FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 1 of 61

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgement delivered on: 02.06.2025

+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 6/2024, CM APPL. 2216 & 2219 of 2024

INDIAMART INTERMESH LTD. ..... Appellant

Versus

PUMA SE ..... Respondent

Advocates who appeared in this case

For the Appellant : Mr Sandeep Sethi, Mr Rajshekhar Rao, Sr

Advocates with Mr Sidharth Chopra, Mr

Nitin Sharma, Mr Naman Tandon, Mr

Kuber Mahajan, Ms Riya Kumar, Mr Sumer

Saeth and Mr Harshil Wason, Advocates.

For the Respondent : Mr. Ranjan Narula, Mr. Shakti Priyan Nair

and Mr. Parth Bajaj, Advocates

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU

JUDGMENT

VIBHU BAKHRU, J.

1. The appellant – IndiaMART Intermesh Limited [IIL] has filed the

present intra-court appeal, inter alia, impugning a judgment dated

03.01.2024 [impugned judgment] passed by the learned Single Judge in an

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application filed by the respondent – PUMA SE [PSE] under Order XXXIX

Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [the CPC] being I.A.

No. 15564/2021 in CS(COMM) 607/2021 captioned PUMA SE v.

IndiaMART Intermesh Ltd., seeking interim reliefs.

2. PSE has filed the aforementioned suit [being CS(COMM) 607/2021],

inter alia, seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining IIL from

using, facilitating, or offering to any third parties the trademark ‘PUMA’ as

a brand suggestion/keyword/search term on its website

<www.indiamart.com> or use the mark ‘PUMA’ in any manner which may

amount to infringement of PSE’s registered trademarks and to restrain IIL

from passing off its goods and services as that of PSE. PSE has also prayed

for directions to be issued to IIL to remove all listing for sale of its

counterfeit products or uploading any product images of its trademarks

, Form strip logo without verification

and due diligence. Additionally, PSE seeks compensatory and punitive

damages to the tune of ₹2,00,00,010/- from IIL. PSE’s aforementioned

trademarks are hereafter referred to as ‘PUMA’.

3. In terms of the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has

restrained IIL from providing any of PSE’s registered trademark including

PUMA in respect of any goods as search option in the drop-down menu

presented to prospective sellers at the time of their registration on their

platform. The learned Single Judge has also directed IIL to take down all

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infringing listings containing any of PSE’s registered trademark in respect of

goods, which are offered for sale.

4. The learned Single Judge has observed that IIL’s use of the mark

‘PUMA’ amounts to trademark infringement under Sub-sections (1), (2) and

(4) of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 [TM Act]. Further, IIL

could not claim “safe harbor” protection under Section 79(1) of the

Information Technology Act, 2000 [IT Act]. IIL being aggrieved by the

impugned judgment has preferred the present appeal.

PREFATORY FACTS

5. IIL is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies

Act, 1956. IIL is engaged in the business of operating an integrated

electronic business to business [B2B] portal named <www.indiamart.com>,

which provides internet based e-market place/platform [Indiamart].

Indiamart provides an interface between buyers and suppliers of various

products and services. The sellers desirous of using IIL’s platform get

registered with IIL and list the products being dealt with by them on the

platform. The buyers who are interested in the products as listed can contact

the sellers whose details are listed. The sale-purchase transaction in respect

of any goods is directly consummated by the buyers and the sellers without

the involvement of IIL or its platform, Indiamart.

6. IIL claims to be an intermediary under Section 2(1)(w) of the IT Act.

IIL claims that it enables sellers of various products and/or services in

various industries to list their goods and services on its platform and does

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not alter their content in any manner.

7. PSE is a company and it is established and incorporated under the

laws of Germany. It claims that it is one of the world’s largest manufacturer

of sportswear and accessories. It operates in India through its wholly owned

subsidiary, PUMA Sports India Pvt. Limited. PSE claims that it has been

using the following registered trademarks since 1977, which have since

become source identifiers for its products [PUMA Products]:

a. word mark 'PUMA' registered under Class 18 and Class 25.

b. device mark under Classes 18, 24, 09, 03,16,

41, 28, 14, 25 and 35.

c. device mark under Classes 18, 25 and 35

d. device mark under Class 25

8. In addition to the above, its aforementioned trademarks are also

registered with the concerned authorities in other jurisdictions. PSE’s

trademark ‘PUMA’ has been declared as a well-known trademark by the

Trademark Registry and was published in the Trademarks Journal No.1942

on 24.02.2020. PSE claims that it has also been afforded protection not only

for identical goods but also for completely different goods including

medicines, electrical goods, locks, chemicals etc.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 5 of 61

THE DISPUTE

9. PSE claims that in August, 2021, it received various consumer

complaints of counterfeit PUMA Products, which are listed on IIL’s

platform.

10. The process for registration of sellers on Indiamart requires the sellers

to key-in their details including those products in which they are dealing. IIL

provides a drop-down menu, which enables the sellers to select one of the

options or directly fill-in the description of their product in the menu bar.

The options for certain products include the name PUMA which, as stated

above, is PSE’s registered trademark.

11. Once a seller is registered describing its goods as PUMA, the seller’s

listing would feature in the list of sellers selling the specific PUMA goods.

Any buyer conducting a search on Indiamart using the term PUMA or any

other words, which may include the word ‘PUMA’ would be led to such

listings.

12. PSE contends that various sellers listed on Indiamart have tagged their

counterfeit goods including clothing, footwear, face masks, socks, caps,

watches, accessories and other merchandise, which bear PSE’s registered

PUMA marks – and [PUMA Marks].

13. PSE has set out certain screenshots of Indiamart website, which are

reproduced below:

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14. PSE claims that use of its registered trademarks on the goods as

displayed by sellers on Indiamart amounts to infringement of its registered

trademarks within the meaning of Section 29 of the TM Act. It also claims

that the use of its trademark amounts to passing off.

15. PSE states that on enquiries and studying IIL’s web portal –

Indiamart, it discovered that IIL does not carry out any due diligence or

verification in respect of the sellers. It alleges that IIL’s business model is

based on enrolling large number of traders in order to convert them into paid

listings. PSE claims that once they submit a request to take down third party

listings, the same is actioned but the third parties relist under a different or

similar name. It alleges that in this manner, IIL is “encouraging and

inducing infringement by lack of due diligence”. It also claims that IIL was

“actively infringing its brand name by aiding and abetting the users on its

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platform to choose PUMA trademark/brand as a keyword suggestion/search

term/recommended search to describe their products as PUMA branded

products from a drop-down menu”.

