Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO(s). 235-578/2011

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 6561/2009,6528/2009, 6531/2009, 6529/2009,

6552/2009, 6567/2009, 6535/2009, 6836/2009, 6560/2009, 6571/2009,

6530/2009, 6525/2009, 6527/2009, 6570/2009, 6546/2009, 6565/2009,

6548/2009, 6550/2009, 6563/2009, 6537/2009, 6532/2009, 6569/2009,

6534/2009, 6559/2009, 6572/2009, 6583/2009, 6580/2009, 6573/2009,

6584/2009, 6588/2009, 6590/2009, 6575/2009, 6823/2009, 6853/2009,

6855/2009, 6554/2009, 6566/2009, 6557/2009, 6533/2009, 6558/2009,

6541/2009, 6556/2009, 6562/2009, 6568/2009, 6564/2009, 6539/2009,

6538/2009, 6553/2009, 6540/2009, 6852/2009, 6576/2009, 6587/2009,

6582/2009, 6581/2009, 6577/2009, 6574/2009, 6585/2009, 6578/2009,

6579/2009, 6854/2009, 6666-6667/2009, 6757/2009, 6747-6755/2009,

6831/2009, 6756/2009, 6591/2009, 6651/2009, 6606/2009, 6592/2009,

6658/2009, 6594/2009, 6595/2009, 6650/2009, 6657/2009, 6655/2009,

6596/2009, 6597/2009, 6620/2009, 6621/2009, 6602/2009, 6603/2009,

6622/2009, 6598/2009, 6624/2009, 6647/2009, 6654/2009, 6599/2009,

6607/2009, 6608/2009, 6623/2009, 6609/2009, 6600/2009, 6601/2009,

6649/2009, 6593/2009, 6605/2009, 6610/2009, 6611/2009, 6612/2009,

6653/2009, 6613/2009, 6642/2009, 6652/2009, 6643/2009, 6614/2009,

6659/2009, 6645/2009, 6648/2009, 6656/2009, 6646/2009, 6626/2009,

6615/2009, 6616/2009, 6644/2009, 6625/2009, 6639/2009, 6636/2009,

6637/2009, 6627/2009, 6631/2009, 6628/2009, 6638/2009, 6641/2009,

6629/2009, 6630/2009, 6619/2009, 6635/2009, 6640/2009, 6632/2009,

6633/2009, 6824- 6827/2009, 6664-6665/2009, 7724/2009, 7725/2009,

7723/2009, 6871-6875/2010, 6876-6878/2010, 53/2010, 1370/2010,

2475/2010, 4212/2010, 4213/2010, 4214/2010, 4215/2010, 4218/2010,

4220/2010, 4221/2010, 4222/2010, 4224/2010, 4225/2010, 4226/2010,

4227/2010, 4228/2010, 4223/2010, 4229/2010, 4230/2010, 4231/2010,

4232/2010, 4233/2010, 4234/2010, 6879/2010, 6880/2010, 6881/2010,

6882/2010, 6883/2010, 6884/2010, 6885-6888/2010, 6889/2010, 6890/2010,

6891/2010, 6892/2010, 6893/2010, 6894/2010, 6895/2010, 6896/ 2010,

6897/2010, 6898/2010, 6899/2010, 6900/2010, 6901/2010, 6902/2010,

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6915/2010, 6916/2010, 6917/2010, 6918/2010, 6919/2010, 6920/2010,

6921/2010, 6922/2010, 6923/2010, 6924/2010, 6925/2010, 6926/2010,

6927/2010, 6928/2010, 6929/2010, 6930/2010, 6931/2010, 6932/2010,

6933/2010, 6934/2010, 6935/2010, 6936/2010, 6937/2010, 6938/2010,

6939/2010, 6940/2010, 6941/2010, 6942/2010, 6943/2010, 6944/2010,

6945/2010, 6946/2010, 6947/2010, 6948/2010, 6949/2010, 6950/2010,

6951/2010, 6952/2010, 6953/2010, 6954/2010, 6955/2010, 6956/2010,

6957/2010, 6958/2010, 6959/2010, 6960/2010, 6961/2010, 6962/2010,

6963/2010, 6964/2010, 6965/2010, 6966/2010, 6967/2010, 6968/2010,

6969/2010, 6970/2010, 6971/2010, 6972/2010, 6973/2010, 6974/2010,

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6981/2010, 6982/2010, 6983/2010, 6984/2010, 6985/2010, 6986/2010,

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7029/2010, 7030/2010, 7031/2010, 7032/2010, 7033/2010, 7034/2010,

7035/2010, 7036/2010, 7037/2010, 7038/2010, 7039/2010, 7040/2010,

7041/2010, 7042/2010, 7043/2010, 7044/2010, 7045/2010, 7046/2010,

7047/2010, 7048/2010

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. Petitioner

VERSUS

MAWASI & ORS. ETC.ETC. Respondent(s)

With

I.A.Nos.2066-2067

With

Conmt.Pet.(C)No.51/2011 In C.A.No.6526/2009

Page 2 of 39

Page 3 Conmt.Pet.(C)No.52/2011 In C.A.No.6537/2009

Conmt.Pet.(C)No.89/2011 In C.A.No.6854/2009

J U D G M E N T

G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.Undeterred by the dismissal of two similar petitions, Haryana State

Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) has filed these petitions for

review of judgment dated 17.08.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 6515 of

2009 and batch whereby the appeals filed by it against the judgments of

the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court were

dismissed, those filed by the landowners were allowed and a direction

was given for payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 lakhs per

acre with all statutory benefits.

