2024 INSC 429 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (C) No. 1025 of 2019

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6567 OF 2014

LEHNA SINGH (D) BY LRS. …. PETITIONER

VERSUS

GURNAM SINGH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. ...RESPONDENT S

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

The petitioner has preferred this Review Petition seeking

review of the Order dated 13.03.2019 passed in Civil Appeal

No. 6567 of 2014 wherein the present petitioner was the

respondent. In the Order under review, the Civil Appeal was

allowed, and the judgment and decree passed by the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana on 27.11.2007 in Civil Regular

2

Second Appeal No. 2191 of 1985 was set aside and the

judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Sangrur, on

06.06.1985 in Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1983 has been restored.

2. In the judgment under review, this Court held that the

judgment and decree passed by the Punjab and Haryana High

Court is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 100 of Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908

1

on the ground that in exercise of such

power, the High Court could not have reappreciated the entire

evidence on record to unsettle the finding of facts recorded by

the First Appellate Court, by substituting its own opinion for

that of the First Appellate Court.

3. Basing the judgment rendered in Pankajakshi (Dead)

Through Legal Representatives & Ors. v. Chandrika &

Ors.

2

, this Court directed that the review petition be listed

before the open Court for hearing and subsequently on

13.08.2019 notices were issued to the opposite parties, at the

same time, directing the parties to maintain status quo.

1.

‘CPC’

2.

(2016) 6 SCC 157

3

4. In substance, the main ground for review of the judgment

is that the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pankajakshi

(supra) have uphold the validity of Section 41 of Punjab Courts

Act, 1918

3

, overruling this Court’s earlier judgment in case of

Kulwant Kaur & Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Maan (Dead) By

Lrs. & Ors.

4

holding that since Section 97(1) of the Code of

Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 has no application to

Section 41 of the Punjab Act, therefore, Section 41 of the

Punjab Act would necessarily continue as a law in force and the

second appeal before the High Court has to be heard within the

parameters of Section 41 of the Punjab Act, and not under

Section 100 CPC.

5. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior counsel appearing for

the petitioner would also refer to the subsequent judgments of

this Court in Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh & Ors.

5

and

Gurbachan Sing (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Gurcharan Singh

(Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors.

6

wherein this Court relying upon

Pankajakshi (supra) held that the scope of interference within

3.

‘Punjab Act’

4.

(2001) 4 SCC 262

5.

(2019) 17 SCC 71

6.

(2023) SCC Online SC 875

4

the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court would be

the same as under Section 100 of CPC as it existed prior to the

1976 amendment. The provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab

Act and of Section 100 CPC, before its amendment in 1976, are

in pari materia. Therefore, the questions of law are not required

to be framed in second appeal before Punjab and Haryana High

Court whose jurisdiction in second appeal is circumscribed by

provision of Section 41 of the Punjab Act.

6. Shri Patwalia would submit that this Court has set aside

the Judgment of High Court terming it as beyond the power

under Section 100 CPC which is not legally correct, in view of

the law laid down in Pankajakshi (supra). It is further argued

that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner

was entitled to succeed to the property by way of natural

succession and the finding of the High Court that the Will relied

upon by the respondents has not been proved as it is

surrounded by suspicious circumstances ought not to have

been interfered by this Court. It is argued that a finding of fact

erroneously or perversely recorded by the First Appellate Court

can always be interfered by the High Court. Hence, there is no

5

infirmity in the Judgment rendered by the High Court and the

same ought not to have been interfered by this Court while

deciding the Civil Appeal No. 6567 of 2014 on an erroneous

ground that the High Court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction

and power under Section 100 CPC as it stands of the 1976

amendment.

7. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel appearing for

the respondents would not dispute the legal position as has

been settled by this Court in the matter of Pankajakshi

(supra). However, he would submit that even in the case when

the High Court would exercise the power under Section 41 of

the Punjab Act, the finding of fact recorded by the First

Appellate Court cannot be interfered on re -appreciation of

evidence to substitute its own decision for that of the First

Appellate Court. According to him, the finding recorded by the

First Appellate Court was borne out from the record. Therefore,

the High Court erred in interfering with the said finding, and

this Court rightly set aside the Judgment and decree of the

High Court while deciding the Civil Appeal. According to Shri

Swarup, the respondents had proved the Will, which was a

6

registered one, in accordance with law and that there were no

suspicious circumstances accompanying the Will.

