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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 311 of 2007

PETITIONER:

GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF KARNATAKA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2007

BENCH:

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench

of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant

questioning correctness of the conviction recorded by the Fast Track Court.

The said Court found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under

Section 302 of the India Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and

sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of

Rs.8,000/- with default stipulation.'

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

One Chengapa (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'), his wife Smt.

Baby Chengappa (PW-1), the accused and most of the witnesses are the

residents of Garvale village. There is no much dispute that the accused

and the deceased were related. According to the prosecution the Geejaganda

family to which the accused and the deceased belong owned nearly 348 acres

of land. Out of the same, donation of about 48 acres, was made and the

remaining area was with the family. There were six sharers in the said

Geejaganda family. The said six sharers were in possession of the

respective portion of the remaining area. The deceased was claiming

equitable partition and share in family land which was opposed by the

accused and this resulted in ultimate murder of the deceased Chengappa on

23.9.1995 at 8.00 p.m. It is relevant to note that there is no much

dispute that on 21.9.1995 i.e. two days before the incident, the Revenue

Inspector had visited and inspected the family lands on the request made by

the deceased for having equitable partition. On 23.9.1995 in the morning

the deceased left the house informing his wife PW-1, that he is going to

Madapura to meet the Revenue Inspector. At that time, he was wearing one

HMT Watch, gold ring with inscription "GDC", a gold chain and a sum of

Rs.2,500/-. He informed PW-1 that he may return in the evening and if he

does not, he will come back on the next day morning. Since the deceased

did not come back even in the morning of 24.9.1995, PW-1 went to the coffee

land to attend the work and on the way on Thakeri-Garvale Road, saw the

dead body of her husband lying by the side of the road with injuries on his

person. On seeing it she went back to the house and informed the incident

to her children and all the family members came back to the place. By then

the police who had received incomplete information also arrived at the spot

and after recording the statement of PW-1 and treating the same as first

information report, registered a case in Crime No.215/1995 for the offence

punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC against the two

accused persons including the appellant- accused no.1 and investigation was

taken up.

4. After registration of the case the mandatory procedures like holding of

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mahazar, drawing up of inquest proceedings were conducted. Statements of

witnesses were recorded and search for the accused was carried out. On the

same day, i.e., on 24.9.1995, accused no.1 voluntarily appeared before the

Investigating Officer and surrendered. He was taken into custody and

interrogated and from his voluntary statement, the permissible portion

marked as Ex.P-14 was recorded. On the basis of the voluntary statement,

gold chain, ring belonging to the deceased and the weapon alleged to have

been used in the crime in question were discovered from the house of the

accused no.1. Those were seized along with the bloodstained clothes which

were subjected to forensic science examination. On receipt of all the

reports including F.S.L., autopsy, serologist and on completion of the

investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons for the

offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

5. In order to establish its accusations the prosecution examined 16

witnesses. The accused persons pleaded innocence and stated that because of

enmity they have been falsely implicated.

6. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record found the

appellant guilty. However, the co-accused was given the benefit of doubt

and order of acquittal was recorded.

7. The entire case of the prosecution revolves around the evidence which is

circumstantial in nature, as there were no eye witnesses to the actual

assault. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are:

(i) Motive;

(ii) Last seen together'

(iii) Discovery/recovery of the golden ornaments by the deceased and the

murder weapon seized from the house of the accused no.1 along with the

bloodstained clothes of the accused no.1; and lastly

(iv) absence of any explanation by the accused no.1.

8. The High Court found that the circumstances were conclusive to prove

guilt of the accused and, therefore, confirmed the conviction and the

sentence by dismissing the appeal.

9. In support of the appeal leaned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the factual scenario as projected by the prosecution does not establish the

guilt of the accused and the circumstances highlighted by the prosecution

to establish its case does not present a complete chain of circumstances to

warrant any interference of guilty.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the

judgment of the High Court affirming that the judgment of the Trial Court.

11. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case

rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be

justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found

to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any

other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1977) SC 1063,

Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of

Karnataka, AIR (1983) SC 446, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, AIR (1985) SC

1224, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, and Ashok

Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. ,AIR (1989) SC 1890. The circumstances

from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected

with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In

Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR (1954 )SC 621 it was laid down that where

the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the

cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the

innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable

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doubt.

We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy

v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:

"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that

the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be

fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover,

all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in

the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally

inconsistent with his innocence."

