2025 INSC 178 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1387 OF 2012

HANSRAJ …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. The appellant Hansraj is a convict for offence under Section

302 IPC

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for murdering Ramlal of village Ghotha Sakulpara

Bhanupratappur, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh and has

been awarded life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-.

2. The order of conviction and sentence of the Trial Court

dated 19.12.2002 has been confirmed by the High Court in

1 Indian Penal Code

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appeal by the impugned judgment and order dated

30.07.2010.

3. The appellant preferred the Special Leave Petition with delay

of 653 days which was condoned and leave to appeal was

granted. Since the appellant had remained in jail for over 10

years, he was directed to be released on bail by this Court.

4. The case of the prosecution is based only on circumstantial

evidence and there is no eyewitness to the incident.

5. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is

that it is a completely false case and that even the

circumstances have not been proved conclusively to hold the

appellant guilty and there are stark contradictions in the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

6.The incident is of 28.03.2002. It is alleged that the

appellant was residing with the deceased and was assisting

him in his work for the last over two months. On the fateful

day the appellant at 7:00 am in the morning left for his

native place on cycle with a bag but is set to have returned

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at around 9:00 am claiming that his cycle got punctured. He

therefore asked for money from Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) the

wife of the deceased, to get the puncture repaired.

Budhiyarin Bai told him that she had no money readily

available at home and that he can take paddy and sell it in

the market, but he refused. So, Budhiyarin Bai herself went

to the market to sell the paddy, leaving the appellant and

her husband at home. When she returned at about 9:30

am, she saw the appellant fleeing with a farsi (Ex P/6) in his

hand and discovered that her husband is lying on the floor,

profusely bleeding with his neck severed. She therefore

raised an alarm and upon hearing her cries her neighbours

Jogeshwar (PW-3) and Jhadu Ram (PW-4) came and they

also saw her husband lying dead. The neighbours informed

another villager namely Jogi Ram (PW-1) who also came on

the spot and thereafter proceeded to the Police Station

Bhanupratappur to lodge an FIR. He lodged the FIR at

11:15 am on the same day.

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7.It is alleged that the relationship of the appellant with the

deceased was strained probably on account of non-

payment/untimely payment of his wages. The appellant was

the person last seen in the company of the deceased and

that the weapon of recovery i.e., farsi was recovered at his

pointing out. The injuries sustained by the deceased were

opined to have been caused by the weapon recovered. In

these circumstances, the prosecution asserts that the

evidence on record proves beyond reasonable doubt that the

appellant alone is the person who committed the offence

and that he has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the

two Courts below.

8.Undisputedly, the case of the prosecution is based on

circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the

commission of the offence in as much as the wife of the

deceased, Budhiyarin Bai, was also not present at the time

of the commission of the offence and had discovered that

her husband was lying on the floor bleeding profusely with

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neck severed upon returning from the market. She probably

saw the accused fleeing from the scene of crime.

9.The law with regard to a case based purely on

circumstantial evidence stands crystalised by the decision

of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs

State of Maharashtra

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wherein five golden principles

known as panchsheel proof of a case based on

circumstantial evidence were enshrined namely (i) the

circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be

drawn should be fully established crafting out a distinction

between ‘may be’ established and ‘must or should’ be

established; (ii) the facts established should be consistent

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; (iii) the

circumstances should be of a conclusive nature; (iv) the

circumstance should exclude every other possible

hypothesis except the one to be proved i.e., the guilt of the

accused; and (v) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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conclusion that the accused is innocent and must show

that in all human probability the act must have been done

by the accused.

10.In other words, the chain of events leading to the

prosecution of the convict must conclusively be established

with certainty and there shall not be any room for any

second opinion which may lead to the innocence of the

accused.

11.The appellant is said to have a motive to kill the deceased.

The alleged motive being that he was living as a servant of

the deceased for the last two months and there was some

discord between him and the deceased in connection with

non-payment/untimely payment of wages. However, such a

discord is not of such a nature of extent which may lead to

such a drastic action on part of the appellant to kill the

deceased. The issue of non-payment of wages is hardly

material and is so trivial a matter so as to compel anyone to

take an extreme step of committing a crime of such a grave

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nature. Moreover, there is no material evidence to prove any

discord between the two.