8. When this Court rendered the judgment under review in

Civil Appeal No. 6567 of 2014, the only ground which weighed

with the Court was that the High Court exercised the power

under Section 100 CPC erroneously and decided the second

appeal by re-appreciating the evidence without even framing a

substantial question of law.

9. The second appeal in Punjab and Haryana High Court is

heard under Section 41 of the Punjab Act, which is reproduced

hereunder for ready reference: -

“41. Second Appeals – (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court

from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to

the High Court on any of the following grounds, namely:

(a) the decision being contrary to law or to some custom

or usage having the force of law:

(b) the decision having failed to determine some

material issue of law or custom or usage having the

force of law:

(c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure

provided by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (V of

1908), or by any other law for the time being in force

which may possibly have produced error or defect in

the decision of the case upon the merits;

[Explanation – A question relating to the existence or validity of

a custom or usage shall be deemed to be a question of law

within the meaning of this section:]

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree

passed ex parte.”

7

10. The provision contained in Section 41 of the Punjab Act,

as reproduced above, do es not mandate framing of a

substantial question of law for entertaining the second appeal.

Therefore, a second appeal under Section 41 of Punjab Act can

be entertained by the Punjab and Haryana High Court even

without framing a substantial question of law.

11. It would be appropriate to refer to the provision contained

in Section 41 of the Punjab Act in juxtaposition to Section 100

CPC, before its amendment in 1976, to appreciate and

understand the jurisdiction of Punjab and Haryana High Court

in second appeal. The provisions are reproduced hereunder for

ready reference: -

“Section 41 of the Punjab Act Section 100 CPC

41. Second appeals.—(1) An appeal

shall lie to the High Court from

every decree passed in appeal by

any court subordinate to the High

Court on any of the following

grounds, namely:

100. Second appeal.—(1) Save

where otherwise expressly

provided in the body of this Code

or by any other law for the time

being in force, an appeal shall lie

to the High Court from every

decree passed in appeal by any

court subordinate to a High

Court, on any of the following

grounds, namely:

(a) the decision being contrary to

law or to some custom or usage

having the force of law;

(a) the decision being contrary to

law or to some usage having the

force of law;

(b) the decision having failed to

determine some material issue of

law or custom or usage having the

force of law;

(b) the decision having failed to

determine some material issue of

law or usage having the force of

law;

(c) a substantial error or defect in

the procedure provided by the Code

(c) a substantial error or defect in

the procedure provided by this

8

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of

1908), or by any other law for the

time being in force which may

possibly have produced error or

defect in the decision of the case

upon the merits;

Code or by any other law for the

time being in force, which may

possibly have produced error or

defect in the decision of the case

upon the merits.

* * *

(2) An appeal may lie under this

section from an appellate decree

passed ex parte.

(2) An appeal may lie under this

section from an appellate decree

passed ex parte.”

12. In Pankajakshi (supra), the Constitution Bench of this

Court has held that substantial question of law may not be

required to be framed in a second appeal before Punjab and

Haryana High Court. However, the finding of fact recorded ,

cannot be interfered with even in terms of Section 41 of Punjab

Act. The law laid down by this Court in Pankajakshi (supra)

has been relied upon in Randhir Kaur (supra) to hold thus in

paragraphs 10 to 12: -

“10. The effect of the Constitution Bench judgment in Pankajakshi is

that in second appeal, the scope of interference within the Punjab

and Haryana High Court would be the same as the Code of Civil

Procedure existed prior to the 1976 Amendment. The provisions of

Section 41 of the Punjab Act and of Section 100 CPC are in pari

materia.

11. Some of the judgments of this Court dealing with the scope of

the old Section 100 are required to be discussed. In a judgment

in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya [AIR 1959 SC 57] —

three Judges, while examining the scope of Section 100 CPC, held

as under : (AIR p. 59, para 13)

“13. The finding on the title was arrived at by the learned

District Judge not on the basis of any document of title but on

a consideration of relevant documentary and oral evidence

adduced by the parties. The learned Judge, therefore, in our

9

opinion, clearly exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the

said finding. The provisions of Section 100 are clear and

unambiguous. As early as in 1891, the Judicial Committee

in Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri [1890 SCC

OnLine PC 10 : (1889 -90) 17 IA 122] stated thus : (SCC

OnLine PC)

‘There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the

ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or

inexcusable the error may seem to be.’

