicant to meet her parents at

Banglore and with the consent of parents, she got engaged with the

Applicant   on   23.05.2004   at   Banglore.   The   Applicant   had   told   the

deceased that he has taken divorce from his earlier wife – Ms. Naushin

Khan   by   executing   some   kind   of   document   or   Memorandum   of

Understanding   (‘MoU’  for   short),  however,     the  Applicants’  mother

informed the deceased that he was not divorced. Therefore, she asked

the Applicant to show the divorce-papers. But inspite of her request,

divorce papers were not shown. Deceased informed her mother on

telephone that on 28.07.2004 she had a fight with the Applicant. On the

same day, Applicant also called and informed deceased’s mother that he

had fight with the deceased over the divorce papers and requested her

to come Mumbai. On receiving such calls, mother of deceased came to

Mumbai from Banglore on 28.07.2004 and she went to Applicant's

house at Bandra, where the deceased, her mother, the Applicant and his

parents were present. The Applicant refused to marry the deceased on

the ground that she was short tempered and that she did not listen to

anybody. According to deceased, she was only asking for divorce papers

in respect of earlier marriage and that was the only ground of quarrel.

The mother of the deceased also asked Applicant for divorce papers and

questioned him as to why he is not showing such papers, even though

had promised to do so, but Applicant kept quiet. Then deceased and her

mother returned to deceased’s flat at Andheri.  On the next day, i.e.

29.07.2004 in the morning, mother of deceased called the Applicant

because she wanted to meet him. He sent his car to fetch mother of the

deceased. In presence of parents and sisters of Applicant, deceased’s

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

mother asked the Applicant as to whether  he wants to marry the

deceased, when the Applicant said that Nafisa quarrels with him and

that he will not marry her.

3. The deceased’s mother returned home at Andheri but sent a

message to deceased’s friend Ms. Poonam Damania calling her home. In

the evening, at about 06:00 p.m. Poonam came to the Andheri flat. The

deceased was in a depressed state of mind, due to refusal by Applicant

to marry her. Said Poonam and Mother of deceased requested the

deceased to go to the doctor but she refused saying that she will go to

the doctor, only if Applicant accompanies her. So, Poonam informed the

Applicant on telephone that deceased has not eaten food for two days

and he should  come, but  he did not  come  despite repeated  calls.

Thereafter,   deceased   went   out   of   the   room,   locked   the   door   from

outside, went to another bed room, asked her maid to go out, locked

herself inside and committed suicide by hanging herself to the ceiling

fan with 

dupatta.

4. First   Information   Report   ('FIR'   for   short)   was   lodged.

Investigation   was   conducted.   Statements   of   various   persons   were

recorded. Chargesheet was filed. After committal, case was numbered

as Sessions Case No. 244/2005 in Sessions court.

5. The Applicant filed Misc. Application No. 625 of 2005  seeking

discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.PC. which is rejected under

impugned order dated 24.08.2005.

6. In these circumstances, the Applicant filed present revision

Application. This Court admitted the revision on 29.11.2005 and further

proceedings of the trial was stayed. The Applicant was already granted

anticipatory bail on 11.11.2004.

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

SUBMISSIONS

7. Learned   Senior   Advocate   Mr.   Mundargi   appearing   for   the

Applicant submitted as under:

7.1. That the material collected during investigation, when taken at its

highest, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence u/s.

306 or 107 of IPC nor does it disclose ‘abetment of suicide’ which

requires 

‘mens rea’.

7.2. That the chargesheet does not attribute any act of instigation,

threat,   coercion,   humiliation   or   intentional   aid   on   the   part   of   the

Applicant. That the Chargesheet also fails to record that the Applicant

and deceased had not spoken with each other for last 2 days prior to the

death.

7.3. That the entire case is based on an erroneous assumption that the

Applicant's decision not to proceed with the proposed marriage on

account of persistent disputes and not to accompany the deceased to the

doctor, is sufficient to attract Section 306 of IPC.