16. IIL has countered the said contentions. Its defense is that it is an

intermediary and does not either encourage, abet or influence the sellers on

listing their products. It claims that the drop-down menu provided for

registration of the sellers is only to facilitate the sellers in selecting their

products. The sellers can either select an appropriate description from the

drop-down menu or key-in the specific description of their products. The

various names on the drop-down menu are only for the purposes of

facilitating sellers from selecting an appropriate description.

17. IIL also contends that the sellers selling genuine PUMA products can

use the said listing. IIL claims that wherever the counterfeit listing is

brought to its notice, it takes requisite steps in accordance with the

procedure established to take down the said listing.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

18. The learned Single Judge noted all the rival submissions and the

issues that arose for consideration of the Court. The relevant extract of the

impugned judgment is set out below:

“(i) Is IIL infringing the plaintiff’s registered trade

marks, or passing off goods or services, other than

those of the plaintiff, as the plaintiff’s? If not, the

matter ends there.

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(ii) If IIL is doing so, is it entitled to safe harbour

under Section 79 of the IT Act and thereby insulated

from the consequences of infringement/passing off?”

19. The learned Single Judge observed that both the issues are

substantially covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court (of

which one of us – Vibhu Bakhru, J. was a member) in Google LLC v. DRS

Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors.: Neutral Citation No.: 2023:DHC:5615-DB.

However, the learned Single Judge also observed that there were certain

features in that case, which are not available in the present case. The learned

Single Judge thereafter proceeded to analyse the decision of this Court in

Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and its applicability

to the issues raised in the present case.

20. The learned Single Judge framed the following questions for

consideration on similar lines as in Google LLC’s case:

“(i) Whether use of the trade mark as choices in the drop

down menu amounts to use of those marks for the purposes

of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act ?

(ii) If so, whether such use is that of the seller on the

Indiamart platform or by IIL as well?

(iii) Whether the use of the trade mark as a search option in

the drop down menu per se amounts to infringement of the

trade mark ?

(iv) If so, whether IIL is absolved of its liability in respect of

use of the trade mark as a search option in the drop down

menu by virtue of being an intermediary under Section 79 of

the IT Act ?”

21. In regard to the first question whether the use of mark ‘PUMA’ in the

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drop-down option menu would be considered as a use of the trademark

PUMA, the learned Single Judge referred to the relevant extract of the

decision in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and

observed as under:

“35.4 Paras 56 and 57 of the report once again record

Google’s contention predicated on the “invisibility” of

the ad words provided in the Google Ads program to

the consumer using the Google search engine. Google

contended that, as the ad words were invisible to the

consumer, the making available of third party trade

marks as ad words by Google did not constitute “use”

within the meaning of Section 2(2)(b) or 2(2)(c)(ii) of

the Trade Marks Act, which required “use of a mark”

to be “use of printed or other visual representation of

the mark”. As the making available of “AGARWAL

PACKERS AND MOVERS” as an ad word in the

Google Ads program did not amount to “use” of

“AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS” as a trade

mark within the meaning of Section 2(2)(b) or

2(2)(c)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, Google contended

that DRS had no sustainable actionable claim under

the Trade Marks Act.

*** ***

35.7 In paras 84 to 88 of the report, the Division Bench

returned two important findings. The first was that the

use of the registered trade mark, in order to constitute

“use of a mark” within the meaning of Section 2(2)(b)

and 2(2)(c)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, is not limited to

use in a visual form on goods, but would also include

use in relation to goods in any form whatsoever. The

second was that Section 2(2) of the Trade Marks Act

does not control or limit the width of Section 29(6).

As such, use of the registered trade mark of the

plaintiff, even if in one of the manners envisaged by

Section 29(6), would also constitute “use” for the

purposes of the Trade Marks Act.

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35.8 Following the above, in paras 90 and 91 of the

report, the Division Bench has interpreted the

expression “in advertising” as employed in Section

29(6)(d). It holds that the expression “in advertising”

is not synonymous with “in an advertisement”. In

order for a registered trade mark to be regarded as

having been used “in advertising”, therefore, it is not

necessary that the registered trade mark must feature in

an advertisement. As a sequitur, the Division Bench

holds that the use of a trade mark as a keyword to

trigger the display of an advertisement of the goods or

service would amount to use of the trade mark in

advertising.

35.9 These findings apply, mutatis mutandis, to the

present case.

35.10 In view of the width accorded to the ambit of the

expression “in any other relation whatsoever”, as they

occur in Section 2(2)(c)(i) of the Trade Marks Act, by

the Division Bench, and the consequent finding of the

Division Bench that the use of the trade mark as an ad

word in the Google Ads program would also amount to

“use” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Trade

Marks Act, the use of the plaintiff’s registered trade

mark as one of the drop down choices available to the

seller at the time of registration with the Indiamart

platform would also amount to “use” of the trade mark

within the meaning of Section 2(2)(b) and 2(2)(c)(i).”

22. Additionally, the learned Single Judge also held that the appearance

of PSE’s PUMA mark on the drop-down menu, which is visible on the

screen, also amounts to a visual representation of the mark PUMA

irrespective of the purpose for which the representation was made or the

persons whose eye it was intended for. The learned Single Judge held that

whether the visual representation is made at the backend or frontend or in

between, would also not be affected/reflected from the representation being

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a visible representation. Thus, the learned Single Judge rejected the

contention that since the drop-down menu was available only to a seller at

the very backend of the registration process, the same would not amount to

use of the trademark. In terms of Section 2(2)(b) of the TM Act, the

argument was rejected. The learned Single Judge proceeded to hold that:

“35.13 Providing, to the prospective seller, of PUMA

as one of the choices in the drop down menu also

satisfies the ingredients of Section 2(2)(c)(i), which

includes, in the definition of “use of a mark”, use of

the mark in any relation to the plaintiff’s goods. It is

IIL’s avowed case that the suggestions provided in the

drop down menu are intended to identify the goods

which are being displayed for sale vis-a-vis their brand

name owner. Thus, in the example provided in para 5

supra, IIL provides “Puma shoes” as a choice in the

drop down menu, to be filled in by the seller, to

indicate a relationship with the goods that the seller

seeks to sell and the plaintiff.