The principle laid down in this decision has been followed in

innumerable cases by the Privy Council as well as by different

High Courts in this country. Again the Judicial Committee

in Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Uma Charan Mandal [1923

SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1924-25) 29 CWN 131] further elucidated

the principle by pointing out : (SCC OnLine PC)

‘[If] the question to be decided is one of fact, it does not

involve an issue of law merely because documents which were

not instruments of title or contracts or statutes or otherwise

the direct foundations of rights but were merely historical

documents, have to be construed.’

Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate court is

based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a

finding of fact (see Wali Mohammad v. Mohd. Bakhsh [1929

SCC OnLine PC 115 : (1929-30) 57 IA 86 : ILR (1930) 11 Lah

199]). But, notwithstanding such clear and authoritative

pronouncements on the scope of the provisions of Section 100

CPC, some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of

second appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces,

apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises

a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in

the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public.

This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a

Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under

Section 100 CPC. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set

aside the decree of the High Court on the simple ground that

the learned Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to

interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the

first appellate court based upon an appreciation of the relevant

evidence. In the result, the decree of the High Court is set

aside and the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.”

12. Later, in a judgment, in Kshitish Chandra Bose v.

Commr. [(1981) 2 SCC 103] — three Judges, of this Court held that

the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain second appeal on

findings of fact even if it was erroneous. The Court held as follows :

(SCC p. 108, para 11)

“11. On a perusal of the first judgment of the High Court we

are satisfied that the High Court clearly exceeded its

jurisdiction under Section 100 in reversing pure concurrent

findings of fact given by the trial court and the then appellate

10

court both on the question of title and that of adverse

possession. In Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai [AIR 1963 SC

1203 : (1963) 1 SCR 456] this Court held that the High Court

had no jurisdiction to entertain second appeal on findings of

fact even if it was erroneous. In this connection, this Court

observed as follows : (AIR pp. 1205-06, paras 5 & 7)

‘5. It is settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to

entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding

of fact. …

***

7. … As the two courts approached the evidence from a correct

perspective and gave a concurrent finding of fact, the High

Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said finding.’

To the same effect is another decision of this Court in V.

Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar [AIR 1963 SC 302

: (1963) 3 SCR 604] where the Court observed as follows :

(AIR p. 306, para 12)

‘12. … But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions

of fact recorded by the lower appellate court, however

erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High

Court, because, as the Privy Council has observed, however

gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, there is no

jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error.’ ”

13. In a recent decision in the matter of Gurbachan Sing h

(supra), this court has reiterated the legal position vis-à-vis

Section 41 of Punjab Act and the unamended Section 100 CPC

holding thus in paragraphs 9 to 11: -

“9. The Constitution bench in Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs

v. Chandrika had held Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann which

held section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 to be repugnant to

section 100, CPC to be bad in law, thereby implying that

section 41 of the Punjab Court Act holds as good law. It was held as

under: —

“25. We are afraid that this judgment in Kulwant Kaur

case [Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262]

does not state the law correctly on both propositions. First and

foremost, when Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1976 speaks of any amendment made or

any provision inserted in the principal Act by virtue of a State

Legislature or a High Court, the said section refers only to

amendments made and/or provisions inserted in the Code of

Civil Procedure itself and not elsewhere. This is clear from the

11

expression “principal Act” occurring in Section 97(1). What

Section 97(1) really does is to state that where a State

Legislature makes an amendment in the Code of Civil

Procedure, which amendment will apply only within the four

corners of the State, being made under Schedule VII List

III Entry 13 to the Constitution of India, such amendment shall

stand repealed if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the

principal Act as amended by the Parliamentary enactment

contained in the 1976 Amendment to the Code of Civil

Procedure. This is further made clear by the reference in

Section 97(1) to a High Court. The expression “any provision

inserted in the principal Act” by a High Court has reference to

Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure by which High

Courts may make rules regulating their own procedure, and the

procedure of civil courts subject to their superintendence, and

may by such rules annul, alter, or add to any of the rules

contained in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure.”

