Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26940

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

M. A. No. 311 of 2015

ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, having its office at

Zenity House, Keshavrao, Khadey, Marge, Opposite Race Course,

Mahalaxmi, Mumbai-400 034, through the Manager, ICICI Lombard

General Insurance Company Ltd., Agra (U.P), Regional Office, Ranchi,

Insurer of Vehicle, Main Road, near Big Bazar, Ranchi through its Legal

Manager Mr. Dipankar Raoy, Son of Dilip Kumar Roy, resident of

Ashirward Mansion, Main Road, P.O & P.S.-Chutia, District Ranchi

(Jharkhand).

... … Opposite Party No.3/Appellant

Versus

1. Gayatri Kuar, widow of late Budhdeo Dubey

2. Nitish Kumr Dubey

3. Sahank Shekhar Dubey

4. Abhishek Dubey

5. Sourabh

Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are sons of late Budhdeo Dubey and being

minor are represented through their mother and natural guardian

respondent no. 1 and all are residents of village Dugila, P.O & P.S.

Lesliganj, District -Palamau (Jharkhand)

… … … Claimants/Respondents

6. Shekhar Constructions Pvt. Ltd., 7

th

Mile Stone Road, Fatch Lead, P.O

& P.S. Agra, U.P., Pin 283111, through its Incharge Naresh Sharma,

having his office at Amanat Baraj, P.O & P.S. Panki, Palamau

7. Shishir Sardar, son of G. Sardar, resident of Main Road, Chatshila, P.O

& P.S. Ghatshila, District-East Singhbhum (Jharkhand)

8. Hirday Kumar Pandey, son of late Kailash Pandey, resident of Village-

Ramsagar, P.O & P.S. Lesliganj, District-Palamau (Jharkhand)

9. Jogendra Singh, son of Deo Narayan Singh, resident of Village-

Ashehar, P.O & P.S. Panki, District-Palamau (Jharkhand)

... Opposite Parties/Respondents

With

C.O. No. 01 of 2021

1. Gayatri Kuar, (aged about 51 years), W/o Late Budhdeo

2. Nitish Kumr Dubey (Aged about 27 years), son of Late Budhdeo Dubey

3. Sahank Dubey (Aged about 25 years), son of Late Budhdeo Dubey

4. Abhishek Dubey (Aged about 21 years), son of Late Budhdeo Dubey

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5. Sourabh Raj (Aged about 19 years), son of Late Budhdeo Dubey

All permanent resident of village Dugila, P.S. Lesliganj, Post-

Bashdih, District -Palamau PIN 822118

…….. Applicants/Respondent No.1 to 5/Cross Objectors

Versus

1. Shekhar Constructions Pvt. Ltd., 7

th

Mile Stone Road, Fatch Lead, P.S.

