[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 612/2021

Rajendra Kumar S/o Shri Rohitashav Gurjar, Aged About 34

Years, R/o Village Kalata, Post Babai, Tehsil Khetri, District

Jhunjhunu (Rajasthan).

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

2. Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur

----Respondents

Connected With

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 613/2021

Arjun Lal S/o Shri Gyarsi Lal, Aged About 49 Years, Resident Of

Village And Post Rajgarh, Via Sardhana, Tehsil Nasirabad, District

Ajmer (Rajasthan).

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur

----Respondents

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 614/2021

Hardeep Singh Choudhary S/o Shri Kishan Lal Choudhary, Aged

About 33 Years, Resident Of Village Kalayanpura, Post Sewa,

Tehsil Mouzmabad, District Jaipur (Rajasthan).

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

2. Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur

----Respondents

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 615/2021

Sunil Kumar Dangi, S/o Shri Ranveer Siwan Dangi, Aged About

31 Years, Resident Of Village And Post Narhar, Tehsil - Chirawa,

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District Jhunjhunu (Rajasthan).

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan).

2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur.

----Respondents

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 616/2021

Phool Chand S/o Shri Jayram Prajapat, Aged About 63 Years,

Resident Of Ganesh Nagar, Tekari, Tara Grah Road, Behind Kanak

House, Ajmer (Rajasthan)

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur, Rajasthan, Jaipur.

----Respondents

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 617/2021

Mukesh Kumar S/o Shri Rohitash, Aged About 30 Years, Resident

Of Village Rajora Post Mandri Tehsil Khetri, District Jhunjhunu,

(Rajasthan).

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan).

2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur.

----Respondents

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 618/2021

Gopal Lal Sharma S/o Shri Ram Ji Lal Sharma, Aged About 33

Years, Resident Of Village And Post Rajpura Tehsil Malpura

District Tonk (Rajasthan)

----Appellant

Versus

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,

Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

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2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur

----Respondents

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pradeep Kumar

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bhuwnesh Sharma, AAG assisted

by Mr. Vishnu Dutt Sharma,

Mr. Siddharth Sharma, AGC and

Mr. Shivam Chauhan, AGC

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA

Order

1.Date of conclusion of Arguments 03.02.2026

2.Date on which the judgment was reserved 03.02.2026

3.Whether the full judgment or only operative

part is pronounced

Full

4.Date of pronouncement 27.02.2026

Per, Ravi Chirania, J:-

1.These writ petitions are decided by this common order, as the

facts and issues involved in these writ petitions are common. For

convenience, the facts are taken from Special Appeal Writ No.

612/2021.

2.The present appeals have been filed by the appellants-petitioners

(hereinafter referred to as 'petitioners' for short) whereby they have

challenged the judgment dated 18.05.2021 passed by the learned

Single Judge, by which their writ petitions i.e. S.B. Civil Writ Petition

Nos. 5600/2021, 5573/2021, 5576/2021, 5601/2021, 5602/2021,

5603/2021, 5604/2021, 5605/2021, 5606/2021 & 5608/2021 were

dismissed.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Disciplinary

Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have not considered the

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preliminary report and the other evidence on record, which is sufficient

to show that, in the entire incident, none of the petitioners herein were

responsible in any manner and further there was no intentional

negligence or dereliction of duties on their part. Learned counsel further

submitted that the Enquiry Officer also did not consider the complete

facts and found the charges proved and by considering the same, the

Disciplinary Authority punished them with the stoppage of annual grade

increment with cumulative effect as mentioned in the punishment order

dated 04.04.2018.

4.Learned counsel submitted that against the punishment order

dated 04.04.2018, the petitioners filed the Departmental appeal under

Rule 30A of the CCA Rules, 1958 along-with other similarly situated

persons namely Anil Kumar Pandey, Phool Chand & Dharmesh Dayma

etc. The charges against all the delinquent employees including the

petitioners herein were almost same, in respect of the same incident,

the Enquiry Officer also found the charges to be proved against all and

passed the order of punishment, however, the Appellate Authority

dismissed the departmental appeals filed by the petitioners herein and

the punishment order was maintained. However, in the case of the other

similarly situated persons namely Anil Kumar Pandey, Dharmesh Dayma

& Shambu Singh, different yardsticks were followed and their appeals

were allowed and were exonerated from all the charges.

5.Learned counsel further submitted that except the Commando

Shakti Singh, not before the Court, all police persons who were inside

the police van were carrying the criminal Anand Pal Singh, had no idea

about his (Commando Shakti Singh's) involvement with the criminal in

van and his associated groups. Despite seriousness of the charges as

levelled against all the persons, the specific findings of the Enquiry

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Officer and the after consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while

passing the punishment order, the Appellate Authority exonerated the

above three persons while maintaining the punishment order in respect

of all the petitioners herein.