2.The facts necessary for deciding whether the petitioner has succeeded in

making out a case for review are encapsulated below:

2.1.For the purpose of setting up an Industrial

Model Township at Manesar, District Gurgaon, the Government of

Haryana acquired large chunks of land. By Notification dated 30.4.1994

issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short,

Page 3 of 39

Page 4 ‘the Act’), the State Government proposed the acquisition of 256 acres 3

kanals and 17 marlas land situated in village Manesar. The declaration

under Section 6(1) was published on 30.3.1995. The Land Acquisition

Collector passed award dated 28.3.1997 and fixed market value of the

acquired land at the rate of Rs.3,67,400/- per acre. Additional District

Judge, Gurgaon (hereinafter described as ‘the Reference Court’) to whom

the reference was made under Section 18 considered the pleadings and

evidence of the parties and determined the amount of compensation by

dividing the acquired land into two blocks, i.e., ‘A’ and ‘B’. For the land

comprised in Block ‘A’ which fell within 500 yards of National Highway

No.8, the Reference Court fixed the amount of compensation at the rate

of Rs.6,57,994.13 per acre. The remaining land was included in Block

‘B’ and the amount of compensation was fixed at Rs.3,91,196.97 per

acre.

2.2. By another Notification dated 15.11.1994 issued under

Section 4(1), the State Government proposed the acquisition of 1490

acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas land situated in villages Manesar, Naharpur

Kasan, Khoh and Kasan. The declaration issued under Section 6(1) was

published on 10.11.1995. By an award dated 3.4.1997, the Land

Acquisition Collector fixed market value at the rate of Rs.4,13,600/- per

Page 4 of 39

Page 5 acre. The Reference Court divided the land into two Blocks. For the land

comprised in Block ‘A’, the Reference Court determined the amount of

compensation at the rate of Rs.6,89,333/- per acre. The remaining land

was included in Block ‘B’ and no enhancement was granted in the

compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Collector.

2.3.Before proceeding further, we may mention that in support of their

claim for award of higher compensation, the land owners had produced 13

sale deeds which were marked Exhibits P1 to P13. Of these, Exhibit P1

dated 16.9.1994 was in respect of 12 acres land situated in village Naharpur

Kasan, which was sold by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell

India Pvt. Ltd. and was proved by Shri Albel Singh, authorised signatory of

M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. The land owners also produced copy of

Massavi Chakbandi of Village Khoh (Exhibit P14) and Aks-shajras of the

four villages (Exhibits P15 to P18). On behalf of the State Government, Shri

Arun Kumar Pandey, Manager, HSIDC was examined as RW-1 and sale

deeds marked Exhibits R1 to R15 were produced along with other

documents. The Reference Court did consider Exhibit P1 but did not rely

upon the same for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

2.4.The appeals filed by the landowners who were affected by

Page 5 of 39

Page 6 Notification dated 15.11.1994 were disposed of by the learned Single Judge

of the High Court vide judgment dated 19.5.2006 and market value of the

entire acquired land was fixed at Rs.15 lakhs per acre. The learned Single

Judge referred to the sale deed Exhibit P1 and opined that the same reflected

market value which a willing buyer would have paid to a willing seller. The

reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for arriving at this conclusion

are extracted below:

“The claimants have produced various sale instances to

prove their claim. Sale deed Ex.Pl is dated September 16,

1994 whereby 96 kanals and 13 marlas ( more than 12

acres ) of land in village Naharpur Kasan was sold by the

owner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Private Limited to M/s

.Dura Cell India Private Limited for a sale consideration

of Rs,.2,42,00,000/-, reflecting the average price of

Rs,20,03,103/- per acre. The aforesaid sale instance has

been proved by the statement of one Albel Singh PWl,

who at the relevant time was the authorised signatory of

the seller Company, M/s. Heritage Furniture Private

Limited. The aforesaid witness has clearly proved that

the said transaction was genuinely entered between the

two companies and the entire payment was made through

bank drafts. The factum of the payment having been

made through bank drafts is also reflected in the sale

deed Ex.Pl. Some other sale instances relied upon by the

claimants are Ex.P2, P3, P4, P7 and P8. Vide Ex.P2 land

measuring 9 kanals was sold on June 4, 1994 for

consideration of Rs.7,87,500/-, reflecting an average

price of Rs.7 lacs per acre. Similarly Ex.P3 is also dated

June 24, 1994 pertaining to sale of 10 kanals 10 marlas of

land reflecting average sale price of Rs,7,00,000/- Ex.P4

is dated October 25,1991 whereby land measuring 9

kanals 9 marlas in Manesar was sold for Rs. 9,15,470/-

Page 6 of 39

Page 7 reflecting an average price of Rs,7,75,000/- per acre.

Ex.P7 and Ex.P8 are also the sale instances dated June

24, 1994 with regard land measuring 9 marlas each

reflecting an average price of Rs,7,00,000/-per acre. The

remaining sale instances Ex.P9 and P13 are of the year

1996 i.e. more than two years after the date of

notification under section 4 of the Act. Similarly the sale

instances Ex.Pl0, P11 and PI2 pertain to the sale of land

in village Noorangpur. The said sale instances are, thus,

not relevant.

On the other hand, the sale instances relied upon

by the State are Ex.Rl to Ex. R15 but they have rightly

been rejected by the reference court itself on the ground

that the said sale instance reflected an average price

which is even less than the one assessed by the Collector

and, as such, in view of the provisions of section 25 of

the Act, the same were not relevant and worth

consideration.

