criminal law, procedure
 16 Sep, 2025
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Himank Vs. State Of Haryana And Another

  Punjab & Haryana High Court CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M)
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Case Background

As per case facts, the complainant alleged the petitioner engaged in a physical relationship with her under a false promise of marriage from early 2021, leading to an FIR under ...

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CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M)

Date of Decision: 16.9.2025

Himank ......Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana and another .....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH

Present:Mr. Amit Chadha, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Kunwar Ranjan, Advocate and

Mr. Atin Chadha, Advocate

for the petitioner.

Ms. Saumya Ahluwalia, Sr. DAG, Haryana.

Mr. Sukhdeep Singh, Advocate

for respondent No. 2.

****

KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL)

1. The instant petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS

2023 seeking quashing of FIR No. 339 dated 24.10.2024, under Section

376(2)(n) IPC, registered at Police Station Sector-56, District Gurugram

(Annexure P-1) and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The brief factual matrix relevant and essential for disposal of

the present petition, is that a complaint No. 3383 dated 16.9.2024 moved by

the complainant-respondent was received at Police Station Dwarka, New

Delhi, wherein it was alleged that in January 2021, the complainant met the

petitioner and they became good friends. She accepted the marriage

proposal of the petitioner, and she thus engaged in physical relationship with

him. On 29.10.2023, the petitioner along with his mother and two sisters

came at her residence for finalizing their marriage, and told them to make

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -2-

necessary arrangements for the marriage in January 2024. It is alleged that

the petitioner told her to book a five star venue for roka ceremony, and also

that he demanded jewellery for himself and his family memebrs. He further

told her that minimum Rs. 50.00 lacs should be spent on the marriage. When

the complainant apprised the petitioner about their financial condition, he

proposed the postponement of the marriage to November 2024 for the reason

that his maternal aunt had passed away in November 2023. After the roka

ceremony, in the first week of August 2024, the petitioner after requesting

the parents of the complainant, took her to Ayodhya, and yet again made

physical relations with her. However shortly after, the petitioner told her

that because the gifts given in the roka ceremony were not expensive

enough, therefore his family was quarreling with him. It was also alleged

therein that a demand of an XUV-700 car was also raised by the petitioner.

Thereafter on 01.9.2024, the petitioner informed her that his family was

against their union, and he called off the marriage. On the basis of the above

said complaint, a ZERO FIR was registered at Police Station Dwarka, Delhi.

However, since the alleged occurrence pertained to District Gurugram,

therefore, the said complaint was forwarded to District Gurugram,

whereafter the present FIR was registered.

Submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner

3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has vehemently

argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case

by the complainant to wreck vengeance, as her marriage with the

petitioner which was scheduled for November 2024, was called off. It is

submitted that the petitioner is a B-Tech Graduate, and was working as a

Senior Manager at Pristyn Care Company, Gurugram in November 2020.

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -3-

The complainant joined the said company in January 2021 as a Business

Development Manager and she was reporting directly to the petitioner.

After a few months, the parties developed a liking for each other, and

started engaging in physical relations. It is highlighted by the learned

senior counsel that at no point in time, any false assurance was given by

the petitioner to the complainant for this purpose. Everything happened

with the mutual consent of both the parties. Further, the explicit whatsapp

chats (Annexure P-11) clearly show that it was the complainant who

insisted upon the physical relations, and by no stretch of imagination can

it be presumed from a perusal of the whatsapp chats that there was any

kind of coercion or pressure upon the complainant.

4. Subsequently, talks of marriage of the two started. However,

neither the petitioner nor his family members ever demanded any dowry.

Rather the petitioner was financially supporting the complainant, who had

left her job, and on numerous occasions gave money to the complainant in

cash as well as through online transactions. The petitioner even paid the

premium of Rs. 51,000/- of the health insurance policy of the parents of

the complainant, and bore the expenses of dinner at their roka ceremony

amounting to Rs. 50,000/-. Throughout the period of their relationship,

the petitioner gave many gifts to the complainant, including airpods,

phone, bags etc. besides cash, which shows the earnestness of the

petitioner and his clean intentions. Copies of the screenshots of UPI

transactions, insurance policy along with corresponding bank statement of

the petitioner are annexed with the instant petition as Annexures P-2 to

P-5.

