CRM-M-46237-2025 

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(127) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

  CRM-M-46237-2025 

Date of Decision: 26.08.2025

GURMEET SINGH 

... Petitioner

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA

...Respondent

CORAM:  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE  JASJIT SINGH BEDI

Present: Mr. Arpandeep Narula, Advocate

for the petitioner.

****

JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J. 

The prayer in the present petition under Section 528 of BNSS,

2023 is for quashing of the FIR No.0016 dated 18.01.2017 initially registered

under Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 506 (subsequently added Sections 201 & 109

IPC) at Police Station Ellenabad, District Sirsa (Annexure P-1), the final

Report No.1B dated 06.03.2025 (Annexure P-8) qua the petitioner and all

consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner who was the

initial complainant got registered an FIR No.0016 dated 18.01.2017  under

Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 506 (subsequently added Sections 201 & 109 IPC)

at Police Station Ellenabad, District Sirsa against six accused persons alleging

that the accused in connivance with each other had fraudulently induced the

petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.42,00,000/- approximately under the false

pretext of securing his son Amritpal Singh a job as an Assistant Sub-Inspector

in the Chandigarh Police with the aid of unnamed politicians and senior

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police officials. Later, when the son of the complainant was not provided

employment as promised, he sought the return of the same. The accused

repaid a sum of Rs.2 lakhs and sought time to repay the remaining amount.

However, they did not do so and to the contrary, threatened him with false

implication in cases. The copy of the FIR No.0016 dated 18.01.2017 under

Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 506 (subsequently added Sections 201 & 109 IPC)

Police Station Ellenabad, District Sirsa is attached as Annexure P-1 to the

petition.

3. The report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was presented against

accused Navraj and Azadwinder Singh while stating that accused Kashmir

Kaur, Nachhattar Singh, Gurbhej Singh and Balvir Singh were yet to be

arrested. The copy of the first challan dated 28.07.2017 is attached as

Annexure P-2 to the petition.

4. Navraj  Singh  and Azadwinder   Singh  approached  this  Court

seeking grant of regular bail vide CRM-M-39182-2017 titled as Navraj Singh

& another Vs. State of Haryana. This Court vide order dated 08.02.2018

observed as under:-

“Even if the version of the complainant is taken to be as gospal

truth, he would be seen as a party to the scam and would be

required to be nominated as an accused as well.

Let an affidavit of the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa be filed in

response to the observations made by this Court in this order.”

The copy of the order dated 08.02.2018 is attached as Annexure

P-3 to the petition.

5. In compliance of the aforementioned order, the Superintendent of

Police, Sirsa filed an affidavit stating before this Court that an application had

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been moved before the Trial Court seeking permission for re-investigation.

The copy of the order passed on 07.03.2018 containing the reference to the

affidavit of the S.P., Sirsa is annexed as Annexure P-4 to the petition.

6. Subsequent   thereto,   the   application   seeking   further

investigation/re-investigation was dismissed by the SDJM, Ellenabad vide

order dated 07.08.2019. The copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure P-

5 to the petition.

7. It may be pertinent to mention here that the application for re-

investigation filed by the Investigating Agency was misconceived and what

was required to be filed was an application for further investigation.

8. Accused Navraj Singh and Azadwinder Singh filed a petition in

this   Court   bearing   CRM-M-44269-2022   challenging   the  order   dated

07.08.2019   and   also   sought   an   inquiry   into   the   role  of   the

petitioner/complainant in the alleged incident. The said petition was disposed

of with the liberty to the petitioners to file a fresh petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C.   by   including   all   prayers   while   clarifying   that   the   order   dated

07.08.2019 passed by the SDJM, Ellenabad dismissing the plea of further

investigation/re-investigation would not come in the way of the petitioners

therein while deciding the fresh petition and that the same was to be decided

independently.   The   relevant   extract   of   the   order   dated   23.09.2022   is

reproduced as under:-

“It is clarified that the order dated 07.08.2019 shall not come in

the way of the petitioners while deciding the said petition, which

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shall be decided independently without being affected by the

principle of estoppel.”

The copy of the order dated 23.09.2022 is annexed as Annexure

P-6 to the petition.

9. In view of the observations made by this Court, accused Navraj

Singh and Azadwinder Singh filed a second petition bearing CRM-M-48689-

2022   praying   therein   for   a   fair   and   impartial   investigation.   The

aforementioned petition was disposed of with the directions to the concerned

Commissioner of Police to consider any application moved by the petitioners

seeking   fair   and   impartial   investigation.   The   copy  of   the   order   dated

29.10.2022 is annexed as Annexure P-7 to the petition.