7.4. That the prosecution case merely alleges that differences arose

between the parties and the Applicant expressed his unwillingness to

proceed with the marriage because of incompatibility. This by itself does

not satisfy the statutory requirements of Sections 306 and 107 of IPC.

Mere failure of a relationship, refusal to marry, emotional distress or

disappointment   cannot,   by   themselves,   tantamount   to   abetment

especially when we consider the social background and previous broken

relationships of both the parties involved.

7.5. That statement of Mr. Nirmal Joseph (Father of Deceased) mentions

about the knowledge of the Applicant's earlier marriage and his divorce

Navnath Waghmare 4

Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

under a MoU. Rest of the details mentioned speak about information

derived from his wife, Mrs. Usha, after 15-20 days of the incident.

7.6.   That   statement   of   Mrs.   Usha   Joseph   (Mother   of   Deceased)

mentions about the failed past relationships of the Deceased with one

Mr. Sameer Malhotra and one Mr. Sameer Soni. In both these cases, the

Deceased had got engaged, or decided to marry, but the relationships

failed. The statement also finds mention about the Applicant's earlier

marriage and his divorce under a MoU. Further, it also states about the

temperamental issues of the Deceased.

7.7. That statement of Ms. Poonam Damania (Friend of the Deceased)

mentions about the Deceased consuming ‘Restyl’ tablets and ‘Benadryl’

syrup to sleep and further informs that she was called by Mrs. Usha at

the residence and that she was with the Deceased for three hours prior

to the incident. She also informs that she had messaged the Applicant

asking him to accompany the Deceased to the doctor, signifies that the

Applicant was not in contact with the Deceased at the relevant time.

She also confirms that in the diary of the Deceased, there was only

mention about house expenses, addresses and telephone numbers.

7.8. Statement of Ms. Durga Bisai (Maid of the Deceased) mentions that

on the date of the incident, the Deceased was with her mother, Usha

and her friend, Poonam, for about three hours, before death of the

Deceased and there were arguments between the three of them.

7.9. In the impugned Order at paragraph no. 13, the learned Sessions

Judge has observed that there is no evidence about the conspiracy or

intention to aid on the part of the Accused.

7.10. That Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in catena of judgments that

Navnath Waghmare 5

Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

offence under section 306 requires 

mens rea and direct instigation.

7.11. That therefore, taking the case of the prosecution at its highest,

there is absolutely no material demonstrating  

mens rea,  instigation,

threat,   coercion,   humiliation   or   intentional   aid   on   the   part   of   the

Accused and therefore the essential ingredients of Sections 306 and 107

of IPC are not made out and the Revision Application deserves to be

allowed.

7.12. That in the offence under section 306 of IPC, what is to be seen is

the intention of the Accused in alleged act or statement which led the

Deceased to commit suicide and merely because Deceased committed

suicide, the Accused cannot be held guilty without reference to his

intention or 

mens rea.

7.13. He relied on following judgments in support of his case :

(i)  Satish Vs. State of Maharashtra 1997 Cri LJ 935.

(ii) Sanju Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 5 SCC 371.

(iii)Seema   Ajay   Bhoosreddy   Vs.   State   of   Maharashtra

MANU/MH/1961/2011.

(iv) Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. (2010) 1

SCC 750.

(v) Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi Vs. State of Karnataka AIR 2025

SC 153.

(vi) Abhinav Mohan Delkar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2025

INSC 990.

(vii) Mahendra Vs. State of Maharashtra. 2025 ALLMR (Cri)

4559.

Navnath Waghmare 6

Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

8. Nobody appeared for Respondent No.2 (father of deceased)

despite name of his advocate appearing on the cause-list. 

9. Learned APP, Ms. Tidke, on the other hand supported the

impugned   order   contending  

inter   alia  that   considering   material

available on record, there is enough suspicion against the Applicant for

him to face trial. She submitted that in close proximity of the incident in

question, the Applicant was involved in the interaction, in as much as,

there was quarrel between the Applicant and Deceased over non supply

of   divorce   documents.   She   further   submitted   that   admittedly,   the

Applicant was engaged with the deceased and marriage date was fixed

and invitation cards were distributed. In such circumstances, since the

Applicant refused to marry the deceased, deceased felt so humiliated by

fear of disrepute to her and her family that she committed suicide.