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -4-

5. In fact, at the time of the roka ceremony i.e. on 21.7.2024, the

petitioner’s family gave one gold diamond pendant set with tops and

chain costing to Rs. 3,00,000/-, one bag worth Rs. 12,000/-, and cash of

Rs. 15,000/-, among other gift items to the complainant’s family, which

are still lying in their possession. Reliance in this regard has been placed

on Annexure P-6. It is submitted that subsequently, the complainant

started putting pressure on the petitioner to separate from his family after

marriage, to which the petitioner flatly refused. Ultimately due to

irreconcilable temperamental differences, the family of the petitioner

decided to call of the wedding, whereupon the petitioner was abused by

the complainant and her brother. Subsequently, the present FIR was

lodged by the complainant against the petitioner, wherein vide order dated

18.11.2024, the petitioner was granted the concession of anticipatory bail

by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram.

6. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that the

petitioner had already paid the booking amount for the marriage, which

was to be solemnized in November 2024 at Radisson Blu Hotel, New

Delhi, among other things. It is submitted that the payment receipts,

including that of booking make-up services, clearly show that the

petitioner had the bona fide intention of marrying the complainant, which

unfortunately had to be called off only due to fundamental disagreements

and incompatible viewpoints between the parties. In conclusion, it is

submitted by the learned senior counsel that there is no evidence on

record that even remotely suggests that the relations between the

petitioner and the complainant were made under the false promise of

marriage. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 376(2)(n) IPC having not

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -5-

been made out, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner

would tantamount to a gross abuse of process of law. In support of the

submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court

in cases titled as (i) Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani versus State of U.T. and

another, SLP (Crl.) No. 11642 of 2019 (ii) Deepak Gulati versus State of

Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675, (iii) Sheikh Arif versus State of

Maharashtra and another (2024) 4 SCC 463 and (iv) Uday versus State

of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639. Therefore, it is prayed that the instant

petition be allowed and the present FIR be quashed.

Submissions made by the learned State counsel as well as the counsel

for the complainant-respondent No. 2

7. Per contra, the learned State counsel as also learned counsel

for complainant-respondent No. 2 have vehemently opposed the present

petition, since serious and specific allegations have been levelled against

the petitioner. Learned State counsel submits that investigation is

complete, and final report under Section 193(3) BNSS against the present

petitioner stands presented before the learned Court concerned.

8. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the

petitioner has deliberately concealed and suppressed the material facts.

The petitioner since 2021, had exploited and repeatedly sexually assaulted

respondent No. 2 on the false pretext of marriage, and induced her into an

intimate relationship. In fact, the petitioner even humiliated respondent

No. 2 on account of her physique, and also compelled her to leave her job

in October 2023. Thereafter on 29.10.2023, the petitioner and his family

members visited the house of respondent No. 2 for finalizing their

marriage. However, they raised unreasonable and unlawful demands

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -6-

pertaining to roka ceremony to which the family of respondent No. 2 had

to concede. In compliance of the said demands, they even booked Polo

Farms at New Delhi, for which an advance payment of Rs. 75,000/- was

made. Reliance in this regard has been placed on Annexure R-2/1.

Throughout the said relationship, the petitioner kept giving false

reassurances to respondent No. 2 that he would marry her, however, when

it came to taking any action, the petitioner kept dilly-dallying, but

continued making physical relations with her. Learned counsel further

submits that the petitioner never intended to marry respondent No. 2, and

even the talks of marriage and the small ceremonies performed were for

show. Rather, after their roka ceremony, the petitioner started avoiding

her, and ultimately called off the marriage by citing baseless and frivolous

reasons, despite having no objections throughout their relationship.

9. It is submitted that the allegations levelled against the

petitioner are grave and specific, substantiated with documentary

evidence. All the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the

petitioner herein are disputed question of facts, which can be determined

only after the evidence is produced before the learned trial Court. It is,

therefore, prayed that the present petition be dismissed

Inference(s) of this Court

10. Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the judicial

record with their able assistance.