10. In furtherance of the aforementioned order, Azadwinder Singh

sent an email dated 23.12.2024 to the S.P., Sirsa containing a reference to the

order dated 29.10.2022 passed in CRM-M-48689-2022. In compliance with

the   aforementioned   order,   the   ADGP,   Hisar   Range,   Hisar   vide   order

No.353/8-4   dated   03.01.2025   directed   the   constitution   of   a   Special

Investigation Team (SIT) for further investigation. The S.P., Sirsa constituted

an SIT for further investigation of the case vide order No.1158-63 dated

08.01.2025.   In   compliance   with   the   orders   of   the   S.P.,   Sirsa,   an   SIT

comprising of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ellenabad, Station House

Officer, P.S. Ellenabad, Incharge Crime Branch Ellenabad, Incharge Cyber

Jail Sirsa and L/Sub Inspector Saroj Bala filed a supplementary report under

Sections 120-B, 201, 406, 420 & 506 IPC (Section 109 of IPC added later on)

inculpating the complainant as an accused with the aid of Section 109 of the

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IPC. The copy of the supplementary challan dated 06.03.2025 under Sections

120-B, 201, 406, 420 & 506 IPC (Section 109 of IPC added later on) is

annexed as Annexure P-8 to the petition.

11. It is the FIR No.16 dated 18.01.2017  (Annexure P-1) and the

supplementary challan dated 06.03.2025 (Annexure P-8) to the extent that the

petitioner has been nominated as an accused which are under challenge in the

present petition.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the report

under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. has been submitted on the basis of a further

investigation by the Investigating Agency on its own without there being any

order for the same. The petitioner was a complainant in the case and his

subsequent conversion to him being an accused in the supplementary challan

is in violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as

material supplied by him during the course of the investigation is sought to be

used against him which would amount to self-incrimination. No offence under

Sections 406/420 IPC is made out as the complainant who is now accused

cannot   be   convicted   for   having   committed   cheating   or   criminal

misappropriation of himself and in the absence of any invocation of the

provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the question of the

culpability of the petitioner does not arise. He, therefore, prays that the FIR

(Annexure P-1) and the supplementary challan (Annexure P-8) to the extent

that inculpates the petitioner is liable to be quashed.

13. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

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14. The   first   contention   raised   by   the   petitioner   is  that   the

supplementary challan (Annexure P-8) could not have been submitted without

there being any directions of either this Court or the Magistrate for further

investigation and in any case further investigation could not have taken place

at a belated stage when evidence was already being recorded in the Trial

based on the first challan.

15. Before examining this contention of the petitioner, it would be

apposite to refer to the judgment in Vinay Tyagi Versus Irshad Ali @ Deepak

& others, 2013(2) RCR (Criminal) 197. The relevant extract is as under:-

“

13. Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the

scheme of the Code, now we must examine the powers of the

Court to direct investigation. Investigation can be ordered in

varied forms and at different stages. Right at the initial stage of

receiving the FIR or a complaint, the Court can direct

investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 156(1)

in exercise of its powers under Section 156(3) of the Code.

Investigation can be of the following kinds :

(i) Initial Investigation.

(ii) Further Investigation.

(iii) Fresh or de novo or re3investigation.

14. The initial investigation is the one which the empowered

police officer shall conduct in furtherance to registration of an

FIR. Such investigation itself can lead to filing of a final report

under Section 173(2) of the Code and shall take within its ambit

the investigation which the empowered officer shall conduct in

furtherance of an order for investigation passed by the court of

competent jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code.

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15. 'Further investigation' is where the Investigating Officer

obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final

report has been filed before the Court in terms of Section 173(8).

This power is vested with the Executive. It is the continuation of a

previous investigation and, therefore, is understood and described

as a 'further investigation'. Scope of such investigation is

restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary

evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the Court

even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary

investigation. It is commonly described as 'supplementary report'.

'Supplementary report' would be the correct expression as the

subsequent investigation is meant and intended to supplement the

primary investigation conducted by the empowered police officer.

Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does

not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial

investigation conducted by the investigating agency. This is a

kind of continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is

discovery of fresh evidence and in continuation of the same

offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence

incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in

complete contradistinction to a 'reinvestigation', 'fresh' or 'de

novo' investigation.

16. However, in the case of a 'fresh investigation',

'reinvestigation' or 'de novo investigation' there has to be a

definite order of the court. The order of the Court unambiguously

should state as to whether the previous investigation, for reasons

to be recorded, is incapable of being acted upon. Neither the

Investigating agency nor the Magistrate has any power to order

or conduct 'fresh investigation'. This is primarily for the reason

that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code. It is essential

that even an order of 'fresh'/'de novo' investigation passed by the

higher judiciary should always be coupled with a specific

direction as to the fate of the investigation already conducted.