Agra Kotwali, Post Agra, U.P. Pin 283 111, District Agra (U.P.), at

present at I/c Naresh Sharma, at Amanat Baraj, Post and P.S. Panki,

Palamau, PIN 822 122

…… Opposite Party No.1/Respondent No.6/Respondent

2. Shishir Sardar, son of G. Sardar, resident of Main Road, Chatshila,

Post & P.S. Ghatshila, District-East Singhbhum, PIN 832103

…… Opposite Party No.2/Respondent No.7/Respondent

3. The Manager, ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited,

Agra, Post – Agra, P.S. Kotwali, District Agra (Uttar Pradesh), through

ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, Main Road, near

Big Bazar, Main Road, P.S. Hindpiri, Post-Ranchi 834001, District

Ranchi, now shifted to 1

st

Floor, Lake View Tower, Kadru Bye Pass

Lane, Opposite Canara Bank, P.S. and Post-Doranda, Ranchi-834 002

District Ranchi

…… Opposite Party No.3/Appellant/Respondent

4. Hirday Kumar Pandey, son of late Kailash Pandey, Village-Ramsagar,

Post and P.S. Lesliganj, District-Palamau

…… Opposite Party No.4/Respondent No.8/Respondent

5. Jogendra Singh, son of Deo Narayan Singh, Village-Ashehar, Post and

P.S. Panki, District-Palamau

…… Opposite Party No.5/Respondent No.9/Respondent

---------

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

---------

For the Appellant: Mrs Swati Shalini, Advocate

For the Claimants: Mr Arvind Kumar Lall, Advocate

---------

Reserved on: 28.08.2026 Pronounced on: 08/09/2026

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This miscellaneous appeal, preferred by the insurer, is directed

against the Judgment and Award dated 13.02.2015 passed by the

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Claims Tribunal, Palamau at Daltonganj, in M.V. Claim Case No.

56 of 2009, whereby the appellant-Insurance Company has been

directed to pay a sum of Rs. 7,10,000/- to the claimants, together

with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of

the claim petition.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the insurer has assailed the award

primarily on two grounds. Firstly, it has been contended that the

offending vehicle did not possess a valid permit on the date of the

accident and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297, National Insurance Co. Ltd.

v. Challa Upendra Rao, (2004) 8 SCC 517, and Amrit Paul

Singh v. TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC

558, the insurer ought to have been granted the right to pay the

compensation and thereafter recover the same from the owner of

the offending vehicle. Secondly, it has been contended that the

Tribunal adopted an erroneous approach while determining the

amount of compensation.

4. The claimants, in turn, have preferred Cross Objection No. 01 of

2021, contending that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is

neither just nor adequate and that the way the same has been

computed is contrary to the settled principles governing

assessment of compensation as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in several judgments.

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5. They also contend that, since the offending vehicle was engaged in

road-construction work, the same was not required to possess a

permit.

6. In view of the rival submissions, the following points arise for

determination: -

(i) Whether the Tribunal was justified in declining the

insurer’s prayer for a direction to pay and recover on

the ground that the offending vehicle was without a

valid permit on the date of the accident?

(ii) Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is

just and reasonable and, if not, to what extent the same

requires enhancement?

7. Insofar as the first point is concerned, in its written statement, the

appellant-Insurance Company, apart from seeking protection of

Section 149(2) and S. 134(c) of the MV Act, has proceeded to

denying most of the averments in the claim petition. The appellant-

Insurance Company has called upon the owner and the driver of

the insured vehicle to produce and prove documents like

registration certificate, road permit, driving licence, etc. and

further pleaded that in case they failed to produce or prove such

documents, it should be presumed that there were violations of the

statutory conditions of the policy as contained in S. 149(2) of the

MV Act. Based upon such a plea, the appellant-Insurance

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Company has pleaded that it would not be bound to indemnify the

insured.

8. In paragraph 8 of the written statement, the appellant-Insurance

Company has admitted that the vehicle involved in the accident

was covered under the insurance policy issued by the appellant

subject to the terms, conditions, limitations and exceptions

contained in the policy which specifically stipulate that the

Insurance Company shall not be liable to indemnify the insured

against any liability incurred by him in respect of death or bodily

injury of any third party caused by the insured vehicle, if the same

was allowed to be used without having any road permit, or in

violation of the terms and conditions of the permit and the vehicle

was being driven by a person not having valid and effective

driving licence.

9. The pleadings in paragraphs 8 and 9 nowhere specifically allege

that the insured vehicle did not have a permit or was being driven

by a person not having a valid and effective driving licence. The

pleadings in paragraph 9, as noted earlier, seek to deny everything

and place the burden of the owner of the insured vehicle.

Paragraph 8 of the written statement merely states that the

insurance policy issued by the appellant-Insurance Company was

subject to certain terms, conditions, limitations and exceptions

contained in the policy. One of the terms was that the appellant-

Insurance Company would not be liable to indemnify the insured

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against any liability incurred by him in case of death or bodily

injured to a third party caused by the insured vehicle, if the same

was allowed to be used without having the road permit or in

violation of the terms and conditions of the road permit, or if the

insured vehicle was being driven by a person not having a valid

and effective driving licence.

