LPA 349/2021 Page 1 of 50

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 19 March 2026

Pronounced on: 6 April 2026

+ LPA 349/2021, CM APPL. 33731/2021

GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Sameer Vashisht, SC

CIVIL, GNCTD, Ms. Harshita Nathrani,

Mr. Aryaman Vachher, Advocates

versus

NAJMA AND ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Gaurav Jain, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

% JUDGMENT

06.04.2026

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

A. The lis

1. This case requires us to revisit, painfully, a dark period in our

history – the COVID-19 pandemic. It throws up, for consideration, the

issue of whether an assurance extended by the Chief Minister of

Delhi, in a press conference, as a step towards enforcement of the

restrictions on public movement of persons put in place in the wake of

COVID, is unenforceable in law, absent a formal written policy

decision to that effect.

LPA 349/2021 Page 2 of 50

2. A learned Single Judge of this Court has answered the issue in

the negative, invoking the principles of promissory estoppel and

legitimate expectation. The Delhi Government

1

is in appeal.

B. Facts

3. COVID struck India in March 2020. In the wake of the

calamity, the likes of which had not been seen in foreseeable history

earlier and, hopefully, would never have to be seen in future, the

Government, both at the Centre and State level, put into effect a slew

of measures to ensure minimal exposure of the populace to the

pandemic and to persuade all to remain indoors as far as possible. As

is well known, the Hon’ble Prime Minister himself came on air to

prohibit movement of persons outside their homes for the period 25

March 2020 to 31 May 2020. It merits mention, while the lockdown

was relaxed in phases, the proscription on inter-state travel was lifted

with effect from 1 June 2020.

4. State Governments were not lagging behind. The then Chief

Minister of Delhi, Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, addressed the public through

a press conference held on 29 March 2020, and the dispute, in these

proceedings, relates to a single utterance made by him during the

press conference. We deem it appropriate to reproduce, in vernacular

as well as in English, the statement made by the Chief Minister,

around which the dispute revolves:

In vernacular

1

Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, hereinafter referred to as “the State”

LPA 349/2021 Page 3 of 50

LPA 349/2021 Page 4 of 50

In English

"A few days ago, I had asked the landlords to postpone the rent of

impoverished tenants unable to pay rent for 2-3 months and not

take immediate payment.

Today, I am appealing to you and the landlords of entire Delhi-if

you consider me your son or brother then all the landlords must

talk to their tenants and ask them to rest assured that you are with

them and won't force them to pay rent. Today, all of you must go

and give assurance to them.

There has been news from some places that a few landlords are

forcing their tenants due to which they are evacuating and leaving.

Please don't force them. Kindly postpone their rent.

In a month or two when this Corona and let's assume after this

entire mess is over, if a tenant has been unable to pay rent due to

poverty, I assure you the Government will pay for it. I am talking

about those tenants who may be unable to pay some of their rent

due to lack of means.

However, no landlord will force them right now and if they do so

then the Government will take strict action against them."

(Emphasis supplied)

5. Do the italicized words in the above statement of the Chief

Minister constitute a promise, enforceable, proprio vigore, against the

State and in favour of citizens? As we have already noted, a learned

Single Judge of this Court has, vide judgment dated 22 July 2021,

answered the question in the affirmative, relying on the principles of

promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation.

LPA 349/2021 Page 5 of 50

6. Following the conclusion that the words of the Chief Minister,

as italicized above, constituted an enforceable promise in law, the

impugned judgment concludes with the following directions:

“110. In view of the above factual and legal discussion, the

following directions are issued:

i. The GNCTD would, having regard to the statement

made by the CM on 29

th

March, 2020, extracted in

paragraph no. 3 above, to landlords and tenants, take a

decision as to the implementation of the same within a

period of 6 weeks;

ii. The said decision would be taken, bearing in mind

the larger interest of the persons to whom the benefits were

intended to be extended in the said statement, as also any

overriding public interest concerns.

iii. Upon the said decision being taken, the GNCTD

would frame a clear policy in this regard.

iv. Upon the said decision being taken, if a Scheme or

Policy is announced, the Petitioners' case be considered

under the said Scheme/Policy as per the procedure

prescribed therein, if any. Remedies against any decision

taken are left open.”

7. Aggrieved thereby, the State is in appeal.

8. We have heard Mr. Sameer Vashisht, Standing Counsel (Civil)

for the State, and Mr. Gaurav Jain, learned Counsel for the

respondents, at length.

C. The Impugned Judgment

LPA 349/2021 Page 6 of 50

9. Six petitioners petitioned this Court, by way of WP (C)

8956/2020

2

. Of these, five were daily wage labourers, who claimed to

be in impecunious circumstances, and unable to pay, to their

landlords, the rents demanded. The sixth petitioner was a landlord.

All petitioners sought issuance of a mandamus, to the State, to

disgorge the rent payable against the tenanted premises, effectively

seeking, therefore, enforcement of the assurance held out by the Chief

Minister to the public in his press conference of 29 March 2020.

10. Though the State also contested, before the learned Single

Judge, the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned Single

Judge negatived the contention and held the writ petition to be

maintainable. Before us, Mr. Vashisht did not reiterate the objection.

In any event, we find no reason to differ with the learned Single

Judge. The writ petition was clearly maintainable.

11. On merits, the learned Single Judge first examines, in the

impugned judgment, the position regarding promissory estoppel as it

obtains in the United Kingdom and in India. We have, in this country,

an enviable body of precedent on the issue, thereby obviating the

necessity of referring to any foreign judgments. Apropos the legal

position as it obtains in India, the learned Single Judge refers to the

decisions in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the

City of Bombay

3

, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of

Uttar Pradesh

4

, Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies

5

, State of

2

Najma & ors v. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi

3

AIR 1951 SC 469

4

(1979) 2 SCC 409

LPA 349/2021 Page 7 of 50

Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd

6

, State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone

Law House

7

, Manuelsons Hotels Pvt Ltd v. State of Kerala

8

, State of

Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd

9

and proceeds, thereafter, to

cull out the principles emerging therefrom. Thereafter, the learned

Single Judge proceeds to hold that the issue was required to be

examined in the context of the fact that the statement, the

enforceability of which was in question, was an assurance and

promise made by a Constitutional functionary such as the Chief

Minister, made with the purpose of limiting migration of people from

Delhi, and that presumably some tenants and landlords might have

altered their positions based on the assurance. The learned Single

Judge enumerates the following salient features of the present case, in

the impugned judgment:

“(1) Exceptional circumstances of the Covid-19 Pandemic.

(2) Extreme distress being faced by migrant labourers and

blue-collar workers and employees.

(3) A clear promise/assurance made by the CM.

(4) No positive policy to implement the said

promise/assurance given by the GNCTD.

(5) No contrary policy implemented by the Government,

placed before the court.

(6) No decision taken to not implement the said

promise/assurance that was given by the CM.

(7) The exception of public interest having not been invoked

for the non-implementation of the promise/assurance.”

5

AIR 1968 SC 718

6

(2004) 6 SCC 465

7

(2008) 5 SCC 609

8

(2016) 6 SCC 766

9

2020 SCC OnLine SC 968

LPA 349/2021 Page 8 of 50

12. The learned Single Judge goes on to hold that the Government

could not have remained silent on the promise/assurance held out by

the Chief Minister without taking a decision whether to implement it,

or not implement it. In times of distress, observes the impugned

judgment, elected representatives of the people, especially those

holding posts of heads of the government, are expected to make

responsible assurances and promises, which can be believed by the

citizenry. It could not be argued that no one would take the words of

the Chief Minister seriously, or believe what he said. At the very least,

the citizens could entertain a legitimate expectation that the promise

held out by the Chief Minister would be honoured.