The cases where such direction can be issued are few and far

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between. This is based upon a fundamental principle of our

criminal jurisprudence which is that it is the right of a suspect or

an accused to have a just and fair investigation and trial. This

principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained in

Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the

investigation ex facie is unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of

foul play, the courts would set aside such an investigation and

direct fresh or de novo investigation and, if necessary, even by

another independent investigating agency. As already noticed,

this is a power of wide plenitude and, therefore, has to be

exercised sparingly. The principle of rarest of rare cases would

squarely apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the

investigation is such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the

Court, the Court should be reluctant to interfere in such matters

to the extent of quashing an investigation and directing a 'fresh

investigation'. In the case of Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of

Delhi), [(2010)6 SCC 1], the Court stated that it is not only the

responsibility of the investigating agency, but also that of the

courts to ensure that investigation is fair and does not in any way

hamper the freedom of an individual except in accordance with

law. An equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is that high

responsibility lies upon the investigating agency not to conduct an

investigation in a tainted or unfair manner. The investigation

should not prima facie be indicative of a biased mind and every

effort should be made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands

above law de hors his position and influence in the society. The

maxim contra veritatem lex nunquam aliquid permittit applies to

exercise of powers by the courts while granting approval or

declining to accept the report. In the case of Gudalure M.J.

Cherian & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [(1992)1 SCC 397],

this Court stated the principle that in cases where charge3sheets

have been filed after completion of investigation and request is

made belatedly to reopen the investigation, such investigation

being entrusted to a specialised agency would normally be

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declined by the court of competent jurisdiction but nevertheless in

a given situation to do justice between the parties and to instil

confidence in public mind, it may become necessary to pass such

orders. Further, in the case of R.S. Sodhi, Advocate v. State of

U.P., [1994 SCC Supp. (1) 142], where allegations were made

against a police officer, the Court ordered the investigation to be

transferred to CBI with an intent to maintain credibility of

investigation, public confidence and in the interest of justice.

Ordinarily, the courts would not exercise such jurisdiction but the

expression 'ordinarily' means normally and it is used where there

can be an exception. It means in the large majority of cases but

not invariably. 'Ordinarily' excludes extra3 ordinary or special

circumstances. In other words, if special circumstances exist, the

court may exercise its jurisdiction to direct 'fresh investigation'

and even transfer cases to courts of higher jurisdiction which

may pass such directions.

17. Here, we will also have to examine the kind of reports that

can be filed by an investigating agency under the scheme of the

Code. Firstly, the FIR which the investigating agency is required

to file before the Magistrate right at the threshold and within the

time specified. Secondly, it may file a report in furtherance to a

direction issued under Section 156(3) of the Code. Thirdly, it can

also file a 'further report', as contemplated under Section 173(8).

Finally, the investigating agency is required to file a 'final report'

on the basis of which the Court shall proceed further to frame the

charge and put the accused to trial or discharge him as envisaged

by Section 227 of the Code.

18. Next question that comes up for consideration of this Court is

whether the empowered Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct

'further investigation' or 'fresh investigation'. As far as the latter

is concerned, the law declared by this Court consistently is that

the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct 'fresh' or 'de

novo' investigation. However, once the report is filed, the

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Magistrate has jurisdiction to accept the report or reject the same

right at the threshold. Even after accepting the report, it has the

jurisdiction to discharge the accused or frame the charge and put

him to trial. But there are no provisions in the Code which

empower the Magistrate to disturb the status of an accused

pending investigation or when report is, filed to wipe out the

report and its effects in law. Reference in this regard can be made

to K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala, [1998(2) RCR (Criminal)

719 : (1998) 5 SCC 223]; Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar

[(2008) 5 SCC 413], Nirmal Singh Kahlon v State of Punjab &

Ors. [2009(1) RCR (Criminal) 3 : 2008(6) Recent Apex

Judgments (R.A.J.) 555 : (2009) 1 SCC 441]; Mithabhai

Pashabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [2010(1) RCR

(Criminal) 171 : 2009(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 600 :

(2009) 6 SCC 332]; and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat [2010(4)

RCR (Criminal) 311 : 2010(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.)

267 : (2010) 12 SCC 254].

19. Now, we come to the former question, i.e., whether the

Magistrate has jurisdiction under Section 173(8) to direct further

investigation.

*** *** ***

30. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the various

judgments as afore3indicated, we would state the following

conclusions in regard to the powers of a magistrate in terms of

Section 173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the

Code :

1. The Magistrate has no power to direct 'reinvestigation' or

'fresh investigation' (de novo) in the case initiated on the basis of

a police report.

2. A Magistrate has the power to direct 'further investigation'

after filing of a police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the

Code.

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3. The view expressed in (2) above is in conformity with the

principle of law stated in Bhagwant Singh's case (supra) by a

three Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of

precedence.

4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision

therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The

language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as

to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of

the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section

173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the

language of Section 173(8).

5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a

construction which would advance the cause of justice and

legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to

reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation

to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtail the

power of the Court to the extent that even where the facts of the

case and the ends of justice demand, the Court can still not direct

the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it

could do on its own.

6. It has been a procedure of proprietary that the police has to

seek permission of the Court to continue 'further investigation'

and file supplementary charge3sheet. This approach has been

approved by this Court in a number of judgments. This as such

would support the view that we are taking in the present case.

31. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under

Section 173 of the Code, now we have to examine the kind of

reports that are contemplated under the provisions of the Code

and/or as per the judgments of this Court. The first and the

foremost document that reaches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is

the First Information Report. Then, upon completion of the

investigation, the police are required to file a report in terms of

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Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be appropriate to term this

report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of the case

of the prosecution before the Court. It is the record of the case and

the documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the Court

and then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of

the three options afore3noticed. Out of the stated options with the

Court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict

consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the

magistrate to direct 'further investigation' is a significant power

which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to

achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and

unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating

agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity is required to

ensure the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders

of the Court, including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its

own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a

supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt

with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that

the provisions of Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to

such reports in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code.

32. Both these reports have to be read conjointly and it is the

cumulative effect of the reports and the documents annexed thereto

to which the Court would be expected to apply its mind to

determine whether there exist grounds to presume that the accused

has committed the offence. If the answer is in the negative, on the

basis of these reports, the Court shall discharge an accused in

compliance with the provisions of Section 227 of the Code.

33. At this stage, we may also state another well3settled canon of

criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the

jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of

the Constitution of India to direct 'further investigation', 'fresh' or

'de novo' and even 'reinvestigation'. 'Fresh', 'de novo', and

'reinvestigation' are synonymous expressions and their result in law

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would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with the

power of transferring investigation from one agency to another,

provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is

also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the

superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection.

34. We have deliberated at some length on the issue that the powers

of the High Court under section 482 of the Code do not control or

limit, directly or impliedly, the width of the power of Magistrate

under Section 228 of the Code. Wherever a charge sheet has been

submitted to the Court, even this Court ordinarily would not reopen

the investigation, especially by entrusting the same to a specialised

agency. It can safely be stated and concluded that in an appropriate

case, when the court feels that the investigation by the police

authorities is not in the proper direction and that in order to do

complete justice and where the facts of the case demand, it is

always open to the Court to hand over the investigation to a

specialised agency. These principles have been reiterated with

approval in the judgments of this Court in the case of Disha v. State

of Gujarat & Ors., [2011(3) RCR (Criminal) 694 : 2011(4) Recent

Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 190 : (2011) 13 SCC 337]. Vineet Narain

& Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., [1998(1) RCR (Criminal) 357 :

(1998) 1 SCC 226], Union of India & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar Modi &

Ors., [1996(6) SCC 500] and Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of

Gujarat & Ors., [2010(1) RCR (Criminal) 738 : (2010)2 SCC 200].

35. The power to order/direct 'reinvestigation' or 'de novo'

investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in

exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code, there

is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except that

the investigating agency can file a closure report (where according

to the investigating agency, no offence is made out). Even such a

report is subject to acceptance by the learned Magistrate who, in

his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid

reasons, the Court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct

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'further investigation', or even on the basis of the record of the case

and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused.

36. The Code does not contain any provision which deals with the

court competent to direct 'fresh investigation', the situation in

which such investigation can be conducted, if at all, and finally the

manner in which the report so obtained shall be dealt with. The

superior courts can direct conduct of a 'fresh'/'de novo'

investigation, but unless it specifically directs that the report

already prepared or the investigation so far conducted will not

form part of the record of the case, such report would be deemed to

be part of the record. Once it is part of the record, the learned

Magistrate has no jurisdiction to exclude the same from the record

of the case. In other words, but for a specific order by the superior

court, the reports, whether a primary report or a report upon

'further investigation' or a report upon 'fresh investigation', shall

have to be construed and read conjointly. Where there is a specific

order made by the court for reasons like the investigation being

entirely unfair, tainted, undesirable or being based upon no truth,

the court would have to specifically direct that the investigation or

proceedings so conducted shall stand cancelled and will not form

part of the record for consideration by the Court of competent

jurisdiction.

37. The scheme of Section 173 of the Code even deals with the

scheme of exclusion of documents or statements submitted to the

Court. In this regard, one can make a reference to the provisions of

Section 173(6) of the Code, which empowers the investigating

agency to make a request to the Court to exclude that part of the

statement or record and from providing the copies thereof to the

accused, which are not essential in the interest of justice, and

where it will be inexpedient in the public interest to furnish such

statement. The framers of the law, in their wisdom, have

specifically provided a limited mode of exclusion, the criteria being

no injustice to be caused to the accused and greater public interest

CRM-M-46237-2025 

                                                                ::15::

being served. This itself is indicative of the need for a fair and

proper investigation by the concerned agency. What ultimately is

the aim or significance of the expression 'fair and proper

investigation' in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose.

Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in

accordance with law. Secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair

investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the

court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin paradigms of fair

investigation are satisfied, there will be the least requirement for

the court of law to interfere with the investigation, much less quash

the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing out the truth by

fair and investigative means in accordance with law would

essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or

cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of law to

pass a specific order as to the fate of the investigation, which in its

opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the settled principles of

investigative canons.

38. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how

the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied

by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there

is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the

Code to conduct 'further investigation' or file supplementary report

with the leave of the Court, the investigating agencies have not only

understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek

permission of the courts to conduct 'further investigation' and file

'supplementary report' with the leave of the court. The courts, in

some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The

requirement of seeking prior leave of the Court to conduct 'further

investigation' and/or to file a 'supplementary report' will have to be

read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of

Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea

expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the

matters which are understood and implemented for a long time,

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and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as

part of the interpretative process.

39. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view.

Firstly, through the doctrine of precedence, as afore3noticed, since

quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the

investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied

the principle. The matters which are understood and implemented

as a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law

would be good practice and such interpretation would be

permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea expositio.

Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the court would meet the ends

of justice and also provide adequate safeguard against a

suspect/accused.

40. We have already noticed that there is no specific embargo upon

the power of the learned Magistrate to direct 'further investigation'

on presentation of a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code.

Any other approach or interpretation would be in contradiction to

the very language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the Code for

giving precedence to proper administration of criminal justice. The

settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would support such

approach, particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the Code,

the Magistrate is the competent authority to take cognizance of an

offence. It is the Magistrate who has to decide whether on the basis

of the record and documents produced, an offence is made out or

not, and if made out, what course of law should be adopted in

relation to committal of the case to the court of competent

jurisdiction or to proceed with the trial himself. In other words, it is

the judicial conscience of the Magistrate which has to be satisfied

with reference to the record and the documents placed before him

by the investigating agency, in coming to the appropriate

conclusion in consonance with the principles of law. It will be a

travesty of justice, if the court cannot be permitted to direct 'further

investigation' to clear its doubt and to order the investigating

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agency to further substantiate its charge sheet. The satisfaction of

the learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement

of further proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction.

Whether the Magistrate should direct 'further investigation' or not

is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a given case.

The learned Magistrate or the higher court of competent

jurisdiction would direct 'further investigation' or 'reinvestigation'

as the case may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the

Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the courts of

higher jurisdiction can direct further, re3investigation or even

investigation de novo depending on the facts of a given case. It will

be the specific order of the court that would determine the nature of

investigation. In this regard, we may refer to the observations made

by this court in the case of Sivanmoorthy and Others v. State

represented by Inspector of Police, [2012(1) RCR (Criminal) 317 :

2011(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 467 : (2010) 12 SCC 29].

In light of the above discussion, we answer the questions

formulated at the opening of this judgment as follows :

Answer to Question No. 1

40.1. The court of competent jurisdiction is duty bound to consider

all reports, entire records and documents submitted therewith by

the Investigating Agency as its report in terms of Section 173(2) of

the Code. This Rule is subject to only the following exceptions;

a) Where a specific order has been passed by the learned

Magistrate at the request of the prosecution limited to exclude any

document or statement or any part thereof;

b) Where an order is passed by the higher courts in exercise of its

extra3 ordinary or inherent jurisdiction directing that any of the

reports i.e. primary report, supplementary report or the report

submitted on 'fresh investigation' or 're3investigation' or any part of

it be excluded, struck off the court record and be treated as non est.

Answer to Question No. 2

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40.2. No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a 'fresh', 'de

novo' or 're3investigation' in relation to the offence for which it has

already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It is

only upon the orders of the higher courts empowered to pass such

orders that aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which

event the higher courts will have to pass a specific order with

regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the

report so filed before the court of the learned magistrate.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. The   aforementioned   judgment   has   been   relied   upon  by   the

Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  Amrutbhai   Shambhubhai   Patel   Versus

Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel & others, 2017(1) RCR (Criminal) 1030.

17. A perusal of the aforementioned judgments would show that

while ‘re-investigation’ means a ‘de novo investigation’ virtually washing off

the investigation so conducted ‘further investigation’ would mean  some

additional evidence has been found against the existing accused or some other

person is to be nominated as an accused to face Trial along with the existing

accused   and   therefore,   some   additional   investigation   is   required   to   be

conducted.

18. For   the   purposes   of   ‘re-investigation’/’de   novo  investigate’

directions for the same must be issued by a superior Court such as the High

Court and no such directions can be issued by a Magistrate. As regards

‘further investigation’, it is the domain of the Investigating Agency but it is

desirable that prior intimation of the same is given to the Magistrate as the

primary   report   under   Section   173(2)   Cr.P.C.   already  stands   submitted.

Further, in the case of multiple reports under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. and

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173(8) Cr.P.C., it is only a superior court such as the High Court that can

direct the exclusion of any of the reports for the purposes of framing of

charges. If not so done, it is the domain of the Trial Court to consider all the

reports under Sections 173(2) Cr.P.C. and 173(8) Cr.P.C to either frame

charges or discharge the accused.

