2026 INSC 451 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14479 of 2025)

HABBAN SHAH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHERUDDIN …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Heard Shri Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel for the

defendant-appellant and Shri Divyesh Pratap Singh,

learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent.

2. Leave granted.

3. A short but an intricate question of law which arises for

our consideration in this appeal is: whether the decree of

specific performance passed by the court of first instance

on 31.10.2012 directing for the execution of sale deed on

deposit of the balance sale consideration within three

2

months would be inexecutable for the reason that the

balance sale consideration was not deposited within the

time stipulated.

4. The suit property is an agricultural land admeasuring 12

kanals and 19 marlas situate in village Shikarpur, Tehsil

Tauru, District Mewat in the state of Haryana. The said

land belonged to Habban (defendant -appellant). He

entered into an agreement to sell the said land to

Sheruddin (plaintiff-respondent) for a sale consideration of

Rs.5,00,000/- per acre and received a sum of Rs.80,000/-

in advance. It was agreed that the sale deed shall be

executed on or before 15.03.2006 and that balance sale

consideration would be payable at the time of execution

and registration of sale deed.

5. Upon non-execution of the sale deed within the time

stipulated, the plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for

specific performance of the aforesaid agreement to sell

dated 19.10.2005. The said suit after contest by the

defendant-appellant was decreed on 31.10.2012 by the

court of first instance. The said decree specifically provided

that the defendant-appellant shall execute the sale in

3

favour of plaintiff-respondent in respect of suit land in

terms of the agreement after receiving the balance sale

consideration within a period of three months from the

date of the judgment and if the sale is not so executed, the

plaintiff-respondent would be entitled to get it executed

through the process of the court.

6. It is not in dispute that the aforesaid decree was

challenged in a first appeal wherein on 17.12.2012 an

interim order was passed restraining both the parties from

alienating suit property till 25.01.2013. The said interim

order was not extended and as such lapsed on 25.01.2013

itself. Finally, the said appeal was dismissed on

11.11.2014 upholding the decree of the first court.

7. The decree so passed by the court of first instance and

confirmed by the first appellate court was taken to the

High Court by means of a second appeal by the defendant-

appellant. Ultimately the same was also dismissed on

12.01.2017. It may be worth noting that in the second

appeal no interim order of any nature was ever passed.

8. In the meantime, the plaintiff-respondent as a decree

holder on 04.03.2013 applied for the execution of the

4

aforesaid decree dated 31.10.2012. However, the said

execution was dismissed for want of prosecution on

01.08.2014. It appears that the execution may not have

been pressed for the reason that an appeal was preferred

by the other side which continued to remain pending

wherein though an interim order was passed for a short

period which lapsed with the efflux of time.

9. Subsequently, the plaintiff-respondent moved another

application dt. 08.01.2015 for execution of the aforesaid

decree of specific performance. In the said execution, the

defendant-appellant filed objections dated 14.07.2015 to

the effect that the execution is barred by time as the

execution has been moved after a gap of three years and

that the decree allowed only three months’ time for

depositing the balance sale consideration.

10. The objections filed in the aforesaid Execution Petition

were dismissed by the Executing Court vide order dated

07.09.2015 primarily on the ground that the plaintiff-

respondent was always ready and willing to perform his

obligation and that the balance sale consideration could

5

not have been deposited due to the interim order passed

in the first appeal or due to its pendency.

11. Not satisfied by the above order passed by the Executing

Court, the defendant-appellant preferred Civil Revision

No.7232 of 2015 before the High Court specifically

contending that the decree of specific performance, in

unequivocal terms directed for the execution of the sale

deed upon receiving the balance sale consideration within

a period of three months. Therefore, the plaintiff -

respondent was under an obligation to deposit the balance

amount within three months and since neither the amount

was deposited nor any extension of time to deposit the

same was applied, he is not entitled to execute the decree.

The decree as such has become inexecutable.

