2025 INSC 439

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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1759 OF 2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6053 of 2021)

G.C. MANJUNATH & O THERS …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

SEETARAM ...RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court of

Karnataka dated 17.03.2021 in Criminal Petition No.4512 of

2020 in refusing to quash the order dated 11.06.2020 passed by

the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City

affirming the summoning order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the

learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru

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against the accused persons under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501,

502, 506 (b) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(for short “IPC”), the appellants/accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 have

preferred this appeal.

3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the

complainant/respondent herein has been prosecuting certain

police officers for their illegal activities. Due to this, the

complainant alleged that some police officers ha d engaged

accused Nos.1 to 5, who were also police officers, to take revenge

against him. Accused Nos.1 to 5 were serving at the

Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station, and accused No.6 is the

daughter of the proprietor of Bruna Weekly Magazine.

4. The complainant stated that in order to seek revenge,

accused Nos.1 to 5 lodged false complaints against the

complainant and registered fabricated cases. They also

threatened him with dire consequences. On 10.04.1999, at about

10:30 p.m., accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 trespassed into his house,

dragged him out, and forcibly took him to the Mahalakshmi

Layout Police Station. There, the accused Nos.1 to 5 allegedly

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assaulted him after stripping him of his clothes and continued to

torture him throughout the night.

5. On 11.04.1999, accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 allegedly procured

a slate, forced the complainant to hold it with his name written

on it, and accused No. 6 took his photograph at that time.

Subsequently, the complainant was produced before the

Magistrate after registering false cases in Crime Nos.137 and 138

of 1999. The complainant showed his injuries to the learned

Magistrate, who referred him to a hospital. He was later released

and eventually acquitted in the above cases.

6. It was further averred that on 27.10.1999, at about 9:45

p.m., accused Nos.3 to 5 stopped the complainant while he was

riding his scooter. They slapped him, engaged an autorickshaw,

and took him to the Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station. Accused

No.1 was present at the station and abused the complainant in

filthy language, demanding that he should withdraw the case

filed by him. It was further alleged that accused No.1 then

instructed accused No.3 to take possession of the complainant’s

belongings. Accused No.3 removed his gold chain, wristwatch,

purse, spectacles, and Rs.26,000/- in cash, wrapped them in a

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handkerchief, and handed over the same to accused No.1.

Thereafter, they stripped the complainant of his clothes and

assaulted him throughout the night using a lathi and an iron rod

causing dislodgement of his tooth leading to profuse bleeding.

7. The complainant further stated that the accused persons

continued to torture the complainant and later produced him

before the Magistrate, registering a false case under Crime

No.448 of 1999 for the offences under Section 392 of the IPC. The

complainant reported the ill-treatment to the learned Magistrate,

who directed the jail authorities to provide him with medical

treatment. He was released from custody and sought treatment

at Victoria Hospital on 04.11.1999.

8. Subsequently, accused No.6, with the intent to defame and

ruin the complainant’s life, published the illegally taken

photographs along with defamatory slogans in the Bruna Weekly

Magazine on 25.01.2001, 10.09.2001, and 15.09.2001. Accused

No.6 also filed a case against the complainant in Crime No.146

of 2005. The complainant alleged that accused Nos.1 to 6 have

continuously threatened him, causing him mental agony, and

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have even threatened to kill him if he does not withdraw the

complaints filed against them.

9. Therefore, the complainant approached the Court of learned

VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru by filing

a private complaint P.C.R. No.6754 of 2007 dated 21.04.2007

and prayed for taking cognisance of the offences punishable

under Sections 196, 199, 200, 201, 211, 326, 327, 345, 338,

357, 368, 395, 397, 500, 501, 502, 506(b) read with Section 120B

of the IPC against accused Nos. 1 to 6.

10. The learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by

order dated 26.12.2009, recorded the sworn statement of the

complainant, took cognisance of the complaint dated 21.04.2007

and issued summons to accused No.1 to 6 in C.C No. 368 of

2010. Being aggrieved, accused No.6 approached the High Court

by way of filing Criminal Petition No.4364 of 2010 challenging the

order dated 26.12.2009. By order dated 30.03.2012, the High

Court set aside the order dated 26.12.2009 insofar as accused

No.6 is concerned and remanded the matter to the learned

Magistrate for a fresh consideration.

