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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.951 OF 2026

Glider Buildcon Realtors Private Limited,

being Company under the Companies Act,

2013, through its Director / Authorized

Signatory, Mr. Rupen Kanawala,

Having address at, Piramal Tower,

8

th

Floor, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,

Lower Parel, Mumbai – 400 013. ...Petitioner

versus

1.Chief Controlling Revenue Authority,

Inspector General of Stamps

State of Maharashtra, Pune,

Having office at, Office of Inspector

General of Registration, Gr. Floor,

Opposite Vidhan Bhavan,

(Council Hall), New Administrative

Building, Pune 411 001.

2.Assistant Inspector General of

Registration, Having Office at,

Office of Inspector General of

Registration, Ground Floor,

Opposite Vidhan Bhawan,

(Council Hall), New Administrative

Building, Pune, 411 001.

3.State of Maharashtra,

through Additional Chief Secretary,

Revenue and Stamps,

Mantralaya, Mumbai. … Respondents

Mr. Drupad Patil with Mr. Sunil Gangan, Mr. Namit Pansare, Mr. Swapnil

Shikhare i/by RMG Law Associates, for Petitioner.

Ms. Savina Crasto, AGP for Respondents.

SSP 1/20 2026:BHC-AS:41704

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CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.

RESERVED ON : 3 AUGUST 2026

PRONOUNCED ON : 13 OCTOBER 2026

JUDGMENT :

1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the consent of the

learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2.By this Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India,

the Petitioner takes exception to the orders dated 9 June 2025 and 8

December 2025 passed by the Respondent Nos.2 and 1, respectively,

thereby rejecting the application preferred by the Petitioner for refund of the

stamp duty to be impressed on an instrument that was agreed to be executed,

but was never executed.

3.The background facts can be stated, in brief, as under :

3.1The Petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013

and is engaged in the real estate business. The Petitioner was developing a

project known as “Piramal Aranya” at Byculla, Mumbai. Junaid Kudia and

Mehjabeen Kudia had evinced interest in purchasing a flat, being Flat

No.1205, on the 12

th

floor of the building “Avyan Tower” in the said project, for

a total consideration of Rs.5,10,45,155/-.

3.2A Request for Reservation (RFR) was, thus, issued in favour of Kudias

(hereinafter referred to as “the allottees”) on 2 December 2021. The

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Petitioner and the allottees agreed upon the terms of the draft agreement for

sale. The Petitioner had undertaken to pay the registration charges and the

stamp duty on the agreement for sale to be executed between the parties.

Thus, on 4 February 2022, the Petitioner paid the registration charges of

Rs.30,000/-. On 17 February 2022, the Petitioner also paid a sum of

Rs.25,52,500/- towards the stamp duty on the instrument to be executed

between the Petitioner and the allottees to evidence the said transaction.

3.3On 7 June 2022, the allottees, however, expressed their inability to

complete the transaction on account of financial constraints. The allottees

requested the Petitioner to cancel the RFR. Appreciating the financial

difficulties faced by the allottees, the Petitioner acceded to their request for

cancellation of RFR.

3.4Subsequent to the cancellation of the transaction, as the instrument

was not required to be executed, the Petitioner filed an application for refund

of the stamp duty under the provisions of Section 47 of the Maharashtra

Stamp Act, 1958 (the Stamp Act, 1958). Though, the application was

notarized on 14 July 2022, yet, it was filed with Respondent No.2 on 20

September 2022.

3.5By an order dated 9 June 2025, Respondent No.1 rejected the said

application on the ground that the application was filed beyond the period

prescribed under Section 48(3) of the Stamp Act, 1958, which mandates that

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such an application be filed within a period of six months from the date of

purchase of stamps.

3.6The Petitioner preferred another application on 14 November 2025,

annexing thereto a letter dated 7 June 2022 issued by the allottees seeking

cancellation of the RFR. By a further order dated 8 December 2025,

Respondent No.2 informed the Petitioner that the first order dated 9 June

2025 rejecting the prayer for refund of the stamp duty was confirmed.

