REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 732 OF 2018

GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU .....PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 301 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 304 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 303 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 305 OF 2017

AND

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 306 OF 2017

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

Petitioners in these petitions were appointed as Presiding

Officers of Debt Recovery Tribunal created under the Recovery of

Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which is

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 1 of 21

rechristened as Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The appointment was made

under the provisions of the said Act. Chapter II of the Act deals

with the establishment of Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal. The

provisions relevant for our purposes are Sections 3 to 6. Section

3 deals with establishment of the Tribunal by the Central

Government to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

Section 4 talks of composition of the Tribunal. Section 5 deals

with the qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officers.

Once appointed, the term of office of a Presiding Officer is

stipulated in Section 6. There have been amendments to the

various provisions of this Act in the year 2016. Also, the Act which

was earlier known as the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and

Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is given a new nomenclature and

is now known as the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993

by the Finance Act, 2017. Unamended Sections 3 to 6 were as

under:

“3. Establishment of Tribunal.—(1) The Central

Government shall, by notification, establish one or more

Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to

exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on

such Tribunal by or under this Act.

(2) The Central Government shall also specify, in the

notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within

which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining

and deciding the applications filed before it.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 2 of 21

4. Composition of Tribunal.—(1) A Tribunal shall consist

of one person only (hereinafter referred to as the Presiding

Officer) to be appointed by notification, by the Central

Government.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),

the Central Government may authorise the Presiding

Officer of one Tribunal to discharge also the functions of

the Presiding Officer of another Tribunal.

5. Qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer.

—A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the

Presiding Officer of a Tribunal unless he is, or has been, or

is qualified to be, a District Judge.

6. Term of Office. – The Presiding Officer of a Tribunal

shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on

which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age

of sixty-two years, whichever is earlier.”

2)As is clear from Section 6, after the appointment of a person as

Presiding Officer to a Tribunal, he could hold office for a term of

five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or

until the attainment of 62 years of age, whichever is earlier. This

Section is substituted by Act 44 of 2016 w.e.f. September 1, 2016

and the amended provision read as under:

“6. Term of office of Presiding Officer – The Presiding

Officer of a Tribunal shall hold office for a term of five years

from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall

be eligible for reappointment.

Provided that no person shall hold office as the

Presiding Officer of a Tribunal after he has attained the age

of sixty-five years.”

3)Along with that, another provision in the form of Section 6A is also

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 3 of 21

inserted which is to the following effect:

“6A. Qualifications, terms and conditions of service of

Presiding Officer – Notwithstanding anything contained in

this Act, the qualifications, appointment, term of office,

salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and the

other terms and conditions of service of the Presiding

Officer of the Tribunal appointed after the commencement

of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 2017, shall be

governed by the provisions of section 184 of that Act:

Provided that the Presiding Officer appointed before

the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the

Finance Act, 2017, shall continue to be governed by the

provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder as if

the provisions of section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 had

not come into force.”

Some other provisions are also amended, but those are not

relevant for the purposes of these cases.

4)All the petitioners were appointed before the amendment to

Section 6. Thus, at the time of their appointment, the term of

their office was “five years or till attaining the age of 62 years,

whichever is earlier”. These officers have not completed five

years of service. However, they are completing/or have attained

62 years of age after coming into force amended Section 6. In

the aforesaid backdrop, the question that arises for consideration

in these petitions is as to whether the petitioners are entitled to

complete the term of five years taking advantage of the amended

provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until

attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 4 of 21

of 65 years, whichever is earlier.

5)For the sake of convenience, we may give particulars in respect

of Transfer Case (Civil) No. 301 of 2017 and, at the same time,

take note of the progress in other cases as well.

Date Event

27.12.1954Date of birth of the petitioner. The petitioner turned 62

years on 26.12.2016 and will turn 65 years, on

26.12.2019.

27.08.1993Enactment of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and

Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 6 of the Act

prescribed that a Presiding Officer of the Debt Recovery

Tribunal shall hold office for five years form the date he

enters office or 62 years, whichever is earlier.

15.12.2014Appointment notification of petitioner as Presiding

Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow.

06.01.2015Petitioner took office as the Presiding Officer, Debt

Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow.

