2025 INSC 104 CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 1 of 20

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.21778 of 2024)

HARSHIT HARISH JAIN & ANR. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

& ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal assails the final judgment

and order dated 18.04.2024, rendered by the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (C)

No. 2018 of 2024, whereby the writ petition preferred

by the Appellants stood dismissed. The gravamen of

the dispute concerns the rejection of the Appellants’

claim for refund of stamp duty under the provisions

of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter “the

Act”).

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 2 of 20

3. The brief facts leading to the present appeal are

as follows:

3.1. The Appellants entered into an Agreement

to Sell dated 30.08.2014 with a real estate

developer, M/s. Krona Realties Pvt. Ltd.

(hereinafter, “the Developer”), for the purchase of a

residential flat (Flat No. 5102) in the “Lodha

Venezia” project at Mumb ai. The total

consideration agreed was ₹5.46 crores, against

which an advance payment of ₹1.08 crores was

made to the Developer.

3.2. Pursuant to the execution of the

Agreement to Sell, the Appellants paid stamp duty

of ₹27,34,500, as mandated under the Act. The

said Agreement was registered on 18.09.2014,

upon payment of an additional registration charge

of ₹30,000.

3.3. Sometime thereafter, on 05.11.2014, the

Developer informed the Appellants of unavoidable

delays tied to issues involving adjacent slums,

thereby making it impossible to hand over

possession of the flat by 31.03.2017, the date

earlier envisaged. The Developer offered three

options to the Appellants: (i) transfer the booking

to another project, (ii) opt for cancellation with a

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 3 of 20

refund along with interest at 12% per annum, or

(iii) continue with the present booking but with a

revised possession timeline.

3.4. Constrained by the uncertainty over timely

possession, the Appellants chose to cancel the

booking. Consequently, a Deed of Cancellation was

executed on 17.03.2015. However, the said

Cancellation Deed came to be registered only on

28.04.2015 before the Sub-Registrar of

Assurances, Mumbai City. Subsequently, on

23.05.2016, a Deed of Rectification was also

executed, clarifying the refund details and other

particulars of the cancellation.

3.5. Meanwhile, by an amendment dated

24.04.2015 to Section 48(1) of the Act, the time

limit for seeking a refund of stamp duty on a

registered cancellation deed was curtailed from two

years to six months (counted from the date of

registration of such deed). On 06.08.2016, the

Appellants filed an application for refund of the

stamp duty amounting to ₹27,34,500, contending

that they were governed by the earlier (pre -

amendment) statutory regime, since their

Cancellation Deed was executed before

24.04.2015.

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 4 of 20

3.6. The refund application was initially

allowed by the Chief Controlling Revenue

Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune (CCRA), vide

its Order dated 08.01.2018. Soon thereafter,

however, the same authority, by a subsequent

Order dated 03.03.2018, recalled it s earlier

decision and rejected the refund request as time-

barred, citing the amended limitation period.

3.7. Aggrieved by the 03.03.2018 order

recalling the earlier sanction of refund, the

Appellants first attempted to challenge it before the

Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) by way

of an appeal under Section 53 of the Act. The CCRA

dismissed the appeal on 16.04.2019, prompting

the Appellants to file Writ Petition No. 8276 of 2019

before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. In

its judgment dated 04.10.2022, the High Court set

aside the orders dated 03.03.2018 and 16.04.2019,

noting that the Appellants had not been accorded

proper opportunity of hearing. The matter was

remanded to the CCRA for fresh consideration,

particularly on the question of whether the original

(unamended) or the amended provision under

Section 48(1) of the Act would apply to t he

cancellation. Pursuant to that remand, the CCRA

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passed a fresh order on 16.12.2022, again rejecting

the refund claim on the ground that the amended

six-month limitation governed the Appellants’ case.

3.8. Aggrieved by the CCRA’s stance, the

Appellants filed Writ Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024

before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,

urging, inter alia, that (i) the right to seek refund

accrued on the date of execution (17.03.2015), thus

invoking the unamended two-year window, and (ii)

the CCRA had no statutory power of review to recall

its initial order granting refund.

3.9. By the impugned judgment dated

18.04.2024, the High Court dismissed the writ

petition, holding, in essence, that the date of

registration (28.04.2015) triggered the Appellants’

claim, which fell under the amended provision

stipulating a six-month limitation. The High Court

further opined that, in the specific facts, the

CCRA’s recall could not be struck down solely on

the ground of no express power of review.

4. Aggrieved with the dismissal of their writ

petition, the Appellants have now approached this

Court by way of the present appeal.

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 6 of 20

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the

Appellants and the Respondents, the primary issue

for consideration before us is whether the amended

six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015

amendment to Section 48(1) of the Act governs the

Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund, particularly

when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the

amendment but registered thereafter.