As noticed above, the land which was acquired in

the present proceedings is approximately 1500 acres. The

sale instance Ex.Pl in my considered view, reflects as

near as possible, the market value of the acquired land on

the date of notification under section 4 of the Act. The

said sale had taken place on September 16,1994. The

recitals in the sale deed reflect that there was a prior

agreement between the two companies on May 31, 1994

with regard to the sale of the land. It is also recited in the

sale deed that the entire sale consideration was paid by

the purchaser-company to the seller company by bank

drafts. The aforesaid fact is also proved by Albel Singh,

PWl. In this view of the matter, since the aforesaid

transaction was between two companies, then obviously ,

there is no justification to doubt the authenticity of the

said sale transaction. Moreover, the land covered under

the aforesaid sale transaction is a big chunk of land i.e

more than 12 acres. The said land was situated in village

Naharpur Kasan i.e. one of the villages from which the

present land was also acquired. In these circumstances to

Page 7 of 39

Page 8 my mind, the said sale instance could not have been

rejected by the reference Court, in any manner. Although

the other sale instances Ex. P2, P3, P7 and P8 reflect the

market price of Rs.7 lacs per acre but it is also apparent

that the aforesaid transactions pertain to small piece of

land and are between private persons. In these

circumstances, the possibility of the aforesaid sale deeds

being undervalued, with a view to save stamp duty and

registration charges, can also not be ruled out. However,

there is no justification to prefer the aforesaid sale deeds

Ex.P2, P3, P7 and P8 over and above the sale deed Ex.Pl

which is a transaction between the two cooperate bodies

and wherein the entire sale consideration had been paid

through bank drafts. The aforesaid sale also pertains to a

big chunk of land i.e. more than 12 acres. It may also be

noticed that the acquired land was owned by

approximately more than 350 persons, thus each having a

small holding. Therefore, the sale-deed Ex.Pl duly

reflects the market value, which a willing buyer would

have paid to a willing seller. “

(underlining is ours)

2.5.The appeals filed by the landowners affected by the first acquisition

were disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 5.9.2008.

He referred to judgment dated 19.5.2006 but applied the cut of 20% and

fixed market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.12 lakhs per acre.

2.6.The petitioner had challenged the judgments of the High Court on

several grounds but the only point argued by the learned senior counsel

appearing on its behalf was that the High Court committed serious error by

determining market value of the acquired land solely on the basis of Exhibit

Page 8 of 39

Page 9 P1 ignoring other sale deeds by which similar parcels of land were sold at

the rate of Rs.7 lakhs per acre or less. This is evinced from the following

extracts of the judgment under review:

“Shri Amarendera Sharan, learned Senior Counsel and

Shri Ravindra Bana, learned counsel appearing for the

Corporation argued that the High Court committed

serious error by fixing market value of the acquired land

at Rs. 15 lakhs per acre in one batch of appeals and Rs.

12 lakhs in the other batch of appeals by relying upon the

sale deed, Ext. P-1 excluding other sale transactions,

which were produced before the Reference Court. The

learned counsel submitted that the value of 12 acres of

land which was sold by Ext. P-1 was wholly

disproportionate to the prevailing market value and,

therefore, the same could not be made basis for fixing

market value of the acquired land measuring more than

1490 acres. Shri Amarendera Sharan emphasised that

actual market value of the acquired land was not more

than Rs. 7 lakhs and the High Court committed serious

error by discarding other sale transactions through which

similar parcels of land were sold for Rs. 7 lakhs or less.

The learned Senior Counsel submitted that if the High

Court had given due weightage to other sale transactions,

market value of the acquired land could not have been

fixed at Rs. 15 lakhs or even Rs. 12 lakhs per acre.”

2.7.This Court rejected the aforesaid argument and observed:

“In our view, the learned Single Judge did not commit

any error by relying upon sale transaction Exhibit P1 for

the purpose of fixing market value of the acquired land.

Undisputedly, that sale transaction was between two

corporate entities and the entire sale price was paid

through bank drafts. It is also not in dispute that the land

which was subject matter of Exhibit P1 is situated at

Page 9 of 39

Page 10 village Naharpur Kasan and is adjacent to the acquired

land. The Corporation and the State Government did not

adduce any evidence to prove that the land sold vide

Exhibit P1 was over valued with an oblique motive of

helping the land owners to claim higher compensation.

Therefore, we do not find any justification to discard or

ignore sale deed Exhibit P1. The refusal of the learned

Single Judge to rely upon other sale transactions in

which sale price of the land was shown as Rs.7 lakhs

per acre also does not suffer from any legal infirmity

because it is well-known that transactions involving

transfer of properties are usually undervalued with a

view to avoid payment of the requisite stamp duty and

registration charges.”

2.8.With a view to generate funds necessary for payment of additional

compensation to the landowners, the petitioner increased the cost of

land to be allotted to the prospective industrial entrepreneurs and

others. IMT Industrial Association, which claims to be a

representative body of the plot holders protested against this decision

of the petitioner and persuaded it to seek review of judgment dated

17.8.2010.

2.9. In the review petitions filed on behalf of the petitioner, which were

registered as Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, it was pleaded

that the determination of market value needs reconsideration because

the sale deed Exhibit P1 on which reliance was placed by the High

Court and this Court was not a genuine transaction. According to the

Page 10 of 39

Page 11 petitioner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India

Pvt. Ltd. were controlled by the same management and this fact was

brought to the notice of the concerned officers only after disposal of

the appeals by this Court. IMT Industrial Association filed I.A.Nos.5

and 6 for impleadment as party to the review petitions. This Court

dismissed the review petitions and the impleadment applications vide

order dated 13.1.2011, paragraphs 4 to 8 of which are extracted

below:

“4. In the review petitions, it has been averred that the

sale transaction dated 16.9.1994, upon which reliance

was placed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and

Haryana High Court and by this Court for grant of

enhanced compensation was motivated because parties

to the transaction were under the control and

management of the common board of directors and this

fact came to the notice of the review petitioner only after

dismissal of the appeals by this Court.

5. In paragraph 'A' of the grounds of the review

petitions, the review petitioner has referred to the

composition of M/s. Dura Cell India Private Limited and

Heritage Furniture Private Limited to show that both the

companies have common management.

6. The review petition is supported by an affidavit of

Shri Hamvir Singh, Deputy General Manager (I.A.),

Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development

Corporation Ltd. In paragraph 2 of his affidavit, the

deponent has stated that contents of the review petition

(pages 25 to 43), list of dates (pages B to P) and other

Page 11 of 39

Page 12 applications are true to my knowledge and the

information derived from records of the case. However,

he has not enclosed any document on the basis of which

this assertion has been made.

7. We have carefully perused the entire

record and are convinced that the judgment of which

review has been sought does not suffer from any error

apparent warranting its reconsideration. The review

petitioner has not produced any material to substantiate

its assertion that the price mentioned in the sale deed

relied upon by the courts was manipulated with an

oblique motive. Hence, the review petitions are

dismissed.