12. The aforesaid revision preferred by the defendant -

appellant has been dismissed by the High Court by order

impugned dated 24.03.2025 , more or less on similar

grounds as assigned by the Executing Court with a further

reasoning that the plaintiff-respondent had in the

meantime moved an application on 05.03.2013 and again

on 08.01.2015 for the deposit of the balance sale

6

consideration and the second application seeking

permission to deposit the balance amount was allowed on

09.10.2015 by the Executing Court and the amount of

Rs.6,92,410/- was duly deposited.

13. The above orders passed by the Executing Court and the

Revisional Court dismissing the objections of the

defendant-appellant and affirming the same, have been

assailed in this appeal.

14. The submission of Shri Manoj Swarup, learned senior

counsel for the defendant-appellant is that the decree

provided for the deposit of balance sale consideration

within a period of three months and since it was not

deposited within the time provided, the decree is no longer

executable. The plaintiff-respondent never moved any

application for the extension of time to deposit the balance

sale consideration and has not even explained the reason

for the delay in making the deposit. Therefore, the

defendant-appellant is entitled to the revocation of the

contract in accordance with provisions of Section 28 of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963

1. In support of his contentions, he

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

7

has relied upon a number of decisions, to be precise four

in number, of this Court in which the latest is Balbir

Singh and Another v. Baldev Singh (Dead) Through his

legal representatives and Others

2.

15. From the other side, it is contended that the decree of

specific performance is clear enough and is an executable

decree. The court of first instance had decreed the suit

after recording clear finding of fact that the plaintiff-

respondent was always ready and willing to perform his

obligations under the agreement. Therefore, the question

of readiness and willingness does not arise at this stage of

the execution. The plaintiff-respondent never denied to

deposit the balance sale consideration rather it was on

account of the defendant-appellant filing an appeal and

obtaining interim order restraining parties from alienating

the property that it was not possible for the plaintiff-

respondent to deposit the amount. There was no need on

his part to deposit the amount as directed, as under the

order of the appellate court sale/alienation was not

permissible. Moreover, once the application of the plaintiff-

2

(2025) 3 SCC 543

8

respondent to permit him to deposit the balance sale

consideration was allowed, it was no longer open for the

defendant-appellant to allege non-compliance of the

decree. In such a scenario, the delay, if any, in depositing

the amount stands condoned or in other words the time

for making the deposit stands extended. It is also

submitted that the defendant-appellant is not entitled to

any benefit under Section 28 of the Act as he never moved

any application for rescinding the contract as envisaged

therein.

16. It is in the above factual position that we have to examine

whether the decree of specific performance passed by the

court of first instance is executable or has become

inexecutable on account of default in depositing the

balance sale consideration within the time stipulated

under the decree.

17. The operative portion of the judgment and decree dated

31.10.2012 reads as under:-

“As a sequel to the findings on issue wise,

the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs.

The defendant is directed to execute the sale

deed in favour of the plaintiff in reject to the

suit land in view of the agreement to sell

dated 19.10.2005 after receiving the balance

9

sale consideration within the period of three

months from the date of this judgment failing

which the plaintiff will be at liberty to get

execute the sale deed by approaching this

court. The defendant is also directed to hand

over the possession over the possession of

the suit land legally and the defendant is

restrained from alienating the suit land.

Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly. File

be consigned to the record-room after due

compliance.”

18. A simple reading of the aforesaid directions contained in

the order would reveal that the court had directed the

defendant-appellant to execute the sale deed in favour of

the plaintiff-respondent in terms of the agreement after

receiving the balance sale consideration within the period

of three months from the date of the judgment. Therefore,

the direction is to the defendant-appellant to execute the

sale deed within a period of three months after receiving

the balance sale consideration. There appears to be no

specific direction to the plaintiff-respondent that the

balance sale consideration has to be deposited by him

within three months. The direction in this regard is

specifically to the defendant-appellant to execute the sale

deed within three months on receipt of the balance sale

consideration, which by implication means that there is

10

reciprocal obligation upon the plaintiff-respondent to

deposit the amount within three months. It is only by

necessary implication that the plaintiff-respondent was

required to deposit the amount within three months.

19. It is trite to mention that in view of Order XX Rule 12A CPC

it is mandatory that every decree of specific performance

of a contract must specify the period within which the sale

consideration/the balance sale consideration should be

paid. It is in consonance with the aforesaid provision that

the decree of specific performance in the case at hand

provides for the execution of the sale deed after receiving

the balance sale consideration within a period of three

months.