Therefore, the Applicant is directly responsible for suicide and this is

not a fit case for discharge. She emphasized on the limited revisional

jurisdiction of this Court and submitted that mini trial is not permitted

at the stage of discharge. She prayed for dismissal of the revision

application.

REASONS AND CONCLUSION

10. I   have   considered   the   rival   submissions   and   perused   the

record. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the scope of

discharge application as well as limited revisional jurisdiction being

exercised by this Court. 

11. In Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr (1979) 3

SCC 4, Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the scope of Section

227 of Cr.P.C., where it is held that while deciding discharge application,

the Court should not act as a Trial Court, but should weigh evidence

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

and form opinion only on the limited question of whether a prima facie

case is made out. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :

“7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:

If, upon consideration of the record of the case and

the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing

the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in

this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not

su�cient ground for proceeding against the accused,

he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons

for so doing.

The words 'not su�cient ground for proceeding

against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not

a mere post o�ce to frame the charge at the behest

of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial

mind to the facts of the case in order to determine

whether a case for trial has been made out by the

prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary

for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the

matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence

and probabilities which is really his function after the

trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has

merely to sift the evidence in order to �nd out whether

or not there is su�cient ground for proceeding against

the accused. The su�ciency of ground would take

within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by

the police or the documents produced before the court

which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious

circumstances against the accused so as to frame a

charge against him.

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

8. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was

considered by a recent decision of this Court in this

Court in the case case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh

Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 where Untwalia, J., speaking for

the Court observed as follows:

Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter

remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the

place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial.

But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion

which leads the Court to think that there is ground for

presuming that the accused has committed an o�ence

then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no

su�cient ground for proceeding against the accused.

The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to

be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the

law governing the trial of criminal cases in France

where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the

the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of

deciding prima facie whether the the Court should

proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the

Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of

the accused even if fully accepted before it is

challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the

defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the

accused committed the o�ence, then there will be no

su�cient ground for proceeding with the trial

This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion

may not take the place of the proof a the trial stage,

yet it may be su�cient for the satisfaction of the

Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the

accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has

Navnath Waghmare 9

Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

hold that a committing Magistrate had ample powers

to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of

�nding out whether or

not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has

been made out.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. In  State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors (2014) 11

SCC 709, once again while considering the scope of Section 227 of

Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under.

“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival

submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit

Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of

consideration of the applications for discharge, the

court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution

or act as a post o�ce and may sift evidence in order

to �nd out whether or not the allegations made are

groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is

trite that at the stage of consideration of an

application for discharge, the court has to proceed

with an assumption that the materials brought on

record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the

said materials and documents with a view to �nd out

whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their

face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients

constituting the alleged o�ence. At this stage,

probative value of the materials has to be gone into

and the court is not expected to go deep into the

matter and hold that the materials would not warrant

a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be

Navnath Waghmare 10

Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

considered is whether there is a ground for presuming

that the o�ence has been committed and not whether

a ground for convicting the accused has been made

out. To put it di�erently, if the court thinks that the

accused might have committed the o�ence on the

basis of the materials on record on its probative

value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction,

the court has to come to the conclusion that the

accused has committed the o�ence. The law does not

permit a mini trial at this stage.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. In  State of Rajasthan V/s Ashok Kumar Kashyap (2021) 11

SCC 191, the Honb’le Supreme Court while considering the scope of

interference at the stage of framing of charges or considering discharge

application, has held as under.

“13. Having considered the reasoning given by the

High Court and the grounds which are weighed with

the High Court while discharging the accused, we are

of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its

jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction

and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239

CrPC. While discharging the accused, the High Court

has gone into the merits of the case and has

considered whether on the basis of the material on

record, the accused is likely to be convicted or not.

For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in

detail the transcript of the conversation between the

complainant and the accused which exercise at this

stage to consider the discharge application and/or

framing of the charge is not permissible at all.