3.6Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction.

4.The substance of the Petition is that, the time to seek refund of the

stamp duty started to run from 7 June 2022 when the allottees sought

cancellation of the RFR, and, resultantly, the execution of the instrument in

connection with which the stamp duty was paid became impossible. The

Respondents have taken a very rigid and hyper-technical view of the matter

and rejected the prayer for refund, completely ignoring the fact that the

instrument in connection with which the stamp duty was paid, never came into

existence.

5.The Respondents have resisted the Petition by filing an affidavit in

reply. The Respondents contend that the statutory provisions contained in

Sections 47 and 48 of the Stamp Act, 1958, empower the Competent

Authority to refund the stamp duty only when the application is filed within the

stipulated period of six months (as it then stood). The statute does not confer

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any discretion upon the authorities to condone the period of delay in making

such an application and refund the stamp duty on equitable considerations.

Since the Respondents are not vested with any discretion to relax or condone

the delay, any such exercise would lead to anomalous consequences.

Therefore, the reasoned order passed by Respondent No.1 on 9 June 2025,

after providing an efficacious opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner, does not

merit any interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.

6.I have heard Mr. Drupad Patil, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and

Ms. Savina Crasto, learned AGP for the State, at some length. With the

assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have also perused the

material on record.

7.Mr. Patil, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that,

Respondent No.1 was in error in computing the period of limitation from the

date of purchase of the stamp duty. Laying emphasis on the letter addressed

by the allottees dated 7 June 2022, whereby the allottees sought to cancel the

transaction, Mr. Patil would urge that, at no point of time prior thereto, the

Petitioner could have sought a refund of the stamp duty. The inability of the

allottees to complete the transaction on account of financial difficulties, gave a

cause of action for the Petitioner to seek refund of the stamp duty. Therefore,

by no stretch of imagination, the period of six months could have been

reckoned from the date of purchase of the stamp duty.

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8.Mr. Patil laid emphasis on the fact that, in the case at hand, though the

registration charges and the stamp duty were paid by the Petitioner on the

basis of the RFR, yet, no instrument was ever executed. Respondent No.1

lost sight of the aforesaid crucial fact. To allow the State to retain the stamp

duty in respect of an instrument which was never executed would amount to

unjust enrichment, submitted Mr. Patil.

9.To this end, Mr. Patil placed reliance on a three-judge Bench judgment

of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshit Harish Jain and Anr. V/s. State

of Maharashtra and Ors.

1

and a judgment of this Court in the case of

Suresh Ramchandra Sancheti and Anr. V/s. State of Maharashtra and

Ors.

2

10.In opposition to this, Ms. Crasto, learned AGP, stoutly supported the

impugned orders. Laying emphasis on the plain textual reading of the

provisions contained in Sections 47 and 48 of the Stamp Act, 1958, Ms.

Crasto would urge that, the authorities were within their rights in rejecting the

prayer for refund of the stamp duty made after the expiry of the stipulated

period. As the statute does not confer any discretion upon the authorities,

Ms. Crasto would urge, reading down the provisions contained in Section 48

of the Stamp Act, 1958, may amount to exercise of jurisdiction by the

authorities not vested in them and would be susceptible to the allegations of

1(2025) 3 SCC 365

22025 SCC Online Bom 5198

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exercise of power in an arbitrary and inequitable manner if the authorities

were to relax the period in one case and decline to do so in another. As the

authorities have acted in conformity with the legislative mandate, the

impugned orders cannot be interfered with in exercise of the extraordinary writ

jurisdiction, submitted Ms. Crasto.