6. Section 48(1) of the Act reads as follows:

“48. The application for relief under section 47

shall be made within the following period, that

is to say,—

(1) in the cases mentioned in clause (c)(5),

within [six months] of the date of the

instruments:

Provided that where an Agreement to

sale immovable property, on which stamp

duty is paid under Article 25 of the Schedule

I, is presented for registration under the

provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 and if

the seller refuses to deliver possession of the

immovable property which is the subject

matter of such agreement the application may

be made within two years of the date of the

Instrument [or where such agreement is

cancelled by a registered cancellation deed on

the grounds of, dispute regarding th e

premises concerned, inadequate finance,

financial dispute in terms of agreed

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 7 of 20

consideration, or afterwards found to be

illegal construction or suppression of any

other material fact, the application may be

made within two years from the date of such

registered cancellation deed.]”

Through the amendment on 24.04.2015, the

two-year period was curtailed to six months

from the date of registration of the

cancellation deed, thus altering the time

frame under which a party could claim a

refund.

7. The Appellants assert that, although the

Cancellation Deed was registered on 28.04.2015, it

was executed on 17.03.2015 — prior to the

amendment dated 24.04.2015, which curtailed the

time limit for seeking a refund from two years to six

months. They rely upon Section 47 of the

Registration Act, 1908, emphasizing that “a

registered document shall operate from the time from

which it would have commenced to operate if no

registration thereof had been required or made.” In

other words, the operative date for their right to seek

refund would be 17.03.2015, placing them under the

un-amended regime.

8. In our view, this contention carries substantial

weight. The High Court laid undue emphasis on the

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 8 of 20

registration date without fully appreciating that the

Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund arose the

moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed.

The legislative scheme governing the earlier proviso

to Section 48(1) of the Act, contemplated a broader

two-year window. Constricting that window

retroactively, merely because registration happened

post-amendment, unduly defeats a vested cause of

action.

9. Moreover, in M.P. Steel Corporation v.

Commissioner of Central Excise

1

, this Court has

held that amendment to provision as to limitation is

inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the

amendment has reduced the period earlier provided.

The relevant paras of this judgement have been

extracted hereunder:

“53. Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has

strongly contended before us that the present

appeal must attract the limitation period as on

the date of its filing. That being so, it is clear

that the present appeal having been filed

before Cestat only on 23-5-2003, it is Section

128 post amendment that would apply and

therefore the maximum period available to the

1

(2015)7 SCC 58

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 9 of 20

appellant would be 60 plus 30 days. Even if

time taken in the abortive proceedings is to be

excluded, the appeal filed will be out of time

being beyond the aforesaid period.

54. It is settled law that periods of limitation

are procedural in nature and would ordinarily

be applied retrospectively. This, however, is

subject to a rider. In New India Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976)

2 SCR 266] , this Court held : (SCC p. 844, para

5)

5. “On the plain language of Sections 110-A

and 110-F there should be no difficulty in

taking the view that the change in law was

merely a change of forum i.e. a change of

adjectival or procedural law and not of

substantive law. It is a well-established

proposition that such a change of law

operates retrospectively and the person has

to go to the new forum even if his cause of

action or right of action accrued prior to the

change of forum. He will have a vested right

of action but not a vested right of forum. If by

express words the new forum is made

available only to causes of action arising

after the creation of the forum, then the

retrospective operation of the law is taken

away. Otherwise, the general rule is to make

it retrospective.”

55. In answering a question which arose under

Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, this

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 10 of 20

Court held : (Shanti Misra case [(1975) 2 SCC

840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266] , SCC p. 846, para 7)

7. “… ‘(1) Time for the purpose of filing the

application under Section 110-A did not start

running before the constitution of the

tribunal. Time had started running for the

filing of the suit but before it had expired the

forum was changed. And for the purpose of

the changed forum, time could not be deemed

to have started running before a remedy of

going to the new forum is made available.

(2) Even though by and large the law of

limitation has been held to be a procedural

law, there are exceptions to this principle.

Generally the law of limitation which is in

vogue on the date of the commencement of

the action governs it. But there are certain

exceptions to this principle. The new law of

limitation providing a longer period cannot

revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly

extinguish a vested right of action by

providing for a shorter period of limitation.’”

56. This statement of the law was referred to

with approval in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v.

National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 333]

as follows : (SCC p. 337, para 7).