12.08.2016Amendment to the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and

Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 6 of the 1993

Act was substituted. The amended Section 6

contemplates that the Presiding Officer shall hold office

for five years from the date he enters office. The

proviso clarifies that the Presiding Officer shall not

continue beyond the age of 65 years.

01.09.2016The 2016 amendment takes effect upon being so

notified, by the Central Government.

29.09.2016The Union of India advertises anticipated vacancies for

Presiding Officer for Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow

and other Debt Recovery Tribunals.

06.10.2016By way of an interim order, the Central Administrative

Tribunal, New Delhi, stays the release of Presiding

Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Guwahati (V.K. Garg),

having regard to the enhanced age of retirement, in the

O.A. filed by him.

07.12.2016By way of an interim order, the Allahabad High Court,

Lucknow Bench stays the release of petitioner, having

regard to the enhanced age of retirement in the writ

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 5 of 21

petition filed by him.

09.12.2016The Bombay High Court dismissed WP(L) No.

3299/2016 filed by Vasant Narayan Lothey Patel,

Presiding Officer, DRT III, Mumbai, whereby the said

officer sought application of the amended Section 6, to

extend his tenure to 65 years or completion of five

years.

26.12.2016The petitioner attained the age of 62 years.

02.02.2017By way of an interim order, the Madras High Court stays

the release of J.V. Raj, Debt Recovery Tribunal,

Coimbatore having regard to the enhanced age of

retirement in the writ petition filed by him.

09.02.2017By way of an interim order, the Jharkhand High Court

says the release of B.N. Dash, Debt Recovery Tribunal

having regrd to the enhanced age of retirement, in his

writ petition.

28.02.2017By way of an interim order, the Madras High Court stays

the release of R. Ravindra Bose, Presiding Officer, Debt

Recovery Tribunal-II, Chennai having regrd to the

enhanced age of retirement.

04.10.2017The Union of India filed five transfer petitions qua the

aforementioned petitions pending before the Central

Administrative Tribunal, Delhi and High Courts of

Allahabad, Madras, Jharkhand. A sixth transfer petition

was filed in respect of WP(L) No. 2358/2016 filed by

Mohd. Zafar Imam before the Bombay High Court. This

officer had already demitted office on 17.09.2016. On

04.10.2017, this Court issued notice in the

aforementioned transfer petitions being TP(C) Nos.

1315-1320/2017 and stayed further proceedings before

the courts concerned.

14.11.2017This Court allowed all six transfer petitions (TP(C) Nos.

1315-1320/2017) and also passed an interim order

reinstating Mohd. Zafar Imam as Presiding Officer, DRT

II, Mumbai.

26.12.2019The petitioner will be completing the age of 65 years.

06.01.2020The petitioner will be completing the term of five years

on this date.

6)As per the provisions of unamended Section 6, the petitioner

could continue only upto December 26, 2016 as he had

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 6 of 21

completed 62 years of age on that date though he had not

completed five years of term as the Presiding Officer. If amended

Section 6 is applicable, then he would be entitled to continue upto

December 26, 2019 on which date he shall attain the age of 65

years. Same is the fact situation in all these cases, though the

dates on which they would be completing five years term or

attaining 65 years of age, are different.

7)In this backdrop, the issue that has arisen in these petitions is as

to whether the petitioners would be governed by Section 6 as

amended or this provision is to be applied prospectively i.e., w.e.f.

September 1, 2016 i.e. in respect of appointments which are

made on or after September 1, 2016.

8)The endeavour of the petitioners is to demonstrate that they

would be governed by Section 6 as amended and, therefore, they

have right to continue upto the age of 65 years or till the time they

complete five years tenure before they have attained the age of

65 years. The submission which are paraphrased by the

petitioners in support of their aforesaid plea are the following:

(a)By the Amendment Act, new Section 6 stands ‘substituted’

with the old Section 6. The legislature has used the expression

‘substituted’ with a definite purpose, namely, making this provision

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 7 of 21

applicable also to those Presiding Officers who were holding the

post as on September 1, 2016 when the amendment was brought

into force. It was argued that the very expression ‘substituted’

would mean that the old Section 6 stands obliterated.

