2026:HHC:9652

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 81 of 2016

Reserved on: 5.3.2026

Date of Decision: 01.4.2026.

Guru Dev ...Petitioner

Versus

State of HP ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior

Advocate, with Mr Divya Raj

Singh, Advocate.

For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy

Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present revision is directed against the judgment

dated 29.2.2026, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi,

District Mandi, HP (learned Appellate Court), vide which the

judgment of conviction dated 6.12.2014 and order of sentence

dated 8.12.2014, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Mandi, District Mandi, HP, were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2

be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the

learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the police presented a challan against the

accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of

offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the

Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Suman Kumar

(PW8) was going towards Beat No. 2 on 13.6.2010, at about 9.20

AM. A truck bearing registration No. HP-72-1603 came from

Mandi at a high speed and hit the motorcycle bearing

registration No. HP-31A-2360, which was moving ahead of the

truck. The motorcycle was dragged for a distance of 80 mtrs. The

driver stopped the truck at some distance and ran away from the

spot. The accident occurred due to the high speed and

negligence of the truck driver. An intimation was given to the

police. An entry No. 13A was recorded in the Police Station. HC

Jagdish Chand (PW3), HHC Milkhi Ram (PW5) and ASI Satish

(PW4) were sent for verification. ASI Satish Kumar (PW4)

recorded the statement of Suman Kumar (Ex.PW4/A) and sent it

to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW4/B) was registered. He

took the photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P6) and prepared the site

3

plan (Ex. PW4/C). Bharti Sharma, the pillion rider, had died in

the accident. ASI Satish Kumar conducted the inquest on her

dead body and prepared the report (Ex.PW4/D). Dr Nag Raj

(PW6) conducted her postmortem examination and found that

the cause of death was a burst abdomen and crush injuries to the

gut and spleen, leading to multiple lacerations to these organs.

He issued a report (Ex.PW6/A). The truck bearing registration

No. HP-72-1603 and motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-

31A-2360 were seized vide memos (Ex.PW3/A and Ex.PW1/A).

HC Devkinandan (PW2) conducted the mechanical examination

of the vehicles and found that there was no defect in them that

could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ex.PW2/A).

Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and

after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared

and presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of

accusation was put to him for the commission of offences

punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC, to which he

pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4

4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove

its case. Narinder Kumar (PW1) was driving the motorcycle. HC

Devkinandan (PW2) conducted the mechanical examination of

the vehicle. HC Jagdish Chand (PW3) witnessed the recovery. ASI

Satish Kumar (PW4) investigated the matter. HHC Milkhi Ram

(PW5) carried the rukka to the Police Station. Dr Nag Raj (PW6)

conducted the postmortem examination of Bharti Sharma.

Inspector Bahadur Singh (PW7) prepared the challan. HC Suman

Kumar (PW8) is an eyewitness and the informant.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He

stated that the documents were taken into possession at

Dharamkanta at Dadour. A false case was registered against him.

The statement of Gurnam Singh (DW1) was recorded in defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of

Narinder Kumar (PW1) and Suman Kumar (PW8) corroborated

each other. The statement of Gurnam Singh (DW1) was not

sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. It was duly proved

on record that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle,

which led to the accident, causing the death of Bharti Sharma.

5

Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the

accused as under: -

Under Section 279 of the IPCTo suffer simple imprisonment for

three months, pay a fine of ₹1,000/-,

and in default of payment of the fine,

to undergo simple imprisonment for

one month.

Under Section 304-A of the

IPC

To suffer simple imprisonment for

one year, pay a fine of ₹5,000/-, and

in default of payment of the fine, to

undergo simple imprisonment for

two months.

Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run

concurrently.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi (learned Appellate

Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings

recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of

Narinder Kumar (PW1) and Suman Kumar (PW8) corroborated

each other. The medical evidence showed that Bharti had died

due to the crush injuries to the gut, liver, and spleen, which

could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. There was

6

no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned

Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed

by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in

appreciating the evidence on record. Narinder Kumar (PW1) was

the husband of the deceased, and he was interested in the

success of the prosecution. No independent witness was

examined by the prosecution. The defence witness proved that

the truck was seized at 3.00 PM when it was parked on a

Dharamkanta at Dadaur. The statement of the defence witness

to this effect was wrongly rejected. Therefore, it was prayed that

the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order

passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel,

assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy

Advocate General for the respondent/State.

10. Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below

7

erred in appreciating the material on record. The photographs

and the injuries do not show that the motorcycle was dragged

for some distance, as alleged by the prosecution. The possibility

of the motorcycle skidding and the deceased suffering injuries

from a fall cannot be ruled out. No negligence was shown in the

present case, and the mere use of high speed is not sufficient to

infer negligence. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be

allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned

Courts below be set-aside.

11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

the respondent/State, submitted that the statements of

prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The medical

evidence also showed that a crushed injury was caused, which

falsifies the defence version that the injury was caused by way of

skidding. Both the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated

the evidence on record, and there is no infirmity in the

judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence,

he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional

court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent

defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

207: -

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at

the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence

brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision

against conviction is not supposed to exercise the

jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of

interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397

of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests

jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence

or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of

any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the

provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of

jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error

that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases.