8. The application filed by IMT Industrial Association

is wholly misconceived. The members of the applicant

are beneficiaries of the acquisition of the land because

plots have been allotted to them out of the acquired land

which belong to the respondents and others. Therefore,

they do not have the locus standi to be heard in the

proceedings relating to determination of market value of

the acquired land and that too in a petition filed by the

Corporation for review of the judgment of this Court. It

is not the pleaded case of the applicant that its members

were not aware of the fact that the plots have been carved

out of the land acquired by the State Government for and

on behalf of the Corporation and that the price

mentioned in the allotment letter was tentative and

further that in paragraph 5 of the allotment letter, it was

specifically mentioned that they will have to pay

additional price in the event of enhancement in the

compensation. It is quite surprising that members of the

applicant-Association paid price of the plots at the rate of

Rs.2200/- per square yard and they are objecting to the

payment of compensation to the land owners at the rate

of less than Rs.500/- per square yard.

This shows that members of the applicant want to take

advantage of the measure taken by the State Government

for compulsory acquisition of the land of the farmers

Page 12 of 39

Page 13 and want to deprive them of just and reasonable

compensation. Consequently, the impleadment

application is dismissed.”

3.Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed these petitions by reiterating that

sale deed Exhibit P1 dated 16.9.1994 executed by M/s. Heritage Furniture

Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. was not a bona fide

transaction and the High Court and this Court committed serious error by

relying upon the same for the purpose of determining the amount of

compensation. In paragraph A of the review petition, the petitioner has set

out the brief history of the two companies and pleaded that at the time of the

execution of sale deed both the entities were under the control of the same

set of persons. It has also been averred that the facts relating to composition

of the Board of Directors of two companies could not be ascertained by

exercising due diligence and the true nature of Exhibit P1 was revealed only

after the judgment of this Court. According to the petitioner, M/s. Heritage

Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased different parcels of land from the farmers

by executing 10 different sale deeds executed on 16

th

and 18

th

August, 1993

at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre and, as such, there was no

occasion for M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. to have purchased the same land

just after one year at the rate of Rs.20,03,103/- per acre. It is the petitioner’s

case that exorbitant price is shown to have been paid by the vendee to the

Page 13 of 39

Page 14 vendor because its Indian promoters were to be benefited by the proposed

joint venture between the Indian company and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA.

Another ground taken by the petitioner is that sale deeds Exhibits P-2, P-3,

P-4, P-7 and P-8, three of which were executed in June, 1994 and one in

October, 1991 at an average price of Rs.7 lakhs per acre reflected true

market value of the acquired land and in the absence of any cogent evidence,

the High Court and this Court could not have discarded the same by

assuming that the same were undervalued.

4.On 30.3.2011, this Court issued notice to the landowners and granted

stay subject to certain conditions which included a direction to the Managing

Director of the petitioner to file an affidavit and disclose the names of the

officers/officials responsible for not bringing the facts relating to Exhibit P1

to the notice of the High Court and this Court. In compliance of that order,

Shri Rajiv Arora, the Managing Director of the petitioner filed affidavit

dated 27.7.2011 in which he did not disclose the names of the concerned

officers/officials but claimed that the functionaries of the Corporation did

not suspect the bona fides of the sale deed executed between M/s. Heritage

Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. because the same was a

registered instrument and they did not know that the two companies were

controlled by the same set of persons. Shri Arora further claimed that the

Page 14 of 39

Page 15 facts relating to two companies were brought to the notice of the concerned

officers by the representatives of the Manesar Industrial Welfare

Association, who were given opportunity of personal hearing in compliance

of the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Writ Petition

No.6527/2010. According to Shri Arora, the information made available by

the Association was got verified from the records of the Registrar of

Companies and the same was found to be correct. In support of the affidavit

of its Managing Director, the petitioner has placed on record the following

documents:

(i)Search Reports issued by M/s AKG and Co relating to M/s Heritage

Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Duracell India Pvt Ltd dt. 20.1.2011 and

21.2.2011;

(ii)Certificate of Incorporation of Heritage;

(iii)MoA and AoA of Heritage;

(iv)Mutations showing the purchase of land by Heritage under sale

deeds dt. 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993 at an average price of Rs 6 lac per

acre;

(v)Annual Return of Duracell dt. 14.6.2000 showing Saroj Kumar

Poddar, Gurbunder Singh Gill and Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors;

(vi)True copy of sale deed dt. 16.9.1994;

(vii)Statement of Albel Singh substantiating the statements of the

petitioners.

Page 15 of 39

Page 16 5.Some of the landowners have filed reply affidavits. Their stand is that

Exhibit P1 reflected true market value of the acquired land as on the date of

issue of notifications under Section 4(1) and that the petitioner’s assertion

that the transaction was not genuine is not correct. They have denied that the

vendor and vendees were under the control of the same management and

that exorbitantly high price was paid for 12 acres land in anticipation of

some collaboration between M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell

Inc. USA, which would have benefited the former. With a view to avoid

repetition, we may notice the averments contained in paragraphs 4 to 9 of

the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No.239/2011 and paragraph 5 of

the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the landowners who were respondents

in Civil Appeal No.6561/2009. The same read as under:

Paragraphs 4 to 9 of the reply affidavit filed in

Review Petition No.239/2011

“4.I state that vide 5 sale deeds all dt. 6.7.1992 land

measuring 49 kanals 2 marlas situated in Village Kherka

Daula, District Gurgaon was sold by some of the co-

owners to one Sh. D. C. Rastogi s/o Sh. L. P. Rastogi at

the sale price of Rs.1,35,000/- per acre. The said village

is at the distance of about 2 km from the land in question.

Copies of 5 sale deeds all dt. 6.7.1992 are collectively

Annexure R-1 hereto. Thereafter the vendee Sh. D. C.

Rastogi sold the said land in terms of agreement to sell

dt.6.12.1993 vide sale deed dated 16.3.1994 at the rate of

about Rs.15,73,289/- per acre. This shows that there was

a jump in the price of the land in that area equal to almost

Page 16 of 39

Page 17 11 times of the original price. It is also common

knowledge that the parties often undervalue the land

price in order to minimize stamp duty and the land might

have been sold at a higher price. Copy of sale deed dt.