13. The learned Single Judge goes on to hold that the lack of any

decision regarding the assurance given by the Chief Minister, rather

than any decision taken in that regard, was arbitrary. In the event that

the State had decided not to act on the basis of the said assurance, it

owed a responsibility to disclose the reasons for the decision. The

learned Single Judge emphasizes, in this context, the fact that the

decision affected the fundamental rights of citizens, as it dealt with

the right to shelter during the pandemic. Applying the equitable

doctrine of promissory estoppel, the learned Single Judge holds the

State responsible for failing to take any decision on the

assurance/promise held out by the Chief Minister. In this regard, the

learned Single Judge has sought to distinguish the judicial authorities

cited by the State before her, as those were cases in which a policy

decision, contrary to the assurance/promise, had been announced.

LPA 349/2021 Page 9 of 50

The State had failed to provide any explanation for failing to take any

decision on the promise or assurance held out by the Chief Minister in

a press conference consciously held in the background of the

lockdown announced pursuant to the COVID pandemic.

14. The learned Single Judge has distinguished the promise made

by the Chief Minister, in the press conference, with statements made

in an election rally. The Chief Minister was presumed to know all

implications, including the number of persons who would be affected

and the financial outlay involved, while making the promise. The

citizen was entitled to believe that, while making the promise, the

Chief Minister was speaking on behalf of the Government.

15. The learned Single Judge has also held the reliance, by the

State, on Article 166

10

of the Constitution of India, to be misplaced.

The learned Single Judge holds that a common man, or a citizen,

would believe that the statement of the Chief Minister could be relied

upon and trusted. Invoking Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills, the

learned Single Judge holds that a statement or representation, even

made by the Chief Secretary to the Government, while discharging

Governmental functions, would, even by virtue of the position held by

him, be presumed to be within the scope of his authority and

10

166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State. –

(1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the

name of the Governor.

(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be

authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the

validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the

ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.

(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the

Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it

is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in

his discretion.

LPA 349/2021 Page 10 of 50

enforceable in law. The final enforceable decision would have to be in

the name of the Governor. However, the learned Single Judge

observes that, in the present case, it is the indecision of the State,

following the promise held out by the Chief Minister, which is under

challenge and, therefore, Article 166 of the Constitution would not

apply. The learned Single Judge, therefore, holds that, even absent any

formal policy or order by the State, the very assurance given by the

Chief Minister in a press conference, on a public platform, would

create a valuable and legal right, applying the principle of promissory

estoppel. Non-consideration of the promise thus held out was

amenable to being tested on the anvil of the doctrine of legitimate

expectation. Quoting, thereafter, from a passage from Principles of

Administrative Law by Prof. M.P. Jain and Prof. S.N. Jain, the learned

Single Judge finally opines “that the promise/assurance/representation

given by the CM clearly amounts to an enforceable promise, the

implementation of which ought to be considered by the Government”.

16. Thereafter, before issuing the operative directions already

reproduced in para 6 supra, the learned Single Judge observes as

under:

“109. While holding that the assurance/promise given by the CM

is enforceable, both on the basis of the doctrines of promissory

estoppel and legitimate expectation, the relief would have to be

moulded keeping in mind the various factors as set out below:

• Firstly, the assurance given by the CM has to be

considered by the Government and a decision has to be

taken whether to implement or not implement the same;

• Secondly, the bona fides of the said petitioners need

to be verified. The material particulars in respect of each of

LPA 349/2021 Page 11 of 50

the petitioners, the premises which they have either rented

out or have taken on rent, the amounts which they had paid

during the lockdown period, the loans which have been

taken, etc. would need to be verified. Further, owing to the

decision of the learned Division Bench in Gaurav

Jain v. Union of India

11

, this Court is also concerned about

the bona fides of the petitioners themselves owing to the

lack of material particulars.

• The pleadings in the present case, especially the

rejoinder, also gives an impression to this Court that the

intention is to sensationalise the issue rather than to actually

seek redressal of a grievance.”

17. Thereafter, the directions, reproduced earlier in this judgment,

follow.

D. Rival Contentions

I. Submissions of Mr. Sameer Vashisht

18. Mr. Vashisht commenced his submissions by stating that the

writ petition filed by the respondents was in fact not even

maintainable, as it sought enforcement of a statement made by a

politician, without any supportive law or policy of the Government.

The principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation

would not, he submits, apply in such a situation. The statement of the

Chief Minister was made, as he would submit, “in the air”,

unfortunately. There was no contract between the State and the

respondents, which could be enforced in the manner sought in the writ

petition.

11

2020 SCC OnLine Del 652

LPA 349/2021 Page 12 of 50

19. A further preliminary submission, advanced by Mr. Vashisht, is

that the learned Single Judge has directed the State to frame a policy,

which is impermissible in law. He submits that no writ of mandamus

can issue to the Government to frame a policy, for which purpose he

relies on Asif Hameed v. State of J & K

12

.

20. Mr. Vashisht further pleads issue estoppel, for which purpose he

relies on a judgment, dated 15 June 2020, by a Division Bench of this

Court in Gaurav Jain v. Union of India.

21. On merits, Mr. Vashisht submits that the learned Single Judge

was in error in holding that the Chief Minister had held out any

promise to the public and, effectively, directing enforcement of the

promise so held out. To substantiate his plea that such directions could

never have been issued, Mr. Vashisht relies on Union of India v.

Ganesh Rice Mills

13

, para 23 of State of Karnataka v. K.K.

Mohandas

14

and paras 3, 25, 28 to 30, 33, 40 to 42 and 45 of Nestle.

He submits that no law or executive instruction had been issued, with

the approval of the Lieutenant Governor

15

as required by Article 166

of the Constitution of India, to the effect that the rent of defaulting

tenants, whatever be their financial condition, would be borne by the

State.

22. Mr. Vashisht has also emphasised the circumstances in which

the statement of the Chief Minister, of which the respondents sought

12

1989 Supp (2) SCC 364

13

(1998) 9 SCC 630

14

(2007) 6 SCC 484

15

“LG” hereinafter

LPA 349/2021 Page 13 of 50

enforcement, was made. He points out that, consequent to the

outbreak of COVID, the Hon’ble Prime Minister had directed a

complete lockdown, with the public being prohibited from venturing

outside, and concomitant closure of all private and government

offices, except those which were rendering essential services. A

meeting, chaired by the Hon’ble Prime Minister followed, pursuant to

which the National Disaster Management Authority

16

issued an Order

on 24 March 2020, directing complete restriction of movement of

persons for a period of 21 days with effect from 25 March 2020.

Following this, the Delhi Disaster Management Authority

17

issued an

order on 25 March 2020 directing implicit compliance with the

directives of the NDMA. The Chief Minister, thereafter, addressed the

people of Delhi in a press conference on 25 March 2020, in which,

among other things, landlords were requested not to harass tenants

who were battling the COVID pandemic. Owing to fear of the

pandemic, several migrant labourers gathered at the State border, to

leave for their respective homes. As this led to great risk of spreading

of the COVID virus, the Chief Minister, on 29 March 2020, made the

statement which forms a subject matter of the present controversy. We

deem it appropriate to reproduce the exact manner in which the

written submissions of the State refer to this statement:

“f. On 29.03.2020, the Hon’ble Chief Minister held a press

conference and requested the people of the NCT to abide by the

Hon’ble Prime Ministers request of staying at home. In this

context, he also appealed/requested the landlords not to compel

tenants to leave their homes on account of non-payment of rent

and said that if the situation continues for 2-3 months and a tenant

16

"NDMA" hereinafter

17

"DDMA" hereinafter

LPA 349/2021 Page 14 of 50

is unable to pay owing to poverty, then the Government would

consider making some payment on their behalf.”

We are afraid the reference, to the statement made by the Chief

Minister, as contained in the afore-extracted paragraph from the

written submissions of the State, is somewhat misleading. The

statement of the Chief Minister was not that the Government “would

consider making some payment” on behalf of the tenants who are in

default of payment of rent, but that, where the default was owing to

poverty and incapacity to pay the rent, the State would pay the rent on

behalf of the tenants. Nothing was left, therefore, for “consideration”.