10. The above pleadings cannot be called as any specific and

categorical pleadings to the effect that the insured vehicle, in fact,

did not have any permit or that it was being driven by a person

who had no licence to drive the same. No amount of proof which is

not being by pleadings can be ordinarily considered. Besides, in

the absence of clear pleadings, there is no question of placing an

undue burden upon either the claimants or the owner and driver of

the insured vehicle.

11. Admittedly, in this case, the appellant-Insurance Company did not

lead any oral evidence or produced any documentary evidence.

The appellant-Insurance Company however seeks to place reliance

upon Ext. 4 produced by the claimants which is a temporary permit

dated 09.12.2009 issued by the Government of Jharkhand in

respect of the insured vehicle. In Clause 10 of the temporary

permit, the validity of this permit is stated to be from 10.12.2009 to

05.04.2009. The learned counsel for the appellant urges that since

the accident took place on 07.09.2009, this Court must hold that

the insured vehicle was operating without a permit and for further

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that such an operation would be in breach of terms and conditions

of the insurance policy.

12. The appellant-Insurance Company failed to produce the insurance

policy. Therefore, there is no evidence about breach of any specific

terms of the insurance policy. The temporary permit was produced

by the claimants possibly because these were the documents

furnished to the claimants by the police authorities. The appellant-

Insurance Company neither summoned any of the RTO Officers

nor made any efforts to otherwise establish that the insured vehicle

had no permit at the time of the accident. Merely calling upon the

owner and the driver of the insured vehicle to produce documents,

as was done in paragraph 9 of the appellant-Insurance Company’s

written statement is not sufficient.

13. In the case of Swaran Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has held that the onus for establishing fundamental breach of the

terms of insurance policy would lie upon the insurance company

which raises such a plea. Here, there is no specific plea raised by

the appellant-Insurance Company. In any event, if the averments in

paragraphs 8 and 9 are to be construed as raising of such plea (on a

demurer), still, no evidence was led by the appellant-Insurance

Company to prove such a plea.

14. In Swaran Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also

considered the provisions of Section 149 of the MV Act and held

that a bare perusal of the provisions leads only to one conclusion

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that the usual rule is that once the assured prove that the accident is

covered by the compulsory insurance clause, it is for the insurer to

prove that it comes within an exception.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to MacGillivray on Insurance

Law in paragraph 67 and the contents of paragraph 67 are

transcribed below for the convenience of reference: -

“67. In MacGillivray on Insurance Law it is stated:

“25-82. Burden of Proof.—Difficulties may arise in

connection with the burden of proving that the facts of

any particular case fall within this exception. The usual

rule is that once the assured has proved that the case

comes within the general risk, it is for the insurers to

prove that it comes within an exception. It has,

therefore, been suggested in some American decisions

that, where the insurers prove only that the assured

exposed himself to danger and there is no evidence to

show why he did so, they cannot succeed, because they

have not proved that his behaviour was voluntary or

that the danger was unnecessary. Since an extremely

heavy burden is imposed on the insurers if they have to

prove the state of mind of the assured, it has been

suggested in Canadian decisions that the court should

presume that the assured acted voluntarily and that,

where he does an apparently dangerous and foolish act,

such danger was unnecessary, until the contrary is

shown. In practical terms, therefore, the onus does in

fact lie on the claimant to explain the conduct of the

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assured where there is no apparent reason for exposing

himself to an obvious danger.”

16. In paragraph 69 of Swaran Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held that the proposition of law is no longer res integra

that the person who alleges breach must prove the same. The

Insurance Company is, thus, required to establish the breach which

it claims it has alleged by cogent evidence. In any event, the

Insurance Company fails to prove that there has been a breach of

the conditions of policy on the part of the insured, the Insurance

Company cannot be absolved of its liability.