(b)Purpose behind the amendment was to reduce the burden

of pendency by enhancing the age of the Presiding Officers. This

is categorically mentioned in the report of the Lok Sabha, Joint

Committee and also in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to

the amendment.

(c)The provision needs to be given purposive interpretation

and keeping in view the purpose and object behind the

amendment, the said purpose would be sub-served only if it is

applied to the incumbents in the service as well as on the date of

the application. Reference is made to the judgment of this Court

in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and

Investment Co. Ltd. & Ors.

1

9)In that very hue, it is argued that to interpret the provision as

inapplicable to the incumbent would lead to assigning a perverse

object to the amendment which would be totally illogical. For this

proposition, judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada

Bachao Andolan & Anr.

2

is relied upon. Reliance is also placed

1(1987) 1 SCC 424

2(2011) 7 SCC 639

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 8 of 21

on Boucher Pierre Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail,

Tihar, New Delhi & Anr.

3

10)Contrasting the provisions of Section 6 with Section 6A of the Act,

it is argued that proviso to Section 6A categorically makes a

provision to the effect that the Presiding Officer appointed before

the commencement of Finance Act, 2017 shall continue to be

governed by the provisions of Section 184 of the Finance Act,

2017 as if the said provisions had not coming to force. It was

submitted that there is no such proviso added to Section 6 which

makes the intention of the legislature very clear, namely, the

Presiding Officers who were in office as on the date of

amendment would be governed by the newly inserted Section 6.

11)Mr. Banerjee, learned ASG appearing for the respondent Union of

India contradicted the aforesaid arguments raised by the

petitioners with the following submissions:

No right has accrued by virtue of amendment in Section 6

to hold the office upto the age of 65 years. It was argued that

unamended Section 6 provided that the Presiding Officer shall

hold office for a term of five years or ‘until he attains the age of 62

years, whichever is earlier’. Amended provision, on the other

3(1975) 1 SCC 192

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 9 of 21

hand, does not state that the term of office would be five years or

until the Presiding Officer attains the age of 65 years. On the

other hand, this provision of 65 years was made in the proviso to

Section 6 which was couched in negative terms as it is stipulated

that no person shall hold the office after he has attained the age

of 65 years. Thus, no right accrues in favour of any person with

such a proviso. It was also submitted that unless a provision is

specifically given retrospective effect by the legislature, it only has

prospective operation. Therefore, intentment behind Section 6

was to make it applicable in respect of appointments which would

be made on or after September 1, 2016 when this provision was

inserted and the date from which it was specifically made

effective. It was also argued that the purpose was to infuse

young blood by deputing fresh Presiding Officers and not to give

benefit to the existing Presiding Officers. The learned ASG relied

upon judgment of this Court in C. Gupta v. Glaxo-Smithkline

Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

4

and, in particular, following portion in that

judgment:

“21. In the present case, we find that for determining the

nature of amendment, the question is whether it affects the

legal rights of individual workers in the context that if they

fall within the definition then they would be entitled to claim

several benefits conferred by the Act. The amendment

should be also one which would touch upon their

substantive rights. Unless there is a clear provision to the

4(2007) 7 SCC 171

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 10 of 21

effect that it is retrospective or such retrospectivity can be

implied by necessary implication or intendment, it must be

held to be prospective. We find no such clear provision or

anything to suggest by necessary implication or intendment

either in the amending Act or in the amendment itself. The

amendment cannot be said to be one which affects

procedure. Insofar as the amendment substantially

changes the scope of the definition of the term “workman” it

cannot be said to be merely declaratory or clarificatory. In

this regard we find that entirely new category of persons

who are doing “operational” work was introduced first time

in the definition and the words “skilled” and “unskilled” were

made independent categories unlinked to the word

“manual”. It can be seen that the Industrial Disputes

(Amendment) Act, 1984 was enacted by Parliament on 31-

8-1982. However, the amendment itself was not brought

into force immediately and in sub-section (1) of Section 1 of

the amending Act, it was provided that it would come into

force on such day as the Central Government may by

notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. Ultimately, by a

notification the said amendment was brought into force on

21-8-1984. Although this Court has held that the

amendment would be prospective if it is deemed to have

come with effect on a particular day, a provision in the

Amendment Act to the effect that amendment would

become operative in the future, would have similar effect.