35.14 Mr. Rao stressed that, while allowing the seller

to select “Puma shoes” from the drop down menu, it

was never the intent of IIL to allow a counterfeiter to

peddle counterfeit goods on its platform. That may

very well be true. Indeed, it is not Mr. Narula’s case –

it cannot be – that IIL was consciously allowing

counterfeiters to sell counterfeit products on its

platform. That, however, is irrelevant as a

consideration while examining whether providing of

“Puma shoes” as a choice in the drop down menu

presented to the prospective seller constitutes “use” of

the plaintiff’s registered trade mark by IIL. In my

considered opinion, it certainly does. The intent of

providing “Puma shoes” as an option to the

prospective seller is so that, if the seller chooses that

option, then, a future customer who accesses the

Indiamart website and desires to purchase “Puma

shoes” would immediately be presented with the

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seller’s product – along with the products of others

who may have chosen “Puma shoes” from the drop

down menu. “Puma shoes” is, therefore, being used

by IIL, even if it is only in the form of one of the

choices provided in the drop down menu at the

“backend”, in relation to the goods manufactured by

the plaintiff. Providing of “Puma shoes” as an option

in the drop down menu, therefore, satisfies the

ingredients of “use of a mark” as envisaged in Section

2(2)(c)(i) of the Trade Marks Act.

35.15 Thus, though the “Puma shoes” option provided

in the drop down menu is visible only to the seller at

the time of registering himself with the Indiamart

platform, and is not visible to the consumer who visits

the website with intent to purchase goods, and though

it is provided only at the “backend” of the registration

process, the providing of the option itself constitutes

“use of a mark” of the plaintiff, within the meaning of

the Trade Marks Act.

35.16 Even if one were, therefore, to regard “use of a

mark” as necessitating visual representation of the

mark, the providing, by IIL, of “Puma” as one of the

drop down menus available to the seller at the time of

registration, on the Indiamart platform would

constitute “use” within the meaning of Section 2(2)(b)

and 2(2)(c)(i) of the Trade Marks Act.”

23. The learned Single Judge also held that IIL’s provision of PUMA

shoes as a drop-down option for a seller to register himself as a seller of

PUMA shoes would also amount to use “by IIL of PSE registered trademark

‘in advertisement’ and therefore, would constitute use of the trademark

within the meaning of Section 29(6) of the TM Act”.

24. The learned Single Judge also found that IIL was an active participant

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 16 of 61

in the use and selection of options from the drop-down menu, which was

projected to a prospective seller seeking to register on Indiamart. The

learned Single Judge noted that IIL’s commercial venture was to allow sale

of goods of third parties and providing an option of PUMA shoes as a choice

in the drop-down menu available to the seller at the time of registration

made IIL an active participant in the process.

25. The learned Single Judge also noted the contention advanced on

behalf of PSE that IIL does not include all brands in its drop-down menu,

but selects only a few brands for the purpose of attracting more sellers and

maximizing its revenue. The learned Single Judge made observations to the

effect that IIL was the architect of its platform including the drop-down

feature on the website and therefore, could not be considered a non-

participant.

26. In so far as the use of the trademark is concerned, the learned Single

Judge referred to Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and

held that same would also be applicable in the facts of the present case for

determining whether the trademark PUMA is used by the sellers alone or by

IIL as well. The learned Single Judge concluded that the use of PUMA

trademark in the present case was not restricted to the sellers alone, but also

to IIL, thus, the learned Single Judge rejected the contention that use of the

trademark, if any, is by the seller and not by IIL.

27. Insofar as the question of infringement is concerned, the learned

Single Judge found that IIL’s use of PUMA trademark was required to be

considered as use of the trademark for the purpose of Section 29(1) of the

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 17 of 61

TM Act. The learned Single Judge referred to the definition of the trademark

under Section 2(1)(zb)(ii) of the TM Act and noted that it was used in

relation to the goods and services for the purpose of indicating a connection

in the course of trade between the goods and services. The learned Single

Judge further reasoned that choice of PUMA shoes in the drop-down menu

provided on the Indiamart platform essentially performs a primary function

of identifying the sources of the goods and services to be sold under the said

trademark.

28. The learned Single Judge also found that offering of an option of

PUMA shoes on the drop-down menu would also constitute infringement of

the trademark PUMA within the Section 29(2) of the TM Act as the material

produced by PSE, prima facie, indicated that the counterfeit goods were

being offered to sale on Indiamart.

29. The learned Single Judge observed that by offering PUMA as a drop-

down menu option to prospective seller seeking to register on Indiamart, IIL

not only facilitates the genuine seller of PUMA products, but also

counterfeiters masquerading as genuine PUMA dealers.

30. The learned Single Judge noted that in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics

(P) Ltd. & Ors. (supra), this Court held that the use of a trademark as a key

word in the Google ad words programme was not actionable or illegal,

however, the Court distinguished the facts in the present case as under:

“38.15 In para 137 of the judgment in Google LLC,

the Division Bench holds that the use of a trade mark

as a keyword in the Google Ads program, to seek out

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 18 of 61

internet users as target for advertisements which they

may find relevant is not actionable or illegal. There is,

however, a fundamental difference between providing

a trade mark as a keyword on the Google Ads program

and providing the registered trade mark as one of the

options in the drop down menu to a prospective seller

on the Indiamart platform. Unlike the Google search

engine, the Indiamart platform is not merely in the

form of directory, but is an e-commerce website,

across which goods are bought and sold. It may not be

possible, therefore, to extend the observation contained

in para 137 of the Google LLC to a case in which,

without the requisite checks and balances, IIL allows

prospective sellers to register themselves, without

ascertaining whether they are in fact genuine dealers of

the goods bearing the concerned trade mark or mere

counterfeiters.

*** *** ***

38.17 The situation that obtains in the present case is

altogether different. Here, by making available Puma

as a drop-down option to the prospective seller seeking

to register himself on the Indiamart platform, IIL

facilitates not only genuine sellers of Puma

merchandise, but also counterfeiters in selling their

products by masquerading as genuine Puma dealers.

Thus, this is not a case in which two genuine

competitors are being placed side by side. This is a

case in which a counterfeiter is managing, on account

of the availability of Puma as a drop-down option, to

peddle counterfeits as genuine Puma products. This is,

therefore, a case of defrauding of consumers, unlike

the situation envisaged in para 138 of Google LLC.

(emphasis added)”

31. The learned Single Judge – using the language as employed in Google

LLC’s case – held that “the link displayed a consequence of unchecked

providing of the plaintiff’s registered trade mark as a choice in the drop-

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down option to the prospective buyer does lend itself to confusion, as it

enables counterfeiters and persons who are not genuine peddlers of Puma

merchandise to represent themselves as genuine and thereby deceive

consumers”. The learned Single Judge held that use of the drop-down menu

containing the word Puma shoes would also constitute infringement under

Section 29(2) of the TM Act.

32. The learned Single Judge also found that instances of counterfeit

PUMA products being displayed for sale on IIL’s platform were detrimental

to the distinctive character and repute of PSE’s registered trademark and

therefore, the action for infringement would lie.

33. In view of the above discussion, the learned Single Judge found that a

prima facie case for infringement within the meaning of Section 29(1), (2)

and (4) of the TM Act exits.