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

xxxx

15. As observed hereinabove, the High Court was

required to consider whether a prima facie case has

been made out or not and whether the accused is

required to be further tried or not. At the stage of

framing of the charge and/or considering the

discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

At this stage, it is to be noted that even as per Section

7 of the PC Act, even an attempt constitutes an

o�ence. Therefore, the High Court has erred and/or

exceeded in virtually holding a mini trial at the stage

of discharge application.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. In State of Gujarat v/s. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao. (2023) 17

SCC 688, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,   while considering revisional

jurisdicion   of   this   Court   while   deciding   discharge   application,   in

paragraph nos. 10 and 17 has held that 

“10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of

considering an application for discharge the court

must proceed on an assumption that the material

which has been brought on record by the prosecution

is true and evaluate said material in order to

determine whether the facts emerging from the

material taken on its face value, disclose the

existence of the ingredients necessary of the o�ence

alleged.

xxxx

17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

court and start appreciating the evidence by �nding

out inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it

is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be

cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing

with an application for discharge.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. In State of Tamil Nadu v/s. R. Soundirarasu & Ors. (2023) 6

SCC 768, once again, while commenting on revisional jurisdcition of

this Court while dealing with discharge application, has held as under :

“79. xxxx

Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a

casual or mechanical manner. It can only be

exercised to correct manifest error of law or

procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not

corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated

with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot

undertake meticulous examination of the material on

record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the

appellate court. This power can only be exercised if

there is any legal bar to the continuance of the

proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-

sheet are taken to be true on their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not constitute the

o�ence for which the accused has been charged. It is

conferred to check grave error of law or procedure”.

(emphasis supplied)

16. It   is   therefore   clear   that   while   considering   the   discharge

application, this Court cannot go into the merits of the case. It cannot

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

be considered whether on the basis of material on record, the accused is

likely to be convicted or not. What is required to be considered is

whether 

prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the

accused is required to be further tried or not. The Court is expected to

sift through the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is

sufficient  ground   for   proceeding  against  the  accused  and  it  is  not

necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or

weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities. Mini trial is

certainly not permitted.

17. In the present case, statements of following persons have been

recorded :

1. Nirmalkumar B. Joseph, Informant – Father of decease d,

statement recorded during registration of FIR on 30.07.2004

and 30.09.2004.

2. Usha Nirmalkumar Joseph, Mother of the deceased,

statement recorded on 31.07.2004.

3. Poonam Tejas Damania, Friend of deceased, statement

recorded on 30.07.2004 ,04.08.2004, 30.09.2004 and

11.10.2004

4. Durga Gopan Bisai, House-help of deceased, stateme nt

recorded on 30.07.2004 , 09.08.2004 and 30.09.2004.

5. Kuljeet Gurubachan Singh Randhva, Friend of the

deceased, Statement recorded on 05.08.2004 and

11.10.2004 .

6. Ramchandra Ojleshwar Mishra, Secretary of building of

deceased, statement recorded on 30.07.2004 and

23.10.2004.

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

7. Harjit Harbanssingh Khanduja, Mother of Applicant,

Statement recorded on 12.08.2004 and 23.10.2004.

8. Kishor David Rodrigues, Friend of the Applicant, Statement

recorded on 03.08.2004 and 03.10.2004.

9. Parveen Kenneth Samuel, Friend of the Applicant,

Statement recorded on 31.10.2004.

10. Chandramohan Amarnath Malhotra, Father of close friend

(Poonam) of deceased, Statement recorded on 06.10.2004 .

11. Gautam Harbans Khanduja, Applicant, Statement

recorded on 31.07.2004 and 28.11.2004.

12. Ramnarayan Sitaram Verma, Watchmen of the residence

building of deceased, Statement recorded on 30.07.2004.

13. Harbanssingh Khanduja, Father of Applicant, Statemen t

recorded on 12.08.2004.