16.3.1994 is Annexure R-2 hereto. Thus if M/s Heritage

Furniture Pvt. Ltd. purchased land, which is subject

matter of sale deed dt.16.9.1994, Ex.P.1, in the year 1993

at a price of about Rs.6 lakhs per acre as alleged by the

review petitioner even though there is no evidence of

purchase at such rate then its value increasing to Rs.20

lakhs per acre in the year 1994 is commensurate with the

market trend. Moreover agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994

was executed after first notification u/s 4 on 30.4.1994

and it is a common knowledge that after publication of

section 4 notification, the value of the land increases.

5.It is further submitted that vide sale deed

dt.14.12.1993 (Ex.P.10) one M/s. DCN Internatinal Ltd.

sold land measuring 62 kanals 7 marlas situated in

Village Naurangpur District Gurgaon for Rs.95,21,160/-

i.e. at the rate of Rs.13,74,345/- per acre. Copy of sale

deed dt. 14.12.1993 is Annexure R.3 hereto.

6.I further state that sale deed dt. 16.9.1994 (Ex.P.1)

was executed pursuant to agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994

between M/s Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (vendor) and

M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) wherein the

vendor agreed to sell the land in question measuring

about 12 acres to the vendee at a sale price of

Rs.2,42,00,000/- (Rs. Two crore forty lakhs only) as is

clear from the recital in the sale deed itself. Ultimately

vide sale deed dt.16.9.1994 the said land was sold at the

same sale price by the vendor to the vendee. Thus the

sale price of the land was agreed upon and fixed on

31.5.1994 as is clear from the recitation of the sale deed

itself.

7.I further state that as per assertion of the review

petitioner M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. (vendor) and M/s

Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had common persons

Page 17 of 39

Page 18 in their Board of Directors namely Sh. Saroj Kumar

Poddar, Ms. Jyotsana Poddar and Sh. Gurvinder Singh

Gill. The review petitioner has filed search reports of

both the said companies to show that the abavoe said

three persons were common directors of both the

companies. However, from the said search report of M/s.

Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. it is clear the two directors

namely Sh. Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana

Poddar were appointed as Directors of this company on

9.6.1994 whereas Sh. Gurvinder Singh gill was appointed

as its Director on 9.2.1997. Thus all the three alleged

common Directors of the vendor and vendee companies

were not on the Board of Directors of M/s Duracell

(India) Pvt. Ltd. on or before 31.5.1994 on which date

the agreement to sell of the land in question was executed

and the sale price was fixed. The said three directors

had no interest in M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee)

as on 31.5.1994 when the sale price of the land was

fixed.

8.I further state that except for making a bald

allegation that the sale price of the said land was inflated

intentionally so that the vendee company would increase

its share holding in a Joint Venture it was going to enter

into with one Duracell INC USA, this assertion has not

been substantiated by placing ay cogent evidence on

record. So much so that even it has not been pleaded in

the review petition as to whether Joint Venture between

M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell INC

USA did take place or not. To the knowledge of the

deponent there was no joint venture between M/s.

Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell INC USA.

This fact that there was no Joint Venture between the

said two companies also stands proved from the fact that

the land purchased vide said sale deed dt.16.9.1994 was

sold by M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. vide sale deed

dt.28.4.2004 to one M/s Lattu Finance & Investments

Ltd. at a sale consideration Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e.

approximately at the rate of Rs.1,13,00,000/- (Rs.one

crore thirteen lakhs per acre approximately). At the time

Page 18 of 39

Page 19 the name of M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. had been

changed to M/s Gillette India Ltd. on account of its

amalgamation with other company. In this sale deed dt.

28.4.2004 entire history of purchase of land by M/s.

Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. from M/s. Heritage Furniture

Pvt. Ltd. in 1994 onwards has been recited, which

includes construction of industrial building over the said

land, its conversion of status from Pvt. Ltd. to Public Ltd.

Company, its amalgamation with Indian Shaving

Products Ltd. in the year 2000 and its change of name

from Indian Shaving Products Ltd. to Gillette India Ltd.

in December, 2000 and thereafter its sale to M/s. Lattu

Finance & Investments Ltd. However, in the entire

recitation there is no mention of any joint venture with

M/s Duracell INC USA.

9.It is submitted by the respondents/land owners that

the said sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects true market price of

the land in the year 1994 when section 4 notifications for

the acquired land was issued. The allegation of the

review petitioner that the sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects

inflated price is false and baseless. It is further submitted

that another sale deed dt.17.7.1996 which is on record as

(Ex.P.9) reflects the market value of the land in one of

the acquired villages at Rs.25,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty five

lakhs) per acre. In this transaction 1 kanal 11 marlas of

land situated in Village Naharpur Kasan, has been sold at

a price of Rs.4,84,375/-. This sale deed also proves that

the market price of the acquired land in the year 1994

was Rs.20 lakhs per acre. Copy of sale deed dt.17.7.1996

is Annexure R-4 is hereto. It may be mentioned here that

the same purchaser purchased different pieces of land at

the same rate vide 15 different sale deeds and the total

land purchased was 18 kanals 5 marlas i.e. more than

2.25 acres.”

Paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of

the landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal

No.6561/2009.