11. On 25.8.2025, respondent No. 2 appeared in person before

the Court. Upon being suggested by the Court regarding exploring the

possibility of mediation, respondent No. 2 expressed her unwillingness

qua the same unequivocal terms.

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -7-

12. Before proceeding to make an adjudication upon the present

petition, it would be apposite to first discuss the dictum of law as laid down

by the Apex Court in the judgments dealing with the offence of establishing

physical relations on the false pretest of marriage.

13. The Apex Court in case titled as ‘Amol Bhagwal Nehul versus

State of Maharrashtra and another’, SLP (Crl.) No. 10044 of 2024, has

held as under-

“8.Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully

considering the material on record, the following attributes come to

the fore:

(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and

correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from

the record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent

no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an

assurance to marry. The Appellant and the

Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since

08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they interacted

frequently and fell in love. The Complainant/Respondent no.

2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the

Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not

only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but

continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions.

The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not

corroborate with her conduct.

(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as

defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have

been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no

material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation”

on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual

relations without having any intention of fulfilling said

promise. Investigation has also revealed that the Khulanama,

was executed on 29.12.2022 which the

Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-

husband. During this time, the parties were already in a

relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place.

It is inconceivable that the Complainant had engaged in a

physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of

marriage, while she was already married to someone else.

Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and

unenforceable qua the Appellant.

(c)x x x x

(d)x x x x

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -8-

9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was

a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship

turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for

invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only

burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of

such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned

against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly3 to

treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and

prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.

10.As demonstrated hereinabove, the ingredients of the offence

under Sections 376 (2)(n) or 506 IPC are not established. The

present case squarely falls under categories enumerated in Para

102(5) & 102(7) as identified by this Court in State of Haryana Vs

Bhajan Lal (supra) for the exercise of powers u/s 482 CrPC by the

High Court so as to prevent the abuse of process of law. Para 102

reads as under:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the

principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of

decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power

under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of

the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we

have given the following categories of cases by way of

illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down

any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive

list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1)Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value

and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers

under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a

Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -9-

(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do

not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case

against the accused.

(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,

no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an

order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of

the Code.

(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are

so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

and with a view to spite him due to private and personal

grudge.”

11.Taking into consideration that the Appellant is just 25 years of

age, and has a lifetime ahead of him, it would be in the interest of

justice that he does not suffer an impending trial and, therefore, the

proceedings emanating from C.R. No. 490/2023 dt. 31.07.2023 are

quashed at this stage itself.”

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Nitin B. Nikhare versus the

State of Maharashtra’, SLP (Crl.) No. 1889 of 2024, has observed as

under-

“5. On the other hand, the prosecution’s case is that the prosecutrix

entered into a sexual relationship with the appellant solely for the

reason that he had promised to marry her and this relationship

continued for some time and was broken when the promise of

marriage was not fulfilled. In other words, the main allegation of

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -10-

the prosecutrix is that had it not been for the promise of marriage

made by the appellant she would have never entered into a physical

relationship with him and considering that this was done by

cheating, the same amounts to rape.

6.This Court in a catena of judgments has held that the mere

fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise

to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. In order for the

offence of rape to be made out, two conditions need to be satisfied

i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely

with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having

any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and

that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the

prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.

7.From a perusal of the record, it is clear that this was a case of a

consensual relationship from the beginning. Even if the case of the

prosecutrix is accepted, it does not appear that the initial promise to

marry was in bad faith. It was only the subsequent circumstances that

prevented fulfilment of alleged false promise to marry. Resultantly, the

relationship turned sour which has given rise to the present FIR.

Further, in view of the material on record, we do not see this as a case

where provisions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act can be attracted.

8.Hence, the entire criminal proceedings initiated against the

appellant are nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In our

opinion the High Court should have exercised its inherent power under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the

proceedings.”