To be fair to him, Mr. Vashisht, on our expressing our unhappiness at

this statement of fact, as contained in the written submissions of the

State, requested us to ignore it and stated that he would argue on the

statement of the Chief Minister as actually made.

23. The written submissions of the State thereafter proceed to detail

developments which took place after 29 April 2020. They are not of

particular relevance to the controversy at hand, except for the

assertion that, on 29 April 2020, the Central Government relaxed the

restriction on inter-State level of stranded persons and directed State

Governments to develop protocols to send and receive such persons.

Even while the lockdown was, thereafter, extended by order dated 1

May 2020, till 17 May 2020, the relaxation for movement of stranded

migrant workers, pilgrims, tourists and other persons, was maintained.

The Ministry of Home Affairs

18

also issued orders permitting travel

through special trains operated by the Railways. The lockdown was

18

"MHA" hereinafter

LPA 349/2021 Page 15 of 50

further extended by order dated 3 May 2020 for two weeks with effect

from 4 May 2020, but, simultaneously, a detailed Standard Operating

Procedure

19

was notified, for movement of stranded persons from and

to Delhi. This was followed by a formal notification dated 11 May

2020 issued by the MHA. By these measures, as also a further order

dated 14 May 2020 issued by the Central Government, movement of

stranded migrant workers and labourers by train and bus was

facilitated. On 17 May 2020, the first notification was issued by the

Central Government relaxing the lockdown restrictions. Following

this, on 18 May 2020, the DDMA issued a notification, relaxing the

direction to landlords not to collect rent from their tenants, in view of

the reduction of intensity of the COVID pandemic.

24. Mr. Vashisht submits that, therefore, the circumstance which

prompted the Chief Minister to make the statement, of which the

respondents seek enforcement, on 29 March 2020, i.e. restriction on

movement of stranded migrant labourers and workers, was no longer

in existence after 29 April 2020 and, therefore, no further statement,

continuing the assurance contained in the statement dated 29 March

2020, was made by the Chief Minister.

25. Mr. Vashisht submits that, in law, a mere statement, sans

anything more, cannot form the basis of an enforceable right against

the Government. Inasmuch as the statement made on 29 March 2020

was never converted into a formal decision in the shape of a policy

19

"SOP" hereinafter

LPA 349/2021 Page 16 of 50

document of the Government, he submits that no writ of mandamus

could issue to enforce the statement.

26. Similarly, he submits that the doctrine of legitimate expectation

has been erroneously invoked by the learned Single Judge. According

to Mr. Vashisht, the foundational basis for invoking the doctrine is the

conversion of a representation/statement/assurance into a definite

policy. Equally, for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel,

he submits that an assurance/representation, in the form of a policy

document of the Government, coupled with the intention to bring into

existence a legal relationship, must exist. The pleadings in the writ

petition, he submits, do not even make out a prima facie case of

existence of these factors. There is no material on the basis of which it

could be found that the petitioners were in fact migrant labours who

had come to Delhi from other states or that, relying on the statement

of the Chief Minister, they decided to stay back in Delhi and, thereby,

altered their position to their prejudice. The impugned judgment,

which proceeds without considering these facts is, therefore, he

submits, unsustainable.

27. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, submits Mr. Vashisht,

can be invoked only where there exists a legal obligation, and not

merely a wish, a desire, a pious hope, or even a moral obligation. The

obligation, of which enforcement is sought, he submits, must be

founded on the sanction of law or custom or established procedure

followed in the regular and natural sequence. He relies, for this

LPA 349/2021 Page 17 of 50

purpose, on paras 21 to 23 of State of Bihar v. Sachindra Narayan

20

and paras 8 to 15 of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd v. CTO

21

.

II. Submissions of Mr. Gaurav Jain

28. Mr. Gaurav Jain, in reply, draws our attention to para 17 of the

impugned judgment, in which the learned Single Judge has noted the

contention of the State that the statement of the Chief Minister, dated

29 March 2020, “could at best be construed as an assurance by a

CM”. He submits that, therefore, the State acknowledges and admits

that the statement was, at the very least, an assurance.

29. Mr. Jain submits that the circumstances in which the statement

was rendered are of extreme significance, as the statement was

intended at providing succour to persons who were desperate to save

their life. This position, he submits, continued till October-November

2020. Mr. Jain submits that the learned Single Judge has held,

unexceptionably, that the statement was in the nature of a promise

affecting the right of the respondents to life, livelihood and residence

and had, therefore, to be adhered to.

30. Mr. Jain contests Mr. Vashisht’s contention that the promise

extended by the Chief Minister was not supported by any policy or

other statutory instrument. He submits that the provisions of the

Disaster Management Act, 2005 and Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897,

imminently empowered the State to make such a promise. Mr. Jain

20

(2019) 3 SCC 803

21

(2005) 1 SCC 625

LPA 349/2021 Page 18 of 50

also relies on Order No. 122-A, dated 29 March 2020, issued by the

DDMA, and specifically emphasises the following paras from the said

Order:

“10. Wherever the workers, including the migrants, of living in

rented accommodation, the landlords of those properties shall not

demand payment of rent for a period of one month.

11. If any landlord is forcing labourers and students to vacate

their premises, they shall be liable for action under the Act.

The District Magistrates & District Deputy Commissioners of

Police, Incident Commanders & counterpart Assistant

Commissioners of Police and SHOs of respective jurisdiction will

be personally liable for implementation of the above directions and

lockdown measures issued under the aforesaid Orders as

enclosed.”

Mr. Jain submits that the statement of the Chief Minister was only

towards implementation of this Order of the DDMA, as landlords

could not be compelled to allow tenants to stay in rented premises

without paying any rent. It was for this reason, he submits, that the

State undertook to bear the burden of the rent payable to the

landlords. It was not, therefore, as though the Chief Minister had

made his statement “in the air”, or unsupported by any policy or

statute, as Mr. Vashisht would seek to contend. Mr. Jain submits that

the State cannot seek to enforce Order No 122-A issued by the

DDMA and avoid the statement made by the Chief Minister.

31. Mr. Jain also relies on Article 300-A

22

of the Constitution of

India.

22

300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. – No person shall be deprived

of his property save by authority of law.

LPA 349/2021 Page 19 of 50

III. Submissions of Mr. Vashisht in rejoinder

32. In rejoinder, Mr. Vashisht nearly submits that the DDMA

Order No 122-A was extended only till 17 May 2020 as, after the

said date, movement of the migrants was permitted.

E. Analysis

I. What does the impugned judgment direct?

33. Facially, the directions in the impugned judgment only require

the State to take a decision as to implementation of the statement

made by the Chief Minister on 29 March 2020. Also, the impugned

judgment, at more points than one, observes that the Court was

concerned with the indecision, on the part of the State, regarding

whether to implement, or not to implement, the assurance held out by

the Chief Minister on 29 March 2020 that the State would bear the

rent of migrants who were unable to pay rent owing to poverty.

However, the impugned judgment, in para 108, also holds, with some

degree of finality, that “the promise/assurance/representation given

by the CM clearly amounts to an enforceable promise, the

implementation of which ought to be considered by the

Government.” The tenor of the impugned judgment is, therefore,

unmistakably that the State was bound to bear the rent of the

poverty-stricken migrants, and were only required to take a decision

on the modality of implementation.

LPA 349/2021 Page 20 of 50

34. The issue of whether, therefore, the statement of the Chief

Minister, dated 29 March 2020, gave rise to an enforceable promise

that the State would bear the rent of the migrants, therefore, squarely

arises for consideration.

II. Was the statement of the Chief Minister, forming subject matter

of dispute, merely “a statement made by a politician”?