20. Thus, we assume that there was a specific direction to the

plaintiff-respondent to deposit the amount within three

months of the judgment and therefore, the issue as stated

earlier is; whether non-deposit of the balance sale

consideration within the time stipulated above would be

fatal and would make the decree inexecutable which

otherwise is an executable decree.

11

21. Before we dwell on the merits of the above issue, we would

like to mention that a feeble attempt was made to contend

that the execution as filed by the plaintiff-respondent is

barred by time and that the first execution having been

dismissed, the second was not maintainable.

22. As regards limitation, the decree is dated 31.10.2012

whereas the second execution was filed on 08.01.2015 i.e.,

within three years of the decree and as such the same was

clearly within time. Article 136 of the Schedule to the

Limitation Act, 1963, provides for a period of twelve years

from the decree or the time when it becomes enforceable

in law for filing an application for the execution of any

decree. The execution in the case at hand was moved

within the aforesaid period of twelve years and as such

cannot be said to be barred by limitation.

23. The aforesaid execution is maintainable even otherwise for

the simple reason that the first application was not decided

on merits but was simply dismissed for want of

prosecution. In this connection, reference may be made to

paragraph 25 of Bhagyoday Cooperative Bank Limited

12

v. Ravindra Balkrishna Patel

3, wherein also a second

Execution Petition was filed after the first was dismissed

on the ground of default and the court held that mere

dismissal of the first application on the ground of default

does not preclude the decree holder from filing a fresh

execution within limitation.

24. In view of the above, the objections to the limitation and

maintainability of the execution are not tenable and stand

overruled.

25. Now coming to the merits of the executability of the decree

for specific performance dated 31.10.2012. It may be noted

that the aforesaid decree is an executable decree but is a

conditional decree. It provides for the execution of the sale

deed by the defendant-appellant within three months,

subject to the plaintiff-respondent depositing the balance

sale consideration. Therefore, as stated earlier, the decree

imposes reciprocal obligations upon both the parties. The

obligation of executing the decree is upon receipt of the

balance sale consideration. Therefore, by necessary

implication for the purposes of executing the sale deed, the

3

(2022) 14 SCC 417

13

plaintiff-respondent had to deposit/pay the balance sale

consideration within the time stipulated for depositing the

aforesaid amount or for executing the sale deed, as the

case may be.

26. Admittedly, in the present case, the plaintiff-respondent

had not deposited the balance sale consideration within

the period of three months stipulated under the decree. He

had not even moved any application within the said time

for seeking extension of time, either under Section

148/151 of the CPC or under Section 28 of the Act.

27. The interim order dated 17.12.2012 passed in first appeal

preferred by the defendant-appellant, only restrained the

parties from alienating the suit property. It nowhere

prohibited the plaintiff-respondent from depositing the

balance sale consideration as a prelude to the execution of

the sale deed. Moreover, the aforesaid stay order elapsed

on 25.01.2013 and the first appeal itself was dismissed on

11.11.2014. No doubt, the plaintiff-respondent had moved

application on 05.03.2013 seeking extension of time for

depositing the balance sale consideration but no orders

were ever passed on the said application. The said

14

application was filed after the stay in the first appeal had

expired. Therefore, there was no application seeking

extension of time within the period of three months

stipulated under the decree.

28. Subsequently, plaintiff-respondent filed second

application to deposit balance sale amount on which the

court permitted the deposit of balance sale consideration

vide order dated 09.10.2015, in pursuance whereof the

balance amount was deposited. This was done much after

the first appeal itself was dismissed. The question,

therefore, is whether such permission to deposit or the

deposit itself would ipso facto amount to condoning the

delay in making the deposit and resultantly it amounts to

deemed extension of time. The answer of the above

proposition is an absolute ‘No’.