10. Recently, a Bench of three learned Judges in Satyender

v. Saroj while dealing with a property dispute arising out of the

State of Haryana, held as under: —

“16. We may also add here that we are presently concerned

with the laws in the State of Haryana. All the same, the laws as

applicable in Punjab in the year 1918, were also applicable to

the present territory of Haryana since it was then a part of the

State of Punjab. Later on, the creation of the new State of

Haryana, under the provision given in Section 88 of the Punjab

Re-organization Act, 1966, the laws applicable in the erstwhile

State of Punjab continued to be applicable in the new State of

Haryana. Furthermore, State of Haryana formally adopted the

laws of the erstwhile State of Punjab, under Section 89 of

the Punjab Re-Organisation Act, 1966. Therefore, in the State

of Haryana a court in second appeal is not required to

formulate a substantial question of law, as what is applicable in

Haryana is Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and not

Section 100 of CPC. Consequently, it was not necessary for the

High Court to formulate a substantial question of law.”

11. In view of the above discussion, it is clear to this court that the

judgment of the learned single Judge sitting in second appellate

jurisdiction cannot be faulted for not having framed substantial

questions of law under section 100, CPC”.

14. Regard being had to the settle d legal position in

Pankajakshi (supra) reiterated in Randhir Kaur (supra) and

Gurbachan Singh (supra), we are of the view that the

12

Judgment of this Court under review in Civil Appeal No. 6567 of

2014 has been wrongly decided holding that the Punjab and

Haryana High Court has travelled beyond the jurisdiction under

Section 100 CPC by interfering with the finding of fact recorded

by the First Appellate Court without framing a substantial

question of law.

15. Since there is an error apparent on the face of the record,

in view of the law laid down in Pankajakshi (supra), we review

our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6567 of 2014 and recall the

same for deciding the Civil Appeal on merits. The Review

Petition is allowed. The Civil Appeal is restored to its original

number and taken on board with the consent of the parties,

and we proceed to decide the Civil Appeal afresh on merits.

Civil Appeal No. 6567 of 2014

16. This Civil Appeal is preferred by the defendants in the suit

against whom the plaintiff brought a suit for perpetual

injunction on the pleadings, inter alia, that he and his brother

Bhagwan Singh alias Nikka Singh were owners in possession of

the suit land. Bhagwan Singh was issueless being unmarried.

13

Since the defendant No. 1 was trying to dispossess the plaintiff

forcibly, the suit for perpetual injunction was filed. The

defendants did not deny that plaintiff and Bhagwan Singh were

real brothers. However, he claimed to be the half-brother of

Bhagwan Singh as they were given birth by same lady namely

Mrs. Har Kaur who was earlier married to Sunder Singh but

after his death, she was married to Mehar Singh and the

defendant no. 1 was born out of the wedlock of Har Kaur with

Mehar Singh. The defendant’s case rested on a Will allegedly

executed by Bhagwan Singh on 17.01.1980. Prior to this,

Bhagwan Singh had executed an unregistered Will on

17.08.1979. However, the defendant admitted that during the

lifetime of Bhagwan Singh, the suit land was cultivated jointly

by the plaintiff and Bhagwan Singh. In the alternative, the

defendant pleaded that if plaintiff’s possession over the suit

land is proved, the defendant nos. 2 to 6, the beneficiary of the

Will, are entitled to joint possession of half share of the suit

land.

17. On the strength of evidence adduced by the parties in

course of trial, it was held by the trial court that the defendants

14

have failed to prove the genuineness of the Will, therefore, the

plaintiff is entitled to succeed by way of natural succession. It

was found that the Will relied by the defendants is surrounded

by suspicious circumstances, therefore, it is not a validly

executed Will. The trial court held that the defendants’ case

that they served the deceased Bhagwan Singh during the

lifetime and out of love and affection for the services rendered,

he executed the Will in their favour as they were also related to

the deceased, has not been believed by the trial court. There is

evidence that it was plaintiff who admitted Nikka Singh in

hospital on 02.08.1979 when he was ill and his address was

also shown as care of Lehna Singh (the ‘plaintiff’).