35. We reject, outright, the opening submission of Mr. Vashisht that

the assurance to bear the rent of the migrants, as contained in the

statement made by the Chief Minister on 29 March 2020 in the press

conference, was merely a “statement made by a politician”. Facially,

Mr. Vashisht is correct, inasmuch as the Chief Minister was

unquestionably a politician. What we understood from Mr. Vashisht’s

submission is, however, that politicians often make statements, not all

of which are to be taken seriously and, at the very least, not all of

which are enforceable in a court of law. If that is what Mr. Vashisht

meant, we are clear in our mind that the assurance made by the Chief

Minister in his press conference dated 29 March 2020, that the State

would bear the rent of poverty-stricken migrants who were unable to

pay rent, is not one such.

36. Politicians make statements, and statements. Indeed, the very

raison d’ etre of a politician is to speak, ideally for and in the welfare

of the public. There is, however, a distinction between a statement

made by politician before he is elected to public office, and the

statement made by the politician thereafter. During election

propaganda, statements made by candidates aspiring to success in the

LPA 349/2021 Page 21 of 50

election are made without even knowing whether they would succeed

in the election, or being conscious of the circumstances which would

face them in the event of their success and election to public office.

Such statements are made without even being aware of the ground

realities which would face the candidates in the event of their election

and as to whether they would be in a position to fulfil the promise that

they make. At the highest, therefore, failure to abide by the promises

made by a politician prior to his election to public office may only

affect, adversely, his public image, and, perhaps, future success in

elections.

37. A statement made by an elected representative of the people,

such as the Chief Minister, on a public podium is qualitatively

different. Such a statement, therefore, wears an entirely different

complexion, as compared to a statement made by the same politician

before his election to public office. The statement, in the present case,

is not, therefore, merely a statement by a politician, but a statement by

the Chief Minister of the State, and cannot, therefore, be lightly

dismissed.

38. We cannot, therefore, decide the present lis on the premise that

the assurance held out by the Chief Minister in his press conference

dated 29 March 2020 was merely a “statement made by a politician”,

of which no serious note was required to be taken.

39. Whether, however, the assurance contained in the statement

could translate into a mandamus in a court of law is, however, a

LPA 349/2021 Page 22 of 50

somewhat more nuanced issue, with which we are essentially

concerned.

III. A preliminary point

40. The prayer clause, in the writ petition, read thus:

“In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is most

respectfully prayed that this Court may be pleased to:

a. Pass an appropriate writ of mandamus or order

directing the Government of NCT of Delhi (R1) to honour

the promise made by its Chief Minister (R2) on 29.03.2020.

b. Make the above writ or order, if in favour of the

Petitioners, applicable to the people who have already

written to R2, and other tenants and landlords placed in a

situation similar to that of Petitioners.

c. Pass any other direction, order or writ is this Court

may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the instant

case.”

41. The impugned judgment directs the State to take a decision as

to implementation of the statement made by the Chief Minister on 29

March 2020, without restricting the direction to any particular part or

facet of the statement.

42. The statement of the Chief Minister, dated 29 March 2020,

however, held out two promises, not one. The first was that landlords

could not compel migrant tenants, occupying rented premises, to pay

the rent, during the period the lockdown remained in force. The

second was that the State would pay the said rent.

LPA 349/2021 Page 23 of 50

43. There is a qualitative difference between these assurances,

apropos their enforceability. This is because, while the first

assurance was preceded by the DDMA Order No. 122-A of the same

day, the second was not. The DDMA Order No. 122-A proscribed

collection of rent by landlords from impecunious migrant tenants

during the period the lockdown remained in force, but did not contain

any assurance that the rent would be paid by the State.

44. The prayer clause in the writ petition, and the relief ultimately

granted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment,

covers both these assurances. They are not limited to the assurance,

by the State, to disgorge the rent payable by the migrant tenants to

their landlords.

IV. The position in law

45. Before addressing these issues in greater detail, we may, even

at this juncture, set out what we find the legal position to be.

46. The law, as per discussion hereinafter would reveal, would

permit enforcement of the first assurance, proscribing collection of

rent by landlords from migrant tenants during the period of the

lockdown, as it was not merely an assurance contained in a statement

of the Chief Minister, but was also contained in the DDMA Order No.

122-A of the same date, which was never challenged.

LPA 349/2021 Page 24 of 50

47. However, the second assurance, i.e., that the rent would be paid

by the State, is not a legally enforceable assurance, even applying the

principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. This is

because the assurance was restricted merely to a statement made

during the press conference held by the Chief Minister on 29 March

2020, and was never reduced to writing in the form of any official

document or communication made known to the public.

48. A mere statement made by the Chief Minister would not be

enforceable in law, even if the citizens to whom it was made believed

it to be so. Inasmuch as the assurance to pay the rent, out of State

funds, was not translated to any written document, Office

Memorandum, Notification, Circular, or any other instrument having

the force of law, it cannot be enforced merely because it was made in

a statement during the press conference. That, as we see it, is the law

which emerges from the decisions of the Supreme Court on the point.

49. In fact, the Supreme Court goes to the extent of holding that

such a statement does not even constitute a “promise”, apart from

independently ruling that it is not enforceable on the principle of

promissory estoppel.

V. Examining the legal position

50. Let us review the circumstances which preceded, and

succeeded, the assurance extended by the Chief Minister in his

statement dated 29 March 2020. COVID struck in mid March 2020.

LPA 349/2021 Page 25 of 50

The Prime Minister announced a nationwide lockdown on movement

of the public, save in certain exceptional circumstances, for the period

25 May 2020 to 31 May 2020. During this period, the DDMA, in its

Order dated 29 May 2020, directed landlords not to insist on payment

of rent by migrants for a period of one month or evict them from the

tenanted premises in their occupation, so as to ensure that the migrant

tenants were not on the streets. The Order did not, however, contain

any assurance that the rent payable by the migrants to the landlords

would be paid by the State. The Chief Minister, however, in his press

conference held on the same day, i.e. 29 May 2020, did extend such

an assurance, and it is that assurance which forms the nub of

controversy.

51. The press conference was not followed, however, by the

issuance of any official document, such as an Office Memorandum,

Notification, Public Notice or Circular, reducing the assurance held

out by the Chief Minister to writing. Why, is not for us to hazard any

view, but the circumstance was, at the least, extremely unfortunate.

We are clear in our mind that the State Government of the day ought

to have translated the assurance given by the Chief Minister into a

written document, so that it would acquire legal form and sanctity.

52. That, however, never happened. Resulting in our requiring to

decide whether the learned Single Judge was correct in holding that

the assurance, only contained as it was in the statement of the Chief

Minister during the press conference, is enforceable as such.

LPA 349/2021 Page 26 of 50

53. While we have no doubt that the migrants, and their landlords,

who may have heard the statement, legitimately believed in its

enforceability, the belief of the migrants and the landlords cannot

translate into authority, on the part of the Court, to issue a writ of

mandamus, commanding its compliance. A mandamus can issue only

to compel performance of a duty which the State, or public authority,

is required, in law, to perform. If no such legal liability exists, no writ

of mandamus can issue.

54. We are clear, in our mind, that the fact that the statement was

made consequent on the onset of COVID, and the circumstances in

which it was made, cannot influence us in compelling its

performance. Else, the law would become totally subjective, and

statements could be made enforceable, or not enforceable, merely on

the basis of the circumstances in which they were made. That, in our

view, cannot be the law. Expressed otherwise, we cannot bind the

State to the assurance contained in the statement of the Chief Minister

merely because of the circumstances in which it was made, if said

assurance is not, otherwise, enforceable in law.

55. A “promise”, in law, has its own connotations, as it becomes

enforceable against the promisor. While there may not be any

substantial difference, in this context, between an “assurance” and a

“promise”, a “promise”, when made by the Government to the

citizens, has its own indicia.

LPA 349/2021 Page 27 of 50

56. We proceed, now, to examine what the Supreme Court holds,

on the issue.