34. The learned Single Judge also rejected the contention that IIL was

entitled to the safe harbour under Section 79 of the IT Act. The learned

Single Judge held that Section 79 of the IT Act is also required to be read

alongside Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) of the Information Technology Rules, 2021

(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code).

35. We consider it apposite to refer to the aforesaid extract from the

impugned judgment, which sets out the learned Single Judge’s reasoning to

hold that the protection of Section 79 of the IT Act would not be available in

the facts of the present case:

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“46.3 Besides, Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) of the IT Rules

requires every intermediary to make reasonable efforts

to cause users of its computer resource not to host,

display or upload any information that infringes any

patent, copyright or other proprietary rights. This

requirement having been cautiously inserted in

October 2022, has to be given a strict interpretation.

Strict adherence and compliance with the requirement

are mandatory. Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) of the IT Rules has to

be read alongside Section 79 of the IT Act. While sub-

section (1) of Section 79 insulates an intermediary

from third party information, data or communication

links made available or hosted by it, sub-section (2)

sets out the circumstances in which this protection

would be available and sub-section (3) sets out the

circumstances in which this protection would not be

available. Both these provisions prima facie augur

against IIL in the present case. Section 79(2)

stipulates the three circumstances in clauses (a), (b)

and (c) thereof, in which Section 79(1) would apply.

Of these, clauses (a) and (b) are separated by the

conjunction “or”, whereas there is no conjunction

between (b) and (c). One presumes, however, that

clauses (b) and (c) are also to be deemed as having

been separated by the conjunction “or”. This indicates

that it is not necessary that all the three clauses (a) to

(c) must simultaneously apply for Section 79(1) to

apply and that Section 79(1) would apply if any one of

the three clauses (a) to (c) of Section 79(2) is

applicable.

*** *** ***

46.10 For all these reasons, IIL cannot claim “safe

harbour” protection under Section 79 of the IT Act.”

IIL’S CHALLENGE TO THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

36. IIL has challenged the impugned judgment on the following broad

grounds:

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a. The learned Single Judge has erred in not appreciating the

services offered by IIL and in holding that IIL’s platform is an

e-commerce website which allows sale of goods of third-parties

to the projected users seeking to purchase goods on the IIL’s

platform. In this regard the learned Single Judge has incorrectly

placed reliance on the decision of Google LLC v. DRS

Logistics (P) Ltd. (supra).

b. The learned Single Judge erred in holding that the use of PSE’s

trademark ‘PUMA’ within the drop-down menu on IIL’s

platform constitutes use ‘as a trademark’ and constitutes

infringement under Section 29(1) of the TM Act.

c. The learned Single Judge has further erred in holding that such

use of PSE’s trademark within the drop-down menu available

to sellers amounts to likelihood of confusion/actual confusion

inasmuch as the counterfeit ‘PUMA’ products sold by the

sellers would be confused to originate from PUMA and amount

to infringement under Section 29(2) of the TM Act.

d. The learned Single Judge has erred in holding that the use of

PSE’s trademark ‘PUMA’ within the drop-down menu on IIL’s

platform constitutes infringement under Section 29(4) of the

TM Act.

e. The learned Single Judge has erred in holding that ‘Doctrine of

Exhaustion’ does not exist under the TM Act nor does Section

30(1), 30(3) & (4) of the TM Act come to the aid of IIL.

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f. The learned Single Judge has erred in holding that use of PSE’s

trademark ‘PUMA’ within the drop-down menu amounts to IIL

actively suggesting choices to sellers and buyers with a view to

maximise revenue and thus, acting beyond the scope of an

intermediary and disentitling IIL from the benefit of the safe

harbour protection under the IT Act.

g. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the protection

granted under Section 79 of the IT Act and erred in holding that

IIL has failed to fulfill the requisite due diligence requirements

mandated by law and aided in the commission of the unlawful

acts of counterfeiting and infringement.

SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL

37. Mr Sethi, the learned senior counsel appearing for IIL contended that

the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the nature of services

offered by IIL. He contended that IIL is only an online discovery platform

for various industries and individuals for listing of their profile and

catalogue of their products/services as advertisements to prospective sellers.

He submitted that IIL merely connects the buyers and sellers and its services

were akin to a Yellow Pages Directory, which enables any seller to list its

products or services. He contended that IIL does not participate or facilitate

participation in any negotiations between the buyers or sellers on its

platform. It merely provides identity and the contact details of the sellers

listed on the platform. The buyers are at liberty to contact the sellers

directly. He submitted that IIL is not privy to any negotiations that may take

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place between the buyers or the sellers.

38. He submitted that in so far as the revenue model is concerned, the

revenue is generated by value added services, which do not use PSE’s

trademark. Thus, the use of the trademarks are not monetised, but only used

as a method of segregating the category of products. He submitted that IIL

has no commercial interest in use of the trademarks of PSE, but uses it only

for the purpose of enabling the sellers to describe their goods. He contended

that the decision in the case of Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd

(supra) is inapplicable in the facts of the present case.

39. He submitted that reference of PUMA shoes or PUMA in the drop-

down menu is completely descriptive of the nature of the goods and is

offered as an option to avoid misspellings by sellers registering to list on

IIL. He contended that the same does not constitute use of the trademark in

course of trade and would fall within the exclusion of Clauses (a) and (b) of

Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the TM Act. He emphasised that making a

choice on the drop-down menu was not mandatory or in any manner limiting

in nature. He submitted that IIL does not provide any listing service or

offers any role in selecting the listings for the buyers which may infringe the

trademark PUMA. He also pointed out of 2180 listings under the PUMA

brand and PSE [Indian associate]. PSE had only shared 259 listing which

displayed the images of the products, which according to PSE were

infringing its trademark.

40. He also contended that there is no cause of confusion on account of

use of option in the drop-down menu as it was to facilitate only the genuine

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 24 of 61

prospective seller to opt for the said listing.

41. In so far as the applicability of Section 29(4) of the TM Act is

concerned, Mr Sethi contended that same would be inapplicable as PSE’s

case is that images of goods displayed by the sellers on IIL were similar

goods. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Renaissance

Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Ors.: (2022) 5 SCC 1 in support

of his contention that if the goods were similar, Section 29(4) of the TM Act

would have no application as all three conditions set out are required to be

cumulatively satisfied.

42. Lastly, he submitted that IIL could not be denied the immunity against

third party action under Section 79 of the IT Act as the option to select the

particular brand or trademark in the drop-down menu on its platform would

not amount to initiating any transmission or selection of transmission

resulting in IIL forfeiting its immunity under the IT Act. He also submitted

that Section 79 of the IT Act does not envisage an intermediary undertaking,

any policing role, whereby the intermediary can take measures on its own.