11.Chapter V of the Stamp Act, 1958, makes provisions for allowances for

Stamps in certain cases. Section 47 reads as under :

“47.Allowance for spoiled stamps

Subject to such rules as may be made by the State

Government as to the evidence to be required, or the inquiry

to be made, the Collector may on application, made within the

period prescribed in section 48, and if he is satisfied as to the

facts, make allowance for impressed stamps spoiled in the

cases hereinafter mentioned, namely: -

(a)the stamp on any paper inadvertently and undesignedly

spoiled, obliterated or by error in writing or any other means

rendered unfit for the purpose intended before any instrument

written thereon is executed by any person;

(b)the stamp on any document which is written out wholly

or in part, but which is not signed or executed by any party

thereto;

(c)the stamp used for an instrument executed by any party

thereto which -

(1)has been afterwards found by the party to be

absolutely void in law from the beginning;

(1A)has been afterwards found by the Court, to be

absolutely void from the beginning under section 31 of the

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Specific Relief Act, 1963;

(2)has been afterwards found unfit, by reason of

any error or mistake therein, for the purpose originally

intended;

(3)by reason of the death of any person by whom it

is necessary that it should be executed, without having

executed the same, or of the refusal of any such person to

execute the same, cannot be completed so as to effect the

intended transaction in the form proposed;

(4)for want of the execution thereof by some

material party, and his inability or refusal to sign the same, is

in fact incomplete and insufficient for the purpose for which it

was intended;

(5)by reason of the refusal of any person to act

under the same, or to advance any money intended to be

thereby secured, or by the refusal or non-acceptance of any

office thereby granted, totally fails of the intended purpose;

(6)becomes useless in consequence of the

transaction intended to be thereby effected by some other

instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of

not less value;

(7)is deficient in value and the transaction intended

to be thereby effected had been effected by some other

instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of

not less value;

(8)is inadvertently and undesignedly spoiled, and in

lieu whereof another instrument made between the parties and

for the same purpose is executed and duly stamped;

Provided that, in the case of an executed instrument,

except that falling under sub-clause (1A), no legal proceeding

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has been commenced in which the instrument could or would

have been given or offered in evidence and that the instrument

is given up to be cancelled or has been already given up to the

Court to be cancelled.

Explanation – The certificate of the Collector under section 32

that the full duty with which an instrument is chargeable has

been paid is an impressed stamp within the meaning of this

section.”

12.Firstly, Section 47 is subject to such rules as may be framed by the

State Government. Secondly, an application for refund has to be made within

the period stipulated in Section 48. Thirdly, it enumerates the contingencies in

which, upon being satisfied, the Collector of Stamps can make allowance for

impressed stamps. One of the categories specified in sub clause (c) is the

stamp used for an instrument executed by the party thereto which, by reason

of the refusal of any person to act under the same, or to advance any money

intended to be thereby secured, or by the refusal or non-acceptance of any

office thereby granted, totally fails of the intended purpose.

13.It would be advantageous to immediately notice the time stipulated by

section 48, to make an application for relief under section 47. Section 48 of

the Stamp Act, 1958 ( as it then stood) reads as under :

“48. Application for relief under section 47 when to be

made

The application for relief under section 47 shall be made

within the following period, that is to say, -

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(1)in the cases mentioned in clause (c) (5), within one

year of the date of the instruments;

Provided that where an agreement to sale of

immovable property on which stamp duty is paid under Article

25 of the SCHEDULE 1, is registered under the provisions of

the Registration Act, 1908 and thereafter such agreement is

cancelled by a registered cancellation deed for whatsoever

reasons before taking the possession of the property which is

the subject matter of such agreement, within a period of five

years from the date of execution of the agreement to sale,

then the application for relief may be made within a period of

one year from the date of registration of cancellation deed.

(2)in the case when for unavoidable circumstances any

instrument for which another instrument has been substituted

cannot be given up to be cancelled, the application may be

made within one year after the date of execution of the

substituted agreement.

(3)in any other case, within six months from the date of

purchase of stamps.”

14.The authorities have reckoned that the controversy at hand was

governed by sub-section (3) of Section 48. Incontrovertibly, no instrument

was executed by either party. Before agreement for sale could be executed in

pursuance of the RFR and the terms of the draft agreement for sale settled

between the parties, the allottees sought to cancel the transaction. In other

words, the situation that obtained was that, the Petitioner had paid the stamp

duty towards an instrument, which the parties had agreed to execute but

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never executed. Could the Petitioner thus seek refund of the stamp duty on

the ground that the instrument which was intended to be executed was not

executed on account of the inability and default on the part of the allottees,

beyond the then prescribed period of six months from the date of purchase of

stamps, is the moot question.