In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR (1990) SC 79, it was laid down

that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must

satisfy the following tests:

(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be

drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly

pointing towards guilt of the accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete

that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human

probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and

(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be

complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of

guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with

the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence."

In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) Crl. LJ 1104, it was

pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial

evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two

inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also

pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been

fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established

must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.

12. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book `Wills' Circumstantial Evidence'

(Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the

case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any

legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt

connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on

the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal

accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial

evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case

admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory

facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable

of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his

guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the

accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.

13. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial

evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to

circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.

In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR (1952) SC 343, it was

observed thus:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a

circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt

is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established, and

all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis

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of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a

conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every

hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be

a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground

for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must

be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been

done by the accused."

A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.

State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622, Therein, while dealing with

circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the

prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna

in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The

conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be

based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn

should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and

not may be established;

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis

of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable

on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be

proved; and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any

reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the

accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been

done by the accused.

14. Some of the circumstances which need to be highlighted are recovery of

the gold ornaments of the deceased as well as the weapon used in the crime.

The bloodstained clothes of the appellant were also seized. Prosecution has

relied on the evidence of PWs 6 and 12 to establish its stand about the

recovery. PW-6, the goldsmith who was called for testing and weighing gold

ornaments. He admitted that he accompanied police officer for recovery of

the ornaments from the accused but resiled from certain parts of the

statement made during investigation. PW-12 specifically stated that the

appellant led the police and the mahazar witness for discovery of the

articles namely, gold chain MO 10, bloodstained clothes i.e. MO 14 of the

accused. These are along with clothes were sent for forensic examination.

The evidence of FSL Officer and his report equally established that the

bloodstains were there. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in

short 'Evidence Act') has also application. As held by this Court in J.P.

Anand v. D.G. Baffna, AIR (2002) SC 141, and Ezhil and Ors. v. State of

Tamil Nadu, AIR (2002) SC 2017, in the absence of explanation of the

accused as to legitimate or origin of their possession of articles

belonging to the deceased, keeping in view of the time within which the

murder was supposed to have been committed and the body found and the

articles recovered from the possession of the accused an inference can be

can be safely drawn that not only the accused was in possessions of those

articles belonging to the deceased but also committed murder of the

deceased. The articles belonging to the deceased were in possession of the

accused who had voluntarily disclosed and as such presumption under Section

114 of the Evidence Act was clearly applicable.

15. The most important circumstance for the prosecution in the case is the

disclosure statements of the accused persons and recoveries of the stolen

property, blood stained shirt and weapon of offence consequent upon such

statements. The admissibility of the statements made by the accused persons

to the police is challenged on twin grounds, i.e., (i) factually no such

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statement was made, and (ii) the statement made was inadmissible in

evidence.

Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no confession made to a police

officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence.

Similarly Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that confession by the

accused person while in custody of police cannot be proved against him.

However, to the aforesaid rule of Sections 25 to 26 of the Evidence Act,

there is an exception carved out by Section 27 the Evidence Act providing

that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of

information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody

of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a

confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered,

may be proved. Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26. Such

statements are generally termed as disclosure statements leading to the

discovery of facts which are presumably in the exclusive knowledge of the

maker. Section 27 appears to be based on the view that if a fact is

actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is

afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly it can be

safely allowed to be given in evidence.

As the Section is alleged to be frequently misused by the police, the

courts are required to be vigilant about its application. The court must

ensure the credibility of evidence by police because this provision is

vulnerable to abuse. It does not, however, mean that any statement made in

terms of the aforesaid section should be seen with suspicion and it cannot

be discarded only on the ground that it was made to a police officer during

investigation. The court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the

prosecution to make out a statement of accused with a simple case of

recovery as a case of discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions

of Section 27 the Evidence Act.

16. The position of law in relation to Section 27 of the Evidence Act was

elaborately made clear by Sir John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. v.

Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 87, wherein it was held:

"Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the

prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain

statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition

necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact

in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence

in the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so

much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby

discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if

a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some

guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and

accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the

extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the

fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally

the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody

produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a

weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the

informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown has argued that in such a

case the 'fact discovered' is the physical object produced, and that any

information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon

this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a

person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in

the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a

dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of section 27,

little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding

sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police

custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature

that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the

exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be

the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object

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subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive

powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice

the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their

Lordships think that the proviso to S.26, added by S.27, should not be held

to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships' view it is

fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent

to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which

the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the

information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to

past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to

its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information

supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in

the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives

were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that

a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if

the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the

fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be

added 'with which I stabbed A' these words are admissible since they do not

relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant."

17. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR (1960) SC 1125, this

Court held that Sections 25 and 26 were manifestly intended to hit an evil,

viz., to guard against the danger of receiving in evidence testimony from

tainted sources about statements made by persons accused of offences. These

sections form part of a statute which codifies the law relating to the

relevancy of evidence and proof of facts in judicial proceedings. The State

is as much concerned with punishing offenders who may be proved guilty of

committing of offences as it is concerned with protecting persons who may

be compelled to give confessional statements. Section 27 renders

information admissible on the ground that the discovery of a fact pursuant

to a statement made by a person in custody is a guarantee of truth of the

statement made by him and the legislature has chosen to make on that ground

an exception to the rule prohibiting proof of such statement. The principle

of admitting evidence of statements made by a person giving information

leading to the discovery of facts which may be used in evidence against him

is manifestly reasonable. In that case the High Court had acquitted the

accused on the ground that his statement which lad to the recovery of

gandasa, the weapon of offence was inadmissible. The accused Deoman had

made a statement to hand over the gandasa which he stated to have thrown

into a tank and got it recovered. The trial court convicted the accused for

the offence of murder. The Full Bench of the High Court held that Section

27 of the Evidence Act which allegedly created an unjustifiable

discrimination between persons in custody and persons out of custody

offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the

'Constitution') was unenforceable. After the opinion of the Full Bench a

Division Bench of the Court excluded from consideration the statement made

by the accused in the presence of the police officer and held that the

story of the accused having borrowed a gandasa on the day of occurrence was

unreliable. The accused was acquitted but at the instance of the State of

U.P., the High Court granted a certificate to file the appeal in this

Court. This Court did not agree with the position of law settled by the

High Court and decided to proceed to review the evidence in the light of

that statement in so far as it distinctly related to the fact thereby

discovery being admissible. Dealing with the conclusions arrived at by the

High Court and on the facts of the case, this Court observed:

"The High Court was of the view that the mere fetching of the gandasa from

its hiding place did not establish that Deoman himself had put it in the

tank, and an inference could legitimately be raised that somebody else had

placed it in the tank, or that Deoman had seen someone placing that gandasa

in the tank or that someone had told him about the gandasa lying in the

tank. But for reasons already set out the information given by Deoman is

provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered;

and his statement that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is information

which distinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa. Discovery from

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its place of hiding, at the instance of Deoman of the gandasa stained with

human blood in the light of the admission by him that he had thrown it in

the tank in which it was found therefore acquires significance, and

destroys the theories suggested by the High Court."

In Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1976) SC 483 it was

held that expression 'fact discovered' includes not only the physical

object produced but also place from which it is produced and the knowledge

of the accused as to that. Interpreting the words of Section "so much of

the information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, the

Court held that the word "distinctly" means "directly", "indubitably",

"strictly", "unmistakably". The word has been advisedly used to limit and

define the scope of proveable information. The phrase "distinctly" relates

"to the fact thereby discovered". The phrase refers to that part of

information supplied by the accused which is the direct cause of discovery

of a fact. The rest of the information has to be excluded.

In Earabhadrappa alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, [1983] 2 SCR 552,

it was held that for the applicability of section 27 of the Evidence Act

two conditions are pre-requisite, viz., (i) information must be such as has

caused discovery of the fact, and (ii) the information must 'relate

distinctly' to the fact discovered. Under Section 27 only so much of the

information as distinctly relates to the fact really thereby discovered, is

admissible. While deciding the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence

Act, the Court has also to keep in mind the nature of presumption under

Illustration (a) to (s) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The Court can,

therefore, presume the existence of a fact which it thinks likely to have

happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human

conduct and public and private business, in their relations to the facts of

the particular case. In that case one of the circumstance relied upon by

the prosecution against the accused was that on being arrested after a year

of the incident, the accused made a statement before the police leading to

the recovery of some of the gold ornaments of the deceased and her six silk

sarees, from different places which were identified by the witness as

belonging to the deceased. In that context the court observed:

"There is no controversy that the statement made by the appellant Ex.P-35

is admissible under S.27 of the Evidence Act. Under S.27 only so much of

the information as distinctly relates to the facts really thereby

discovered is admissible. The word 'fact means some concrete or material

fact to which the information directly relates."