6.Learned counsel further submitted that the punishment as

imposed by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be interfered with by the

Appellant Authority until and unless there are reasons to do so and the

same are required to be recorded while quashing the punishment order.

The complete findings as recorded by the Appellate Authority are illegal,

arbitrary and a classic case of applying different yardsticks in the case

of employees having the same charges in respect of the same incident.

7.Learned counsel further submitted that against the order of the

Appellant Authority of dismissing the departmental appeal, the

petitioners filed the writ petitions before the learned Single Judge,

which were dismissed in limine by order dated 18.05.2021. The learned

Single Judge by considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. P. Gunasekaran

1

and

Industrial Security Force & Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali

2

, dismissed the writ

petitions on the ground that the above settled law does not permit

interference in the departmental proceedings and that the Courts

cannot substitute a punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the

Court.

8.Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge

while dismissing the writ petitions in limine failed to consider the fact

that the similarly situated persons namely Anil Kumar Pandey,

Dharmesh Dayma & Shambu Singh were exonerated by allowing their

departmental appeals, whereas the petitioners herein have been

1 (2015) 2 SCC 610 &

2 (2017) 4 SCC 507

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punished by maintaining the punishment order. The order passed by the

learned Single Judge suffers from the infirmity that the impugned

punishment order was upheld without proper consideration of the

complete facts and circumstances of the case. The impugned order is

unreasonable as there is no consideration of the issue of exoneration of

the similarly situated persons on the similar charges based on the same

facts. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has committed a serious

mistake in law while dismissing the writ petitions.

9.In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the

following judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are

as under:-

1.Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Ashok Kumar Arora

3

.

2.Allahabad Bank Vs. Krihna Narayan Tewari

4

.

3.Rakesh Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P.

5

.

4.Amarendra Kumar Pandey Vs. Union of India

6

.

5.Union of India & Anr. Vs. P. Gunasekaran

7

.

6.State of Andra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao

8

.

9.1.In the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd v Ashok Kumar Arora

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principle governing

the scope of judicial review in the departmental proceedings. The Court

held that the High Court’s jurisdiction in such matters is not that of an

appellant authority but is strictly circumscribed. The relevant para 20 of

the judgment is reproduced as under:-

3. (1997) 3 SCC 72

4. (2017) 2 SCC 308

5. 2019 SCC OnLine All 4004

6. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 881

7. (2015) 2 SCC 610

8. 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6

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20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the

High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and

the findings recorded therein does not exercise the

powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of

the High Court in such cases is very limited for

instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is

vitiated because of non-observance of principles of

natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity;

findings are based on no evidence, and/or the

punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved

misconduct of an employee. There is a catena of

judgments of this Court which had settled the law on

this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these

decisions. Suffice it to refer to a few decisions of this

Court on this topic viz. State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama

Rao, State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, Corpn. of the

City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra and Nelson Motis v.

Union of India.

9.2.In the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while a writ court is

justified in interfering with disciplinary proceedings where findings are

based on “no evidence” or appellant authority fails to apply its mind

independently, it may, instead of remanding the matter, modify the

relief by granting only partial back wages (50%) where a remand would

be harsh due to the employee’s superannuation and poor health. The

relevant paras of the judgment is reproduced as under: -

7. We have given our anxious consideration to the

submissions at the Bar. It is true that a writ court is very

slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by

a departmental authority on the basis of evidence

available on record. But it is equally true that in a case

where the disciplinary authority records a finding that is

unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding

which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the

writ court would be justified if not duty-bound to

examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases.

The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary

enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent

authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was vitiated

on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as

is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-

application of mind by the enquiry officer or the

disciplinary authority, non-recording of reasons in

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support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also

grounds on which the writ courts are justified in

interfering with the orders of punishment. The High

Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities

in the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the

appellate authority. The respondent's case that the

enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and

reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defence

has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More

importantly the disciplinary authority does not appear to

have properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded

reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to

injury the appellate authority instead of recording its

own reasons and independently appreciating the material

on record, simply reproduced the findings of the

disciplinary authority. All told, the enquiry officer, the

disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have

faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in

miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view

right in interfering with the orders passed by the

disciplinary authority and the appellate authority.

8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases

where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient,

either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course

always is to remand the matter back to the authority

concerned to redo the same afresh. That course could

have been followed even in the present case. The matter

could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or

to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh

report and order. But that course may not have been the

only course open in a given situation. There may be

situations where because of a long time-lag or such

other supervening circumstances the writ court considers

it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a

fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority.