He submits that in terms of Rule 3 of the Information and Technology

(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Codes) Rules, 2021 [IT

Rules], IIL has published its rules and regulations, privacy policy and

standard users agreement of sellers. Additionally, a seller is also required to

furnish an undertaking to refrain from violating third party rights.

43. He sought to contest the findings of the learned Single Judge to the

effect that IIL had not satisfied the criterion of ‘reasonable efforts’ under

Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) of the IT Rules. He informed this Court that the court in

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 25 of 61

Starbucks. Corporation & Anr. v. National Internet Exchange of India &

Others: CS(COMM) 224/2023 has directed the Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology [MeitY] to place on record the interpretation as to

what constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ under Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) of the IT Rules.

He submitted that the IT Act and the IT Rules also provides the mechanism

and obligation to take down the material on an intermediary.

44. Mr Narula, the learned counsel appearing for PSE countered the

aforesaid submissions. He supported the findings of the learned Single

Judge. He also drew the attention of this Court to the observations of this

Court in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd (supra), whereby this Court

noted: “the provisions of the TM Act would necessarily have to be read in

an expansive manner to address the novel issues thrown up by the

advancement of technology” along with underscoring that “It is necessary

for protection of the public that when they purchase goods and services

associated with the trademark, they are not deceived in any manner in

accepting goods and services from a source other than that associated with

the trademark. Any use of a mark, which is likely to confuse or deceive the

user is impermissible and is actionable.”

45. He submitted that IIL’s business model is such that it allows sellers

free listing but monetises the use of registered marks, including PUMA

Marks, for increasing the traffic accessing IIL’s website. Further, IIL’s

process of onboarding a seller shows that it actively suggests the use of

registered marks including PSE’s mark without ascertaining if the goods that

the seller intends to retail are genuine and those in relation to the registered

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 26 of 61

mark they are listed under.

46. Next, he submitted that IIL lists certain sellers as verified sellers and

same accords them priority in the order of listings. He contended that the

representation of sellers as a verified seller would encourage the buyers to

accept the credentials of the sellers and to enter into transactions with them.

He submitted that this would clearly establish that IIL was actively aiding

and abetting counterfeiters in peddling their products. He submitted that PSE

has placed on record multiple infringing listings and the same clearly

reflected that IIL profited from an increase in number of listings, by

increased traffic. He contended that IIL’s intention to communicate to the

consumers that the sellers listed on their platform were selling the goods

associated with the given registered trademarks would amount of violation

of Section 29(2) and 29(6) of the TM Act. He submitted that the learned

Single Judge rightly referred to the decision in the case of Google LLC v.

DRS Logistics (P) Ltd (supra) to apply the test of initial interest confusion.

He contended that even if the confusion arose at the pre-purchase stage, the

same would satisfy the criterion of infringement under the TM Act.

47. He contended that IIL’s use of PUMA in the drop-down menu must

be viewed from the lens of the revenue model set up by IIL through their

software/algorithm, which by allowing sellers to select the PUMA mark in

their listing detail ensure that such seller’s listing would show up whenever

a buyer searches for PUMA Products and this would be irrespective of the

fact whether the products provided by the seller may or may not bear the

PUMA Marks. The algorithm/software of IIL is written in a manner to

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 27 of 61

maximize user traffic by allowing sellers, sans due diligence, to list that they

sell PUMA Products and aid in sale of counterfeit products. He also stated

that use of a registered trademark in the drop-down menus for seller’s listing

is not industry practice and thus, IIL cannot take benefit of Section 30 of the

TM Act. In this regard, he referred to the procedure employed by OLX,

Amazon and Flipkart and argued that unlike a Yellow-Pages Directory, IIL

employs categorization by well-known brands and their marks.

48. He also argued that IIL is not a passive intermediary, but actively

participates in providing the sellers various brand names along with other

value added services through which a seller can upgrade its services to

attract more buyers. He submitted that IIL at the initial stages suggests

verified leads through email and WhatsApp if the buyers provided such

details. He submitted that thus, IIL cannot take refuge of the safe harbour

provisions under the IT Act.

ANALYSIS

49. The controversy in the present case centers around the drop-down

menu used by IIL while registering sellers on its platform, Indiamart. The

drop-down menu contains an option mentioning PUMA Marks. The seller

desirous for listing on Indiamart, can select options for describing its

products. According to PSE, the inclusion of PUMA as an option in the

drop-down menu would amount to infringement of its trademark, which is

occasioned by the sellers listed on the platform displaying counterfeit

products on the listing page.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 28 of 61

50. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to examine the

services offered by IIL and the relevance of the drop-down menu in the

registration process.

51. Concededly, IIL is an intermediary defined under Section 2(1)(w) of

the IT Act. This is expressly stated by PSE in its plaint and as also asserted

by IIL in its defence. Thus, there is no cavil between the parties in this

regard. As stated above, IIL operates an integrated electronic business to

business portal – Indiamart. IIL claims that Indiamart is an online discovery

platform, which lists suppliers from various industries in respect of their

products and services. IIL asserts that the platform is used particularly for

listing the profile/catalogue of MSMEs/individual entities. Any person can

advertise its product on the said platform for viewing of buyers for their

goods and services. Prospective sellers can register on Indiamart and create

their goods and/or services catalogue, which is displayed. The sellers select

their range of products and services, including the brand, which they wish to

list. The drop-down menu is used in the listing process for a seller to

describe its goods or services.

Registration Process

52. During the course of the proceedings, the learned counsel for IIL had

handed over print-out of screen images reflecting the online registration

process. The said screenshots are reproduced below:

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FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 30 of 61

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 31 of 61

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 32 of 61

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 33 of 61

53. As noted above, step no.4 is the screen shot of the webpage where the

details of the products are to be filled by the prospective registrant. We also

consider it apposite to set out the screenshot of the webpage involving the

said step as set out in the impugned judgment. The same is reproduced

below:

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 34 of 61

54. The above screenshot is illustrative of a registration of a seller selling

shoes. The product/service name as mentioned in the bar is shoes. The

instructions in bold in the drop-down menu reads: “Please add more specific

product name. You can also choose from the suggestions below”. And the

suggestions, which are displayed in the screenshot are: Dance Shoes, Adidas

Shoes, Lee Cooper Shoes, Puma Shoes and Slip on Shoes etc. The list of

specific options continues but the same are not reflected in the screenshot on

account of limited space. The screen shot of “Step 4” in the registration

process as reproduced above refers to the product “school shoes” and the

specific categories as visible on the screen image are: boys school shoes; girl

school shoes; and kids school shoes.