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11. Thereafter, by order dated 07.05.2016, the learned VII

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, held that there was

prima facie material to register the case against accused Nos.1 to

5 for the offences under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501, 502, 506

(b) read with Section 34 of the IPC and accordingly ordered to

register a criminal case against accused Nos.1 to 5 as well as

issued summons against accused Nos.1 to 5. However, in the

said order, the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, found that the materials on record are insufficient to

take cognisance of the offence punishable under Sections 196,

199, 200, 201, 211, 34, 338, 357, 367, 368, 395 and 397 of the

IPC. Insofar as the aspect of delay in filling the private complaint

is concerned, the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate observed that sufficient material was produced to

prove that the complainant was pursuing this case by way of

writing letters/complaints to the Higher Officials. Further, the

charges against accused No.6 were dropped.

12. Being aggrieved by the order dated 07.05.2016 passed by

the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, accused

Nos.1 to 3 and 5 approached the Court of LXI City Civil and

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Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City by way of filing Criminal

Revision Petition No.720 of 2017. By order dated 11.06.2020,

the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City

dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition No.720 of 2017 filed by

the accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5.

13. Being aggrieved, the accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5 approached

the High Court by way of filing Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020

praying to set aside the order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the

learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru

in taking cognisance of offences punishable under Sections 326,

358, 500, 501, 502 and 506(b) read with Section 34 of the IPC

against them and in registering the case in C.C. No.368 of 2010

and issuing summons against them as well as the order dated

11.06.2020 passed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions

Judge, Bengaluru City predominantly on the ground that a prior

order of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) and Section 170 of the

Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (for short “Police Act”) was not

obtained from the Government before prosecuting the accused

persons.

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14. During the pendency of the Criminal Petition No.4512 of

2020 before the High Court, accused No.1 passed away. By

impugned order dated 17.03.2021, the High Court dismissed the

Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020 filed by accused No.2, 3 and

5. The High Court observed that sufficient material was placed

on record against the accused persons for facing criminal trial.

As regards the plea of limitation under Section 197 of the CrPC

read with Section 170 of the Police Act, the High Court further

observed that the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Bengaluru and the learned LXI City Civil and

Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City have not gone into the aspect of

obtaining a prior order of sanction. However, the High Court held

that it was evident that the complainant made sufficient efforts

to get the order of sanction. Further, the High Court noted that

the accused persons exceeded their limits and assaulted the

complainant resulting in grave injuries. Ergo, the High Court

held that the same cannot be termed as an act done in the

discharge of the official duty and protection cannot be given

under Section 197 of the CrPC. In other words, the High Court

held that an order of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and

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Section 170 of the Police Act was not necessary in the instant

case. The High Court noted that the judgment of this Court in

D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 (“D.

Devaraja”) relied upon by the accused persons cannot come to

their rescue. The High Court observed that the Supreme Court

in the said judgment has categorically held that the protection

given under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police

Act has its own limitation and that the said protection would be

available only for the acts done by the public servant in discharge

of his official duty or if it is reasonably connected with the

discharge of his official duties and not in instances such as the

present case. Being aggrieved, accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 have

preferred the present appeal before this Court.

15. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the

learned senior counsel appearing for the accused persons

submitted that accused Nos.1, 3, and 4 have passed away,

resulting in abatement of the criminal proceedings against them.

Consequently, the present appeal survives only insofar as

accused Nos.2 and 5 are concerned. It was further submitted

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that accused Nos.2 and 5 have attained superannuation from

their posts in the years 2015 and 2020, respectively.

16. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the

appellants/accused No.2 and 5 and the learned counsel for the

respondent/complainant. We have perused the material on

record.

17. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants/

accused persons submitted that there has been an inordinate

and unexplained delay in filing the present complaint. In this

regard, it was contended that the complaint was lodged only on

21.04.2007, pertaining to an alleged incident that is stated to

have occurred during the period 1999-2000, while the accused

were in active police service. Learned senior counsel further

argued that several criminal cases had been registered against

the complainant, in which he was ultimately acquitted in the year

2006. It was pointed out that immediately following his acquittal,

the present complaint came to be filed in 2007. In this backdrop,

it was submitted that the present complaint is nothing but a

retaliatory measure, filed vindictively against the accused

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persons solely for having discharged their official duties as police

officials.