19. Coming back to the facts of the instant case, the order of this

Court dated 08.02.2018 (Annexure P-3) in the prayer for regular bail filed by

Navraj Singh and Azadwinder Singh would be in the nature of a direction for

further investigation. However, it was the Investigating Agency that had

erroneously moved an application for ‘re-investigation’ which obviously was

to be declined and has rightly been done so vide order dated 07.08.2018. Be

that   as   it   may,   when  the   order   dated   07.08.2019   (Annexure   P-5)   was

challenged before this Court, on 23.09.2022  this Court permitted Navraj

Singh and Azadwinder Singh to file an appropriate petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C.   seeking   further   investigation   and   clarified  that   the   order   dated

07.08.2019 would not come in the way of this Court to decide such petition

on merits. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.10.2022 in CRM-M-48689-2022,

this Court permitted the petitioners therein to seek a fair and impartial

investigation by representing to the concerned Commissioner of Police. In

furtherance thereof, an email was sent by Azadwinder Singh to the S.P., Sirsa

which ultimately led to the formation of an SIT and subsequent to a further

investigation, the petitioner/complainant came to be nominated as an accused

and a supplementary challan was submitted against him  as well under

Sections 120-B, 201, 406, 420 & 506 IPC (Section 109 of IPC added later

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on). I may also add that ‘further investigation’ can be conducted at any stage

and the only requirement is that some more evidence must have been brought

to the notice of the Investigating Agency. Therefore, the contention of the

petitioner that the supplementary challan could not have been submitted

cannot be accepted.

20. The second contention of the petitioner is that he was initially a

complainant. His subsequent conversion to the status of being an accused

would be in violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

21. Before examining this contention, it would be apposite to

refer to the judgment in State of Bombay Versus Kathi Kalu Oghad, 1961

AIR Supreme Court 1808. The relevant extract is as under:-

“

16. In view of these considerations, we have come to the

following conclusions :3

1. An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be

a witness against himself simply because he made a statement

while in police custody, without anything more. In other words, the

mere fact of being in police custody at the time when the statement

in question was made would not, by itself, as a proposition of law,

lend itself to the inference that the accused was compelled to make

the statement, though that fact, in conjunction with other

circumstances disclosed in evidence in a particular case, would be

a relevant consideration in an enquiry whether or not the accused

person had been compelled to make the impugned statement.

2. The mere questioning of an accused person by a police officer,

resulting in a voluntary statement, which may ultimately turn out

to be incriminatory, is not 'compulsion'.

3. 'To be a witness' is not equivalent to 'furnishing evidence' in its

widest significance; that is to say, as including not merely making

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of oral or written statements but also production of documents or

giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the

guilt or innocence of the accused.

4. Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or

fingers or specimen writings or showings parts of the body by way

of identification are not included in the expression 'to be a

witness'.

5. 'To be a witness' means imparting knowledge in respect of

relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing, made

or given in Court or otherwise.

6. 'To be a witness' in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving

oral testimony in Court. Case law has gone beyond this strict

literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a

wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in Court or out of

Court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing.

7. To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of

Article 20 (3), the person accused must have stood in the

character of an accused person at the time he made the statement.

It is not enough that he should become an accused, any time after

the statement has been made.”

(Emphasis supplied)

22.  In  Veera Ibrahim Versus The State of Maharashtra, 1976 AIR

Supreme Court 1167, it was held as under:-

“5. Clause (3) of Article 20 provides :

"No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself."

6. From an analysis of this clause, it is apparent that in order to

claim the benefit of the guarantee against testimonial compulsion

embodied in this clause, it must be shown, firstly, that the person

who made the statement was "accused of any offence", secondly,

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that he made this statement under compulsion. The phrase "accused

of any offence" has been the subject of several decisions of

this Court so that by now it is well settled that only a person against

whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence

has been levelled which in the normal course may result in his

prosecution, would fall within its ambit.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. A perusal  of  the  aforementioned  judgments  would establish

beyond doubt that for the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of

India the person concerned must be formally arrayed as an accused in order to

claim the  benefit of the  guarantee against testimonial compulsion. Any

evidence provided by a person to the Investigating Agency during the course

of an investigation can certainly be used against the said person in case he had

not yet attained the status of an accused which can only be attained when

there is a formal accusation against him. 

24. In the instant case, the formal accusation against the petitioner

was levelled only when the supplementary challan (Annexure P-8) was

submitted against him on 06.03.2025.  Therefore, any material supplied by the

petitioner prior to him attaining the status of an accused would not amount to

self-incrimination and therefore, he cannot claim protection under Article

20(3) of the Constitution of India.

25. The third contention raised by the petitioner is that no offence

under Sections 406/420 IPC R/w Section 109 IPC is made out as the

complainant/petitioner who has now attained the status of an accused cannot

be convicted for having cheated/committed criminal misappropriation of

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                                                                ::23::

himself and in the absence of any invocation of the provisions of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the prosecution must fail. Consequently,

the FIR and the supplementary challan qua the petitioner  are liable to be

quashed.