17. In the case of Narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe

Martins, reported in 1985 ACJ 397 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court while reiterating the principle that the burden is on the

insurance company to prove the breach of any of the terms of the

insurance policy, it was held that the insured is not under an

obligation to furnish evidence to enable the insurance company to

wriggle out of its liability.

18. The decision of the Amrit Paul Singh (supra) is distinguishable

because, in that case, it was clearly demonstrable form the material

brought on record that the vehicle at the time of the accident did

not have a permit. It was because of this positive evidence that the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the principle laid down in

Swaran Singh (supra) or Lakhmi Chand v. Reliance General

Insurance, (2016) 3 SCC 100, would not be applicable.

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19. From this, it is clear that the Amrit Paul Singh (supra), has not

dissented from the view taken in Swaran Singh (supra) or

Narcinva V. Kamat (supra), but only pointed out that these

decisions did not apply given the positive evidence on record that

the insured vehicle did not any permit at the time of the accident.

20. Challa Upendra Rao (supra) merely holds that plying of a

vehicle without permit is an infraction and therefore, in terms of

the said provision, such defense is available to the insurer. In the

said matter, the claimants/owner of the insured vehicle had

accepted that there was no permit which covered the insured

vehicle, but since there was no permit, the question of violation of

any condition thereof did not arise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

rejected this contention and held that a person without a permit to

ply a vehicle cannot be placed in a better position vis-à-vis one

who has a permit, but has violated the condition thereof. Therefore,

in Challa Upendra Rao (supra), there was no dispute and in fact,

there was positive evidence that the insured vehicle did not have

any permit.

21. In the present case, there is no categorical plea that the insured

vehicle had no permit and further, the appellant-Insurance

Company led no evidence to show that the insured vehicle had not

permit. By simply relying upon the document (Ext. 4), it will not

be safe to conclude that the insured vehicle had no permit, even

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though, it required to have one and further that, all these constitute

a breach of the terms of the insurance policy.

22. The learned counsel for the claimants in this case has relied on S.

66 of the MV Act which is concerned with a necessity for the

motor vehicles having permits under certain circumstances.

Section 66(3) however provides that provisions of sub-section (1),

which requires certain type of vehicles to have permits, shall not

apply to the vehicles listed in Clauses (a) to (q) of the said sub-

section. He referred to Clause (f) which, in turn, refers to transport

vehicles used for any public purpose as may be prescribed by the

State Government in this behalf. The learned counsel for the

claimants also relied on Rule 180 which deals with exemption

from the provision of the Act.

23. Though, the learned counsel for the claimants was unable to

produce any categorical notification to show that a vehicle which

was involved in the public purpose of road construction was not

required to comply with provisions of Section 67(1) of the MV

Act, such contentions only show that if the appellant-Insurance

Company had properly pleaded that the insured vehicle had no

permit at the time of the accident, then, evidence in support of the

above contentions could have possibly been produced by the

claimants or the owner/driver of the insured vehicle if such

evidence was available.

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24. In any event, the burden was on the Insurance Company to plead

and prove any fundamental breaches of the terms and conditions of

the insurance policy. Here, there are neither any categorical

pleadings nor is there any proof. In such circumstances, there is no

case made out to disturb the finding recorded by the Tribunal about

the liability of the appellant-Insurance Company to indemnify the

owner of the insured vehicle.

25. The first point for determination is answered against the appellant-

Insurance Company and in the above terms.

26. The next point is whether the compensation determined by the

Tribunal represents ‘just and reasonable compensation’.

27. The Tribunal assessed the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.

6,000/- principally on the ground that no documentary evidence

established the income. The claimants, on the other hand, relied

upon the evidence of AW.1, AW.2 and AW.3, who stated that the

deceased was earning approximately Rs. 10,000/- per month.