18. Learned senior counsel further contended that, admittedly,

the complaint was filed without obtaining the requisite prior

sanction as mandated under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section

170 of the Police Act. It was submitted that the High Court

erroneously observed that the acts alleged against the accused

persons bore no connection with their official duties. Accordingly,

it was argued that the High Court committed an error in

concluding that prior sanction was not necessary before

initiating criminal proceedings against the accused persons.

19. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the

expression “under colour or in excess of any such duty” employed

in Section 170 of the Police Act is of particular significance. It

was contended that the offences alleged against the accused

persons would squarely fall within the ambit of the phrase “under

colour or in excess of any such duty.” Therefore, it was urged that

obtaining prior sanction from the competent Government

authority is an indispensable prerequisite before entertaining

prosecution against the accused persons. In support of this

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contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in

Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v s. State of Mysore, AIR

1963 SC 849 (“Virupaxappa”). In the said case, while

interpreting Section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, this

Court held that the phrase “under colour of duty” encompasses

acts done by police officers ostensibly in the discharge of their

official functions, even if they exceeded the authority vested in

them under the Act.

20. Learned senior counsel further contended that the High

Court misinterpreted the ratio laid down by this Court in D.

Devaraja. In this regard, it was submitted that in the said

judgment, this Court unequivocally held that even if a police

officer acts in excess of the scope of his official duties, so long as

there exists a reasonable nexus between the act complained of

and the discharge of his official functions, the mere fact of

exceeding authority would not, by itself, disentitle the officer from

the statutory safeguard of obtaining prior government sanction

before initiation of criminal proceedings. In view of the foregoing

submissions, the learned senior counsel submitted that the

impugned order passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside.

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21. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent/complainant vehemently contended that, at the time

of the complainant’s arrest in connection with certain criminal

cases, he was subjected to physical assault at the hands of the

accused persons. It was further submitted that this fact was duly

brought to the attention of the learned Magistrate, who, on each

occasion, issued directions to both the Jailor and the

Investigating Officer to ensure that the complainant was provided

with necessary medical treatment for the injuries allegedly

sustained during the said assault.

22. Learned counsel further submitted that he has placed

relevant documents on record before this Court, including the

wound certificate, which clearly reflects that the complainant

sustained grievous injuries, including broken teeth. Additionally,

it was pointed out that the X-ray report corroborates the medical

findings, indicating the presence of a healing socket and

confirming that Injury No. 2 is grievous in nature. In light of these

materials, learned counsel for the complainant argued that a

prima facie case was clearly made out against the accused

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persons. Consequently, learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Bengaluru took cognisance of the offences against

them by order dated 07.05.2016, which was subsequently

affirmed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge,

Bengaluru City, by order dated 11.06.2020, and further upheld

by the High Court in the impugned order.

23. It was further submitted that, in the present case, learned

VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate duly considered the

materials placed on record, which demonstrate that the

complainant had made consistent efforts from the year 2002 to

2006 to obtain sanction for prosecution. The learned Magistrate

has also noted that the complainant had addressed multiple

representations to the head of the department seeking the

requisite sanction; however, no conclusive or effective response

was forthcoming from the authorities. Learned counsel for the

complainant further pointed out that the High Court, in the

impugned order, similarly recorded that all necessary steps were

taken by the complainant to secure the sanction, but despite his

earnest efforts, the competent authority failed to grant the same.

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24. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the

accused persons “under the colour of official duty” removed his

clothes and had abused and assaulted him. These acts neither

have any bearing on official duties nor are they connected

remotely to official duties. Instead, it was submitted that the

accused persons exceeded the limits allowed by the law. The act

of raid and seizure is part of official duties but the further acts of

the accused persons cannot fall within the scope of official duty.

It was argued that even the High Court noted that the brutal

conduct of the accused persons, which included not only

breaking the complainant’s teeth but also causing grievous

injuries, clearly demonstrates that they far exceeded the bounds

of their official duties. Accordingly, learned counsel for the

complainant submitted that the High Court was justified in

holding that criminal proceedings could have been initiated

without prior sanction.

25. It was argued that this Court in Bakhshish Singh Brar vs.

Gurmej Kaur, (1987) 4 SCC 663 (“Bakhshish Singh”) dealt

with the issue of sanction under Sections 197 and 196 of the

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CrPC. It was submitted that the said case involved a police officer

accused of causing grievous injuries and death during the course

of a raid and search. It was submitted that in the said judgment,

this Court noted that, in order to determine whether the officer,

while ostensibly acting in the discharge of his official duties, had

exceeded the limits of his official capacity, the court must first

take cognisance of the offence. Accordingly, this Court observed

that, in such circumstances, the trial need not be stayed merely

due to the absence of sanction for prosecution at the initial stage.