That is precisely what the High Court has done in the

case at hand.

9.3. The Allahabad High Court in Rakesh Kumar Pandey v State of

U.P. reported in (2019) SCC OnLine All 4004 decided on 20.02.2019,

held that a disciplinary enquiry completed prior to the to the expiry of

the 15-day period granted delinquent employee to submit his reply to

charge sheet is in clear violation of Rule 794) of the Uttar Pradesh

Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1999 and principal of

natural justice, rendering the enquiry report unsustainable and

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consequently the punishment order based on such report, along with an

unreasoned appellant order affirming it, are liable to be quashed.

Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment Rakesh Kumar Pandey (supra)

are reproduced as under: -

5. The scope of judicial review with respect to the

departmental proceedings is limited.

6. This Court under its power conferred by Article 226

of Constitution of India, can interfere in the matter of

disciplinary proceedings if the disciplinary/enquiry

proceedings were conducted in violation of manner

prescribed and against Principle of Natural Justice and if

the order of concerned authority is non speaking and

unreasoned. This Court can interfere in the matter of

disciplinary proceedings if the decision making process

is in violation of Rules or against Principle of Natural

Justice. The judicial review in the matter of

departmental proceedings is permissible with respect to

decision making process and not against the decision

itself unless it is shown that the decision is without any

evidence or suffers from malafide or malice or harsh or

without jurisdiction.

7. In the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar

Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

held as under:-

"At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High

Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the

findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers

of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High

Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it

is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of

non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of

reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no

evidence, and/or the punishment is totally

disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an

employee. There is a catena of judgments of this Court

which had settled the law on this topic and it is not

necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to

refer to a few decisions of this Court on this topic viz.

State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723:

(1964) 2 LLJ 150], State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao

[(1975) 2 SCC 557: 1975 SCC (L&S) 349: (1976) 1

SCR 521], Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra

[(1981) 2 SCC 714: 1981 SCC (L&S) 455: (1981) 3

SCR 22] and Nelson Motis v. Union of India [(1992) 4

SCC 711: 1993 SCC (L&S) 13: (1993) 23 ATC 382: AIR

1992 SC 1981]".

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8. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (2003) 3

SCC 583 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as

under:-

"17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution the High Court does not act as an

appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by

limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or

procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or

violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review

is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an

appellate authority.

18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC

749: 1996 SCC (L&S) 80: (1996) 32 ATC 44] the scope

of judicial review was indicated by stating that review

by the court is of decision-making process and where

the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on

some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot

reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own

finding.

19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab [(1999)

8 SCC 90: 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424] in paras 16 and 17

the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be

exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted

as follows: (SCC p. 96)

"16. Before adverting to the first contention of the

appellant regarding want of material to establish the

charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to

bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising

writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the

inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence

adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some

evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the

inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to

review the evidence and to arrive at its own

independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole

judge of the fact so long as there is some legal

evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy

or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can

be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ

proceedings.

17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the

inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen

from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has

based its conclusions on materials available on record

after considering the defence put forth by the appellant

and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in

a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion

arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed

as either being perverse or not based on any material

nor is it a case where there has been any non-

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application of mind on the part of the inquiring

authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the

material based on which the enquiry officer has come to

the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it

under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find

any fault with the findings of the High Court in this

regard."

9. In the case of Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan

Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 the Hon'ble Supreme Court

has held as under:-

"7. We have given our anxious consideration to the

submissions at the Bar. It is true that a writ court is

very slow in interfering with the findings of facts

recorded by a departmental authority on the basis of

evidence available on record. But it is equally true that

in a case where the disciplinary authority records a

finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever

or a finding which no reasonable person could have

arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty-

bound to examine the matter and grant relief in

appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere

with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed

by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry

itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of

natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the

present case. Non-application of mind by the enquiry

officer or the disciplinary authority, non-recording of

reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them

are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified

in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High

Court has, in the case at hand, found all these

infirmities in the order passed by the disciplinary

authority and the appellate authority. The respondent's

case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a

fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in

defence has not been effectively rebutted by the

appellant. More importantly the disciplinary authority

does not appear to have properly appreciated the

evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his

conclusion. To add insult to injury the appellate

authority instead of recording its own reasons and

independently appreciating the material on record,

simply reproduced the findings of the disciplinary

authority. All told, the enquiry officer, the disciplinary

authority and the appellate authority have faltered in

the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of

justice. The High Court was in that view right in

interfering with the orders passed by the disciplinary

authority and the appellate authority."