In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, S/o Gopinath Shinde & Ors., JT (2000) 5 SC

575 has held that the Section 27 the Evidence Act was based on the doctrine

of confirmation by subsequent events and giving the section actual and

expanding meanings, held:

"The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine

of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the

principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength

of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is guarantee

that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information

might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but it results in

discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the

legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by

restricting the admissible portion to the minimum. It is now well settled

that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in

section. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor,

AIR (1947) PC 67, is the most quoted authority for supporting the

interpretation that the 'fact discovered' envisaged in the section embraces

the place from which the object was produced; the knowledge of the accused

as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect."

18. Besides Section 27 the Evidence Act, the courts can draw presumptions

under Section 114, Illustrations (a) and Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

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In Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. AIR (1995) SC 1598, where ornaments of the

deceased were recovered from the possession of the accused immediately

after the occurrence, this Court held:

"It is true that simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference

can be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty

of the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability for the aforesaid

offences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the

nature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat

Khan v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1956) SC 54, that no hard and fast rule can

be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain

circumstances. It has also been indicated that where only evidence against

the accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the

circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been

committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the

person in possession of the stolen property had committed the murder. A

note of caution has been given by this Court by indicating that suspicion

should not take the place of proof. It appears that the High Court in

passing the impugned judgment has taken note of the said decision of this

Court. But as rightly indicated by the High Court, the said decision is not

applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High

Court has placed reliance on the other decision of this Court rendered in

Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR (1954) SC 1 In the said decision, this court

has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114,

Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be drawn under the 'important

time factor'. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in

possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be

permitted. But if several months had expired in the interval, the

presumption cannot be permitted to be drawn having regard to the

circumstances of the case. In the instant case, it has been established

that immediately on the next day of the murder, the accused Gulab Chand had

sold some of the ornaments belonging to the deceased and within 3-4 days

the recovery of the said stolen articles was made from his house at the

instance of the accused. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has

been indicated by this Court as an 'important time factor', should not be

lost sight of in deciding the present case. It may be indicated here that

in a latter decision of this Court in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka,

[1993] 2 SCC 330, this Court has held that the nature of the presumption

and Illustration (a) under Section 114 of the Evidence Act must depend upon

the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can be laid down to

determine whether possession in the recent or otherwise and each case must

be judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent

possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according

as the stolen article is or is not calculated to pass readily from hand to

hand. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily

from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be

too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that

period. In our view, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the

accused was not affluent enough to possess the said ornaments and from the

nature of the evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the

said articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the

deceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable inference of

the commission of the said offence can be drawn against the appellant.

Excepting an assertion that the ornaments belonged to the family of the

accused which claim has been rightly discarded, no plausible explanation

for lawful possession of the said ornaments immediately after the murder

has been given by the accused. In the facts of this case, it appears to us

that murder and robbery have been proved to have been integral parts of the

same transaction and therefore the presumption arising under Illustration

(a) of Section 114 Evidence Act is that not only the appellant committed

the murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her ornaments."

19. In the instant case also, the disclosure statements were made by the

accused persons on the next day of the commission of the offence and the

property of the deceased was recovered at their instance from the places

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where they had kept such properties, on the same day. In the same affect

are the judgments in Mukund Alias Kundu Mishra & Anr. v. State of M.P. AIR

(1997) SC 2622 and Ronny Alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of

Maharashtra, AIR (1998) SC 1251 . In the latter case the Court held:

"Apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the Ohol family from the

possession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the murder of the

deceased (Mr.Mohan Ohol. Mrs. Runi Ohol and Mr. Rohan Ohol) which

possession has remained unexplained by the appellants the presumption under

Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act will be attracted. It

needs no discussion to conclude that the murder and the robbery of the

articles were found to be part of the same transaction. The irresistible

conclusion would therefore, be that the appellants and no one else had

committed the three murders and the robbery."

20. These aspects were illuminatingly highlighted in Sanjay @ Kaka v. State

(N.C.T. of Delhi) [2001] 3 SCC 190.

21. Above being the position, the appeal is clearly without merit, deserves

dismissal which we direct.