28. It is true that no wage register, attendance record, bank statement,

income-tax return or other documentary evidence was produced to

establish the precise income of the deceased. The Tribunal,

therefore, cannot be said to have acted wholly without basis in

declining to accept the claim of Rs. 10,000/- per month in its

entirety. At the same time, the absence of documentary evidence

does not necessarily justify adopting the lowest figure as the

income in every case. The evidence must be considered

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cumulatively, keeping in view the occupation of the deceased, the

nature of his work and the surrounding circumstances.

29. AW.1, Laxman Pandey, deposed that the deceased was engaged as

a contractor as well as an agriculturist and earned approximately

Rs. 10,000/- per month. In cross-examination, he stated that the

deceased was engaged in contract work at the block level and that

he had not seen the papers relating to such work. He also stated

that he could not say what the deceased earned from the block

contracts. He, however, denied the suggestion that his statement

regarding the deceased's income was false.

30. AW.2, Chitranjan Dubey, the elder brother of the deceased, also

deposed regarding the same occupation and substantially the same

income, and in cross-examination stated that he could not specify

the commission earned from the block contracts. AW.3, the widow

of the deceased, likewise stated that her husband was an

agriculturist and earned approximately Rs. 10,000/- per month.

31. Thus, the evidence of all three witnesses is consistent insofar as the

occupation of the deceased and the general level of his earnings are

concerned. Their evidence was not discredited in cross-

examination as to the fact that the deceased was engaged in

agricultural as well as contract work. However, documentary proof

of the precise figure of Rs. 10,000/- per month is essentially

absent. The absence of such documentary evidence, however,

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cannot by itself obliterate the consistent oral evidence regarding

the nature of the deceased’s occupation and his earnings.

32. The approach to be adopted in such circumstances stands

sufficiently explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case

of Chameli Devi v. Jivrail Mian, (2019) 4 SCC 415, the Court

recognised that, in cases involving persons engaged in occupations

where formal documentary proof of income may not ordinarily be

available, oral evidence can legitimately form the basis of

assessment.

33. Likewise, in Chandra @ Chanda @ Chandraram v. Mukesh

Kumar Yadav, (2022) 1 SCC 198, minimum wages were

recognised as a useful yardstick in the absence of documentary

evidence, though not as an inflexible measure of actual income.

34. In the case of Sri Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal

Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 13 SCC 236, the

Hon’ble Apex Court permitted reasonable guesswork based upon

the occupation of the deceased and the surrounding circumstances,

while emphasising that the assessment must remain realistic. The

principle has also been reiterated in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

v. Kalu Ram, 2026 INSC 653, wherein it has been recognised that

the Court need not mechanically adhere to the lowest figure merely

because the precise income has not been established.

35. In view of the aforesaid position, while the claim of Rs. 10,000/-

per month cannot be accepted in full in the absence of

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documentary proof, there is equally no justification for

mechanically confining the income to Rs. 6,000/- per month.

36. Having regard to the evidence on record, the nature of the

deceased’s occupation as an agriculturist and block-level

contractor, and the surrounding circumstances, this Court considers

it just and reasonable to assess his monthly income at Rs. 8,000/.

The said assessment, in the considered view of this Court, strikes a

reasonable balance between the oral evidence available on record

and the absence of documentary proof of the exact income.

37. Once the income is determined, the other components of the

computation follow in accordance with the settled principles. The

deceased was about 45 years old, and the Tribunal's application of

a multiplier of 14 is not in dispute and calls for no interference.

The deceased left behind his widow and four sons, making five

dependants in all. Accordingly, a deduction of one-fourth towards

personal and living expenses is warranted in terms of Sarla

Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121.

38. The deceased was self-employed and was about 45 years of age.

Therefore, an addition of 25% towards future prospects is also

warranted in terms of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi,

(2017) 16 SCC 680.