18. Upon careful marshalling of evidence, the trial court

recorded a finding about active participation of Jagjit Singh

(DW-3) in execution of the Will and the absence of mention in

the Will as to why he disinherited his real brother, the plaintiff,

from succeeding the property and more so when he was living

with him and was attended to during his ill health. Since the

defendant admit joint possession and cultivation of the land by

Nikka Singh and plaintiff, a fact contrary to this mentioned in

15

the Will was also highlighted by the trial court. Despite there

being an earlier Will there was no mention that the said Will is

cancelled and the name of father of Gurnam Singh was also

wrongly mentioned. The trial court also found that Nikka Singh

was suffering from cancer and was also a patient of T.B.

19. The trial court also found that the plaintiff is in possession

of the suit land as the said fact has been admitted by one of

the defendant’s witnesses namely Gurnam Singh.

20. The First Appellate Court set aside the finding of the trial

court holding that the trial court was wrongly persuaded by

insignificant circumstances to hold that the Will in favour of the

defendant nos. 2 to 6 is not genuine and that it is surrounded

by suspicious circumstances. The First Appellate Court

eventually passed a decree for joint possession in favour of

defendant which was assailed by plaintiff Lehna Singh before

the High Court by preferring an appeal under Section 41 of the

Punjab Act. The High Court, under the impugned Judgment,

allowed the appeal, set aside the appellate decree passed by

the District Judge, Sangrur, restoring the Judgment and decree

passed by the trial court.

16

21. The High Court has discussed the evidence threadbare and

framed the following substantial questions of law: -

(i) Whether the Appellate Court can reverse the findings

recorded by the learned trial court without adverting

to the specific finding of the trial court?

(ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower

Appellate Court is perverse and outcome of misreading

of evidence?

22. The High Court answered both the questions of law in

favour of the plaintiff/respondent herein (in Civil Appeal) on the

reasoning that when the person entitled to the property of the

deceased by way of natural succession, is disinherited from the

property without giving any reason and the covenants in the

Will are also found to be factually incorrect, mere registration of

the Will and proof of the same by attesting witnesses could not

be treated to be sufficient to over -come the suspicious

circumstances as has been done by the First Appellate Court.

The High Court also observed that the propounders of the Will

were earlier tried for murder of the deceased-testator and there

being no evidence on record to show that the deceased had

special love and affection with the defendants and when it is

proved that the plaintiff is in possession of the land and the

defendant and their witnesses actively participated in the

17

execution of the Will, there is glaring suspicious circumstances

to hold that the Will is not genuine. It was also observed that

the testator was residing with the plaintiff, and it was he who

got him admitted in the hospital, it was proved that the plaintiff

was taking care of the deceased at the time of his need. Merely

because the attesting witnesses had no enmity towards the

plaintiff, it cannot dispel the suspicious circumstances

surrounded around the Will.

23. It is settled law that the First Appellate Court, while

setting aside the Judgment and decree of the trial court, is

required to meet the reasoning given by the trial court in

rejecting the Will, which in the present case has not been done

by the First Appellate Court.

24. The requirement of exercise of jurisdiction by the First

Appellate Court under Section 96 of CPC has been dealt with by

this Court in Chintamani Ammal vs. Nandagopal Gounder

and Anr.

7

, wherein after noticing the previous judgments of

this Court, the following has been held in paragraphs 18, 19

and 20 thus: -

7.

(2007) 4 SCC 163

18

“18. Furthermore, when the learned trial Judge arrived at a

finding on the basis of appreciation of oral evidence, the first

appellate court could have reversed the same only on assigning

sufficient reasons therefor. Save and except the said statement

of DW 2, the learned Judge did not consider any other materials

brought on record by the parties.

19. In Madholal Sindhu v. Official Assignee of Bombay , it was

observed: (AIR p. 30, para 21)

“It is true that a judge of first instance can never

be treated as infallible in determining on which

side the truth lies and like other tribunals he may

go wrong on questions of fact, but on such

matters if the evidence as a whole can

reasonably be regarded as justifying the

conclusion arrived at, the appeal court should not

lightly interfere with the judgment.”

(See also Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai)

20. In Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri and Co., this Court observed:

(SCC pp. 39-41, paras 48-52)

“48. Reference on the point could also usefully be made to A.L.

Goodhart's article in which, the learned author points out:

‘A judge sitting without a jury must perform dual

function. The first function consists in the

establishment of the particular facts. This may be

described as the perceptive function. It is what

you actually perceive by the five senses. It is a

datum of experience as distinct from a

conclusion.