Page 19 of 39

Page 20 “5. That the present review petition is being filed only on

the ground that Ex. P-1, which has been relied upon by

the Hon’ble High Court as well as upheld by this Hon’ble

Court was entered by the corporate which were under the

control and management of common board of directors

and hence it is not the correct market value. In reply

thereto the respondents humbly submits that:-

a) This fact for the first time is brought into the notice at

the level of this Hon’ble Court, therefore review petition

are estopped by their own conduct.

b) That merely the both the corporate have common

board of directors does not prove that the sale in between

the corporate was an escalated rates, rather it should be

on other side i.e. common board would have trying to get

the sale as possible as on lower rate. Therefore the

ground for review is not legally justifiable.

c) It is submitted that later on corporate Gillette India

Ltd. made a sale deed (land in issue of Ex.P-1) dated

28.4.2004 to another corporate namely Laltu Finance and

Investment Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 13,62,00,000/- of land

measuring 96 Kanalas and 13 Marlas. (i.e. one crore sixty

lacs per acre). It is submitted that this sale can not be said

to be an escalated rate and therefore the Ex. P-1 denotes

the correct market value at the relevant time. A copies of

the relevant sale deeds are annexed herewith and marked

as ANNEXURE R-1.

d) It is also submitted that some other sale deeds at the

relevant time (20.9.1996) were executed in favour of

Time Master Pvt. Ltd. which came around 25 lakh per

acre. Details of the same are as follows-

Sr. No.Vasika No. Dt. Land sold Sale

consideration

1. 8725 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,55,000/-

2. 8726 20.9.1996 1K 8M 3,59,375/-

3. 8727 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,53,000/-

4. 8728 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-

5. 8799 20.9.1996 1K 9M 3,75,000/-

6. 8807 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-

7. 8815 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/-

8. 8825 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,53,000/-

Page 20 of 39

Page 21 9. 8832 20.9.1996 0K 17M 2,75,000/-

10. 8839 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/-

11. 8846 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-

12. 8854 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,55,000/-

13. 8861 20.9.1996 0K 17M 2,75,000/-

Total land sale is 15 Kanals 3 Marlas total amount 4734375/- i.e. at rate of Rs.25 lakh per

acre.

14. 5431 17.7.96 1K 11M 4,84,375/-

i.e. at the rate of Rs. 25 lakh per acre.

It is submitted at sale deed No.5431 (at sr. no. 14) was already produced as Ex.P-9 before

Reference Court in favour of Time Master Pvt. Ltd. by Vinod Kumar vendor.

Thus time master India Pvt. Ltd. purchased total land measuring 16 kanals 14 marlas at

the rate of Rs. 25 lakhs per acre.

e)It is also relevant to point out the following are the

sale transactions in December 2006 of the village

Naharpur/Kasan.

Land sold of Village Naharpur/Kasan

Sr. No.Vasika No. Dt . Land sold Sale consideration

Per acre

1. 18628 4.12.06 12K 16.5M 2,56,50,000/-

1,60,00000

2. 18742 5.12.06 5K 13M 1,13,00,000/-

1,60,00000

3. 18743 5.12.06 5K 14M 74,00,000/-

1,60,00000

4. 19350 14.12.06 5K 13M 1,13,00,000/-

1,60,00000

f) it is also submitted that the rate on which auction

sale of Tower side on acquired land is done on 30.6.2006.

Tower Site No. Area in meters Amount of considerationper sq yard

J 6804 95.10 crores

116865/- per sq. yd

K 5832 101.50 crores

145518/- per sq. yd

L 6804 93.00 crores

114284.50/- per sq. yd

g) It is also submitted the following details of auction

by HSIDC IMT Manesar.

Auction sales by HSIDC IMT Manesar

Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in

Sector-I, IMT Manesar auction held on 18.8.2009.

Sr.No. Site No. Area in Sq. Mts Price of Site

1. T-1 144

2,67,50,000/-

2. T-2 144

Page 21 of 39

Page 22 2,33,50,000/-

3. T-3 144

2,29,00,000/-

4. T-4 144

2,29,00,000/-

5. T-5 144

2,31,00,000/-

6. T-7 144

2,28,00,000/-

7. T-8 144

2,25,00,000/-

8. T-9 144

2,22,00,000/-

9. T-10 144

2,16,00,000/-

10. D-1 108

1,82,00,000/-

11. D-2 108

1,58,00,000/-

12. D-3 108

1,62,50,000/-

13. D-4 108

1,60,00,000/-

14. D-5 108

1,51,00,000/-

15. D-6 108

1,38,50,000/-

16. D-7 108

1,40,00,000/-

17. D-8 108

1,37,00,000/-

18. D-9 108

1,35,00,000/-

19. D-10 108

1,33,50,000/-

Total area 2376 square mts. total Rs.35,78,50,000/-

i.e. 150610.26 per Mt.i.e. Rs.12,5928.58 per yard

i.e. Rs.60,94,94,327/- per acre.

Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in

Sector-1, IMT Manesar auction held on 11.8.2010.

1. D-10 108

2,12,50,000/-

Page 22 of 39

Page 23 2. D-12 108

1,89,50,000/-

3. D-14 108

1,90,00,000/-

4. D-15 108

1,88,50,000/-

5. D-16 108

1,92,00,000/-

Allotment of Triple Storey SCO Sites for in Sector-1,

IMT Manesar, auction held on 11.8.2010 on following

rates.

1. 11 144

3,03,00,000/-

1. 11 144

3,03,00,000/-

2. 12 144

3,00,00,000/-

3. 12-A 144

2,87,00,000/-

Total area 972 sq mts allotted for total amount of

Rs.186250000/- i.e Rs.191615.22 per Mt. i.e.

Rs.160213.67 per square yard or Rs. 77,54,34189/- per

acre.”

6.S/Shri Gopal Subramanium and Altaf Ahmed, learned senior

advocates and other counsel who appeared for the petitioner relied upon

reports dated 20.1.2011 and 21.1.2011 prepared by the Chartered

Accountant M/s. AKG and Company to show that at least two of the

Directors, namely, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were

common to the management of the two companies and submitted that land

was shown to have been purchased by M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. at a very

high price because it was hoping to reap benefit of the joint venture

Page 23 of 39

Page 24 agreement with M/s. Duracell Inc. USA. Learned counsel pointed out that

the vendor, namely, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased 12

acres land from different landowners at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per

acre and argued that even if the benefit of 12% notional increase in the value

of land was allowed to the vendor, no person of ordinary prudence would

have purchased the same land after a period of 13 months at the rate of more

than Rs.20 lakhs per acre. Learned counsel also referred to the statement of

the authorised signatory of the vendor M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to

drive home the point that the Sale Deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide

transaction. Learned senior counsel then argued that dismissal of Review

Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010 cannot operate as a bar to the

maintainability of these petitions because till 13.1.2011, the officers of the

petitioner did not have any inkling about the composition of the two

companies and the fact that the vendor had purchased the land in 1993 at the

rate of Rs.6 lakhs per acre only and the relevant facts came to their notice

only in October, 2010 from the representatives of IMT Industrial

Association.