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9.4.In the case of Amarendra Kumar Pandey Vs. Union of India

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the scope of judicial

review where disciplinary action is based on the subjective satisfaction

of the authority, particularly in the context of discharge from service on

the ground of securing four red ink entries. The Court held that while

the opinion of the authority is ordinarily conclusive if the prescribed

procedure is followed and the authority acts bona fide, such action is

nonetheless subject to judicial review on limited grounds, including

examination of the existence of facts forming the basis of the opinion,

the nexus between those facts and the purpose of the power, and

whether the finding is based on no evidence or is perverse. The relevant

para of the judgment is reproduced as under: -

32. Where an Act or the statutory rules framed

thereunder left an action dependent upon the opinion of

the authority concerned, by some such expression as 'is

satisfied' or 'is of the opinion' or 'if it has reason to

believe' or 'if it considered necessary', the opinion of the

authority is conclusive,

(a) if the procedure prescribed by the Act or rules for

formation of the opinion was duly followed,

(b) if the authority acted bona fide,

(c) if the authority itself formed the opinion and did

not borrow the opinion of somebody else and

(d) if the authority did not proceed on a fundamental

misconception of the law and the matter in regard to

which the opinion had to be formed.

33. The action based on the subjective opinion or

satisfaction, in our opinion, can judicially be reviewed first

to find out the existence of the facts or circumstances on

the basis of which the authority is alleged to have formed

the opinion. It is true that ordinarily the court should not

inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts

found except in a case where it is alleged that the facts

which have been found existing were not supported by

any evidence at all or that the finding in regard to

circumstances or material is so perverse that no

reasonable man would say that the facts and

circumstances exist. The courts will not readily defer to

the conclusiveness of the authority's opinion as to the

existence of matter of law or fact upon which the validity

of the exercise of the power is predicated.

34. The doctrine of reasonableness thus may be invoked.

Where there are no reasonable grounds for the formation

of the authority's opinion, judicial review in such a case is

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permissible. [See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Head,

[1959] A.C. 83 (Lord Denning).

35. When we say that where the circumstances or

material or state of affairs does not at all exist to form an

opinion and the action based on such opinion can be

quashed by the courts, we mean that in effect there is no

evidence whatsoever to form or support the opinion. The

distinction between insufficiency or inadequacy of

evidence and no evidence must of course be borne in

mind. A finding based on no evidence as opposed to a

finding which is merely against the weight of the evidence

is an abuse of the power which courts naturally are loath

to tolerate. Whether or not there is evidence to support a

particular decision has always been considered as a

question of law. [See Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison,

Armah, Ex Parte, [1966] 3 WLR 828 at p. 841].

36. It is in such a case that it is said that the authority

would be deemed to have not applied its mind or it did

not honestly form its opinion. The same conclusion is

drawn when opinion is based on irrelevant matter. [See

Rasbihari v. State of Orissa, (1969) 1 SCC 414: AIR 1969

SC 1081].

37. In Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, (1969) 1

SCC 325 AIR 1969 SC 707, it was held that the existence

of circumstances is a condition precedent to form an

opinion by the Government. The same view was earlier

expressed in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law

Board, AIR 1967 SC 295.

38. Secondly, the court can inquire whether the facts and

circumstances so found to exist have a reasonable nexus

with the purpose for which the power is to be exercised.

In other words, if an inference from facts does not

logically accord with and flow from them, the Courts can

interfere treating them as an error of law. [See Bean v.

Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, (1944) 2 All ER 279 at

p. 284]. Thus, this Court can see whether on the basis of

the facts and circumstances found, any reasonable man

can say that an opinion as is formed can be formed by a

reasonable man. That would be a question of law to be

determined by the Court. [See Farmer v. Cotton's

Trustees, [1915] A.C. 922]. Their Lordships observed:

".....in my humble judgment where all the material

facts are fully found, and the only question is whether the

facts are such as to bring the case within the provisions

properly construed of some statutory enactment, the

question is one of law only."

[See also Muthu Gounder v. Government of Madras,

(1969) 82 Mad LW 1].

39. Thirdly, this Court can interfere if the constitutional or

statutory term essential for the exercise of the power has

either been misapplied or misinterpreted. The Courts have

always equated the jurisdictional review with the review

for error of law and have shown their readiness to quash

an order if the meaning of the constitutional or statutory

term has been misconstrued or misapplied. [See Iveagh

(Earl of) v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt., [1962] 2

Q.B. 147; Iveagh (Earl of) v. Minister of Housing and

Local Govt. (1964) 1 AB 395].