Hence, learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the

High Court was justified in holding that a prior sanction was not

necessary in this case thereby dismissing the criminal petition

filed by the accused persons.

26. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties and

after a thorough examination of the material available on record,

the core issue that emerges for determination is, whether, the

learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was legally

justified in taking cognisance of the offences alleged against the

accused persons in P.C.R. No.6754/2007, in the absence of the

prior sanction contemplated under Section 197 of the CrPC read

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with Section 170 of the Police Act. The real question, therefore,

is whether the acts complained of are reasonably connected to,

or performed, in the purported discharge of the official duties of

the accused persons, so as to attract the statutory protection

afforded by the said provisions.

27. Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act reads as follows:

“170. Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done

under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be

entertained without sanction of Government. —(1) In

any case of alleged offence by the Commissioner, a

Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or

other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by

such Commissioner, Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve

Police Officer or other person, by any act done under

colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as

aforesaid, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the

offence or wrong if committed or done was of the

character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be

entertained except with the previous sanction of the

Government.

(2) In the case of an intended suit on account of such a

wrong as aforesaid, the person intending to sue shall be

bound to give to the alleged wrongdoer one month's

notice at least of the intended suit with sufficient

description of the wrong complained of, failing which

such suit shall be dismissed.

(3) The plaint shall set forth that a notice as aforesaid

has been served on the defendant and the date of such

service, and shall state whether any, and if so, what

tender of amends has been made by the defendant. A

copy of the said notice shall be annexed to the plaint

endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the

plaintiff of the time and manner of service thereof.”

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28. Section 197 of the CrPC is set out hereinbelow for

convenience:

“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—(1)

When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate

or a public servant not removable from his office save by

or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any

offence alleged to have been committed by him while

acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official

duty, no court shall take cognisance of such offence

except with the previous sanction—

(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the

case may be, was at the time of commission of the

alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs

of the Union, of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the

case may be, was at the time of commission of the

alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs

of a State, of the State Government:”

29. A plain reading of Section 170 of the Police Act reveals that

the legislature, in its wisdom, has sought to afford a statutory

safeguard to certain public functionaries, including

Commissioners, Magistrates, Police Officers, and Reserve Police

Officers. The provision is categorical in its stipulation that where

any offence is alleged to have been committed, or any wrong

alleged to have been occasioned, by such officials in the

discharge of their duties or in the exercise of their lawful

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authority, no court shall entertain any prosecution or suit

against them without the prior sanction of the Government.

Importantly, the protective umbrella of Section 170 is not

confined solely to acts strictly within the bounds of authority but

extends to acts done ostensibly in excess of such authority, so

long as there exists a reasonable nexus between the act

complained of and the discharge of official functions.

30. A careful reading of Section 197 of the CrPC unequivocally

delineates a statutory bar on the Court’s jurisdiction to take

cognisance of offences alleged against public servants, save

without the prior sanction of the appropriate government. The

essential precondition for the applicability of this provision is

that the alleged offence must have been committed by the public

servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported discharge

of, their official duties. The protective mantle of Section 197 of

the CrPC, however, is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that

are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly

unconnected thereto. Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to

official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do

not attract the bar imposed under Section 197 of the CrPC.

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31. Both the aforesaid provisions serve a similar protective

function. While Section 170 of the Police Act mandates prior

sanction for prosecuting a public official for "acts done under

colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," Section 197 of

the CrPC requires prior sanction where a public official is

accused of having committed “any offence alleged to have been

committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duty.” The underlying rationale of both

these statutory provisions is to safeguard public functionaries

from frivolous or vexatious prosecution for actions undertaken in

good faith in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their

official duties, thereby ensuring that the fear of litigation does

not impede the efficient functioning of public administration.

32. This Court in B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177

(“B. Saha”) observed that the words “any offence alleged to have

been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duty” employed in Section 197 of the

CrPC, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation.

This Court observed that if these words are construed too

narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, “it is

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no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can

be”. In the wider sense, these words will take under their

umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the

course of the same transaction in which the official duty is

performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the

import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on

the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public

servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, that

is entitled to the protection of Section 197 of the CrPC, an act

constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with

his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the

said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath

vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1966 SC 220), “it is the

quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope

and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated under

Section 197 CrPC will be attracted”.