7.S/Shri J.L. Gupta, S.R. Singh, P.S. Patwalia and Paras Kuhad, senior

advocates and other counsel, who appeared for the landowners argued for

dismissal of the review petitions. They emphasized that the very premise on

Page 24 of 39

Page 25 which the review petitions have been filed, namely, discovery of the facts

relating to composition of the board of directors of the two companies is

incorrect because no-one from the Poddar group on the board of directors of

M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. till 9.6.1994. Shri J. L. Gupta and Shri Paras

Kuhad pointed out that Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar

were taken on the board of directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. after

execution of the agreement for sale and no joint venture agreement was

executed between the vendee, i.e., M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s.

Duracell Inc. USA. Shri Paras Kuhad also referred to the Memorandum of

Association and Articles of Association of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. to

show that S/Shri Jyoti Sagar and Sajay Singh were the only promoters of the

company. Learned counsel then argued that the petitioner cannot seek

review of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the pretext of discovery of facts

relating to composition of the two companies because no evidence was

adduced before the Reference Court to prove that the sale deed Exhibit P1

was not a bona fide transaction or that vendee had paid exorbitant price for

extraneous reasons. Learned counsel further argued that after dismissal of

Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, the petitioner cannot revive its

prayer because there was total absence of diligence on the part of its officers.

Page 25 of 39

Page 26 8.We shall first consider whether the petitioner’s prayer for review

should be entertained by ignoring the dismissal of similar petitions by this

Court vide order dated 13.1.2011. A careful reading of that order shows that

in Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, the petitioner had sought

reconsideration of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the premise that the vendor

and the vendee had common management and that the price mentioned in

the sale deed had been manipulated with an oblique motive. The Court

declined to entertain this plea by observing that the petitioner had not

produced any material to substantiate its assertion. Along with the present

batch of review petitions, the petitioner has placed on record the search

reports prepared by M/s AKG and Company, Certificate of Incorporation,

Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of M/s. Heritage

Furniture Pvt. Ltd., mutations showing the purchase of land by M/s.

Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. vide sale deeds dated 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993,

annual return of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. showing Shri Saroj Kumar

Poddar, Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors

and the statement of Albel Singh, but these documents neither singularly nor

collectively support the petitioner’s plea that management of the two

companies, i.e., the vendor and the vendee, was under the control of the

same set of persons or that the vendee had paid unusually high price with

Page 26 of 39

Page 27 some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms.

Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.

on 9.6.1994 and Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill was so appointed on 9.2.1997

whereas the agreement for sale was executed on 31.5.1994. The petitioner

has not controverted the averments contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the

reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No.239/2011, perusal of which

makes it clear that in 1993 similar parcels of land had been sold at the rate of

Rs.15,73,289/- and Rs.13,74,345/- per acre. Therefore, it cannot be said that

M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. had paid exorbitantly high price to M/s.

Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. for extraneous reasons and we do not find any

valid ground for indirect review of order dated 13.1.2011.

9.At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is

a creature of the statute and no Court or quasi-judicial body or

administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless

it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137 empowers this Court to review

its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or

any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Rules framed by

this Court under that Article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any

of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 which reads as under:

Page 27 of 39

Page 28 “Order 47, Rule 1:

1. Application for review of judgment.—

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,

but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,

or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small

Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter

or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence

was not within his knowledge or could not be produced

by him at the time when the decree was passed or order

made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on

the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason,

desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order

made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to

the court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order

may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the

pendency of an appeal by some other party except where

the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and

the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present

to the Appellate Court the case of which he applies for

the review.

Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of

law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been

reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a

superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for

the review of such judgment.”

Page 28 of 39

Page 29 10.The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We

shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp (4)

SCC 595, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal

Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1 and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai

Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 and observed:

“Review literally and even judicially means re-

examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy

inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human

fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the

statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision

legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily

and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental

mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was

no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the

highest court indicating the circumstances in which it

could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to

avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja

Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court

observed that even though no rules had been framed

permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was

available on the limited and narrow ground developed by

the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court

approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in

Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order

made by the Court was final and could not be altered:

“... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the

judgments, by errors have been introduced, these

Courts possess, by Common law, the same power

which the Courts of record and statute have of

rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The

House of Lords exercises a similar power of

rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own

judgments, and this Court must possess the same

Page 29 of 39

Page 30 authority. The Lords have however gone a step

further, and have corrected mistakes introduced

through inadvertence in the details of judgments;

or have supplied manifest defects in order to

enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added

explanatory matter, or have reconciled

inconsistencies.”

Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same

decision as under:

“It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence

extended in such cases is mainly owing to the

natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable

injustice being done by a Court of last resort,

where by some accident, without any blame, the

party has not been heard and an order has been

inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.”

Rectification of an order thus stems from the

fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is

exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing

finality. When the Constitution was framed the

substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by

this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the

Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the

practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such

provision expressly conferred the substantive power to

review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the

Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this

Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which

any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of

this power Order XL had been framed empowering this

Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds

analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure

Code. The expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in

the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a

decree or order passed under misapprehension of true

state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient

ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule

1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent

Page 30 of 39

Page 31 power to make such orders as may be necessary in the

interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of

Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or

reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is

necessary to do so for sake of justice.”

11.In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose

Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526, the three-Judge Bench referred to the

provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:

“It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an

application for review is much more restricted than that

of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore

Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to

Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction

circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the

language used therein.