57. Ganesh Rice Mills

57.1 This distinction is starkly reflected in the decision in Ganesh

Rice Mills which, though a short, order, is clear and unequivocal:

“1. Leave granted.

2. The only point decided by the High Court is that the

Finance Minister's statement on the floor of the House must be

held to be binding and the Union was stopped

23

from realising the

disputed cess from the appellants. It has been stated that the writ

petitioner had acted to his prejudice on the basis of the promise

made by the Finance Minister. We are of the view that speech

made in Parliament by the Finance Minister cannot be treated as

a promise or representation made to the writ petitioner and the

principle of promissory estoppel was wrongly applied by the High

Court. No case of promissory estoppel has been made out on the

facts of this case.

3. In that view of the matter, the judgment under appeal is set

aside. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.”

57.2 Ganesh Rice Mills holds, clearly and unequivocally, that a

speech made in Parliament by the Finance Minister is not a promise

or representation to the petitioner before the Supreme Court, as would

justify applying the principle of promissory estoppel. While the nature

of the statement made by the Finance Minister on the floor of the

House, the circumstances in which it was made, whether it was

directed towards the appellants before the Supreme Court, are

unknown, it appears clear, from the pronouncement, that such a

23

sic estopped?

LPA 349/2021 Page 28 of 50

statement cannot, by itself, is neither a promise, nor enforceable by

applying the principle of promissory estoppel.

58. K.K. Mohandas

58.1 The exact circumstances in which the issue of promissory

estoppel arose for consideration in K.K. Mohandas are explicit from

the opening sentence in para 18 of the report in that case, which reads:

“18. What is pleaded in this case at best is that in his Budget

speech the Minister concerned had held out to the public at large

that he was proposing to ban sale of toddy in the whole of the State

and this had induced the plaintiffs to believe that the sales in arrack

would go up resulting in their offering higher bid amounts for the

right to sell arrack for Excise Year 1990-1991.”

58.2 Mr. Vashisht relies on the following paragraph from the report,

to contend that the reliance, by the learned Single Judge, on the

principle of promissory estoppel, was misconceived:

“23. That apart, this Court in Express Newspapers (P)

Ltd. v. Union of India

24

has held that the principle of estoppel

does not operate at the level of government policy. In Union of

India v. Ganesh Rice Mills this Court had categorically held that

a speech made in Parliament by a Minister cannot be treated as a

promise or representation made to a person attracting the

principle of promissory estoppel. In Pine Chemicals

Ltd. v. Assessing Authority

25

this Court held that a Finance

Minister's statement referring to a proposal to continue the grant of

exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of ten years is

merely a budget proposal which could not give rise to any right to

the parties and it did not amount to a decision, order or notification

extending the period of exemption which was required to found a

plea based on promissory estoppel. The manner in which the courts

24

(1986) 1 SCC 133

25

(1992) 2 SCC 683

LPA 349/2021 Page 29 of 50

below including the High Court got over the principle enunciated

by these decisions leaves much to be desired.

24. Thus, it would be seen that the plaintiffs are not entitled to

found any case of promissory estoppel merely on the basis of the

speech made by the Minister in the Assembly of a proposal to ban

sale of toddy in the State.”

(Emphasis supplied)

58.3 Mr. Vashisht is, therefore, correct in his submission that

promissory estoppel does not operate at the level of Government

policy. There can be no gainsaying the position, in fact or in law, that

the decision to bear the rent for all migrant labourers and workers,

irrespective of the circumstances in which it was taken, pertains to the

realm of Government policy. At least ordinarily, therefore, the

principle of promissory estoppel would not apply in such a case.

58.4 Significantly, K.K. Mohandas relies upon, and reiterates,

Ganesh Rice Mills.

59. Nestle

59.1 Nestle, as we have noted, has been cited, and relied upon, in the

impugned judgment. Mr. Vashisht, however, invites reference to the

following paragraphs from the report:

“3. The circumstances under which the respondents had

approached the Court chronologically commenced with an

announcement made by the then Chief Minister of Punjab on 26-2-

1996 while addressing dairy farmers at a State-level function, that

the State Government had abolished purchase tax on milk and milk

products in the State. This announcement was given wide publicity

in several newspapers in the State.

LPA 349/2021 Page 30 of 50

*****

25. In other words, promissory estoppel long recognised as a

legitimate defence in equity was held to found a cause of action

against the Government, even when, and this needs to be

emphasised, the representation sought to be enforced was legally

invalid in the sense that it was made in a manner which was not in

conformity with the procedure prescribed by statute.

*****

28. This Court rejected all the three pleas of the Government. It

reiterated the well-known preconditions for the operation of the

doctrine:

(1) a clear and unequivocal promise knowing and

intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee;

(2) such acting upon the promise by the promisee so

that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go

back on the promise.

29. As for its strengths it was said: that the doctrine was not

limited only to cases where there was some contractual

relationship or other pre-existing legal relationship between the

parties. The principle would be applied even when the promise is

intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship

which would arise in future. The Government was held to be

equally susceptible to the operation of the doctrine in whatever

area or field the promise is made — contractual, administrative or

statutory. To put it in the words of the Court:

“The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a

result of this decision, that where the Government makes a

promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by

the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance

on it, alters his position, the Government would be held

bound by the promise and the promise would be

enforceable against the Government at the instance of the

promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for

the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of

a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the

Constitution.

*****

[E]quity will, in a given case where justice and fairness

demand, prevent a person from insisting on strict legal

rights, even where they arise, not under any contract, but on

his own title deeds or under statute.

LPA 349/2021 Page 31 of 50

*****

Whatever be the nature of the function which the

Government is discharging, the Government is subject to

the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential

ingredients of this rule are satisfied, the Government can be

compelled to carry out the promise made by it.”

(emphasis added)

30. So much for the strengths. Then come the limitations.

These are:

(1) Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an

equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so

requires. But it is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper

and adequate material placed by the Government, that

overriding public interest requires that the Government

should not be held bound by the promise but should be free

to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to

enforce the promise against the Government.

(2) No representation can be enforced which is

prohibited by law in the sense that the person or authority

making the representation or promise must have the power

to carry out the promise. If the power is there, then subject

to the preconditions and limitations noted earlier, it must be

exercised. Thus, if the statute does not contain a provision

enabling the Government to grant exemption, it would not

be possible to enforce the representation against the

Government, because the Government cannot be compelled

to act contrary to the statute. But if the statute confers

power on the Government to grant the exemption, the

Government can legitimately be held bound by its promise

to exempt the promisee from payment of sales tax.

*****

33. Of course, it was also found that the representator had no

authority to make the representation it had. To that extent the

decision could not be said to have deviated from the earlier

pronouncements of the law.

*****

LPA 349/2021 Page 32 of 50

40. The case of Kasinka Trading v. Union of India

26

cited by

the appellant is an authority for the proposition that the mere

issuance of an exemption notification under a provision in a fiscal

statute such as Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, could not

create any promissory estoppel because such an exemption by its

very nature is susceptible to being revoked or modified or

subjected to other conditions. In other words, there is no

unequivocal representation. The seeds of equivocation are inherent

in the power to grant exemption. Therefore, an exemption

notification can be revoked without falling foul of the principle of

promissory estoppel. It would not, in the circumstances, be

necessary for the Government to establish an overriding equity in

its favour to defeat the petitioner's plea of promissory estoppel.

The Court also held that the Government of India had justified the

withdrawal of exemption notification on relevant reasons in the

public interest. Incidentally, the Court also noticed the lack of

established prejudice to the promises when it said:

“The burden of customs duty etc. is passed on to the

consumer and therefore the question of the appellants being

put to a huge loss is not understandable.”

(See also Shrijee Sales Corpn. v. Union of

India

27

and STO v. Shree Durga Oil Mills

28

.) We do not see the

relevance of this decision to the facts of this case. Here the

representations are clear and unequivocal.

41. Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab

29

is an

example of where despite the petitioner having established the

ingredients of promissory estoppel, the representation could not be

enforced against the Government because the Court found that the

Government's assurance was incompetent and illegal and “a fraud

on the Constitution and a breach of faith of the people”. This

principle would also not be applicable in these appeals. No one is

being asked to act contrary to the statute. What is being sought is a

direction on the Government to grant the necessary exemption.

The grant of exemption cannot be said to be contrary to the statute.

The statute does not debar the grant. It envisages it.

42. Although the view expressed by two Judges in Jit Ram

30

has been disapproved in Godfrey Philips

31

it was ostensibly

resuscitated in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal

26

(1995) 1 SCC 274

27

(1997) 3 SCC 398

28

(1998) 1 SCC 572

29

(1992) 2 SCC 411

30

Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11

31

Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd, (1985) 4 SCC 369

LPA 349/2021 Page 33 of 50

Revenue Officer, A.P.

32

In that case the State Government had the

power to remit assessment under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh

Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963. Section 11 of that

Act provided for exemption to be made by an order of the State

Government which was required to be published in the Andhra

Pradesh Gazette prior to which the order had to be laid on the table

of the Legislative Assembly. The Court construed the provisions of

the State Act and came to the conclusion that the nature of the

power under Section 11 did not amount to delegated legislation but

conditional legislation. It was held that:

“If the statute requires that a particular act should be done

in a particular manner and if it is found, as we have found

hereinbefore, that the act done by the Government is

invalid and ineffective for non-compliance with the

mandatory requirements of law, it would be rather curious

if it is held that notwithstanding such non-compliance, it

yet constitutes a ‘promise’ or a ‘representation’ for the

purpose of invoking the rule of promissory/equitable

estoppel. Accepting such a plea would amount to nullifying

the mandatory requirements of law besides providing a

licence to the Government or other body to act ignoring the

binding provisions of law. Such a course would render the

mandatory provisions of the enactment meaningless and

superfluous. Where the field is occupied by an enactment,

the executive has to act in accordance therewith,

particularly where the provisions are mandatory in nature.

There is no room for any administrative action or for doing

the thing ordained by the statute otherwise than in

accordance therewith. Where, of course, the matter is not

governed by a law made by a competent legislature, the

executive can act in its executive capacity since the

executive power of the State extends to matters with

respect to which the legislature of a State has the power to

make laws (Article 162 of the Constitution). The

proposition urged by the learned counsel for the appellant

falls foul of our constitutional scheme and public interest. It

would virtually mean that the rule of promissory estoppel

can be pleaded to defeat the provisions of law whereas the

said rule, it is well settled, is not available against a

statutory provision. The sanctity of law and the sanctity of

the mandatory requirement of the law cannot be allowed to

be defeated by resort to rules of estoppel. None of the

decisions cited by the learned counsel say that where an act

is done in violation of a mandatory provision of a statute,

32

(1996) 6 SCC 634

LPA 349/2021 Page 34 of 50

such act can still be made a foundation for invoking the

rule of promissory/equitable estoppel. Moreover, when the

Government acts outside its authority, as in this case, it is

difficult to say that it is acting within its ostensible

authority.”

*****

45. None of these decisions has been considered in I.T.C.

Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P.

except for a brief reference to Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.'s judgment

which was explained away as not being an authority for the

proposition that even where the Government has to and can act

only under and in accordance with a statute — an act done by the

Government in violation thereof can be treated as a presentation to

found a plea of promissory estoppel. But that is exactly what the

learned Judge had said.”

(Italics in original; underscoring supplied)

59.2 It is necessary to note the nature of the dispute which was

before the Supreme Court in Nestle. The principle of promissory

estoppel, in that case, was sought to be invoked on the basis of an

announcement made by the Chief Minister that the State Government

had abolished purchase tax on milk and milk products in the State.

Subsequently, a policy decision was taken not to abolish purchase tax,

despite the statement made by the Chief Minister. It was specifically

pleaded, before the Supreme Court, that abolition of tax had to be by

way of an executive or legislative instrument, and not by a mere

statement made by the Chief Minister.

59.3 The passages on which Mr. Vashisht relies, and which we have

reproduced supra, themselves enunciate the following propositions:

LPA 349/2021 Page 35 of 50

(i) The principle of promissory estoppel would apply even if

the representation, of which enforcement is sought on the said

principle, is made in a manner which is not in conformity with

the statute.

(ii) The principle of promissory estoppel also applies where

the promise intends to create a relationship in the future.

(iii) The promise would bind, whether it is made in a field

which is contractual, administrative or statutory.

(iv) If the ingredients of promissory estoppel are satisfied, the

Government can be bound to the promise.

(v) Promissory estoppel, however, has to yield to equity.

This would, however, apply only where the Court is satisfied,

on the basis of empirical and adequate material, that overriding

public interest requires that the Government be not bound by

the promise.

(vi) Promissory estoppel would not apply if the promise is to

perform an act prohibited by law. Any action taken in a field

covered by an enactment has to be taken in accordance with the

enactment itself, and a promise, envisaging performance of an

act otherwise than as provided in the enactment, would be

unenforceable in law.

LPA 349/2021 Page 36 of 50

(vii) Promissory estoppel would also not apply where the

authority making the promise did not have the authority to do

so.

(viii) No promissory estoppel would apply in a case such as

grant of exemption, as an exemption by its very nature is

capable of being revoked, modified, or subjected to conditions

at a later point of time.

59.4 The learned Single Judge has, in the impugned judgment, relied

on Nestle to hold that the State was bound by the assurance given by

the Chief Minister, that the rent of the migrants, to their landlords,

would be paid by the State.

60. Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat

33

60.1 Before examining the correctness of this finding, we may also

advert to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Arvind Industries.

The appellants before the Supreme Court, in that case, were

manufacturers of edible oil. On 9 September 1969, the State

Government issued a press note that new industries would be granted

exemption from sales tax for five years from commencement of

production. On 3 March 1970, statements were made by the Chief

Minister and the Finance Minister of the State, on the floor of the

Legislative Assembly, to the same effect. Following this, on 29 April

1970, the State Government issued a notification under Section 49(2)

33

(1995) 6 SCC 53

LPA 349/2021 Page 37 of 50

of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, expressing satisfaction of the State

Government that circumstances existed, which made it necessary to

amend the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970. Following this, Rule 42-A

was introduced in the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, granting drawback, set

off or refund of the tax paid on purchase of raw materials by any new

industry, which were used in the manufacture of goods for sale. This

facility was, however, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions,

which included obtaining of a certificate from the Commissioner of

Industries, Gujarat, to the effect that the new industry had been

commissioned in an area beyond 24 km from the municipal limits of

Ahmedabad and Baroda and 16 km from the municipal limits of

Surat, Bhavnagar, Rajkot and Jamnagar. This notification was

available for a period of five years from the date of commissioning of

the industry. However, by a subsequent notification dated 17 July

1971, solvent extraction of oil, as an industry, was removed from the

scope of the earlier notifications.

60.2 The appellants before the Supreme Court challenged the

notification dated 17 July 1971, contending that, on the basis of the

promise held out by the Finance Minister and the Chief Minister of

the State, and the notifications issued thereafter, the appellants had set

up their solvent extraction industry and that, by the subsequent

notification dated 17 July 1971, the benefit held out by the Chief

Minister and the Finance Minister could not therefore be withdrawn.

The principle of promissory estoppel was sought to be pressed into

service.

LPA 349/2021 Page 38 of 50

60.3 The Supreme Court summarily rejected the argument, thus:

“9. The appellant has been entirely unable to make out any

factual basis for a case of promissory estoppel. The appellant

cannot claim that merely because it had set up its industrial unit at

Junagadh at a certain point of time, the fiscal laws of the State

must remain unaltered from that date. The appellant has not been

able to show that some definite promise was made by or on behalf

of the Government and the appellant had acted upon that promise

to its detriment and thereafter the changes effected by the

notification dated 17-7-1971 have caused great prejudice to the

appellant.