18. Clear picture emerging from perusal of above statements is

that one day prior to the date of incident i.e. 28.07.2004, the mother of

the deceased had come to Mumbai and met mother of the Applicant at

their house in Bandra and in presence of everybody i.e. Applicant and

his parents, the deceased and her mother, quarrel had taken place about

the   Applicant   not   supplying   divorce-papers   as   promised   and   the

deceased was  very upset about it. It is also clearly emerging that

thereafter deceased and his mother left the Applicant's house and went

to the deceased’s flat at Andheri. On the next day i.e. on the date of

incident   (29.07.2004),   the   mother   of   the   deceased   again   met   the

Applicant in the morning at his residence at Bandra, where he was

asked in the presence of his parents and sister, whether he wants to

marry. He had refused. Thereafter, the mother of deceased left and came

back to the deceased's flat at Andheri and called her friend Poonam to

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

come over. It appears clearly that   friend Poonam visited the deceased's

house   where   the   deceased,   deceased's   mother   and   Poonam   were

together and deceased was not well, she had not eaten for couple of

days, she was upset and she was refusing to go to the hospital unless

Applicant comes and accompanies her. It further clearly appears that

not showing divorce-papers despite promise, was the cause for quarrel

and discord resulting in Applicant's refusal to marry. It also clearly

appears that the date of marriage was fixed on 07.08.2004 which was

just a week away and marriage-cards were printed and distributed.

According to the statement of friend Poonam, deceased and her friends

were shopping for marriage. In such circumstances, refusal to marry

had hit the deceased. The deceased had the background of two earlier

engagements broken, for one reason or the other. It appears that the

deceased  could   not   bear   the  humiliation  she  felt  about  the  whole

situation and the impending disrepute that would be brought upon the

family and she had taken the extreme step. 

19. Learned   Senior   Advocate   for   the   Applicant   has   succinctly

argued that it is not the perception of the person committing suicide but

the intention of the accused that is required to be seen by the Court.

There   is   no   doubt   about   this   proposition.   However,   whether   the

circumstances   amount   to   any   such   intention   and   whether   the

Applicant's refusal to marry and non-supply of divorce-papers despite

promise, amounts to such intention or immediate cause or indirect

instigation or aid for the suicide, is something that can be decided only

after trial on appreciation of evidence for the acid test of proof beyond

reasonable doubt. 

20. The arguments of the learned Senior Advocate, which are

recorded  above  in  detail,  are  certainly  arguments  that  need  to  be

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

considered at the time of trial on appreciation of evidence. However, on

overall consideration of the statements recorded of various persons,

especially,   deceased's     mother   and     friends,   about   the   proximate

situation that led to the suicide, in my view, it cannot be conclusively

said, at this stage, that ingredients of Section 306 r/w 107 of IPC are

not made out. It is neither possible nor permissible to conduct ‘mini

trial’ by considering the material in chargesheet for proof of guilt. It is

also not possible to comment upon the evidentiary value and proof

about guilt, at this stage.

21. Suffice   it   to   observe,   that   there   are   sufficient   grounds   to

proceed against the Applicant and there are circumstances requiring the

trial to proceed. It it true that strong suspicion cannot take place of the

proof, but that can only be decided at the stage of trial.

22. Also, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the scope of

interference in revision, at the stage of discharge, does not permit this

Court to sit as an Appellate Court and start appreciating evidence. It is

settled   principle   of   law   that   at   the   stage   of   considering   discharge

application, the Court must proceed on the assumption that material

which has been brought on record is true and evaluate such material to

determine whether the ingredients of the alleged offence exists. The

revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only to correct manifest  error of

law or procedures which would cause injustice, if not corrected. In the

facts   and   circumstances   narrated   above   and   on   perusal   of   various

statements, in my considered view, the learned Session's Judge has not

committed any manifest error of law/procedure, causing injustice.

23. It does not appear from the statements that Applicant and

deceased had not spoken with each other for last two days prior to the

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

death, as argued by learned Senior Advocate for the Applicant. The

argument that ‘considering the social background and  previous broken

relationships of the parties, mere refusal to marry or emotional distress

or disappointment cannot amount to abetment’ is a matter that can only

be conclusively decided on appreciation of evidence at the time of trial. 