33. This Court in Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of

Victim of Uphaar Tragedy, (2023) 16 SCC 239 held that the

State performs its obligations through its officers/public

servants and every function performed by a public servant is

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ultimately aimed at achieving public welfare. Often, their roles

involve a degree of discretion. But the exercise of such discretion

cannot be separated from the circumstances and timing in which

it is exercised or, in cases of omission, when the omission occurs.

In such circumstances, the courts must address, whether the

officer was acting in the discharge of official duties. It was

observed that even when an officer acts under the purported

exercise of official powers, they are entitled to protection under

Section 197 of the CrPC. This protection exists for a valid reason

so that the public servants can perform their duties fearlessly,

without constant apprehension of legal action, as long as they

act in good faith. While Section 197 of the CrPC does not

explicitly mention the requirement of good faith, such a condition

is implied and is expressly included in several other statutes that

offer protection to public servants from civil and criminal liability.

34. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197 of the

CrPC, read with Section 170 of the Police Act, this Court in D.

Devaraja observed that not every offence committed by a police

officer automatically gets this protection. The safeguard under

Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is

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limited. It applies only if the alleged act is reasonably connected

to the officer’s official duties. The law does not offer protection if

the official role is used as a mere excuse to commit wrongful acts.

However, it was held that the protection of prior sanction will be

available when there is a reasonable connection between the act

and their duty. While enunciating when the protection of prior

sanction will be applicable, this Court held that even if a police

officer exceeds his official powers, as long as there is a reasonable

connection between the act and his duty, they are still entitled to

the protection requiring prior sanction. Excessiveness alone does

not strip them of this safeguard. The language of both Section

197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is clear that

sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of

official duty as well as for the acts purported to be done in the

discharge of official duty and/or acts done “under colour of or in

excess of such duty or authority”. Sanction becomes mandatory

if there is a reasonable connection between the act and the

officer’s official duties, even if the officer acted improperly or

exceeded his authority. Therefore, if a complaint against a police

officer involves actions reasonably related to his official role, the

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Court cannot take cognisance unless sanction from the

appropriate Government has been obtained under Section 197 of

the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act. The relevant portion

from the abovementioned judgment is as follows:

“66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police

officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official

duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from

facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous

proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the

Government, to prosecute would give an upright police

officer the confidence to discharge his official duties

efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by

initiation of criminal action, from which he would be

protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police

Act. At the same time, if the policeman has committed a

wrong, which constitutes a criminal offence and renders

him liable for prosecution, he can be prosecuted with

sanction from the appropriate Government.

67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not

attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The

protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal

Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka

Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available

only when the alleged act done by the public servant is

reasonably connected with the discharge of his official

duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the

objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside

the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly

not require sanction. To cite an example, a policeman

assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic

violence would certainly not be entitled to protection.

However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official

duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act

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is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal

the act may be.

68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in

excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection

between the act and the performance of the official duty,

the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not

be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the

protection of the government sanction for initiation of

criminal action against him.

69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka

Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is

required not only for acts done in discharge of official

duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done

in discharge of official duty and/or act done under

colour of or in excess of such duty or authority.

70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is

whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty

or whether there is a reasonable connection with the

official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman or any

other public servant unconnected with the official duty

there can be no question of sanction. However, if the act

alleged against a policeman is reasonably connected

with discharge of his official duty, it does not matter if

the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers

and/or acted beyond the four corners of the law.

35. Recently, this Court in Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761 dealt with the object and purpose of

Section 197 of the CrPC which reads as follows:

“22. … the object and purpose of the said provision is to

protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified

criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties

within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to

them. A reading of Section 197 of the CrPC would

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indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognisance

of such offences which are mentioned in the said

provision except with the previous sanction of the

appropriate government when the allegations are made

against, inter alia, a public servant. There is no doubt

that in the instant case the appellant herein was a public

servant but the question is, whether, while discharging

her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there

was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which

did not require the first respondent herein to take a prior

sanction for prosecuting the appellant herein. In this

regard, the salient words which are relevant under

subsection (1) of Section 197 are “is accused of any

offence alleged to have been committed by him while

acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official

duty, no Court shall take cognisance of such offence

except with the previous sanction”. Therefore, for the

purpose of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is

that the public servant is accused of any offence which

had been committed by him in “discharge of his official

duty”. The said expression would clearly indicate that

Section 197 of the CrPC would not apply to a case if a

public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors

or not connected to the discharge of his or her official

duty.”