7. “It is true that the appellant earlier could

file an application even more than six months

after the expiry of the period of limitation, but

can this be treated to be a right which the

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 11 of 20

appellant had acquired. The answer is in the

negative. The claim to compensation which

the appellant was entitled to, by reason of

the accident was certainly enforceable as a

right. So far the period of limitation for

commencing a legal proceeding is concerned,

it is adjectival in nature, and has to be

governed by the new Act—subject to two

conditions. If under the repealing Act the

remedy suddenly stands barred as a result

of a shorter period of limitation, the same

cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise

the result will be to deprive the suitor of an

accrued right. The second exception is where

the new enactment leaves the claimant with

such a short period for commencing the legal

proceeding so as to make it unpractical for

him to avail of the remedy. This principle has

been followed by this Court in many cases

and by way of illustration we would like to

mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2

SCR 266] . The husband of the respondent in

that case died in an accident in 1966. A

period of two years was available to the

respondent for instituting a suit for recovery

of damages. In March 1967 the Claims

Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring

the jurisdiction of the civil court and

prescribed 60 days as the period of

limitation. The respondent filed the

application in July 1967. It was held that not

having filed a suit before March 1967 the

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 12 of 20

only remedy of the respondent was by way

of an application before the Tribunal. So far

the period of limitation was concerned, it

was observed that a new law of limitation

providing for a shorter period cannot

certainly extinguish a vested right of action.

In view of the change of the law it was held

that the application could be filed within a

reasonable time after the constitution of the

Tribunal; and, that the time of about four

months taken by the respondent in

approaching the Tribunal after its

constitution, could be held to be either

reasonable time or the delay of about two

months could be condoned under the proviso

to Section 110-A(3).”

Both these judgments were referred to and

followed in Union of India v. Harnam Singh

[(1993) 2 SCC 162 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 375 :

(1993) 24 ATC 92] , see para 12.

57. The aforesaid principle is also contained in

Section 30(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963:

30. “Provision for suits, etc., for which the

prescribed period is shorter than the period

prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act,

1908.—Notwithstanding anything contained

in this Act—

(a) any suit for which the period of limitation

is shorter than the period of limitation

prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act,

1908, may be instituted within a period of

seven years next after the commencement of

this Act or within the period prescribed for

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 13 of 20

such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,

whichever period expires earlier:”

58. The reason for the said principle is not far

to seek. Though periods of limitation, being

procedural law, are to be applied

retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of

limitation is provided by a later amendment to

a statute, such period would render the vested

right of action contained in the statute nugatory

as such right of action would now become time-

barred under the amended provision.”

10. Even if one were to hold that the Appellants’

claim is examined under the amended six-month

period, we are of the considered opinion that a mere

technical delay should not, by itself, extinguish an

otherwise valid claim. The scheme of stamp duty

refund provisions is designed to ensure fairness

when the underlying transaction is rescinded for

bona fide reasons. The Appellants were compelled to

cancel the purchase due to the developer’s inability

to deliver timely possession, and were in no way

remiss or at fault.

11. Denying a legitimate refund solely on technical

grounds of limitation, especially when the timing of

registration fell close to the legislative amendment,

fails to strike the equitable balance ordinarily

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 14 of 20

expected in fiscal or quasi-judicial determinations. A

measure of discretion or consideration for good faith

conduct is not alien to statutory processes that

safeguard citizens from unjust enrichment by the

State. It has been laid down by this Court in Bano

Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue

Authority & Inspector General of Registration &

Controller of Stamps

2

that the limitation provision

in stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should

not be enforced so as to oust the remedy when the

applicant is otherwise not blameworthy. The relevant

paras of the same have been reproduced hereunder:

“14. In Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech

Private Limited3, wherein the issue of refund of

stamp duty under the same Act was in

question, this Court has observed and held

inter alia as under:

“29. This case reminds us of the

observations made by M.C. Chagla, C.J. in

Firm Kaluram Sitaram v. Dominion of India

[1953 SCC OnLine Bom 39: AIR 1954 Bom

50]. The learned Chief Justice in his

distinctive style of writing observed as

under in para 19: (Firm Kaluram case, SCC

OnLine Bom)

2

2024 SCC OnLine SC 979

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 15 of 20

“19. … we have often had occasion to say that

when the State deals with a citizen it should

not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and if the

State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is

a just one, even though legal defences may be

open to it, it must act, as has been said by

eminent Judges, as an honest person.”

We are in respectful agreement with the

aforementioned observations, as in our

considered opinion these observations apply

fully to the case in hand against the State

because except the plea of limitation, the State

has no case to defend their action.