It is also well settled that while considering the same, the

Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts

and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

9

call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect

or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which

has crept in such proceedings.

15.It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460:

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope

of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly

explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as

to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or

order made in a case. The object of this provision is

to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction

or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it

may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise

the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of

careful consideration and appear to be in accordance

with law. If one looks into the various judgments of

this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction

can be invoked where the decisions under challenge

are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with

the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based

on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or

judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or

perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are

merely indicative. Each case would have to be

determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the

revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very

limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine

manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it

should not be against an interim or interlocutory

order. The Court has to keep in mind that the

exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not

10

lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing

with the question as to whether the charge has been

framed properly and in accordance with law in a

given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the

exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case

substantially falls within the categories aforestated.

Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced

stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the

absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of

Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala

v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC

452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has

laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

call for and examine the record of any proceedings

to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or

propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other

words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory

jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for

correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said

revisional power cannot be equated with the power

of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a

second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,

it would not be appropriate for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its

conclusion on the same when the evidence has

11

already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well

as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring

feature is brought to the notice of the High Court

which would otherwise tantamount to a gross

miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the

impugned judgment of the High Court from the

aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in

concluding that the High Court exceeded its

jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the

respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and

relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court

in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,

(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held

that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the

Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or

there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the

order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that

another view is possible. The following has been laid

down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is

perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly

unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

relevant material or there is palpable misreading of

records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting

aside the order, merely because another view is

possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an

appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional

jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do

justice in accordance with the principles of criminal

jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under

Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that

of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose

decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be

perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or

glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based

on no material or where the material facts are wholly

12

ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised

arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere

with the decision in exercise of their revisional

jurisdiction.”

16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it

is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional

Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by

a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a

jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,

therefore, in the negative.”

17. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore

S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional juris-

diction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perver-

sity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh

(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Re-

visional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence

on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Ser-

vices v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14

SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the

Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order

is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of

a jurisdictional error.

13

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the ab-

sence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in

the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the

concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions

Court.”

18. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. Gurnam Singh (DW1) stated that he was a driver

along with the petitioner in the vehicle bearing registration No.

HP-72-1603. He specifically stated in his cross-examination

that the accused was driving the vehicle on the date of the

incident. Thus, the defence evidence has not disputed the fact

that the accused was driving the truck on the relevant day.

20. Narinder Kumar (PW1) stated that he and his wife

were riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-31A-2360.

A truck bearing registration No. HP-72-1603 came from Mandi

and hit the motorcycle. The motorcycle fell. He fell on the

unmetalled road, while his wife fell on the metalled road. The

truck crushed his wife, and she succumbed to the injuries. The

accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. He

denied that the dupatta of his wife was caught in the motorcycle,

and she fell. He denied that he was crushed by a car. He could not

tell the speed; however, the truck was being driven at a high

14

speed. He had not seen the driver of the truck on the spot. He

admitted that there were shops near the place of the accident.

21. HC Suman Kumar (PW8) stated that he was going

towards Beat No.2 on 13.6.2010. He saw a truck bearing

registration No HP-72-1603 being driven at a high speed, going

towards Sundernagar. One motorcycle bearing registration No.

HP-31A-2360 was moving ahead of the truck. One woman was

sitting as a pillion rider. The truck hit the motorcycle. The

woman fell on the road, and the truck dragged her for a distance

of about 80 mtrs. She succumbed to her injuries. He stated in his

cross-examination that no entry was recorded regarding his

traffic duty. He admitted that there were many shops near the

place of the accident. He denied that he was at some distance. He

denied that the accident had not occurred with the truck.

22. The statements of these witnesses corroborated each

other. Nothing was suggested in their cross-examination that

they had any motive to falsely depose against the accused.

Learned Courts below had rightly held that there was nothing in

their cross-examination to prove that they were making false

statements. The testimony of Narinder Kumar (PW1) cannot be

15

rejected simply because he happened to be the husband of the

deceased. He was riding the motorcycle and was a natural

witness, and the learned Courts below had rightly placed

reliance on their testimonies.

23. The statements of these witnesses are corroborated

by the postmortem report, in which the cause of death was

found to be a burst abdomen and crush injury to the gut and

spleen, leading to multiple lacerations. This report clearly shows

that the deceased was crushed under the tyres of the vehicle.

This falsifies the defence version that the dupatta of the

deceased was trapped in the motorcycle, which led to the

accident. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly relied

upon the prosecution’s evidence and rejected the statement of

the defence witness.

24. It was submitted that the seizure memo of the truck

was prepared in the Police Station as per the statement of

Jagdish Chand (PW3), which falsifies the prosecution's version

that the truck was seized on the spot. This submission will not

help the petitioner. The truck was seized along with the

document (Ex.PW3/A), which was produced by petitioner

16

Gurdev. Since the petitioner had left the spot, the truck could not

have been seized on the spot, that too along with the documents.