It may allow a review on three specified grounds,

namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or

evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was

not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be

produced by him at the time when the decree was passed,

(ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,

and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words

“any other sufficient reason” must mean “a reason

sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those

specified in the rule”. See Chhajju Ram v. Neki AIR

1922 PC 12 (D). This conclusion was reiterated by the

Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath

Nath AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by on

Federal Court in Hari Shankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter

AIR 1949 FC 106 at pp. 110, 111 (F). Learned counsel

Page 31 of 39

Page 32 appearing in support of this appeal recognises the

aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes

within the ground of “mistake or error apparent on the

face of the record” or some ground analogous thereto.”

12.In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (1964) 5 SCR 174,

another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not

analogous to the appellate power and observed:

“A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby

an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies

only for patent error. We do not consider that this

furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this

difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it

would suffice for us to say that where without any

elaborate argument one could point to the error and say

here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the

face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions,

entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the

face of the record would be made out.”

13.In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC

389, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court

can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and

proceeded to observe:

“But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the

power of review. The power of review may be exercised

on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence

which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within

the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could

not be produced by him at the time when the order was

made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error

Page 32 of 39

Page 33 apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be

exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be

exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous

on merits. That would be the province of a court of

appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with

appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to

correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate

court.”

14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC

170, the Court considered as to what can be characterised as an error

apparent on the fact of the record and observed:

“…….it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on

the face of record must be such an error which must

strike one on mere looking at the record and would not

require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points

where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may

usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case

of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun

Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 wherein, K.C.

Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the

following observations in connection with an error

apparent on the face of the record:

“An error which has to be established by a long-

drawn process of reasoning on points where there

may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be

said to be an error apparent on the face of the

record. Where an alleged error is far from self-

evident and if it can be established, it has to be

established, by lengthy and complicated

arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ

of certiorari according to the rule governing the

powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.”

Page 33 of 39

Page 34 15.In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Court

observed:

“An error which is not self-evident and has to be

detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be

said to be an error apparent on the face of the

record justifying the Court to exercise its power of

review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC…….. A review

petition, it must be remembered has a limited

purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in

disguise”.”

16.In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224, R.P. Sethi, J.,

who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the

power of review in the following words:

“Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the

statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review

cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere

possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for

review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further

petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of

following the practice of the binding nature of the larger

Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of

coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be

followed and practised.”

17.In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78, the Court

observed:

“The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for

the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for

a rehearing “on account of some mistake or error

apparent on the face of the records or for any other

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Page 35 sufficient reason”. The former part of the rule deals with

a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a

jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which

two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them

postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had

not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could

perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited

binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a

favourable verdict.”

18.In State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612, the

Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to

Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:

“At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a

review is sought on the ground of discovery of new

matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be

relevant and must be of such a character that if the same

had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In

other words, mere discovery of new or important matter

or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito

justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also

to show that such additional matter or evidence was not

within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due

diligence, the same could not be produced before the

court earlier.

The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very

connotation signifies an error which is evident per se

from the record of the case and does not require detailed

examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts

or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and

detection thereof requires long debate and process of

reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the

face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1

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Page 36 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently

an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected

merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground

that a different view could have been taken by the

court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while

exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal

concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment /

decision.”

19.In the light of the propositions laid down in the aforementioned

judgments, we shall now examine whether the petitioner has succeeded in

making out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Article 137 of

the Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. This consideration needs

to be prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not offered any

explanation as to why it did not lead any evidence before the Reference

Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction and

the vendee had paid unusually high price for extraneous reasons. The parties

had produced several sale deeds, majority of which revealed that the price of

similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per acre. A reading of the

sale deeds would have prompted any person of ordinary prudence to make

an enquiry as to why M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had paid more

than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land, which have been purchased by the

vendor only a year back at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre. However,

the fact of the matter is that neither the advocate for the petitioner nor its

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Page 37 officers/officials, who were dealing with the cases made any attempt to lead

such evidence. This may be because they were aware of the fact that at least

in two other cases such parcels of land had been sold in 1993 for more than

Rs.13 lakhs and Rs.15 lakhs per acre and in 1996, a sale deed was executed

in respect of the land of village Naharpur Kasan at the rate of Rs.25 lakhs

per acre. This omission coupled with the fact that the petitioner’s assertion

about commonality of the management of two companies is ex-facie

incorrect leads to an irresistible inference that judgment dated 17.8.2010

does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record warranting

its review. Surely, in guise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot ask for

de novo hearing of the appeals.

20.The petitioner’s plea that the documents produced along with the

review petitions could not be brought to the notice of the Reference Court

and the High Court despite exercise of due diligence by its officers does not

commend acceptance because it had not explained as to why the concerned

officers/officials, who were very much aware of other sale transactions

produced by themselves and the landowners did not try to find out the

reasons for wide difference in the price of land sold by Exhibit P1 and other

parcels of land sold by Exhibits P2 to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15.

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Page 38 21.Before concluding, we would like to add that while deciding the

review petitions, this Court cannot make roving inquiries into the validity of

the transaction involving the sale of land by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt.

Ltd. to M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. or declare the same to be invalid by

assuming that the vendee had paid higher price to take benefit of an

anticipated joint venture agreement with a foreign company. Of course, the

petitioner has not controverted the statement made by the respondents that

the vendee had sold the land to M/s. Lattu Finance and Investments Ltd. in

2004 for a sum of Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.1,13,00,000/- per

acre.

22.In the result, the review petitions are dismissed. The interim order

passed on 30.3.2011 stands automatically vacated. The petitioner shall pay

cost of Rs.25,000/- in each case. The amount of cost shall be deposited with

the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of three

months.

23.However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be free to withdraw

the amount which it had deposited in compliance of this Court’s order dated

30.3.2011. In any case, the petitioner shall pay the balance amount of

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Page 39 compensation to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with

other statutory benefits within three months from today.

24.In view of the dismissal of the review petitions and the direction given

for payment of the balance amount, the contempt petitions and all the

pending interlocutory applications are disposed of as infructuous.

……….....……..….………………….…J.

[G.S. Singhvi]

………..………..….………………….…J.

[Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]

New Delhi,

July 02, 2012.

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