55. It is apparent from the above that IIL’s endeavour is to encourage the

sellers to describe its product more precisely. This is obviously for the

purposes of making the listing more relevant to the buyers searching for any

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 35 of 61

specific product or services.

56. Any buyer who is desirous of conducting a search on Indiamart

regarding any specific product or services would key-in the name of the

product or services and the portal would list out all listings offering the said

product or services. Thus, any buyer looking for PUMA Shoes would be

presented with the list of sellers who are registered in respect of the specific

product. It would be for the buyer now to navigate through the listings.

57. It is also apparent from the screenshots placed on record that the

listings reflect various details including the name of the particular seller; its

contact details including the phone number; and the product/service offered

or dealt with. Illustratively, one of the images of the screenshot (placed by

PSE in its plaint and as reproduced above) reflects a product – “4way

Multicolor Puma T Shirt, Size: M to xxl”. The same indicates a price per

piece at ₹190/-. It describes the product as PUMA dry fit t-shirts. It also

reflects brand as PUMA. The fabric is described as 4way. The sizes in which

the product is available is described is M to XXL. It also reflects the Age

Group for product as 18 to 55 and additionally, discloses whether the seller

is a manufacturer or not. It also gives the rating of the supplier which is

based on ratings by responses. The image shows that the supplier in that

case (Shabri Unique Apparels Enterprises) has been granted 4.3 star rating

based on 6 (six) responses.

Whether Listing of Counterfeit Products Amounts to Infringement

by IIL

58. The central question to be examined is whether listing of the

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 36 of 61

counterfeit products constitutes infringement of PSE’s trademarks on the

part of IIL. As noted above, the learned Single Judge has held that IIL prima

facie aids and abets the infringement of PUMA Marks on account of the

seller’s displaying catalogues of counterfeit products as a part of their

listings on Indiamart. The said conclusion is founded on the following

premises:

i) that Indiamart is not a directory, but an e-commerce website across

which the goods are bought and sold;

ii) that by making available PUMA Marks as an option in the drop-down

menu setting out options for describing the product/service to a

prospective seller, IIL facilitates the counterfeiter to peddle its

counterfeit goods as genuine PUMA Products;

iii) IIL had failed in its obligation to conduct proper verification as to the

genuineness of the product sold by registered sellers on Indiamart in

order to weed out counterfeiters from selling their products

masquerading as genuine PUMA dealers;

iv) that the use of PUMA as a mark in the drop-down menu in the

selection process constitutes use of PUMA Marks “as a trademark”

and therefore, the same would constitute infringement in terms of

Section 29(1) of the TM Act, which is occasioned by display of

counterfeit PUMA Products by various sellers;

v) that by offering the options, which include the trademark PUMA on

the drop-down menu during filling of registration forms, there is

infringement of PUMA Marks under Section 29(2) and 29(4) of the

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 37 of 61

TM Act, which is occasioned by displaying counterfeit products as

the same would result in confusion and further dilution of the PUMA

Marks; and

vi) that the use of the PUMA Marks in the drop-down menu would

constitute use of the marks in advertising within the meaning of

Section 29(6) of the TM Act.

59. The learned Single Judge has held that since IIL actively encourages

and participates in the selection of options using the PUMA Marks, it forms

a part of its profit making enterprise with the object of increasing its listings

on its website, the safe harbor protection of Section 79 of the IT Act would

not be available to IIL.

60. The learned Single Judge also referred to the decision in the case of

Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. (supra) for drawing its

conclusions. However, the facts in that case has fewer similarities with the

present case than as inferred in the impugned judgment. In Google LLC’s

case the court found that Google LLC was conducting an advertisement

programme – which was used in conjunction with its indexing service –

using trade-marks as keywords. The keywords were used for the purpose of

displaying advertisements to internet users surfing the internet using Google

LLC’s indexing service using keywords and/or phrases that included such

keywords. The AdWords programme is Google LLC’s commercial

enterprise, which involves the use of trademarks as keywords. This court

found that use of registered trade marks as keywords would amount to use

during the course of the trade since the said keywords were used in relation

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 38 of 61

to products and services including products and services for which the trade

mark was registered. However, the same was not use of that mark as a trade

mark. Neither the advertiser nor Google LLC used the keywords as a trade

mark.

61. In the present case, the use of the trade-mark PUMA was held as use

as a trademark. The word ‘trademark’ is defined under clause (zb) of sub-

section (1) of Section 2 of the TM Act. The sub-clause (ii) of clause (zb) of

Section 2(1) of the TM Act is relevant. The same is set out below:

“(zb) “trade mark” means a mark capable of being represented

graphically and which is capable of distinguishing the goods or

services of one person from those of others and may include

shape of goods, their packaging and combination of colours;

and—

*** *** ***

(ii) in relation to other provisions of this Act, a mark used or

proposed to be used in relation to goods or services for the

purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the

course of trade between the goods or services, as the case may

be, and some person having the right, either as proprietor or by

way of permitted user, to use the mark whether with or without

any indication of the identity of that person, and includes a

certification trade mark or collective mark;”

62. In the present case, there is little dispute that the seller who opts to

describe its products or services using a registered trade mark, in the

description box of the online registration form, uses the registered trade

mark as a trademark inasmuch as he purports to describe the source of its

goods and services as that associated with the registered trade mark.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 39 of 61

63. Illustratively, a seller choosing the option Puma shoes from the

dropdown menu describes its products as Puma shoes. If the product is not a

genuine Puma Product, this would be a clear case of counterfeiting falling

within the scope of Section 29(1) of the TM Act.

64. IIL uses the trademark in the registration form to describe specific

goods and services, to serve as a category/classification for facilitating the

display of the listings. IIL does not use the trademark to describe the goods

of the seller, but – as noted by the learned Single Judge – uses the trademark

to describe the goods associated with the trademark.

65. IIL’s case rests on Section 30(1) of the TM Act. The said Sub-section

is set out below: -

“30. Limits on effect of registered trade mark.— (1)

Nothing in section 29 shall be construed as preventing

the use of a registered trade mark by any person for the

purposes of identifying goods or services as those of

the proprietor provided the use—

(a) is in accordance with honest practices

in industrial or commercial matters, and

(b) is not such as to take unfair advantage

of or be detrimental to the distinctive

character or repute of the trade mark.”

66. Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the TM Act clearly provides that

Section 29 of the TM Act would prevent use of the registered trademark by

any person for the purpose of identifying the goods and services as those of

the proprietor. However, this is subject to two conditions. First, such usage

is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters;

and second, that such use is not such so as to take unfair advantage of or

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 40 of 61

detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the trademark.

67. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the

basis that their sale and purchase of products/services is conducted on the

platform, Indiamart and therefore, all the practices that are required for

consummating sale on e-commerce platform are applicable. In the aforesaid

backdrop, the learned Single Judge has also held that prima facie IIL’s use is

not in accordance with honest practices. However, if it is accepted that

services rendered by IIL are in the nature of merely listing services and

providing a platform for businesses to list their contact details and indicate

the products that are being dealt with by him; it would be apposite to

construe the services as akin to those of Yellow Pages Directory, as

contended on behalf of IIL. The nature of examination for such listing would

be materially different.

68. In a brick and mortar world, the commercial platform where goods are

sold and purchased would be possibly be akin to a ‘Hyper Market’; where

different shelves / spaces are allocated to different sellers for displaying of

their products for the purpose of selling the same. If the market allocate

space or shelf space, under a sign board of a registered trademark brand, it

would have a higher responsibility to ensure that the spaces, which is

occupied under the banner of a particular brand or trademark does not

display or offer for sale any counterfeit goods. However, when we consider

the listing in the Yellow Pages Directory, we note that the responsibility of

the publisher in listing out the contact details or businesses under various

categories of products and services, is significantly different. The emphasis

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 41 of 61

of Yellow Pages Directory would perhaps be more to ensure that the

telephone number as listed is correct one rather than to examine the goods

and services dealt with by the businesses listed in the directory.

69. In the facts of this case, we are unable to accept that the action of

offering an option to the sellers to describe their products by a brand name,

per se could be termed as a dishonest business practice.

70. As noted above, Mr Sethi had contended that the object is only to

ensure that brand is correctly spelt by various sellers attempting to describe

the same product. Plainly, if different sellers describe the same goods or

their brand differently, the same would adversely affect the efficacy of the

search conducted in respect of the same brand. If the seller misspelt the

particular brand, his listings may not show up, when a buyer searches for a

product of that brand.

71. Prima facie, we also find no grounds for the allegations that IIL by

mentioning an option regarding description of goods by brand names

encourages persons, who are neither proprietors nor authorised to use the

brand, to use the same.

72. In view of the above, prima facie, Section 29 of the TM Act is not

applicable insofar as IIL provides an option to sellers to describe its goods

by using its brands/trademarks.

The Decision in Amazon Technologies Inc. is inapplicable

73. The reliance placed on behalf of PSE on the decision of this Court in

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 42 of 61

Lifestyle Equities CV & Another v. Amazon Technologies Inc & Others:

Neutral Citation No.:2025:DHC:1231 is misplaced. In the said case,

Beverly Hills Polo Club, the proprietor of the registered trademark in

question had moved this Court, inter alia, praying that the defendants be

restrained from selling identical goods [apparels] under the mark that was

deceptively similar to its registered trademark. Additionally, the plaintiff

also sought damages. Amazon Technologies Inc [defendant no.1] allegedly

dealt with the products under a private label ‘Symbol’ which was a device

mark similar to the plaintiff’s registered trademark. The second defendant

[Cloudtail India Private Limited] had allegedly acted as a retailer of

infringing products for sale on the e-commerce platform – www.amazon.in.

The said e-commerce side was manged by defendant no. 3 [M/s Amazon

Seller Services Private Limited]. Defendant no.1 did not enter appearance

and was proceeded against ex parte. The other defendants also did not

dispute that the plaintiff’s registered trademark was infringed. The dispute

centred around the liability of the defendants to pay damages suffered by the

plaintiff. In the given facts, this Court held:

“43. ….In the present suit the brand ‘Symbol’ is

owned by Defendant No.1- Amazon Technologies,

Inc. The retailer, Defendant No.2- Cloudtail India Pvt.

Ltd., sells the products on the e-commerce platform

www.amazon.in which is operated by Defendant No.3,

Amazon Sellers Services Pvt. Ltd.

*** *** ***

45. …... The brand ‘Symbol’ being used by Defendant

No. 2Cloudtail India Private Limited is admittedly

owned by Defendant No.1. During the proceedings, ld.

Counsel appearing for Defendant No.2 had appeared

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 43 of 61

for Defendant No.1 on 5th September, 2022 and

submitted that Defendant No.1 would be willing to

suffer a decree of permanent injunction and also pay

the reasonable damages…..

*** *** ***

47. It clearly appears to this Court that, all three

companies which are closely related to or interlinked

with each other have sought to project that they are

independent of each other, clearly with an intent to

avoid fastening of liability. The intention of the said

Defendants has clearly been to somehow diffuse and

dissipate the consequences of infringement.

*** *** ***

52. A perusal of the trademark license, liability, and

intellectual property protection clauses in the Amazon

Brand License and Distribution Agreement between

Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2 indicates that

Amazon retains significant control over Cloudtail’s

branding and distribution activities. In the opinion of

this Court, the clauses in the Agreement clearly

diminish Amazon’s ability to distance itself from the

alleged infringement committed by Cloudtail. The

contractual restrictions on unauthorized trademark use,

coupled with indemnification obligations, provide

strong legal grounds for the Plaintiffs to argue

Amazon’s direct involvement in trademark

infringement. The agreement being a license

agreement, Defendant No.1 being a licensor and

Defendant No.2 being a licensee, any infringement or

unlawful use by the licensee would also affix liability

upon the licensor. While licensing the word mark

SYMBOL, Amazon would be unable to distance itself

from the use of the accompanying horse logo device

mark. Thus, the consequences of infringement

squarely fall upon the Defendant No.1. The

Defendants were also directed on 20

th

April, 2022 to

file an affidavit giving the sales figures and their inter

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 44 of 61

se relationship at which stage the matter was prayed to

be referred to mediation. Defendant No.1 was

proceeded ex parte on 20

th

April, 2022. The inter se

relationship has not been satisfactorily explained or

placed on record by any of the Defendants. Under such

circumstances, the Court has to proceed on the basis

that Defendant No.1 being fully aware of the pendency

of the present litigation has chosen not to file any

defence. It has chosen to suffer a permanent injunction

and, thus, the only question that remains is in respect

of damages.”

74. In the aforesaid case, the Court had found that all the three defendants

were inextricably linked in consummating the transaction of sale and

purchase. The decision in the case of Lifestyle Equities CV v. Amazon

Technologies (supra) has little application in the present case as the services

rendered by IIL are essentially indexing services.