Therefore, the seizure of the truck along with the documents in

the Police Station will not make the prosecution case suspect.

25. The statements of the prosecution’s witnesses

proved that the truck had hit the motorcycle from the rear. Rule

23 reads that the driver of the motor vehicle moving behind

another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that

other vehicle to avoid collision, if the vehicle in front should

suddenly slow down or stop; therefore, the driver of the vehicle

following another is under an obligation to maintain sufficient

distance to avoid the collision.

26. In the present case, the petitioner failed to maintain

sufficient distance from the motorcycle as required under Rule

23, and this was the proximate cause of the accident. It was laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nishan Singh v. Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 765: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 463 that

where the driver of the vehicle following another had failed to

maintain sufficient distance, he was negligent. It was observed

at page 770:

17

“12. The finding so recorded by the Tribunal has been af-

firmed by the High Court, by observing that the evidence was

clearly indicative of the fact that the Maruti car was being

driven in a rash and negligent manner, which was the cause

of the accident of this nature and resulting in the death of

one of the passengers in the Maruti car. The Maruti car was

driven by none other than PW 2 Manjeet Singh. In his evi-

dence, he has admitted that the subject truck was running

ahead of the Maruti car for quite some time, about one kilo-

metre and at the time of the accident, the distance between

the truck and the Maruti car was only 10-15 ft. He has also

admitted that the law mandates maintaining a sufficient dis-

tance between two vehicles running in the same direction. It

is also not in dispute that the road on which the two vehicles

were moving was only about 14 feet wide. It is unfathomable

that on such a narrow road, the subject truck would move at

a high speed as alleged. In any case, the Maruti car, which

was following the truck, was expected to maintain a safe dis-

tance, as envisaged in Regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road

Regulations, 1989, which reads thus:

“23. Distance from vehicles in front. —The driver of a mo-

tor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a

sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid colli-

sion if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or

stop.”

The expression “sufficient distance” has not been defined in

the Regulations or elsewhere. The thumb rule of sufficient

distance is at least a safe distance of two to three seconds gap

in ideal conditions to avert collision and to allow the follow-

ing driver time to respond. The distance of 10-15 ft between

the truck and the Maruti car was certainly not a safe dis-

tance, for which the driver of the Maruti car must take the

blame. It must necessarily follow that the finding on the is-

sue under consideration ought to be against the claimants.”

18

27. This position was reiterated in S. Mohammed Hakkim

v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2025) 10 SCC 263, wherein it was

observed: -

8. The car insurer has taken the stand that the appellant

had hit the moving car from behind and thus, the car

driver is not liable. On the other hand, the car driver has

admitted in his evidence that he had suddenly applied the

brakes as his wife was pregnant and she had a vomiting

sensation. In our view, the concurrent finding that the

appellant was definitely negligent in not maintaining a

sufficient distance from the vehicle moving ahead and

driving the motorcycle without a valid licence is

correct….”

28. Therefore, both the learned Courts had rightly held

that the accused was negligent in driving the truck.

29. The accident led to the death of Bharati, hence the

learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused for the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-

A of the IPC.

30. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to

undergo simple imprisonment of one year for the commission

of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC. This

cannot be said to be excessive. It was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5

19

SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person

convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:

“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made

based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted

person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have

proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is

galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in

sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down.

When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more

people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so

much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of

the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half

of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested

in the said decision, thus :

"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts,

not absolute abstractions. In our current

conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under

the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to

the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty

vehicles and speeding menaces."

12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC

538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed

on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to

remain in force although the High Court too had

confirmed the said sentence when an accused was

convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and

causing the death of a human being. In that case, this

Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment

for six months besides imposing a fine.

13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents

in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the

victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat

the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as

attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act.

While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed

for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent

20

driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations

should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the

accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his

working hours. He must constantly inform himself that

he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or

inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in

locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance

thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an

accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not

necessarily result in the death of any human being, or

even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the

offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would

be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep

in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the

offence of causing the death of a human being due to his

callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail

sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play,

particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the

high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of

automobiles.”

31. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.

Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: -

“13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy

of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they

must have better training in traffic laws and moral

responsibility, with special reference to the potential

injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased

number of road accidents, this Court, on several

occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with

the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot

treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as

attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the

view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC

82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].

21

32. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh

Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine

SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196:

“25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to

observe that India has a disreputable record of road

accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the

drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they

survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving,

where other people become their prey. The poor feel that

their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of

uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant

fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious

attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger

than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to

observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and

revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say

so with immense anguish.”

33. Therefore, the sentence of one year is not excessive.

34. Learned Trial Court had also sentenced the accused

to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and pay a

fine of ₹1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo

simple imprisonment for one month, which cannot be said to be

excessive because a precious life was lost.

35. No other point was urged.

36. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and

the same is dismissed.

22

37. Records be sent back to the learned Courts below

forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

April, 2026

(Chander)