29. In this connection, it would be profitable to refer to a

decision of this court in P.R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi

4. In

the said case the court was dealing with a similar issue

where the decree holder failed to make the deposit within

the time stipulated under the decree. The court refused to

4

(2015) 9 SCC 52

15

accept the plea that once the deposit is made and accepted

by the court, though beyond the period stipulated under

the decree, it would amount to deemed extension of time.

It was held that the conditional decree is self-operative,

therefore, non-compliance of any condition leads to

automatic dismissal of the suit. In a case, the deposit is

not made within the time permitted and no application is

moved for the extension of time within the said time, it

would amount to failure to comply with the condition of

the decree which leads to the automatic dismissal of the

suit. In other words, it was held that the suit for specific

performance of a contract stands automatically dismissed

when the conditions under the decree are not complied

with by the decree holder and he is not entitled to seek

execution of the decree as it ceases to exist in the eyes of

law due to deemed dismissal of the suit.

30. This being the position in law, the submission that the

plaintiff-respondent had deposited the balance sale

consideration with the permission of the court and the

same was accepted and as such the condition stands

complied with, cannot be accepted.

16

31. One of the other arguments is that the defendant -

appellant had not even filed any application under Section

28 of the Act for rescinding the contract, therefore, no relief

to the above effect could be granted to the defendant-

appellant.

32. The aforesaid argument does not tie down our hands as

this aspect of the matter stands covered by one another

decision of this court rendered in Prem Jeevan v. K.S.

Venkata Raman and Another

5.

33. In the aforesaid case one of the contentions advanced on

behalf of decree holder was that unless an application

seeking recession of the contract in terms of Section 28 of

the Act is filed, judgment debtor is not entitled to the relief

of rescinding the contract. The court upon due

consideration held that failure of the judgment debtor to

seek recession of the contract in terms of Section 28 of the

Act does not imply that the decree which has become

inexecutable would revive and would be executable when

the deposits were not made in time and no application for

extension of time was moved.

5

(2017) 11 SCC 57

17

34. In view of the above decision, it is settled that moving of an

application under Section 28 of the Act for rescinding the

contract for non-compliance of the condition is not

mandatory rather optional and immaterial and that the

court in a given circumstance is not powerless to treat the

contract as having rescinded for non-compliance of the

condition.

35. In view of the ratio laid down in P.R. Yelumalai (supra)

that the suit for specific performance of contract stands

automatically dismissed, no sooner than the condition

contemplated under the decree is not complied with,

coupled with the fact that there is no mandatory

requirement of moving an application for rescinding a

contract in terms of Section 28 of the Act in view of Prem

Jeevan (supra), we are of the opinion that the plaintiff-

respondent having not only failed to deposit the balance

sale consideration within the time stipulated under decree

but also having failed to move any application for

extension of time within the time permitted disentitled

himself from executing the decree. There is neither

automatic extension of time nor condonation of delay in

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making the deposit. The decree ceases to exists due to non-

compliance and becomes inexecutable.

36. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel for the

defendant-appellant had placed strong reliance upon the

recent decision of this court in Balbir Singh and Another

v. Baldev Singh (Dead) through its legal

representatives and others

6. The aforesaid decision

reiterating the earlier precedents holds that the language

of Section 28(1) of the Act establishes that the court does

not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of decree for specific

performance and it does not become functus officio as the

very said provision gives discretionary power to the court

to grant extension of time to comply with the conditions

under the decree and even for the recession of the contract.

Thus, the court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal

with the decree of specific performance till the sale deed is

executed or the decree is rendered inexecutable.

37. The court therein took cognizance to the fact that neither

the deposit was made within the stipulated time nor

extension of time was sought or granted within the time

6

(2025) 3 SCC 543

19

permitted. Further, no explanation was furnished for the

delay in making the deposit and as such held the view

taken that the decree is inexecutable is correct.

38. The aforesaid decision though relied upon by both the

sides does not render much assistance to the plaintiff-

respondent rather helps the defendant-appellant.

39. The above discussion leads us to the following

conclusions:

i. The decree passed in a suit for specific performance is

in the nature of a preliminary decree.

ii. Since the decree of a specific performance is in the

nature of preliminary decree, the Court passing the

same does not become functus officio as soon as the

decree is passed but retains control over the decree

even after the passing of the decree till the sale deed

is executed or the decree is rendered inexecutable.

iii. Section 28 (1) of the Act provides for depositing or

paying the balance sale consideration within the time

allowed or to seek recession of the contract in the

event of default even though the decree of specific

performance has been granted.