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40. Fourthly, it is permissible to interfere in a case where

the power is exercised for improper purpose. If a power

granted for one purpose is exercised for a different

purpose, then it will be deemed that the power has not

been validly exercised. If the power in this case is found

to have not been exercised genuinely for the purpose of

taking immediate action but has been used only to avoid

embarrassment or wreck personal vengeance, then the

power will be deemed to have been exercised improperly.

[See Natesa Asari v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 481].

41. Fifthly, the grounds which are relevant for the purpose

for which the power can be exercised have not been

considered or grounds which are not relevant and yet are

considered and an order is based on such grounds, then

the order can be attacked as invalid and illegal. In this

connection, reference may be made to Ram Manohar

Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740; Dwarka Das

Bhatia v. State of J. and K., AIR 1957 SC 164 and Moti Lal

Jain v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1509. On the same

principle, the administrative action will be invalidated if it

can be established that the authority was satisfied on the

wrong question: [See Maradana Mosque Trustees v

Mahumud [1967] 1 A.C. 13].

9.5.In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. P. Gunasekaran

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the limits of judicial

review available to High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution in matters relating to departmental disciplinary

proceedings. The Court held that the High Court cannot act as an

appellate authority in disciplinary matters and must refrain from re -

appreciating evidence or interfering with conclusions recorded in a duly

conducted enquiry. The relevant principles and the scope of interference

were succinctly laid down in the following paragraphs: -

12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully

disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an

appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-

appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry

officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the

disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the

Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary

proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a

second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise

of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution

of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the

evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority:

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure

prescribed in that behalf;

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(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice

in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from

reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations

extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly

arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person

could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to

admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted

inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding:

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,

the High Court shall not:

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case

the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which

findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may

appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it

shocks its conscience.

14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S.

Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have

been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR

pp. 1726-27, para 7)

"7. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding

under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of

appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is

concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by

an authority competent in that behalf, and according to

the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether

the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where

there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted

with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and

which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion

that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is

not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ

under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive

at an independent finding on the evidence. The High

Court may undoubtedly interfere where the

departmental authorities have held the proceedings

against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with

the rules of natural justice or in violation of the

statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or

where the authorities have disabled themselves from

reaching a fair decision by some considerations

extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (16 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant

considerations or where the conclusion on the very face

of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

reasonable person could ever have arrived at that

conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental

authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly

held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal

evidence on which their findings can be based, the

adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter

which can be permitted to be canvassed before the

High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226

of the Constitution."

15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, the

principles have been further discussed at paras 21-24,

which read as follows: (SCC pp. 561-63)

"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with

departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.

Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State

of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant

for the view that in considering whether a public officer

is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule

followed in criminal trials that an offence is not

established unless proved by evidence beyond

reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must

be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic

tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to

declare the order of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a

court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of

the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against

a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine

whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent

in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed

in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice

are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence

which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the

enquiry has accepted and which evidence may

reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent

officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of

the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at

an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court

may interfere where the departmental authorities have

held the proceedings against the delinquent in a

manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or

in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode

of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled

themselves from reaching a fair decision by some

considerations extraneous to the evidence and the

merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the

conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary

and capricious that no reasonable person could ever

have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental

authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly

held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (17 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

evidence on which their findings can be based, the

adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter

which can be permitted to be canvassed before the

High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh

said that the High Court does not interfere with the

conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the

finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be

said that no reasonable person could have reached such

a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that

the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with

the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge

that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the

shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on

31-5-1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee

felt that the evidence of two persons that the

respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them

to close down their compressor could not be accepted

at its face value. The General Manager did not agree

with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General

Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it

was open to the General Manager to do so and he was

not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee.

This Court held that the conclusion reached by the

disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court

should not have interfered with the conclusion.

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under

Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court

exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of

fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result

of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or

questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is

apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by

a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may

appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by

a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in

recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously

refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or

had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which

has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding

of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded

as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of

certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal

cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant

and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is

insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The

adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and

the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding

are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

(See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.)

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the

entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The

High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the

aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of

fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (18 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

adequate, the evidence in the present case which was

considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the

High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no

evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal

that the respondent did not make the journey. The

Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not

possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable

person could have arrived at these conclusions. The

High a Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the

evidence and then rejected the evidence as no

evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in

exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should

not do."