39. The loss of dependency is accordingly worked out as follows:

 Monthly income = Rs. 8,000/-

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 Annual income: Rs. 8,000/- × 12 = Rs. 96,000/-

 Add 25% towards future prospects = Rs. 24,000/-

 Annual income after addition of future prospects = Rs.

1,20,000/-

 Less 1/4

th

towards personal expenses = Rs. 30,000/-

 Annual contribution to the family: Rs. 90,000/-

 Rs. 90,000/- × 14 = Rs. 12,60,000/-

40. Accordingly, the loss of dependency comes to Rs. 12,60,000/-.

41. Insofar as the conventional heads are concerned, consortium is

payable to each of the five claimants at Rs. 40,000/- each,

amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/-, in view of the principles laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- is

awarded towards funeral expenses and a further sum of Rs.

15,000/- towards loss of estate. No separate amount is, however,

payable under the head of loss of love and affection.

42. The total compensation is, therefore, computed as Rs. 14,90,000/-.

43. The aforesaid amount, however, cannot be directed to be paid

without considering the amounts already received by the claimants

towards the same accident. In this regard, two amounts require

adjustment. Firstly, an amount of Rs. 50,000/- has already been

paid as interim compensation under S. 140 of the Act. Secondly,

the owner of the offending vehicle paid a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- to

claimant No.1 by Cheque No. 311832 dated 25.05.2009 and

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Cheque No. 311774 dated 19.06.2009. The said payment was

made on account of the death of Budhdeo Dubey in the accident in

question.

44. The payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- thus bears a direct nexus with the

death arising out of the accident which is the subject matter of the

present claim. It cannot, therefore, be characterized as an ex-gratia

payment independent of the compensation payable under the Act.

The said amount is liable to be considered while determining the

balance compensation payable to the claimants.

45. Accordingly, after adjusting Rs. 50,000/- towards the interim

compensation already paid and Rs. 2,50,000/- towards the payment

made by the owner, the net compensation payable comes to Rs.

11,90,000/-. In addition to this, any statutory amount, if deposited,

should also stand adjusted.

46. As regards interest, the Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of

6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. Having

regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the said rate does

not warrant interference and is, accordingly, maintained.

47. The claimants shall, therefore, be entitled to interest at the rate of

6% per annum on the net compensation determined herein from

the date of filing of the claim petition till payment.

48. In view of the foregoing discussion, Point No. (ii) is answered by

holding that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal requires

enhancement and is hereby determined at Rs. 11,90,000/-, after

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due adjustments of the amounts already paid as indicated

hereinabove.

49. Consequently, M.A. No. 311 of 2015, preferred by the Insurer, is

dismissed. Cross Objection No. 01 of 2021 filed by claimants

stands allowed. The compensation payable to the claimants is

enhanced to Rs. 11,90,000/- from Rs. 7,10,000, together with

interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the

claim petition till payment.

50. The entire amount shall be apportioned equally amongst all the

claimants. Insofar as the shares of the minor children are

concerned, the widow of the deceased shall keep their respective

shares in appropriate fixed deposits until they attain the age of

majority.

51. The appellant-Insurance Company shall deposit the aforesaid

compensation of Rs. 11,90,000/-, before this Court within a period

of eight weeks from today, together with the interest payable

thereon, after giving due intimation to the learned counsel for the

claimants.

52. Any amount already deposited pursuant to the impugned award

shall be duly given credit for while making such deposit, to avoid

duplication of payment. Upon such deposit, the Registry shall

permit withdrawal by the claimants by transferring it into their

bank accounts, after due verification of their identity and bank

particulars. Under no circumstances should the transfers be

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otherwise than through regular banking channels. The learned

counsel for the claimants has agreed to provide the identity and

bank details of the claimants so that the transfer of the

compensation can be effected at the earliest.

53. The appeal as well as the Cross Objection stands disposed of in the

above terms, without any order for costs.

54. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, will not survive and are

disposed of.

(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

September 08, 2026

A.F.R.

Manoj/Ranjeet/Cp.2

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