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iv. Sub-Section (4) of Section 28 of the Act bars a

separate suit for any relief which can be claimed in

the same suit by moving an application under Section

28 of the Act.

v. The power of the Court under Section 28 of the Act is

discretionary and can be exercised on equitable

consideration. The exercise of such discretion must be

equitable to both the sellers and purchasers.

vi. The default, if any, subsequent to decree for the

specific performance resulting in the recession of

contract has to be decided having regard to the broad

terms of Section 28 (1) and Section 28 (4) in exercise

of equity jurisdiction so as to give quietus to the

dispute; and

vii. It is not mandatory to move an application under

Section 28 and that the Court in the given

circumstances is not powerless to treat the contract

as having rescind it for non-compliance of the

condition.

21

40. The plaintiff-respondent has placed reliance upon Dr.

Amit Arya v. Kamlesh Kumari

7 which is also a very

recent decision of this court. In the said case, the court

observed that the power to extend time granted can be

exercised by the court, however, non-grant of extension of

time cannot be the end of the transaction. Such non -

extension of time would be a classic example of a hyper

technical approach which the court must eschew in view

of Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (now Deceased), through

its LRs and Others

8, wherein it has been observed that

“non-payment of balance sale consideration within the

time period fixed by the trial court does not amount to

abandonment of the contract and consequent rescinding

of the same. The real test must be to see if the conduct of

the decree holder amounts to a positive refusal to complete

his part of the contract”.

41. In view of the above decision, we have to examine whether

there was any positive act on part of the plaintiff-

respondent for non-compliance of his obligation of

7

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2886

8

2025 SCC OnLine SC 584

22

depositing the balance sale consideration as per the

decree.

42. At the cost of repetition, we must remind that the decree

for specific performance was passed on 31.10.2012 and

the interim order granted in first appeal lapsed on

25.01.2013, but the plaintiff-respondent neither deposited

the balance sale consideration, if he was ready and willing

to perform his obligation, within the period of three months

contemplated under the decree nor cared to move any

application seeking extension of time for depositing the

balance amount on any ground, much less for the reason

that the decree had not attained finality and was subject

matter of appeal. This shows that the plaintiff-respondent

was shying away from performing his obligation.

43. It is pertinent to mention here that the relief of specific

performance of an agreement is an equitable and a

discretionary relief in terms of Section 16 (C) and Section

20 of the Act. It is not mandatory upon the court to grant

the relief of specific performance even if it legally appears

to be correct.

23

44. In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead), by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan

Mohan Rao and Others

9, the court observed that to

adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract, it must take into

consideration the conduct of the plaintiff, both prior to the

filing of the suit and subsequent to the filing of the suit

along with other attending circumstances. The court is not

bound to grant the relief of specific performance merely

because there was a valid agreement or at one point of time

the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his

obligation. The relief of specific performance is an

equitable remedy and it is on the discretion of the court to

grant or not to grant such a relief.

45. Once it is accepted that the relief of specific performance

is an equitable and a discretionary relief, therefore, he who

seeks equity must ensure that equity is done to the

opposite party. The final end of law is nothing but justice,

therefore, the parties to the suit for specific performance

should be informed by equity. In other words, he who

seeks equity must do equity.

9

(1995) 5 SCC 115

24

46. In view of the above legal position when the relief of specific

performance is an equitable and a discretionary relief and

the same having been granted, the plaintiff-respondent

must perform his part of the obligation in time. The

condition to deposit the balance sale consideration within

three months under the decree partakes the condition

under the agreement and makes the aforesaid time as an

essence of the agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff -

respondent is obliged to establish his readiness and

willingness to perform his obligation by depositing the

balance sale consideration strictly within the time allowed.