9.6.In the case of State of Andra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao

(supra), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the

foundational principles governing the scope of judicial review by High

Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters related to

departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that the High

Court does not sit as a court of appeal over the decisions of

departmental authorities and cannot reappreciate the evidence or

interfere with findings of fact recorded in a duly conducted enquiry. The

scope of interference is limited to cases involving violation of natural

justice, procedural irregularity, extraneous considerations, or findings

that are perverse or based on no evidence. The relevant para of the

said judgment are reproduced as under: -

7. There is no warrant for the view expressed by the

High Court that in considering whether a public officer is

guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule

followed in criminal trials that an offence is not

established unless proved by evidence beyond

reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must

be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court

in a petition I... under Article 226 of the Constitution is

competent to declare the order of the authorities holding

a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not

constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the

Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the

authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a

public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the

enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf,

and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (19 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.

Where there is some evidence, which the authority

entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted

and which evidence may reasonably support the

conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the

charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a

petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the

evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the

evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere

where the departmental authorities have held the

proceedings against the delinquent in a manner

inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in

violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of

enquiry or where the authorities have disabled

themselves from reaching a fair decision by some

considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits

of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by

irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the

very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that

no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that

conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental

authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held,

the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal

evidence on which their findings can be based, the

adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter

which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High

Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the

Constitution.

10.Learned counsel, in view of the submissions and the above cited

judgments, prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the

impugned order dated 18.05.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge,

the punishment order dated 04.04.2018 and dismissal of the

departmental appeal by order dated 16.10.2020 be quashed and set

aside.

11.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed

the submissions and argued that the wisdom of the Disciplinary

Authority as well as the Appellate Authority cannot be questioned by the

Courts in exercise of judicial powers in terms of law as settled by the

Supreme Court, and therefore, the learned Single Judge has not

committed any mistake while dismissing the writ petition by judgment

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (20 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

dated 18.05.2021. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners

herein have to stand on their own legs and they cannot claim any relief

by citing the order of the Appellate Authority as passed in the case of

Anil Kumar Pandey, Dharmesh Dayma & Shambu Singh.

12.In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the

following judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are

as under:-

1.Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and

Ors. Vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey

9

.

2.Union of India and Ors. Vs. Dalbir Singh

10

.

3.State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Rajit Singh

11

.

12.1. In the case of Director General of Police, Railway

Protection Force and Ors. Vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey , the Hon’ble

Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principles governing the

scope of judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of

the Constitution in matters arising from departmental/disciplinary

proceedings. The Court held that the High Court must not act as an

appellate authority and reappreciate evidence led before the enquiry

officer, and can interfere only on limited grounds such as violation of

natural justice, findings based on no evidence, or perversity. The

relevant principles were enunciated in the following paragraphs: -

21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by

the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with

respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that

the High Court must not act as an appellate authority,

and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry

officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this

Court with respect to interference by the High Courts

9 (2021) 14 SCC 735

10 (2021) 11 SCC 321

11 (2022) 15 SCC 254

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with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public

servant.

21.2. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao:

AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three judge bench of this Court

held that the High Court Under Article 226 of the

Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of

the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a

public servant. It is not the function of the High Court

under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and

arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The

High Court may, however interfere where the

departmental authority which has held the proceedings

against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the

principles of natural justice, where the findings are based

on no evidence, which may reasonably support the

conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the

charge, or in violation of the statutory Rules prescribing

the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by

some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair

decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by

irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the

very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that

no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that

conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the

departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if

there is some legal evidence on which the findings can

be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is

not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed

before the High Court in a writ petition.

21.3. These principles were further reiterated in the

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao: (1975) 2

SCC 557. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari

Under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court

exercises the power not as an appellate court. The

findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on

the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or

questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is

apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a

writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may

be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording

the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused

to admit admissible and material evidence, or had

erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of

fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the

ground that the material evidence adduced before the

tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding.

The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point,

and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said

finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

tribunal.

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21.4. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including

Union of India v. G. Ganayutham: (1997) 7 SCC 463,

Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu: (2003) 4 SCC 331,

Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board

v. T.T. Murali: (2014) 4 SCC 108, Union of India v.

Manab Kumar Guha: (2011) 11 SCC 535, these

principles have been consistently followed.