22. Therefore, by the application of the tests mentioned

above, it is clear that the definition of workman as

amended must, therefore, be presumed to be prospective.

12)We have given our due consideration to the arguments advanced

by the counsel for the parties on both sides and have also

perused the relevant material. We find force in the arguments of

the petitioners that the amended provisions of Section 6 shall

apply in their cases as well and, therefore, if they have not

completed five years of tenure as Presiding Officers of the Debt

Recovery Tribunal they are entitled to continue to work as

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 11 of 21

Presiding Officers till they attain the age of 65 years or complete

five years’ term before attaining the age of 65 years. In the first

instance, we have to bear in mind the language/terminology

which the Legislature used while inserting new Section 6 with

effect from September 01, 2016. This section stands ‘substituted’

with the old section. The word ‘substituted’ has its own

significance. In Government of India & Ors. v. Indian Tobacco

Association

5

, this Court noted dictionary meaning of the word

‘substitute’ as can be seen from para 15 of the said judgment:

“15. The word “substitute” ordinarily would mean “to put

(one) in place of another”; or “to replace”. In Black's Law

Dictionary, 5th Edn., at p. 1281, the word “substitute” has

been defined to mean “to put in the place of another

person or thing”, or “to exchange”. In Collins English

Dictionary, the word “substitute” has been defined to mean

“to serve or cause to serve in place of another person or

thing”; “to replace (an atom or group in a molecule) with

(another atom or group)”; or “a person or thing that serves

in place of another, such as a player in a game who takes

the place of an injured colleague”.

13)This expression has also come up for interpretation by the Courts

in Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Others

6

, the import and

impact of substituted provision were discussed in the following

manner:

“23. The text of Section 2 of the Second Amendment Act

provides for the word “upto” being substituted for the word

5(2005) 7 SCC 396

6(2004) 8 SCC 1

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 12 of 21

“after”. What is the meaning and effect of the expression

employed therein — “shall be substituted”?

24. The substitution of one text for the other pre-existing

text is one of the known and well-recognised practices

employed in legislative drafting. “Substitution” has to be

distinguished from “supersession” or a mere repeal of an

existing provision.”

14)Ordinarily wherever the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ is used

by the legislature, it has the effect of deleting the old provision

and make the new provision operative. The process of

substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to

cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in

its place. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an

earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of

itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read

and construed as if the altered words had been written into the

earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that

thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. No

doubt, in certain situations, the Court having regard to the purport

and object sought to be achieved by the Legislature may

construe the word "substitution" as an "amendment" having a

prospective effect. Therefore, we do not think that it is a

universal rule that the word ‘substitution’ necessarily or always

connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one of repeal and

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 13 of 21

another of a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps.

However, the aforesaid general meaning is to be given effect to,

unless it is found that legislature intended otherwise. Insofar as

present case is concerned, as discussed hereinafter, the

legislative intent was also to give effect to the amended provision

even in respect of those incumbents who were in service as on

September 01, 2016.

15)The effect, thus, would be to replace Section 6 as amended with

the intention as if this is the only provision which exist from the

date of introduction and the earlier provision was not there at all.

The effect of this would be that all those incumbents who are

holding the post of Presiding Officer on September 01, 2016

would be governed by this provision.

16)When we examine the matter in the aforesaid perspective, the

question as to whether Section 6, as amended, is to be given

retrospective effect or not, does not arise for consideration. The

petitioners are right in submitting that persons who demitted the

office prior to the amendment are not sought to be covered by the

amendment. Had the provision been retrospective then it would

have benefited those persons as well. No such case is set up by

any of the petitioners or any other person, it is only the

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 14 of 21

incumbents who are serving as on the date of the amendment

are sought to be covered.

17)Though in a different context, the judgment in Boucher Pierre

Andre throws some light on the issue at hand, as can be

discerned from the following discussion in that case:

“1. …..The petitioner was arrested on November 10, 1971

in connection with an offence of theft which took place in

the night between October 31, 1971 and November 1,

1971 in Rajasthan Emporium at Ashoka Hotel, New Delhi.