15.An answer to the aforesaid question hinges upon the approach of the

Courts in situations where a party may suffer harsh consequences of strict

rigour of statutory prescription of time, though its conduct is not blameworthy

or malafide. A profitable reference can be made to the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Committee GFIL V/s. Libra Buildtech Pvt.

Ltd. and Ors.

3

, wherein the question of refund of the stamp duty on a

transaction that failed on account of reasons beyond the control of the parties

had arisen for consideration. The Supreme Court observed, inter alia, as

under :

“26.In our considered opinion, while deciding a case of this

nature, we have to also bear in mind one maxim of equity,

which is well settled, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit

meaning – an act of the court shall prejudice no man. In

Broom’s Legal Maxims, 10

th

Edn., 1939 at p. 73 this maxim is

explained saying that it is founded upon justice and good

sense and afforded a safe and certain guide for the

administration of law. This maxim is also explained in the

same words in Jenk. Cent. 118. This principle is

3(2015) 16 SCC 31

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fundamental to any system of justice and applies to our

jurisprudence. (see Busching Schmitz (P) Ltd. V/s. P.T.

Menghani

4

and Raj Kumar Dey V/s. Tarapada Dey

5

).

………...

32.In our considered opinion, even if we find that

applications for claiming refund of stamp duty amount were

rightly dismissed by the SDM on the ground of limitation

prescribed under Section 50 of the Act yet keeping in view

the settled principle of law that the expiry of period of

limitation prescribed under any law may bar the remedy but

not the right, the applicants are still held entitled to claim the

refund of stamp duty amount on the basis of the grounds

mentioned above. In other words, notwithstanding dismissal

of the applications on the ground of limitation, we are of the

view that the applicants are entitled to claim the refund of

stamp duty amount from the State in the light of the grounds

mentioned above.” (emphasis supplied)

16.In the case of Rajeev Nohwar V/s. Chief Controlling Revenue

Authority, Maharashtra State and Ors.

6

, the Supreme Court was confronted

with a similar question, where though the stamp duty was purchased but no

agreement for sale was executed. The Supreme Court found that the

provisions of Section 47 had no application to the facts of the said case. Yet,

the Supreme Court allowed the application for claim of refund observing, inter

alia, that the rejection of the application for refund would violate equity, justice

4(1977) 2 SC 835

5(1987) 4 SCC 398

62021 SCC Online SC 863

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and fairness where the applicant is made to suffer the brunt of judicial delay.

The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.30, 31 and 33 are

instructive, and, hence, extracted below :

“30.Evidently, and for the reasons that we have indicated

above, the application filed by the appellant did not fall within

the ambit of Sections 47, 52 and 52A. It is true that the

application for refund was titled with reference to the

provisions of Section 47. But, it is well settled that a reference

of a wrong statutory provision, cannot oust the citizen of an

entitlement to refund which otherwise follows in terms of a

statutory provision.

31. In the present case, the stamp paper was purchased

bona fide in view of the agreement to sell which was to be

executed by the appellant with the developer. There was a

dispute with the developer which led to the institution of the

proceedings before the NCDRC. There was nothing untoward

in the conduct of the appellant and certainly no unreasonable

delay on the part of the appellant in awaiting the outcome of

the proceedings. The NCDRC allowed the complaint giving

the option to the appellant of either going ahead with the

agreement along with an award of compensation or, in the

alternative, to seek a refund with interest. The appellant

having exercised the latter option applied within two months

from the order of the NCDRC for the grant of refund. The

conduct of the appellant, therefore, cannot be held to be

unreasonable nor was there any intentional or wanton delay

on the part of the appellant in applying for a refund of stamp

duty. Such an application must be filed within a reasonable

period.

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32.…….