It is not at all equitable to condone the delay on his part in

depositing the balance sale consideration or extending the

time for the same, more particularly when due to non-

compliance, the suit itself stands automatically dismissed

and the decree vanishes. The conduct of the plaintiff-

respondent disentitles him the relief which was earlier

granted in view of the long passage of time since 2005

when the agreement was entered into till date as in

between land prices might have increased manifold.

25

47. In the end, an attempt has been made from the side of the

plaintiff-respondent to contend that when valuable rights

have accrued in his favour on account of the decree of

specific performance, such rights cannot be taken away

and that the view which assist the decree must be adopted.

48. It is true that the rights accrued ought not to be disturbed

unless there are strong reasons for the same. In the

present case, the plaintiff-respondent got the decree by

establishing his readiness and willingness to perform his

part of the agreement but n onetheless he failed to

establish his continuous readiness and willingness till the

execution of the sale deed. If he was ready and willing to

perform his part of the agreement till the stage of decreeing

the suit, there would have been no problem on his part in

immediately complying with his obligation under the

decree by depositing the balance sale consideration within

the time permitted. The plaintiff-respondent having failed

to abide by such a condition indicates that he was not

actually ready and willing to perform his obligation under

the decree which obligation, in essence, took the shape of

a condition under the agreement. In such circumstances,

26

the plaintiff-respondent disentitled himself from the

benefit of the decree of specific performance. Therefore, the

submission that the view which assist the decree must be

adopted is not tenable in the facts and circumstances of

the present case.

49. It is trite to mention that Section 28 of the Act provides

that the Court has to pass an order as the justice of the

case may require. The parties approaching the Court must

have the feeling that justice has been done to either of

them in the facts and cir cumstances of the case

particularly when the decree relates to specific

performance of a contract based upon equity, equality and

fairness. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Court to pass

an equitable order accordingly, balancing the equities

between the parties.

50. In the above context, post-hearing, we interacted with the

learned counsel for the parties. Shri Manoj Swarup,

learned senior counsel for the defendant -appellant,

submitted that the defendant-appellant is not in a position

to offer any amount and that at best he can leave one-half

acre out of the two and a half acres involved in the

27

agreement, i.e., 4 kanals to make good the loss, if any,

suffered by the plaintiff-respondent. It may be worth

noting that the defendant-appellant had received part of

the sale consideration amounting to Rs. 80,000/- on

19.10.2005. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, we

consider it prudent to order refund of the earnest money

with simple interest so as to adjust the equities.

51. We have deliberately not touched the submission of the

parties on the doctrine of merger as facts in that regard

were not clear on record. Moreover, the parties have

proceeded to make their submissions on the basis of the

judgment and decree passed by the court of first instance

rather than that of the first appellate Court or the second

appellate Court. The first appellate Court and the Court of

second appeal have not granted any time either for the

execution of the sale deed or for the deposit of balance sale

consideration. Therefore, the time provided by the Court of

first instance under the decree is the material time within

which the parties were required to fulfil their reciprocal

obligations. Accordingly, we have not dealt with the

decision in the case of Surinder Pal Soni vs. Sohan Lal

28

(Dead) through LRs.

10 which is primarily on the doctrine

of merger.

52. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the

decree of specific performance dated 31.10.2012 is

rendered inexecutable on account of non-compliance of

the condition to deposit the balance sale consideration

within the time of three months stipulated therein and the

contract as a whole stand rescinded in terms of Section 28

of the Act.

53. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated

24.03.2025 passed by the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.7232 of 2015

and that of the Executing Court dated 07.09.2015

dismissing the objections, are hereby set aside. The

objections are upheld and the execution proceedings are

directed to be closed with the direction to the defendant-

appellant to refund of the part sale consideration or the

earnest money of Rs.80,000/- received by him with simple

interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum from the date

of its receipt i.e.,19.10.2005 till its refund. In the event, the

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(2020) 15 SCC 771

29

defendant-appellant is unable to refund the said amount,

it would be open for him to sell his ½ acre of the said land

to the plaintiff-respondent or to any other third party if he

refuses to purchase and may make the payment of the

aforesaid amount by the sale of the said land within a

period of three months.

54. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

55. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

…………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

…………………………….. J.

(S. V. N. BHATTI)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 6, 2026.