It is obvious that, in almost all cases tried by a

judge without a jury, an appellate court, which

has not had an opportunity of seeing the

witnesses, must accept his conclusions of fact

because it cannot tell on what grounds he

reached them and what impression the various

witnesses made on him.’

49. The following is the statement of the same principle in ‘The

Supreme Court Practice’:

‘Great weight is due to the decision of a judge of

first instance whenever, in a conflict of

testimony, the demeanour and manner of

witnesses who have been seen and heard by him

are material elements in the consideration of the

truthfulness of these statements. But the parties

to the cause are nevertheless entitled as well on

questions of fact as on questions of law to

demand the decision of the court of appeal, and

that court cannot excuse itself from the task of

weighing conflicting evidence, and drawing its

19

own conclusions, though it should always bear in

mind that it has neither seen nor heard the

witnesses and should make due allowance in this

respect. (pp. 854-55)

…Not to have seen witnesses puts Appellate

Judges in a permanent position of disadvantage

against the trial Judge, and unless it can be

shown that he has failed to use or has palpably

misused his advantage—for example has failed to

observe inconsistencies or indisputable fact or

material probabilities (ibid.

and Yuill v. Yuill; Watt v. Thomas —the higher

court ought not take the responsibility of

reversing conclusions so arrived at merely as the

result of their own comparisons and criticisms of

the witnesses, and of their view of the

probabilities of the case. … (p. 855)

…But while the court of appeal is always reluctant

to reject a finding by a judge of the specific or

primary facts deposed to by the witnesses,

especially when the finding is based on the

credibility or bearing of a witness, it is willing to

form an independent opinion upon the proper

inference to be drawn from it. … (p. 855)

50. A consideration of this aspect would be incomplete without a

reference to the observations of B.K. Mukherjea, J., in Sarju

Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh [1950

SCC 714 : AIR 1951 SC 120 : 1950 SCR 781] which as a succinct

statement of the rule, cannot indeed be bettered:

‘The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one

of fact, the decision of which depends upon the

appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case.

In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in

mind that it has not the advantage which the trial

Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of

observing the manner in which they deposed in court.

This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies

on facts, the appellate court is not competent to

reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge.

The rule is— and it is nothing more than a rule of

practice—that when there is conflict of oral evidence

of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision

hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then

unless there is some special feature about the

evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the

trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of

improbability to displace his opinion as to where the

credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere

with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of

fact.

20

51. The area in which the question lies in the present case is the

area of the perceptive functions of the trial Judge where the

possibility of errors of inference does not play a significant role.

The question whether the statement of the witnesses in regard to

what was amenable to perception by sensual experience as to

what they saw and heard is acceptable or not is the area in which

the well-known limitation on the powers of the appellate court to

reappreciate the evidence falls. The appellate court, if it seeks to

reverse those findings of fact, must give cogent reasons to

demonstrate how the trial court fell into an obvious error.

52. With respect to the High Court, we think, that, what the High

Court did was what perhaps even an appellate court, with full -

fledged appellate jurisdiction would, in the circumstances of the

present case, have felt compelled to abstain from and reluctant to

do. Contention (c) would also require to be upheld.”

(emphasis in original)

25. In Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr.

8

and H.K.N. Swami

v. Irshad Basith (Dead) By Lrs.

9

, this Court has opined that

it would be wholly improper to allow first appeal without

adverting to the specific findings of the trial court and that the

First Appellate Court is required to address all the issues and

determine the appeal upon assignment of cogent reasons.

26. Having considered the evidence on record and the findings

of the trial court, the First Appellate Court and the High Court,

we are satisfied that the First Appellate Court wrongly set aside

the Judgment, decree, and findings of the trial court without

meeting the findings of the trial court which could not have

8.

(2005) 12 SCC 303

9.

(2005) 10 SCC 243

21

been done in exercise of power under Section 9 6 CPC.

Therefore, the High Court has rightly set aside the Judgment

and decree of the First Appellate Court to restore the Judgment

and decree of the trial court. On independent examination also,

we have found that the findings recorded by trial court are

borne out from the evidence on record and are neither perverse

nor illegal.

27. Therefore, we find no substance in this appeal which

deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

28. The parties shall bear their own costs.

…………………………………… .. J.

(VIKRAM NATH )

.......…………………………… …. J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

May 16, 2024.