26. In view of the contentions raised, it would be worthwhile to

examine Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 and the same is

reproduced below:-

8. Offence relating to bribing of a public servant. —(1) Any person

who gives or promises to give an undue advantage to another

person or persons, with intention—(i) to induce a public servant to

perform improperly a public duty; or

(ii) to reward such public servant for the improper performance of

public duty;

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend

to seven years or with fine or with both:

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply where a

person is compelled to give such undue advantage:

Provided further that the person so compelled shall report the

matter to the law enforcement authority or investigating agency

within a period of seven days from the date of giving such undue

advantage:

Provided also that when the offence under this section has been

committeed by commercial organisation, such commercial

organisation shall be punishable with fine.

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                                                                ::24::

Illustration.—A person, ‘P’ gives a public servant, ‘S’ an amount of

ten thousand rupees to ensure that he is granted a license, over all

the other bidders. ‘P’ is guilty of an offence under this sub3section.

Explanation.—It shall be immaterial whether the person to whom an

undue advantage is given or promised to be given is the same

person as the person who is to perform, or has performed, the

public duty concerned, and, it shall also be immaterial whether such

undue advantage is given or promised to be given by the person

directly or through a third party.

(2) Nothing in sub3section (1) shall apply to a person, if that person,

after informing a law enforcement authority or investigating agency,

gives or promises to give any undue advantage to another person in

order to assist such law enforcement authority or investigating

agency in its investigation of the offence alleged against the later.

27. In the context of Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption

Act in State through CBI New Delhi Versus Jitender Kumar Singh, 2014(1)

RCR (Criminal) 908, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

“

27. Thus, an offence under Sections 

8, 9 or 12 can be committed by

any person, who need not necessarily be a public servant. Such an

offence can, therefore, be committed by a public servant or by a

private person or by a combination of the two. It is thus clear that

an offence under the PC Act can be committed by either a public

servant or a private person or a combination of both and in view of

the mandate of Section 4(1) of the PC Act, read with Section 3(1)

thereof, such offences can be tried only by a Special Judge.

For example :

3 A private person offering a bribe to a public servant commits an

offence under Section 12 of Act. This offence can be tried only by

the Special Judge, notwithstanding the fact that only a private

person is the accused in the case and that there is no public servant

named as an accused in that case.

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                                                                ::25::

3 A private person can be the only accused person in an offence

under Section 8 or Section 9 of the said Act. And it is not necessary

that a public servant should also be specifically named as an

accused in the same case. Notwithstanding the fact that a private

person is the only accused in an offence under Section 8 or

Section 9, it can be tried only by a Special Judge.

28. Thus, the scheme of the PC Act makes it quite clear that even a

private person who is involved in an offence mentioned in

Section 3(1) of the PC Act, is required to be tried only by a Special

Judge, and by no other Court. Moreover, it is not necessary that in

every offence under the PC Act, a public servant must necessarily be

an accused. In other words, the existence of a public servant for

facing the trial before the Special Court is not a must and even in his

absence, private persons can be tried for PC as well as non3PC

offences, depending upon the facts of the case.”

(Emphasis supplied)

28. In  Sandeep Deshwal alias Sanju Versus State of Govt. of NCT

of Delhi, CRL.A. No.168 of 2013, decided on 04.05.2020, the Hon’ble Delhi

High Court held as under:-

“10. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that

the prosecution has failed to prove the basic ingredients of

Section 

8 of the P.C. Act, as no officer/public servant has been

mentioned at whose behest, the appellant is alleged to have

accepted the money. He submitted that the appellant himself not

being a public servant, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to

name some public servant to prove the case under Section 8 of the

P.C. Act. It was further contended that there were material

contradictions in the testimony of Panch witness and the Raid

Officer on the manner of recovery of the bribe amount. While,

Jagdish Prasad, the Panch witness stated that it was Insp. Jai

Prakash who seized the bribe amount from the hands of the

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                                                                ::26::

appellant, on the other hand, the Raid Officer deposed that the GC

notes were seized by the Panch witness. It was also contended that

whereas the Panch witness stated that they had gone to the Office

of Food & Civil Supply, the Raid Officer stated that they went to a

PCO booth. It was also contended that the Panch witness admitted

to be part of as many as 40345 raid proceedings. He was a stock

witness of the ACB and hence his testimony was wrongly relied

upon by the trial court.

*** **** ***

14. The contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that

a public servant needs to be named for maintaining a case under

Section 8 of PC Act is fallacious and no longer res integra. The

Supreme Court in State through CBI, New Delhi v. Jitender Kumar

Singh reported as (2014) 11 SCC 724 held as under:

"28...... Thus, an offence under Sections 8, 9 or 12 can be

committed by any person, who need not necessarily be a public

servant. Such an offence can, therefore, be committed by a public

servant or by a private person or by a combination of the two.

29. It is thus clear that an offence under the PC Act can be

committed by either a public servant or a private person or a

combination of both and in view of the mandate of Section 4(1)

of the PC Act, read with Section 3(1) thereof, such offences can

be tried only by a Special Judge. For example:

(i) A private person offering a bribe to a public servant commits

an offence under Section 12 of Act. This offence can be tried only

by the Special Judge, notwithstanding the fact that only a private

person is the accused in the case and that there is no public

servant named as an accused in that case.