Xxxxxxxxx

32. In our considered opinion, even if we find

that applications for claiming refund of stamp

duty amount were rightly dismissed by the

SDM on the ground of limitation prescribed

under Section 50 of the Act yet keeping in view

the settled principle of law that the expiry of

period of limitation prescribed under any law

may bar the remedy but not the right, the

applicants are still held entitled to claim the

refund of stamp duty amount on the basis of

the grounds mentioned above. In other words,

notwithstanding dismissal of the applications

on the ground of limitation, we are of the view

that the applicants are entitled to claim the

refund of stamp duty amount from the State in

the light of the grounds mentioned above.”

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 16 of 20

15. The legal position is thus settled in Libra

Buildtech (supra) that when the State deals

with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on

technicalities, even though such defences may

be open to it.

16. We draw weight from the aforesaid

judgment and are of the opinion that the case

of the appellant is fit for refund of stamp duty

in so far as it is settled law that the period of

expiry of limitation prescribed under any law

may bar the remedy but not the right and the

appellant is held entitled to claim the refund of

stamp duty amount on the basis of the fact that

the appellant has been pursuing her case as

per remedies available to her in law and she

should not be denied the said refund merely on

technicalities as the case of the appellant is a

just one wherein she had in bonafide paid the

stamp duty for registration but fraud was

played on her by the Vendor which led to the

cancellation of the conveyance deed.”

12. We also find merit in the Appellants’ submission

that the CCRA, having once granted a refund by its

order dated 08.01.2018, lacked any express statutory

power to review or recall that decision. A quasi-

judicial authority can only exercise such powers as

the statute confers. There is no provision in the Act

enabling the CCRA to sit in review of its own orders.

In the absence of any enabling clause, the

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 17 of 20

subsequent orders dated 03.03.2018, 16.04.2019,

and ultimately 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier

sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained solely

because the Appellants participated in the

proceedings.

13. We are unable to concur with the High Court’s

reasoning that the Appellants “submitted

themselves” to the authority’s review process or

somehow acquiesced in the second decision.

Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver.

The law does not permit a statutory functionary to

assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of

how the parties engage in subsequent litigation.

Hence, we see clear infirmity in the High Court’s

endorsement of the CCRA’s review-like exercise.

14. In light of the above, the findings recorded by

the High Court in the impugned judgment warrant

interference. The High Court’s focus on the date of

registration as determinative of the applicable legal

regime under Section 48(1) of the Act overlooks the

accrued right crystallizing at the time of execution of

the Cancellation Deed. Further, its refusal to disturb

the recall of the earlier refund order, despite

acknowledging the absence of statutory review

power, is difficult to sustain. Participation in an

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 18 of 20

erroneous procedure cannot, in our considered view,

confer review jurisdiction upon the CCRA where none

exists in law.

15. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that

the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of the un-

amended proviso of Section 48(1) of the Act. Their

refund application, therefore, cannot be repelled as

time-barred merely because the deed’s registration

was post-amendment. Equally, the subsequent

orders recalling the already sanctioned refund stand

vitiated, given the CCRA’s lack of statutory mandate

to review its own final orders.

16. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the

Appellants’ claim for refund falls under the un-

amended proviso to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra

Stamp Act, 1958. Consequently, the impugned

judgment dated 18.04.2024 of the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay, in W.P. No. 2018 of 2024, is

hereby set aside and the writ petition stands allowed.

17. The subsequent orders of the Chief Controlling

Revenue Authority (CCRA) recalling the earlier

sanction of refund, including the Order dated

16.12.2022, are accordingly quashed. The Order

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 19 of 20

dated 08.01.2018, which allowed the Appellants’

refund, shall stand restored.

18. The appellant had applied for refund of the

stamp duty on 6

th August, 2016. The same had been

allowed by the CCRA vide order dated 08.01.2018.

Instead of refunding the amount, the CCRA, by a

subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 illegally recalled

its earlier decision of 08.01.2018 and rejected the

request for refund. We have already held above that

the subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 was vitiated

in law and secondly that the appellant was entitled to

refund. In such circumstances, we find that the

amount of Rs.27,34,500/- had been wrongly retained

by the State from 08.01.2018 for almost seven years.

As such, we are of the view that the appellant would

be entitled to simple interest @ 6 per cent per annum

on the above amount from the date of the first order

of CCRA dated 08.01.2018 till the date it is paid.

19. The Respondents are directed to process and

disburse the refund of stamp duty, already paid by

the Appellants along with accrued interest as

directed above within a period of four weeks from

today, in accordance with law. Any further delay will

entail further interest component @ 12% p.a.

CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C)No.21778 OF 2024 Page 20 of 20

20. The appeal stands allowed.

21. There shall be no order as to costs.

21. Pending applications, if any, shall stand

disposed of.

…………………………………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH)

…………………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL )

…………………………………………J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA )

NEW DELHI

JANUARY 24, 2025