15. Likewise, while making a reference to its previous judicial

pronouncements, the Apex Court in the case of ‘Rajnish Singh @ Soni

verus State of U.P. and another’, SLP (Crl.) No. 8549 of 2023’

concluded that unless it can be proved that the physical relationship

culminated purely on the basis of an explicit promise of marriage,

uninfluenced by any other factor, it cannot be said that there was vitiation

of consent under misconception of fact. The relevant paras of the said

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -11-

judgment read thus-

“26.In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra,

this Court held that to make a man, accused of having sexual

relationship by making a false promise of marriage, criminally

liable, the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the

false promise made and it must not be qualified by other

circumstances or consideration. In a situation where the woman

knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged

period, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical

relationship was purely because of alleged promise made by the

accused to marry her.

27.In conclusion, the Court held that unless it can be shown that

the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of

marriage and without being influenced by any other consideration,

it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under

misconception of fact. It was further held that even if it is assumed

that a false promise of marriage was made to the complainant

initially by the accused, the fact that the relationship continued for a

period of nine long years would render the plea of the complainant

that her consent for all these years was under misconception of the

fact that the accused would marry her implausible.

28.In the case of Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court

observed that it is inconceivable that the complainant would

continue to meet the accused or maintain a prolonged association or

physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent

on her part.

29.Testing the facts of the case at hand, on the touchstone of the

above precedents, it is clear that the complainant, being a highly

qualified major woman continued in a consensual intimate sexual

relationship with the appellant over a period of 16 years. At some

point in time, the relationship went sour leading to the filing of the

FIR. No reasonable man would accept the version that the

complainant allowed the accused to establish sexual relations with

her over a period of 16 years purely under the misconception of

marriage.

x x x x x

34.It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and

consensual intercourse. This Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -12-

Haryana, differentiated between a mere breach of promise and not

fulfilling a false promise and held that an accused will only be liable

if the Courts concludes that his intentions are mala fide and he has

clandestine motives. The relevant extract is reproduced

hereinbelow: -

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or

misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is

an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind

weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side.

There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex

and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine

whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim,

or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to

this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the

ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between

the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false

promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was

made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the

accused; and whether the consent involved was given after

wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual

indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees

to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion

for the accused, and not solely on account of

misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an

accused on account of circumstances which he could not have

foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to

marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases

must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for

rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention

of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine

motives.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate

evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial

stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of

keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of

course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of

intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various

unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise

made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons

that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not

always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come

within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the

fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC

cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the

act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the

other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -13-

beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry

her.” (emphasis supplied)

35.It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the

offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual

relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can

agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion

for the accused.

36.This Court in Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, had

quashed criminal proceedings on the ground that it is difficult to

hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship, which

continued for eight years, as ‘rape’ especially when the complainant

therein had alleged that they lived together as man and wife. The

relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow: -

“4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is

difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant

who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to

the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual

intercourse in the course of a relationship which has

continued for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face of

the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as

man and wife.” (emphasis supplied)

37.Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can this Court be

convinced that present is a case wherein the appellant is liable to be

prosecuted for having sexually exploited/assaulted the complainant

based on a false promise of marriage. The allegations of the

complainant are full of material contradictions and are ex facie

unbelievable. Throughout the prolonged period of 16 years, the

complainant kept completely quiet about the alleged sexual abuse,

meted out to her by the appellant until she learnt that the appellant

had married another woman. Further in complete contradiction to

the case setup in the FIR, the complainant has on many occasions

portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant and thus, evidently,

they lived together as man and wife. Additionally, the long gap of 16

years between the first alleged act of sexual intercourse, continued

relations for one and a half decade till the filing of the FIR

convinces us that it is a clear case of a love affair/live in

relationship gone sour.”