10. In the premises, it is not necessary to go into the question

of applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the field

of fiscal legislation.

11. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to

costs.”

(Emphasis supplied)

60.4 Clearly, therefore, Arvind Industries reiterates the principle

that statements made by the Chief Minister and the Finance Minister

on the floor of the house, even if they hold out some benefit as being

made available to the citizens, do not constitute an enforceable

promise in law.

61. While Nestlé tilts more towards the assessee and the industry

than Arvind Industries, a careful reading of the principles enunciated

in Nestlé would reveal that, even on their basis, it cannot be said that

the assurance contained in the press conference held by the Chief

Minister on 29 March 2020, that the State would bear the rent to be

paid by the migrants to their landlords, was enforceable by

mandamus.

LPA 349/2021 Page 39 of 50

62. Unlike the assurance that landlords would not recover rent from

migrant tenants during the period of lockdown, the DDMA Order No.

122-A did not envisage payment of said rent by the State. As such,

the said assurance, as extended by the Chief Minister in his press

conference on 29 March 2020, was not supported by any provision,

statutory or executive, having the force of law. To that extent, the

Chief Minister had undertaken to do something for which the law did

not provide.

63. Mr Jain also sought to place reliance on the Disaster

Management Act and the Epidemic Diseases Act, to contend that the

assurance fell within the scope of authority of the State as envisaged

in the said statutes.

64. Section 2(1)

34

of the Epidemic Diseases Act empowers the

State, whenever it is visited by, or threatened with, any outbreak of

any dangerous epidemic, to take such measures as the State deems

necessary to prevent such outbreak or the spread of the disease. By

directing landlords not to evict migrant tenants, who were not in a

position to pay rent, from their premises, the requisite measures, in

terms of Section 2(1) of the Epidemic Diseases Act, to prevent the

spread of COVID, already stood taken by the State. The further

assurance, in the press conference of the Chief Minister, that the State

34

2. Power to take special measures and prescribe regulations as to dangerous epidemic disease. –

(1) When at any time the State Government is satisfied that the State or any part thereof is

visited by, or threatened with, an out-break of any dangerous epidemic disease, the State

Government, if it thinks that the ordinary provisions of the law for the time being in force are

insufficient for the purpose, may take, or require or empower any person to take, such measures

and, by public notice, prescribe such temporary regulations to be observed by the public or by any

person or class of persons as it shall deem necessary to prevent the outbreak of such disease or the

spread thereof, and may determine in what manner and by whom any expenses incurred (including

compensation if any) shall be defrayed.

LPA 349/2021 Page 40 of 50

would pay the said rent to the landlords cannot, to our mind, be

treated as necessary to prevent the spread of COVID or, therefore, be

legitimized under Section 2(1) of the EDA.

65. In a similar vein, Section 38(1)

35

of the Disaster Management

Act obligates the State Government to take all measures, as it deems

necessary or expedient, for the purpose of disaster management.

“Disaster” is defined, in Section 2(d) as meaning “a catastrophe,

mishap, calamity or grave currency in any area, arising from natural

or man-made causes, or by accident or negligence which results in

substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and

destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment,

and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping

capacity of the community of the affected area”. It goes without

saying that the COVID pandemic eminently qualifies as a “disaster”,

within the meaning of this definition.

66. Section 38(2) of the Disaster Management Act enumerates

measures which the State Government may take under Section 38(1),

and is worded inclusively, meaning that the enumeration is not

exhaustive. Section 38(2)(l)

36

envisages “such other matters as it

deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing effective

implementation of provisions of” the Disaster Management Act.

35

38. State Government to take measures.—

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, each State Government shall take all measures

specified in the guidelines laid down by the National Authority and such further measures as it

deems necessary or expedient, for the purpose of disaster management.

36

(2) The measures which the State Government may take under sub-section (1) include measures with

respect to all or any of the following matters, namely:—

*****

(l) such other matters as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing

effective implementation of provisions of this Act.

LPA 349/2021 Page 41 of 50

Section 39(a)

37

, titled “Responsibilities of departments of the State

Government” obligates every department of the State Government to,

inter alia, “take measures necessary for prevention of disasters,

mitigation, preparedness and capacity-building in accordance with the

guidelines laid down by the National Authority and the State

Authority”. No guidelines, laid down by the NDMA or DDMA,

authorizing rent payable by the migrants to their landlords to be

defrayed from the State exchequer, has been cited by Mr. Jain and,

indeed, we are sanguine that there are none.

67. The assurance, by the Chief Minister, in his press conference,

that the rent payable by the migrant tenants to their landlords would

be paid by the State does not find support, therefore, from statute,

executive instruction, or any other instrument having the force of law.

The assurance was apparently made in the heat of the situation, which

was unquestionably unprecedented, so as to further incentivize the

migrant tenants to remain indoors, but it was without any legal

authority whatsoever.

68. Order No. 122-A had been issued by the DDMA on the very

day when the Chief Minister, in his press conference, assured that the

State would pay the rent of the migrant workers/labourers. However,

the said Order did not envisage payment of rent by the State. There is

nothing, before us, to indicate that, before he extended the said

assurance, the Chief Minister, or the executive authorities below him,

37

39. Responsibilities of departments of the State Government. – It shall be the responsibility of

every department of the Government of a State to—

(a) take measures necessary for prevention of disasters, mitigation, preparedness and

capacity-building in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Authority and the

State Authority;

LPA 349/2021 Page 42 of 50

had assessed the financial and other implications of the assurance, or

the impact that it would have on the State exchequer. Given the

position that the country found itself at that point of time, we indeed

doubt whether any such exercise was even possible, let alone within

the span of a single day.

69. We are, therefore, prima facie of the opinion that the assurance,

by the Chief Minister, that the State would bear the rent of all

migrants, was not made after the requisite degree of study and

application of mind to all relevant aspects. The impugned judgment,

too, does not say so.

70. Insofar as the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge

are concerned, suffice it to state, without burdening this judgment by a

ruling-by-ruling analysis, that none of the decisions holds that a mere

statement, even if made by the elected representative in the

Government, which is not preceded or followed by any executive

instruction, Rule, Regulation or other instrument having the force of

law, can be enforced through a mandamus.

71. We are, therefore, of the clear view that the assurance that the

State would pay the rent of the migrants, for the period during which

the lockdown remained in force, having not been followed up with

any official documentation to that effect, cannot be enforced by a writ

of mandamus.

LPA 349/2021 Page 43 of 50

72. Before closing the discussion on this issue, we deem it

appropriate to reproduce, here, para 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by

the State before the learned Single Judge, by way of response to the

Writ Petition:

“6. It is reiterated that the present Petition seeks enforcement of

a statement and the same is not maintainable. It is submitted that

statements made by political personalities cannot be enforced

through the judicial process if not backed by any policy decision.

The relief sought in the present Petition is contrary to the settled

position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a

catena of judgements. It is a matter of public knowledge that even

in recent memory, several political leaders across parties have

made several statements. If every such statement becomes the

subject matter of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India then floodgates will open and pave way for all sorts of

misplaced writ petitions, such as the present one. It is therefore

submitted that the present Petition is liable to dismissed at the

threshold itself.”

We find such a stand truly surprising, coming from the executive

which was, at the time of the filing of the counter-affidavit, still

functioning under the Chief Minister whose statement was in issue.

For reasons unknown, the executive of the day was itself unwilling to

manifest the assurance, given by the Chief Minister, in an enforceable

policy decision. Absent any manifestation in the form of a formal

policy decision of the Government, the statement of the Chief

Minister, by itself, would be unenforceable in law.