He was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi and

by an order dated July 16, 1973 he was convicted of the

offence under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code and

sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years and a

fine of Rs 10,000 and in default of payment of fine, further

rigorous imprisonment of one year. An appeal preferred by

him to the High Court of Delhi failed and his conviction was

confirmed but the substantive sentence of imprisonment

was reduced to two years though the fine was enhanced to

Rs 15,000 with one year's rigorous imprisonment in default.

The order of the High Court in appeal was passed on April

4, 1974. The petitioner did not pay the amount of fine and

he was, therefore, liable under the order of the High Court

to serve a maximum sentence of imprisonment for three

years. Since the petitioner was continuing under detention

from November 10, 1971 during the investigation, enquiry

and trial of the case against him, the petitioner contended

that by reason of Section 428 of the new Code of Criminal

Procedure, which came into force from April 1, 1974, the

period of detention from November 10, 1971 upto July 16,

1973 was liable to be set off against the term of

imprisonment imposed upon him and he could be required

to undergo imprisonment only for the remainder of the term

which, after taking into account the remission granted on

account of good behaviour, expired on August 12, 1974.

The petitioner claimed that he was, therefore, entitled to be

freed on August 12, 1974 and his detention in jail since that

date was illegal. The petitioner filed an application for a writ

of habeas corpus in the High Court of Delhi challenging the

validity of his detention since August 12, 1974 but the High

Court took the view that since the conviction of the

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 15 of 21

petitioner by the Sessions Court had taken place prior to

the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal

Procedure, Section 428 had no application and the

petitioner was bound to suffer imprisonment for the full

term of three years calculated from the date of conviction,

namely, July 16, 1973. The habeas corpus application in

the High Court having failed, the petitioner preferred the

present writ petition directly in this Court under Article 32 of

the Constitution. This writ petition also claimed the same

relief and the ground was also the same, namely, that by

reason of Section 428, the term of imprisonment imposed

on the petitioner came to an end on August 12, 1974 and

his detention since that date was contrary to law.

2. The question which arises for determination in this

petition is a narrow one and it rests on the true

interpretation of Section 428. Is this section confined in its

application only to cases where a person is convicted after

the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal

Procedure, or does it also embrace cases where a person

has been convicted before but his sentence is still running

at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure

came into force? It is only if the latter interpretation is

accepted that the petitioner would be entitled to claim the

benefit of the section and hence it becomes necessary to

arrive at its proper construction. Section 428 reads as

follows:

“Where an accused person has, on conviction, been

sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of

detention, if any, undergone by him during the

investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and

before the date of such conviction, shall be set off

against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on

such conviction, and the liability of such person to

undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be

restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of

imprisonment imposed on him.”

This section, on a plain natural construction of its language,

posits for its applicability a fact situation which is described

by the clause “where an accused person has, on

conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term”.

There is nothing in this clause which suggests, either

expressly or by necessary implication, that the conviction

and sentence must be after the coming into force of the

new Code of Criminal Procedure. The language of the

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 16 of 21

clause is neutral. It does not refer to any particular point of

time when the accused person should have been convicted

and sentenced. It merely indicates a fact situation which

must exist in order to attract the applicability of the section

and this fact situation would be satisfied equally whether an

accused person has been convicted and sentenced before

or after the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal

Procedure. Even where an accused person has been

convicted prior to the coming into force of the new Code of

Criminal Procedure but his sentence is still running, it

would not be inappropriate to say that the “accused person

has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a

term”. Therefore, where an accused person has been

convicted and he is still serving his sentence at the date

when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force.

Section 428 would apply and he would be entitled to claim

that the period of detention undergone by him during the

investigation, inquiry or trial of the case should be set off

against the term of imprisonment imposed on him and he

should be required to undergo only the remainder of the

term. Of course, if the term of the sentence has already run

out, no question of set off can arise. It is only where the

sentence is still running that the section can operate to

restrict the term. This construction of the section does not

offend against the principle which requires that unless the

legislative intent is clear and compulsive, no retrospective

operation should be given to a statute. On this

interpretation, the section is not given any retrospective

effect. It does not seek to set at naught the conviction

already recorded against the accused person. The

conviction remains intact and unaffected and so does the

sentence already undergone. It is only the sentence,

insofar as it yet remains to be undergone, that is, reduced.