(ii) A private person can be the only accused person in an

offence under Section 8 or Section 9 of the said Act. And it is not

necessary that a public servant should also be specifically

named as an accused in the same case. Notwithstanding the fact

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                                                                ::27::

that a private person is the only accused in an offence under

Section 8 or Section 9, it can be tried only by a Special Judge.

30. Thus, the scheme of the PC Act makes it quite clear that even

a private person who is involved in an offence mentioned in

Section 3(1) of the PC Act, is required to be tried only by a

Special Judge, and by no other Court. Moreover, it is not

necessary that in every offence under the PC Act, a public

servant must necessarily be an accused. In other words, the

existence of a public servant for facing the trial before the

Special Court is not a must and even in his absence, private

persons can be tried for PC as well as non3PC offences,

depending upon the facts of the case. We, therefore, make it clear

that it is not the law that only along with the junction of a public

servant in array of parties, the Special Judge can proceed

against private persons who have committed offences punishable

under the PC Act."

                                                                        (emphasis added)

29. In   Ghansyam Sharma Versus Surendra Kumar Sharma &

others, 2014(4) RCR (Criminal) 135, the Hon’ble Supreme Court  in the

context of quashing of an FIR held as under:-

“

10. We do not propose to examine the correctness of the findings

recorded by the High Court in an enquiry that there was no

entrustment of money. The fact remains that the appellant lost

money which was kept in the car of the first respondent. Even

according to the High Court , the case would fall under

Section 

379 I.P.C. The High Court , in our opinion, grossly erred in

quashing the proceedings against the respondents with a certificate

that it is one of the rarest cases where the court is required to quash

the proceedings.

11. Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 I.P.C. or

not is a matter of evidence. The fact that the police chose to file a

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                                                                ::28::

chargesheet under Section 406 and 420 I.P.C. is not conclusive

regarding the offences for which the respondents3accused are to be

tried. The trial Court can always frame an appropriate charge if

there is sufficient material from the report of the police available

before it. In case where the material is insufficient to frame a

charge, the trial Court may either discharge the accused or may

direct further investigation in the matter. Before deciding as to

which one of the three courses of action mentioned above is to be

resorted to, the trial Court must examine the content of the

complaint, the evidence gathered by the investigating agency and

also scrutinise whether the investigating agency proceeded in the

right direction.”

(Emphasis supplied)

30. A combined reading of the aforementioned judgments in State

through CBI New Delhi (supra), Sandeep Deshwal alias Sanju (supra) and

Ghanshyam Sharma (supra) would reveal that an offence under Section 8

IPC can be committed by any person who need not necessarily be a public

servant. Such an offence can therefore be committed by a public servant or by

a private person or by a combination of the two. Further, question of quashing

of an of an FIR would not arise where a reading of the FIR would reveal the

commission of other offences though the FIR/Challan have been submitted

regarding different offences for which quashing is sought.  

31. In the instant case, merely because there is no public servant

involved does not mean that the petitioner and accused Navraj Singh and

Azadwinder Singh cannot be chargesheeted for offences under Section 8 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner can also not claim any

benefit  of   the  first   and  second   proviso  of  Section 8  of  Prevention  of

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                                                                ::29::

Corruption Act as he was not compelled to give such undue advantage and

nor did he inform the investigating agency within 7 days from the date of

giving such undue advantage that it was under duress or compulsion. To the

contrary, he only lodged a complaint leading to the registration of the FIR

when the accused did not get his son employed as an Assistant Sub Inspector

with the Chandigarh Police and refused to return the money. Further, the

question of quashing of the FIR would not arise for the offences under

Sections 406/420 IPC as Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is

prima facie made out and it would be the Trial Court which shall examine the

various investigation reports and come to the conclusion as to what offences,

if any, are  made out.

32. In   view   of   the   aforementioned   discussion,   the   question   of

quashing of the  FIR No.0016 dated 18.01.2017 initially registered under

Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 506 (subsequently added Sections 201 & 109 IPC)

at Police Station Ellenabad, District Sirsa (Annexure P-1) and the final report

No.1B dated 06.03.2025 under Section  120-B, 201, 406, 420 & 506 IPC

(Section 109 of IPC added later on) (Annexure P-8) qua the petitioner does

not   arise   and   the   instant   petition   stands   dismissed  with   the   following

directions:-

i. The first order framing charges based on the first report under

Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. against Navraj Singh and Azadwinder

Singh and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand

quashed.

CRM-M-46237-2025 

                                                                ::30::

ii. The police shall conduct a further investigation in the light of

Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act or any other

offence which appears to have been committed and submit a final

report to the Court concerned.

iii.The first report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-2), the

second report under Section 173(8) (Annexure P-8) and the final

report   as   directed   to   be   submitted   by   this   Court   shall   be

considered by the concerned Court for framing of charges, if any. 

(JASJIT SINGH BEDI)

JUDGE

26.08.2025

JITESH Whether speaking/reasoned:-  Yes/No

Whether reportable:-          Yes/No