VI. Legitimate expectation

73. Inasmuch as the question of applying the principle of legitimate

expectation would arise only if there existed, in the first instance, a

promise by the State to the migrants, and we have already held that no

LPA 349/2021 Page 44 of 50

such promise can, in law, be said to have been made, we do not deem

it necessary to dwell at length on the doctrine. Further, legitimate

expectation, even if found to exist, essentially ensures, before the

authority resiles from the promise, compliance with the principles of

natural justice. A detailed analysis of the doctrine is contained in

Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation

38

, which

holds:

“35. Legitimate expectations may come in various forms and

owe their existence to different kind of circumstances and it is not

possible to give an exhaustive list in the context of vast and fast

expansion of the governmental activities. They shift and change so

fast that the start of our list would be obsolete before we reached

the middle. By and large they arise in cases of promotions which

are in normal course expected, though not guaranteed by way of a

statutory right, in cases of contracts, distribution of largess by the

Government and in somewhat similar situations. For instance

discretionary grant of licences, permits or the like, carry with it a

reasonable expectation, though not a legal right to renewal or non-

revocation, but to summarily disappoint that expectation may be

seen as unfair without the expectant person being heard. But there

again the court has to see whether it was done as a policy or in the

public interest either by way of G.O., rule or by way of a

legislation. If that be so, a decision denying a legitimate

expectation based on such grounds does not qualify for

interference unless in a given case, the decision or action taken

amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore the limitation is

extremely confined and if the according of natural justice does not

condition the exercise of the power, the concept of legitimate

expectation can have no role to play and the court must not usurp

the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take

the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an

objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full

range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended.

Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion

of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the

decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere

on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest

based on legitimate expectation might be affected. For instance if

an authority who has full discretion to grant a licence prefers an

existing licence holder to a new applicant, the decision cannot be

38

(1993) 3 SCC 499

LPA 349/2021 Page 45 of 50

interfered with on the ground of legitimate expectation entertained

by the new applicant applying the principles of natural justice. It

can therefore be seen that legitimate expectation can at the most be

one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the

granting of relief is very much limited. It would thus appear that

there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation

should not be substantively protected than the reasons as to why it

should be protected. In other words such a legal obligation exists

whenever the case supporting the same in terms of legal principles

of different sorts, is stronger than the case against it. As observed

in Attorney General for New South Wales

39

: “To strike down the

exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding

the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual

would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism.

Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a

legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the

exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law.”

If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to

denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or

biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural

justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds

attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate

expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to

invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider

but the court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is

violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends

very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of

administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of

legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of

concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative

action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable

and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative

power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate

expectation is “not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural

justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court

out of review on the merits”, particularly when the element of

speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As

cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales the courts

should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal

limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful

litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc. can

successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by

directive principles thwarted to further his own interests. The

caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the

more important.”

39

Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin, (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327

LPA 349/2021 Page 46 of 50

74. The most authoritative pronouncement on legitimate

expectation is to be found in the decision of the Constitution Bench in

Sivananda C.T. v. High Court of Kerala

40

, which emphatically

underscores the position that legitimate expectation creates, at best, an

expectation, and not a legal right, even when a promise was made and

has been withdrawn:

“43. The underlying basis for the application of the doctrine of

legitimate expectation has expanded and evolved to include the

principles of good administration. Since citizens repose their trust

in the state, the actions and policies of the state give rise to

legitimate expectations that the state will adhere to its assurance or

past practice by acting in a consistent, transparent, and predictable

manner. The principles of good administration require that the

decisions of public authorities must withstand the test of

consistency, transparency, and predictability to avoid being

regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.

44. From the above discussion, it is evident that the doctrine of

substantive legitimate expectation is entrenched in Indian

administrative law subject to the limitations on its applicability in

given factual situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence

is keeping in line with the developments in the common law. The

doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation can be successfully

invoked by individuals to claim substantive benefits or

entitlements based on an existing promise or practice of a public

authority. However, it is important to clarify that the doctrine of

legitimate expectation cannot serve as an independent basis for

judicial review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such a

limitation is now well recognized in Indian jurisprudence

considering the fact that a legitimate expectation is not a legal

right. It is merely an expectation to avail a benefit or relief based

on an existing promise or practice. Although the decision by a

public authority to deny legitimate expectation may be termed as

arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the validity of the decision

itself can only be questioned on established principles of equality

and non-arbitrariness under Article 14. In a nutshell, an individual

who claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of

legitimate expectation has to establish: (i) the legitimacy of the

40

(2024) 3 SCC 799

LPA 349/2021 Page 47 of 50

expectation; and (ii) that the denial of the legitimate expectation

led to the violation of Article 14.”

(Emphasis supplied)

75. The above passage from Sivanandan C.T. was cited and

followed, very recently, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana

Mishra

41

.

76. Besides the fact that, as no legally enforceable promise can be

said to be contained in the press conference held by the Chief Minister

on 29 March 2020, that the State would pay the rent of the migrants,

the principle of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to bind the

State to the statement.

VII. The effect of the statement

77. At the same time, the assurance was only for a period of two to

three months. During the said period, the migrant workers and

labourers, who cannot be expected to be schooled in the niceties of

law, must have proceeded on the belief that the assurance was legally

binding and enforceable. Landlords, too, may have believed that the

rent would ultimately be paid by the State.

78. We have already held that the proscription against evicting of

migrants from tenanted premises, contained as it was in the DDMA

Order No. 122-A, was binding on the landlords. No challenge has ever

been laid to the said dispensation.

41

2026 SCC OnLine SC 37

LPA 349/2021 Page 48 of 50

79. The question then arises as to whether the landlords are to be

deprived the rent, for the premises let out to the migrants, during the

period for which the lockdown remained in effect.

80. Had the NDMA or DDMA held this to be a further step which

was necessary to curtail the spread of the pandemic, or had any

Executive Instruction, Circular, Memorandum, Rule or Regulation to

that effect been issued alongside the statement of the Chief Minister,

the assurance that the rent of the migrants would have been borne by

the State would have become enforceable in law as, then, the

assurance would have metamorphosed from a mere statement in a

press conference to a documented indicator of State intent. That,

however, never took place, and, we reiterate, most unfortunately.

81. The question of issuing a writ of mandamus, in the terms

sought by the petitioners does not, therefore, arise. If the Government

decides to act in accordance with the assurance, it would certainly be

at liberty to do so, but we cannot compel performance by mandamus.

F. Conclusion

82. We, therefore, dispose of this appeal by modifying the

directions contained in the impugned judgment in the following terms:

(i) The prayer, in the writ petition, for a direction to the

State to implement the assurance, contained in the press

LPA 349/2021 Page 49 of 50

conference dated 29 March 2020 of the Chief Minister, is

misconceived and is accordingly rejected.

(ii) In view of DDMA Order No. 122-A dated 29 March

2020, which has never been challenged, the landlords cannot be

allowed to recover, from their migrant tenants, the rent for the

period during which they continued to occupy the tenanted

premises, but were unable to move out owing to the COVID

imposed lockdown. This amnesty would, however, apply only

for the period the lockdown remained in force.

(iii) This would not, however, inhibit the State Government

from taking a policy decision regarding the assurance given by

the former Chief Minister in his press conference on 29 March

2020, regarding the State paying the rent of the migrants,

should it so deem appropriate. We reiterate our clear opinion,

however, that no mandamus could be issued to enforce the

statement made by the then Chief Minister in the press

conference on 29 March 2020.

(iv) We are unaware of the financial, logistical and other

implications of enforcement of the decision that the State would

bear the rent of the migrants, which, prima facie, appears to

have been taken on the spur of the moment, as it does not even

find reflection in the DDMA Order No. 122-A. We, therefore,

are not expressing any view, one way or the other, thereon.

LPA 349/2021 Page 50 of 50

83. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

84. There shall be no orders as to costs.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

APRIL 06, 2026