12.In so far as the last seen theory is concerned, that the

appellant was in the company of the deceased at the time

when Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) the wife of the deceased went

to the market to sell paddy also appears to be a little

doubtful. It is the consistent case of all the witnesses

including Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) that the appellant had left

in the morning at about 7:00 am for his native place and

that as told by Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) he returned around

9:00 am as his cycle’s tyre got punctured. The fact that he

actually returned as alleged does not stand established by

any independent evidence except for the statement of

Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5). However, her statement could not be

corroborated by any piece of evidence. It is hardly believable

that a person whose relationship with the deceased was not

cordial and has left for his native place in disgust would

return soon thereafter. The cycle of the appellant was

recovered by the police but no effort was made to find out if

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either of the tyres was actually punctured, which could have

proved that the appellant may have returned as the cycle’s

tyre got punctured.

13.The weapon of crime i.e., farsi (Ex P/6) was set to have been

recovered after 20-25 days of the incident on the pointing

out of the appellant. It has come in evidence that it had

some blood stains. However, no forensic report was brought

on record to prove that the blood stains on it matched with

that of the blood of the deceased. Merely for the reason that

the doctor opined that the injuries on the deceased may

have been caused by a similar weapon would not conclude

that the recovered farsi was the weapon of crime. Similar

and identical instruments like farsi are found in almost

every home in the village as it is one of the most used

farming equipment. That apart, Jogi Ram, who lodged the

complaint, in his cross examination stated that the farsi

was lying in an open place, referring to the place of the

commission of the crime. The said statement completely

belies the fact that the farsi was recovered subsequently

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from the field of one Chamaru Ram. The recovery of the

weapon of crime or the farsi, which was recovered, is

doubtful and it is also not certain that it was actually the

weapon of crime.

14.One important circumstance pointing to the involvement of

the appellant is that he was seen running from the village

both by Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) and Jogi Ram (PW-1).

Budhiyarin Bai in her statement in unequivocal terms

stated that when she returned home after selling the paddy,

the appellant had fled. It means that she had not found and

seen the appellant at the place of the crime after her return

as he had already fled. However, in her cross examination

she took a summersault and stated that when she came

back, she saw the appellant Hans Raj running from the

house with the farsi. Jogi Ram (PW-1) who at the time of

occurrence of the incident was working in his field, stated

that he had seen the appellant running before he came to

know about the incident through Jogeshwar (PW-3),

whereupon he went to the house of the deceased. In his

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cross examination, he further stated that the wife of the

deceased, Budhiyarin Bai, told him that when she came

back after selling paddy, her husband was lying on the spot

and the appellant had disappeared. PW-1 nowhere stated

that Budhiyarin Bai saw the appellant fleeing from the spot

rather, she only informed that the appellant had already

disappeared when she returned from the market. Later, in

the cross-examination, Jogi Ram stated that while working

in the field collecting mahuva he only saw a man running

from a distance of more than a furlong. But he never named

the person who was running. Therefore, the evidence of

none of the two witnesses could conclusively establish that

they saw the appellant running or fleeing from the place of

crime or from the village. The identity of the person running

away had not been established by any evidence.

15.In addition to this, according to the prosecution, the clothes

of the appellant which he was wearing at the time of the

incident were produced by one Pritam Singh (PW-9) who

was declared to be hostile. The said clothes again had the

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blood stains but no forensic report was produced to prove

that the blood of those stains matched with the blood of the

deceased.

16.In the aforesaid facts, the circumstances raising finger upon

the appellant, are not of a conclusive nature to prove beyond

the shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person

responsible for the commission of the crime. The possibility

of innocence of the appellant does not stand excluded as per

the chain of events.

17.Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the

appellant cannot be held guilty of the commission of the

offence beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, in such

circumstances the benefit of doubt goes in his favour.

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Courts below

have manifestly erred in convicting him for the aforesaid

offence.

18.The impugned judgment and orders dated 19.12.2002 and

30.07.2010* are hereby set aside and the appellant is

acquitted from the offence charged with. He has already

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suffered incarceration for over 10 years. He is already on

bail. His sureties and bail bonds are discharged.

19.The appeal is allowed accordingly.

.........………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

...……………………………….. J.

(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 10, 2025.

* Corrected in terms of Corrigendum dated 26.03.2025.

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