33.We are conscious of the fact that as a general rule of

law, the right to refund is a statutory creation. A refund can be

sought in terms envisaged by statute. As discussed above,

the case of the appellant is not specifically barred by any

substantive provision. It is an established principle that this

Court while exercising its power under Article 142 of

Constitution must not ignore and override statutory provisions

but must rather take note of the express statutory provisions

and exercise its discretion with caution. Therefore, if a statute

prescribes a limitation period, this Court must be slow to

interfere with the delay under Article 142. However, in the

case of an eventuality such as the instant case where the

facts of the case are not covered by the statute, this Court

under Article 142 will have the power to do complete justice

by condoning the delay. We are of the view that since the

delay in filling the application for refund in the instant case

was due to the prolonged proceedings before the NCDRC,

the application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. A

litigant has no control over judicial delays. A rejection of the

application for refund would violate equity, justice and fairness

where the applicant is made to suffer the brunt of judicial

delay. Therefore, this is a fit case for the exercise of the power

under Article 142 of the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)

17.After adverting to the aforesaid decisions, in the case of Satish Buba

Shetty V/s. Inspector General of Registration and Collector of Stamps

and Ors.

7

, this Court observed as under :

72024 (3) Mh.L.J. 293

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“23. I am mindful the Supreme Court has resorted to the

plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution.

However, in my considered view the principle enunciated by

the Supreme Court that where a party would suffer

consequences of judicial delay or would be prejudiced for

non-compliance of the condition which was impossible for it

to perform, such course would violate equity, justice and

fairness, deserves to be followed.

24.The authorities under the Stamp Act, 1958 may be

justified in rejecting the application in strict adherence to the

letter of the law. The statutory provision does not vest any

discretion in the authorities. It is trite, refund of the amount

paid under any enactment is a matter of a statutory right.

Reading down the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 48 of

the Stamp Act, 1958 as directory may have serious

repercussions on the revenue. But, the High Court in

exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be

denuded of the power to delve into the question as to

whether the non-compliance of the stipulation as to time was

brought about by factors which were beyond the control of

the affected party and to insist performance would have

amounted to compelling such party to do impossible and,

thus, relieve such party of the hardship in deserving cases,

where injustice is writ large.” (emphasis supplied)

18.In the case of Suresh Ramchandra Sancheti (supra), a learned

Single Judge of this Court was again confronted with the question whether the

extraordinary writ jurisdiction can be invoked to seek refund of the stamp duty

paid with the intention of being impressed on an instrument, that was never

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executed. After a survey of authoritative pronouncements, including the

aforesaid judgments, this Court observed as under :

“46.In sharp contrast to the aforesaid cases, in the instant

case, the draft of the agreement for sale was not even

executed; no instrument even came into existence; and

therefore, there has been no reliance on the document as

evidence in any forum. Without execution leading to an

instrument coming into being, whether Stamp Duty is ever

chargeable is a core question that rears its head. Indeed, in

those cases, the delay in the conduct of judicial proceedings

was factored in, but in those cases, the documents had

actually been executed and the instruments not only came into

existence but were also part of the evidence in the legal

proceedings involved. In the instant case, the transaction was

abandoned during the Covid Pandemic and the money was

felt better conserved owing to Sangita's health condition.

47.Moreover, the approach of the Courts in the aforesaid

cases has been just, equitable and fair, precisely in exercise of

the writ jurisdiction, even while the reasoning was applied to

instruments on which stamp duty had been paid. Transactions

contracted and evidenced by such instruments had been

reversed but in the extraordinary facts of the respective cases,

the Courts invoked the extraordinary powers of the writ

jurisdiction and directed the refund.

48.The net result of the multiple iterations and declaration

of the law can be said to be that the writ court would have the

power to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to deal with the

adjectival provisions of the deadline for an application in

Section 48 of the Stamp Act, even while the Stamp Authorities

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would need to adhere to the stipulated deadlines. Looking to

the nature of the facts and circumstances of the case, the

deadlines in Section 48 of the Stamp Act would not be

directory in nature for purposes of exercise of discretion by the

Stamp Authorities, but would be so in the exercise of the

extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

49.The substantive right to refund must be discerned from

the application of the substantive provisions of the Stamp Act

to the facts of the case, while the procedural deadlines in the

provisions dealt with above would bind the Stamp Authorities

but not the writ courts.