24. It appears from the material available that parties knew each

other's past including the past broken relationships of the deceased

thereby making her sensitive and vulnerable to one more such incident.

Whether the Applicant’s refusal to marry and non-supply of divorce

papers proved to be the ‘last straw on the back of the camel’ that broke

it, will have to be decided at the time of trial. Similarly, the argument

about temperamental issues and about deceased’s habit of consuming

‘Restyl’ tablets and ‘Benadryl’ syrup to sleep and its effect will have to be

considered at the time of trial.

25. The argument about the observations of the learned Single

Judge in paragraph no.13 that there is no evidence about the conspiracy

or intention to aid on the part of the Accused, must be read with what is

stated by the learned Sessions Judge thereafter.  The learned Sessions

Judge has clearly held that the Court has to consider conduct on the

part of the Applicant as to whether it amounts to instigation. 

26. Now, let us consider the judgments relied upon by the learned

Senior counsel for the Applicant one by one.

27. In Satish Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra) and Mahendra Vs.

State of Maharashtra (Supra),  the learned Single Judge of this Court

was considering an appeal over conviction for the offence under Section

306 of  IPC. Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  consideration  in  the  said

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

judgment was after appreciation of evidence on the record at the time

of trial, and not at the time of discharge. Hence, the said judgments will

not help the Applicant.

28. In Abhinav Mohan Delkar Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra),

the Hon’ble Supreme Court, was considering the exercise of powers

under Section 482 of CrPC. In this respect, it is necessary to note that

recently in  Mukesh and Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors

(Hon’ble Supreme Court, SLP (Crl.) No. 12354 of 2024)  the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed as under. Therefore above judgments will

not help the Applicant.

"8. It is true that the appellants can apply for

discharge. However, the scope of application for

discharge is completely di�erent from the scope of a

petition for quashing the criminal proceedings. While

arguing a case for discharge, the appellants will not

be in a position to rely upon any document which is

not the part of charge-sheet. The ground of abuse of

process of law will not be available while arguing

discharge application. However, in a petition for

quashing either under section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 or under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, a wider challenge is available

including a challenge on the ground of abuse of

process of law. In such proceedings, the accused can

rely upon documents which are not the part of the

charge-sheet.

xxxx"

(emphasis supplied)

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

29. Similarly, in the case in respect of Sanju Vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh (Supra).

30. In  Seema Ajay Bhoosreddy (Supra) the learned Single Judge

of this Court was considering the rejection of discharge application in

revision. Facts in that case were that a medical student for the last year

of B.D.S. course had committed suicide, allegedly due to ‘scolding by

one professor’ and the ‘other professor asking the student by way of

punishment to repeat the college assignment’. In such peculiar factual

backdrop,   this   Court   found   that   the   deceased   student   was

hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which was

part of day-to-day life. It was found that the student had lost confidence

and she felt that she only spent parent's money. Having found such facts

to exist, this Court had allowed the discharge application.

The   facts   of   the   present   case   are   completely   different   and

distinguishable. It cannot be disputed that the caselaw applies only in

principle   and   that   principle   has   to   be   applied   to   the   facts   and

circumstances of individual case, on case to case basis.

31. In Gangula Mohan Reddy (Supra) and in Kamaruddin Dastagir

Sanadi (Supra), the  Hon'ble  Supreme Court was considering the case

of suicide however the consideration was after the conviction in trial

and after appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the said judgments will

also not help the Applicant.

32. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and reasons indicated

above, in my considered view, this is not a fit case to interfere in the

order passed by the learned Sessions Judge refusing to discharge the

Applicant.

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Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2

33. Criminal Revision Application is accordingly dismissed. Rule is

discharged. Interim stay to trial, is vacated. Trial to proceed. No order

as to costs.

34. At this stage, learned counsel for the Revision Applicant seeks

continuation of interim stay for a period of 8 weeks. Considering that

revision was pending for a long time with interim stay in favor of the

Revision Applicant, interim stay to the Trial is continued only for a

period of 6 weeks from today.

         (M.M. SATHAYE, J.)  

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