21.5. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the

State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court

has summed up the law in following words: (SCC para

37)

" 37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary

matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first

embodies a Rule of restraint. The second defines when

interference is permissible. The rule of restraint

constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid

reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has

been committed lies primarily within the domain of the

disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the

mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge

wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of

fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the

idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the

efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries

have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are

not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to

judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not

the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of

proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard

governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the

rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches

based on context and subject. The first end of the

spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy -

deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as

a fact-finding authority and autonomy of the employer in

maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At

the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the

court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings

in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they

suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital

evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a

perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an

entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service

jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing

for the authority of the court to interfere when the

finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight

of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in

maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these

two shores which have been termed as the two ends of

the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation

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of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial

review. To determine whether the finding in a

disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial

or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to

satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some

evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to

guard against perversity. But this does not allow the

court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a

disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears

to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would

offend the first principle which has been outlined above.

The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common

sense without which the judges' craft is in vain."

21.6. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court

held that the High Court in exercise of its power Under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not

venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High

Court would determine whether:

"(a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure

prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice

in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from

reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which

are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly

arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could

ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to

admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted

inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence."

21.7. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held

that: (P. GunasekRn case, SCC p. 617)

"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of

India, the High Court shall not:

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in

the case the same has been conducted in accordance

with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on

which findings can be based;

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may

appear to be;

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (24 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment

unless it shocks its conscience."

12.2. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Dalbir Singh ,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principles

governing the scope of judicial review by High Courts under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in matters arising from

departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that the

High Court must not act as an appellate authority and

reappreciate evidence led before the enquiry officer, and can

interfere only on limited grounds such as violation of natural

justice, findings based on no evidence, or perversity. The relevant

paragraphs are reproduces as under: -

16. We find that the High Court has exceeded its

jurisdiction while exercising the power of judicial review

over the orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings

which were conducted while adhering to the principles of

natural justice.

21. This Court in Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran

(2015) 2 SCC 610 had laid down the broad parameters for

the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. The Court

held as under:

"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully

disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an

appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,

reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry

officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the

disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central

Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the

High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first

appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers Under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not

venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court

can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure

prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in

conducting the proceedings;

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (25 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching

a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the

evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly

arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could

ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to

admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted

inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the

High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the

same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which

findings can be based;

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear

to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it

shocks its conscience.

29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is

not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the

criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The

delinquent such as the writ Petitioner could examine

himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including use

of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ

petitioner is upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made

to the Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has

stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he

was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore,

a false case has been made against him. His further stand

is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on

the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have been

even suggested about any terrorist attack or that the writ

Petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra had

immobilized the writ Petitioner whereas all other witnesses

have seen the writ Petitioner being immobilized and being

removed to quarter guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh

deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle

(S.L.R.) of the writ Petitioner in their possession.

Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated

25.2.2013 that the writ Petitioner has fired from the official

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weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental

Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It

is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant

interference by the High Court in exercise of power of

judicial review. It is not the case of the writ Petitioner that

there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the

violation of the principles of natural justice. The best

available evidence had been produced by the appellants in

the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.

12.3. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Rajit Singh ,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined two crucial aspects of

departmental proceedings: (i) whether the "doctrine of equality"

can be invoked to set aside a punishment on the ground that co-

delinquents were exonerated, and (ii) what is the proper remedy

when a disciplinary enquiry is found to be vitiated due to violation

of principles of natural justice. The Court held that the doctrine of

equality cannot be applied in such a manner, and that where an

enquiry is vitiated, the matter must be remanded to the

disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of violation,

rather than reinstating the employee. The relevant paragraphs of

the judgment are as under: -

10. Now, so far as the quashing and setting aside the

order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary

Authority applying the Doctrine of Equality on the

ground that other officers involved in the incident have

been exonerated and/or no action has been taken

against them, is concerned, we are of the firm view

that on the aforesaid ground, the order of punishment

could not have been set aside by the Tribunal and the

High court. The Doctrine of Equality ought not to have

been applied when the Enquiry Officer and the

Disciplinary Authority held the charges proved against

the delinquent officer. The role of the each individual

officer even with respect to the same misconduct is

required to be considered in light of their duties of

office. Even otherwise, merely because some other

officers involved in the incident are exonerated and/or

no action is taken against other officers cannot be a

ground to set aside the order of punishment when the

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charges against the individual concerned - delinquent

officer are held to be proved in a departmental

enquiry. There cannot be any claim of negative

equality in such cases. Therefore, both the Tribunal as

well as the High Court have committed a grave error

in quashing and setting aside the order of punishment

imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by applying the

Doctrine of Equality.