16. A gainful reference can also be made to the observations made

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Jothiragawan versus State REP. By the

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -14-

Inspector of the Police and another’, SLP (Crl.) No. 6821 of 2024,

wherein it was held that-

“11. We have already found that there is no promise of marriage to

coerce consent from the victim for sexual intercourse; as

forthcoming from the statements made by the victim. The promise if

any was after the first physical intercourse and even later the

allegation was forceful intercourse without any consent. In all the

three instances it was the allegation that, the intercourse was on

threat and coercion and there is no consent spoken of by the victim,

in which case there cannot be any inducement found, on a promise

held out. The allegation of forceful intercourse on threat and

coercion is also not believable, given the relationship admitted

between the parties and the willing and repeated excursions to hotel

rooms.

12.On a reading of the statements made by the victim before the

Police, both the First Information Statement and that recorded later

on, we are not convinced that the sexual relationship admitted by

both the parties was without the consent of the victim. That they

were closely related and were in a relationship is admitted by the

victim. The allegation is also of threat and coercion against the

victim, to have sexual intercourse with the accused, which even as

per the victim’s statement was repeated thrice in the same manner,

when she willingly accompanied the accused to a hotel room. The

victim had also categorically stated that after the first incident and

the second incident she was mentally upset, but that did not caution

her from again accompanying the accused to hotel rooms.

13. Having heard both sides in this case, we have absolutely no

doubt in our mind that the criminal proceedings initiated against the

present appellant are nothing but an abuse of process of the court.

This is precisely a case where the High Court should have interfered

in exercise of its inherent and extraordinary powers under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C. These proceedings cannot go on. Hence, we direct

that the proceedings initiated at the instance of the complainant

which are presently going on before Sessions Judge (Mahila Court),

Erode in S.C. No. 49 of 2022, be hereby quashed.”

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -15-

17. The settled position of law, as can be evinced from a perusal

of the afore referred judicial pronouncements, is that for attracting the

offence of rape on the ground that consent was obtained on a false pretext of

marriage, it must be established that the sexual relationship between the

parties had been induced by a false promise of marriage from the very

inception, and that the accused never had any intention of marrying the

complainant. Similarly, for the mere reason that the relationship between a

consenting couple could not culminate into marriage, cannot be made the

basis of instituting criminal proceedings against a person. Trite to say that

the Courts must, in each such case, carefully scrutinize whether the accused

had the intention to actually marry the victim, or had made the false promise

only with the malafide to satisfy his desire.

18. Reverting to the case in hand, it is the admitted position that the

parties were in a long standing consensual relationship, and talks of marriage

between their families also took place, subsequent to which even a roka

ceremony was performed on 21.7.2024. The date of marriage between the

parties was also fixed for November 2024. However, the same could not

fructify due to irreconcilable differences that cropped up between the two

sides. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that during the continuance of their

relationship i.e. from August 2021 till August 2024, the petitioner, on

numerous occasions, had established physical relations with her on the false

pretext of marriage. However, respondent No. 2 has failed to bring on record

any evidence, to prove that the relation between the two was not consensual,

or that there was any intention of the petitioner to deceive respondent No. 2

into making physical relations with him on the false pretext of marriage. It is

clear from the judicial record that the relationship between the petitioner and

respondent No. 2, both well educated and mature adults, was consensual

CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M) -16-

from its very inception. Even if the case of respondent No. 2 is, arguendo,

accepted, it does not appear that the promise to marry made by the petitioner

was in bad faith. In fact, the parties were all set to get married, which

unfortunately could not take place, leading to the relations between the

parties and their families turning bitter, and the subsequent registration of the

instant FIR. The present case is a classic example when criminal colour is

given to a situation where a consensual relationship does not turn out in the

manner desired by one party, which cannot be permitted to continue by the

Courts, since the same tantamounts to gross abuse of process of law.

19. In view of the foregoing analysis of the facts of the present

case done in light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court contained herein above, this Court deems this a fit case

warranting the quashing of the present FIR and the resultant proceedings

emanating therefrom against the petitioner.

20. As a corollary, the present petition stands allowed. FIR No.

339 dated 24.10.2024, under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, registered at Police

Station Sector-56, District Gurugram (Annexure P-1), and all subsequent

proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.

21. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands

disposed of.

(KIRTI SINGH)

JUDGE

September 16, 2025

Gurpreet Singh

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable : Yes/No

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