The section operates prospectively on the sentence which

yet remains to be served and curtails it be setting off the

period of detention undergone by the accused person

during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case. Any

argument based on the objection against giving

retrospective operation is, therefore, irrelevant.”

(emphasis supplied)

18)Our view is also in accord with the purport and objective behind

the amendment which were reflected while carrying out the

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 17 of 21

amendment itself. The purpose of amending Section 6 was to

reduce the burden of pendency by enhancement of age of the

Judges concerned. The Report of the Lok Sabha Joint

Committee qua the Amendment sets out the background to the

amendment as follows:

“On the issue of pendency of cases in various DRTs, the

Committee has been apprised by the Department of

Financial Services that approximately 70,000 court cases

pending in DRTs involving more than Rs. 5 Lakh Crore.

One of the reasons mentioned in the memoranda

submitted by various stakeholders for the pendency of

cases is vacancies in various stakeholders for the

pendency of cases is vacancies in various DRTs/DRATs. A

number of suggestions in this regard have been made by

the stakeholders. After detailed deliberations on the issue,

the Committee decide(d) to insert the following new

provision/substitute some of the provisions under the

RDDB & FI Act….”

(emphasis supplied)

19)Similarly, the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the

amendment inter alia notes:

“The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993 and the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of

Security Interest Act, 2002, were enacted for expeditious

recovery of loans of banks and financial institutions.

Presently, there are approximately seventy thousand cases

pending in Debts Recovery Tribunals. Though the

Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions

Act provides for a period of 180 days for disposal of

recovery applications, the cases are pending for many

years due to various adjournments and prolonged

hearings. In order to facilitate expeditious disposal of

recovery applications, it has been decided to amend the

said Acts and also to make consequential amendments in

the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Depositories Act,

1996.”

(emphasis supplied)

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 18 of 21

20)In order to fulfill the aforesaid objective of reducing the arrears

and tackle the issue of pendency of cases in various Debt

Recovery Tribunals, ‘purposive interpretation’ is to be given. In

Reserve Bank of India, the Court explained this principle in the

following manner:

“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the

context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well

say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the

colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That

interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation

match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we

know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute

must be read, first as a whole and then section by section,

clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a

statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the

glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its

scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may

take colour and appear different than when the statute is

looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With

these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and

discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and

each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the

scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word

of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to

be construed so that every word has a place and

everything is in its place……..”

(emphasis supplied)

21)We are, thus, of the opinion that while carrying out the aforesaid

amendment with the intention to substitute the amended

provision with that of unamended, the Parliament desired that the

benefit of this provision extended even to those who are serving

as Presiding Officers on the date when the amendment became

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 19 of 21

enforceable. This seems to be just, reasonable and sensible

outcome.

22)This interpretation is contextual as well which can be discerned

by contrasting amended Section 6 with newly inserted Section 6A

of the Act.

“…..There is a clear distinction between incumbent officers

and the officers appointed in future. In contrast, there is no

distinction, legislatively drawn, between incumbent or

officers appointed in future for application of amended

Section 6.”

23)This view of ours would negate the contention of the learned ASG

that Section 6 as amended does not create any right. If such an

interpretation is accepted, then even those persons appointed as

Presiding Officers after September 01, 2016, can be denied the

right to continue in service till 65 years. Judgment in Glaxo-

Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which was relied upon by the

learned ASG would have no application. That was a case where

there was an amendment to Section 2(s) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 which was brought into force on August 21,

1994 and the Court held the same to be prospective in nature. It

was further held that the provision which was applicable as on the

date of termination of the appellant in that case would apply.

Obviously, such a case has no application to the instant case.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 20 of 21

24)The writ petition and the transferred cases filed by these

petitioners, accordingly, stand allowed with no order as to costs.

As a result, those petitioners in whose favour there is an interim

stay would be allowed to continue. The petitioner in Writ Petition

(Civil) No. 732 of 2018 shall be taken back in service forthwith,

with continuity of service and salary of intervening period.

.............................................J.

(A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J.

(ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 07, 2018.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018 etc. Page 21 of 21