11. It appears from the order passed by the Tribunal

that the Tribunal also observed that the enquiry

proceedings were against the principles of natural

justice inasmuch as the documents mentioned in the

charge sheet were not at all supplied to the delinquent

officer. As per the settled proposition of law, in a case

where it is found that the enquiry is not conducted

properly and/or the same is in violation of the

principles of natural justice, in that case, the Court

cannot reinstate the employee as such and the matter

is to be remanded to the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary

Authority to proceed further with the enquiry from the

stage of violation of principles of natural justice is

noticed and the enquiry has to be proceeded further

after furnishing the necessary documents mentioned

in the charge sheet, which are alleged to have not

been given to the delinquent officer in the instant

case.

12. In the case of Chairman, Life Insurance

Corporation of India and Ors. v. A. Masilamani: (2013)

6 SCC 530, which was also pressed into service on

behalf of the Appellants before the High Court, it is

observed in paragraph 16 as under:

"16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the

court sets aside an order of punishment, on the

ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted,

the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit

the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it

to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood

vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL v. B.

Karunakar: (1993) 4 SCC 727], Hiran Mayee

Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls [(2002) 10 SCC

293], U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey : (2005)

8 SCC 264] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu: (2008)

12 SCC 30])."

13. From the impugned judgment and order passed by

the High Court, it appears that when the aforesaid

submission and the aforesaid decision was pressed

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (28 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

into service, the High Court has not considered the

same on the ground that the other officers involved in

respect of the same incident are exonerated and/or no

action is taken against them. Applying the law laid

down in the case of A. Masilamani (supra) to the facts

of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the

Tribunal as well as the High Court ought to have

remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to

conduct the enquiry from the stage it stood vitiated.

Therefore, the order passed by the High Court in not

allowing further proceedings from the stage it stood

vitiated, i.e., after the issuance of the charge sheet, is

unsustainable.

13.In the end, learned counsel for the State submitted that there is

no error in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and

therefore, as the conduct of the petitioners was serious rightly noted by

the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority and also

affirmed by the learned Single Judge, deserves no interference and the

special appeals deserve to be dismissed.

14.This Court is aware of the law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court with regard to exercise the power of judicial review in the

departmental proceedings and further that the Court cannot even

examine the adequacy of the evidence nor substitute a punishment until

and unless it shocks the conscience of the Court.

15.Considering the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the above cited judgment by counsel for respondent with regard to

power of judicial review, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the

findings as recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the punishment order

dated 04.04.2018 as passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry

Officer specifically recorded that the charges were found to be proved

against all the employees, and thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority

after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing and following the

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (29 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

principles of natural justice, imposed punishment on the respective

employees by order dated 04.04.2018.

16.This Court noted that the Enquiry Officer as well as the

Disciplinary Authority considered their role and conduct in the entire

incident in depth and thereafter the charges were found to be proved

and petitioners were punished vide order dated 04.04.2018. Once the

charges were found to be proved, the punishment order was passed.

The Appellate Authority decided the appeal and the learned Single

Judge rightly dismissed the writs.

17.The Court is not inclined, as already noted hereinabove, to

interfere with the findings as recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the

punishment as awarded by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate

Authority which decided the departmental appeal as preferred by the

petitioners herein.

18.The law in regard to powers of the Court with regard to judicial

review in the disciplinary cases is well settled by the Supreme Court, as

noted from the judgments cited by both the counsels.

19.This Court has noted that, in the case of Union of India and Ors

v Ex Constable Ram Karan

12

, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set out the

limits of judicial interference in the matters of the disciplinary

proceedings. The Court held that it is sole prerogative of the Disciplinary

Authority or Appellate Authority, to determine the punishment based on

the gravity of the misconduct. While the power of judicial interference in

the matter of disciplinary proceedings is available with the Courts but

the scope is very narrow. The judicial interference is warranted only in

cases where the imposed penalty is so disproportionate that it shocks

the conscience of the Court.

12 2022 (1) SCC 373

[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (30 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]

20.In view of the above settled law as quoted in as quoted in initial

paras of the judgment regarding the exercise of power of judicial review

in the matters of disciplinary proceedings, this Court, is not inclined to

interfere in the impugned order.

21.The order passed by the Appellate Authority in the case of Anil

Kumar Pandey is not available on record for perusal of the Court and

therefore the reasons as recorded in their case cannot be considered by

this Court even otherwise the petitioners herein are required to stand

on their own legs. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to satisfy

this Court in regard to violation of any procedure by the Disciplinary

Authority and also there is no violation of principle of natural justice. In

the absence of the above, this Court finds no merits in the present

appeal.

21.In view thereof, the present Special Appeals Writ are dismissed

and the order passed by the Learned Single Judge dated 18.05.2021

along-with order of the Appellate Authority dated 16.10.2020 are

affirmed.

22.No order as to costs.

23.All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed off.

(RAVI CHIRANIA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J

Monika