50.In the instant case, Sunita has a 100% disability and the

material on record shows that Suresh is the court-approved

guardian taking care of her. The stamp duty being retained by

the State would constitute unjust enrichment and would result

in an unfair and unjust outcome for Suresh and Sunita, where

without a chargeable instrument even having come into being

(unlike in the aforesaid cases dealt with by the Supreme

Court), an ailing couple would be out of pocket and denied an

allowance of stamp duty on what was not even a still-born

instrument but was an unborn instrument that had been

aborted.

51.The sole hitch is that six months had elapsed from the

date of purchase of the stamps. Adopting the very same

approach articulated in the three decisions analysed above,

and applying it to the peculiar facts of the instant case, in my

opinion, a case has been made out for exercise of the

extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the Petitioners.”

(emphasis supplied)

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19.In the case of Harshit Harish Jain and Anr. (supra), on which reliance

was placed by Mr. Patil, the Supreme Court in the light of the 2015

amendment to Section 48(1) of the Stamp Act, 1958, whereby the period of

limitation was reduced from two years to six months for seeking refund of the

stamp duty on the instrument, underscored the approach expected in the

matter of refund of the duty and the necessity to strike an equitable balance in

such matters. The observations in paras 19 to 21 are instructive, and, hence,

extracted below :

“19.Even if one were to hold that the Appellants’ claim is

examined under the amended six-month period, we are of the

considered opinion that a mere technical delay should not, by

itself, extinguish an otherwise valid claim. The scheme of

stamp duty refund provisions is designed to ensure fairness

when the underlying transaction is rescinded for bona fide

reasons. The Appellants were compelled to cancel the

purchase due to the developer’s inability to deliver timely

possession, and were in no way remiss or at fault.

20.Denying a legitimate refund solely on technical grounds

of limitation, especially when the timing of registration fell close

to the legislative amendment, fails to strike the equitable

balance ordinarily expected in fiscal or quasi-judicial

determinations. A measure of discretion or consideration for

good faith conduct is not alien to statutory processes that

safeguard citizens from unjust enrichment by the State.

21.It has been laid down by this Court in Bano Saiyed

Parwaz V/s. State of Maharashtra

8

that the limitation

8(2025) 2 SCC 201

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provision in stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should

not be enforced so as to oust the remedy when the applicant is

otherwise not blameworthy……….”

20.In a line of precedents the Supreme Court and this Court have adopted

an approach which ameliorates the hardship which arises on account of the

strict rigour of law. The provisions of law are required to be interpreted

keeping in view the foundational principle that the stamp duty is collected as a

measure for assurance of title. In a case where the instrument itself is not

executed, much less, the transaction completed, the retention of the stamp

duty may amount to an unjust enrichment. Therefore, the circumstances on

account of which a party could not seek refund within the stipulated period ,

must inform the exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

21.On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the case, the

Petitioner had placed material on record to show that the allottees backed out

of the transaction. The registration charges and the stamp duty were paid by

the Petitioner on the representation of the allottees that they would enter into

the agreement for sale. The application for refund was made within three and

a half months of the cancellation of the allotment at the instance of the

allottees. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, the case at hand

warrants the exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to ameliorate the

harsh consequences of the rigid application of law. The Writ Petition,

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therefore, deserves to be allowed.

22.Hence, the following order :

ORDER

(i)The Writ Petition stands allowed.

(ii)The impugned orders stand quashed and set aside.

(iii)The claim for refund of the stamp duty stands allowed.

(iv)The Petitioner shall be entitled to refund of the stamp duty paid

on 17 February 2022 under GRN No.MH013263480202122E, and the claim

for refund be processed within a period of four weeks from the date of

communication of this order.

(v)Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

(vi)No costs.

( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )

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