36. In light of the aforesaid judgments, the guiding principle

governing the necessity of prior sanction stands well crystallised.

The pivotal inquiry is whether the impugned act is reasonably

connected to the discharge of official duty. If the act is wholly

unconnected or manifestly devoid of any nexus to the official

functions of the public servant, the requirement of sanction is

obviated. Conversely, where there exists even a reasonable link

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between the act complained of and the official duties of the public

servant, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC and

Section 170 of the Police Act is attracted. In such cases, prior

sanction assumes the character of a sine qua non, regardless of

whether the public servant exceeded the scope of authority or

acted improperly while discharging his duty.

37. Turning to the case at hand, there is little doubt that the

allegations levelled against the accused persons are grave in

nature. Broadly classified, the accusations against the accused

persons encompass the following: (1) abuse of official authority

by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the complainant

in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven by malice or

vendetta; (2) physical assault and ill -treatment of the

complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of alleged

police excess; (3) wrongful confinement of the complainant; and

(4) criminal intimidation of the complainant.

38. In the circumstances at hand, we are of the considered

opinion that the allegations levelled against the accused persons,

though grave, squarely fall within the ambit of "acts done under

colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," and “acting or

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purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as

envisaged under Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of

the CrPC respectively. This Court, while adjudicating on

instances of alleged police excess, has consistently held in

Virupaxappa and D. Devaraja, that where a police officer, in

the course of performing official duties, exceeds the bounds of

such duty, the protective shield under the relevant statutory

provisions continues to apply, provided there exists a reasonable

nexus between the impugned act and the discharge of official

functions. It has been categorically held that transgression or

overstepping of authority does not, by itself, suffice to displace

the statutory safeguard of requiring prior government sanction

before prosecuting the public servant concerned.

39. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the

complainant was declared a rowdy sheeter by the Deputy

Commissioner of Police, Law and Order (West), Bengaluru City,

pursuant to a request made by the Mahalakshmi Layout Police

Station, Bengaluru, upon due consideration of the criminal cases

registered against the complainant, vide order dated 23.08.1990.

Subsequently, multiple criminal cases have been instituted

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against the complainant. It is in the course of the investigation

of these cases that the instant allegations have been levelled

against the accused persons. As noted above, any action

undertaken by a public officer, even if in excess of the authority

vested in them or overstepping the confines of their official duty,

would nonetheless attract statutory protection, provided there

exists a reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the

officer’s official functions.

40. In the present case, it is evident that the actions attributed

to the accused persons emanate from the discharge of their

official duties, specifically in connection with the investigation of

criminal cases pending against the complainant. As previously

observed, a mere excess or overreach in the performance of

official duty does not, by itself, disentitle a public servant from

the statutory protection mandated by law. The safeguard of

obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority, as

envisaged under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the

Police Act cannot be rendered nugatory merely because the acts

alleged may have exceeded the strict bounds of official duty. In

view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the

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learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in

taking cognisance of the alleged offences against the accused

persons without the requisite sanction for prosecution in the

instant case. The absence of the necessary sanction vitiates the

very initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused

persons.

41. Admittedly, the alleged incident pertains to the period of

1999-2000. Accused Nos.1, 3, and 4 have since passed away. The

proceedings now survive solely against accused Nos.2 and 5. It

is pertinent to note that both accused No.2 and accused No.5

retired from service long ago on attaining the age of

superannuation; accused No.2 superannuated in the year 2015

and is presently 71 years of age, while accused No.5 retired in

the year 2020 and is now 64 years old. In these circumstances,

we are of the considered view that no meaningful purpose would

be served by prolonging the criminal prosecution against them.

Accordingly, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be

adequately met in the instant case by quashing the proceedings

against accused Nos.2 and 5.

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42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the

appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.03.2021 passed

by the High Court in Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020, preferred

under Section 482 of the CrPC is hereby set aside. Consequently,

Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020 stands allowed. As a result,

the summoning order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the learned

VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru against

accused Nos.2 and 5, as well as the order dated 11.06.2020

passed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge,

Bengaluru City in affirming the same are hereby quashed.

The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

……………………………………….J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

……………………………………….J.

(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 03, 2025.