Whether IIL Aids and Abets in Infringement

75. The sellers’ description of their products as Puma Products is imputed

as an infringement on the part of IIL on the ground that IIL has aided and

abetted such infringement. The import of the words ‘aid’ and ‘aid and abet’

are well defined, albeit in criminal law. We consider it apposite to set out

the definitions of words ‘abet’, ‘abettor’ and ‘aid and abet’, as defined in

Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. The same are reproduced below:

“abet (ǝ-bet), vb. 1. To aid, encourage, or assist (someone), esp. in

the commission of a crime <abet a known felon>. 2. To support (a

crime) by active assistance <abet a burglary>. See AID AND

ABET. Cf. INCITE. [Cases: Criminal Law – 59(5). C.J.S.

Criminal Law §§ 133, 135, 998-999] – abetment, n.

Abettator (ab- ǝ-tay-tǝr), n. [Law Latin] Archaic. See ABETTOR.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 45 of 61

abettor. A person who aids, encourages, or assists in the

commission of a crime. – Also spelled abetter. – Also termed

(archaically) abettator. See principal in the second degree under

Principal. [Cases: Criminal Law – 59. C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 127,

998.]

“aid and abet, vb. To assist or facilitate the commission of a

crime, or to promote its accomplishment. Aiding and abetting is a

crime in most jurisdictions. – Also termed aid or abet; counsel and

procure. [Cases: Criminal Law – 59. C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 127,

998.] – aider and abettor, n.

“The phrase ‘aid and abet’ and ‘aider and abettor’ seem

unnecessarily verbose…. [A]ny aid given with mens rea is

abetment; hence to add the word ‘aid’ to the word ‘abet’ is not ne

necessary and is sometimes misleading.” Rollin M. Perkins &

Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 724-25 (3d ed. 1982).

“In connection with the principal in the second degree or accessory

before the fact, the terms ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ are frequently used

interchangeably, although they are not synonymous. To ‘aid’ is to

assist or help another. To ‘abet’ means, literally, to bait or excite,

as in the case of an animal. In its legal sense, it means to

encourage, advise, or instigate the commission of a crime.” 1

Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 29, at 181 (15th ed.

1993).”

76. It is also well known that aid and abetting any offence would also

include an element of shared intent.

77. The learned Single Judge prima facie found that option of including

the word PUMA in the description of the goods is to aid and abet

infringement of a trade mark. We are unable to accept that any such prima

facie conclusion could have been drawn only on the basis that IIL presents a

dropdown menu for specifying the description of the products that sellers

may wish to specify. This would, of course, be coupled with search feature

where a buyer looking for a Puma Product would be shown the listings of all

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 46 of 61

sellers that had opted to describe their goods using the trade mark PUMA.

This conclusion, in our view, ignores the nature of IIL’s B2B platform –

Indiamart. The learned Single Judge has proceeded on the basis that

Indiamart is an e-commerce site on which goods and services are bought and

sold. However, this assumption is erroneous. Indiamart is not an interactive

website on which buyer can place purchase orders for supply by the

supplier. Indiamart renders listing services where buyers can get in touch

with sellers. They may request for price and terms of supply online, which

are transmitted electronically to the Seller. The negotiations and the

transaction of sale and purchase of the products, is consummated between

the purchaser and the seller directly. Indiamart has no role to play in the said

transaction. As noticed above, the nature of services offered by Indiamart

are akin to Yellow Pages Directory. It provides a platform where sellers

enlist their details for the purpose of buyers to access them. Like in Yellow

Pages Directory, the publisher merely creates an index of the categories of

goods and services and distributes the directory. It is for various suppliers to

determine the category in which their goods and services fall. The publisher

of Yellow Pages Directory would neither determine the genuineness of the

products offered by any of the entities / businesses listed in the Yellow

Pages nor determine whether the person selecting the category of its

goods/services has correctly described the goods or has chosen the

appropriate category. It is for the seller to choose as to which category its

goods fall under.

78. In the present case a seller can choose not to accept any of the options

and type the specific description of its goods in the menu bar. It is not

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 47 of 61

necessary for the seller to choose one of the options as provided by IIL in

the drop-down menu. IIL’s endeavour is merely to create sub-categories for

the purpose of facilitating the search.

79. It may be in the interest of IIL that a large number of sellers use their

services as the same may enhance the efficacy of its platform. The fact that

IIL may have a commercial interest in expanding the base of its listing does

not lead to the conclusion that a drop-down menu offering an option to

describe the products as Puma Products is designed to aid and abet

infringement. Prima facie, we are unable to read any intent on the part of IIL

to encourage listing of counterfeit Puma Products by offering the sellers an

option to choose a specific description of their products/services by

indicating the brand name associated with their product/services.

80. It is not disputed that there are a large number of sellers who have

correctly classified the products listed by them using the brand names

including Puma. As noted earlier, the learned senior counsel for IIL had

submitted that there are over 2180 listings out of which Puma had requested

for taking down of 259 listings. And, the learned counsel for PSE had not

countered the same.

Safe Harbour Under Section 79(1) of the IT Act

81. It is PSE’s case that IIL has an obligation to conduct proper

verification as to the genuineness of the products offered by the registered

sellers on their platform in order to weed out listings of counterfeiters

masquerading as genuine Puma Product dealers. In this regard, it is relevant

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 48 of 61

to refer to Section 79 of the IT Act. The same is set out below:

“79. Exemption from liability of intermediary in certain cases. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being

in force but subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), an

intermediary shall not be liable for any third party information, data,

or communication link made available or hosted by him.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if–

(a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing

access to a communication system over which information

made available by third parties is transmitted or

temporarily stored or hosted; or

(b) the intermediary does not–

(i) initiate the transmission,

(ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and

(iii) select or modify the information contained in the

transmission;

(c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging

his duties under this Act and also observes such other

guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this

behalf.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply if–

(a) the intermediary has conspired or abetted or aided or

induced, whether by threats or promise or otherwise in the

commission of the unlawful act;

(b) upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by

the appropriate Government or its agency that any

information, data or communication link residing in or

connected to a computer resource controlled by the

intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act, the

intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access

to that material on that resource without vitiating the

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 49 of 61

evidence in any manner.

Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, the expression

“third party information” means any information dealt with by

an intermediary in his capacity as an intermediary.”

82. In terms of Section 79(1) of the IT Act, an intermediary would not be

liable for any third-party information, data, or communication link made

available or hosted by him. By virtue of Section 79(1) of the IT Act, IIL

being an intermediary cannot be held liable for third party information listed

on its platform, Indiamart. However, applicability of the protection of

Section 79(1) of the IT Act is subject to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section

79 of the Act. The protection under Section 79 of the IT Act is available

only if the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the IT Act are

satisfied. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has held that neither

of the three conditions, as specified in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section

79(2) of the IT Act, are satisfied. Therefore, the protection of Section 79(1)

of the IT Act is not available to IIL.

83. We are unable to accept that, prima facie, the conditions contained in

Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the IT Act are not

satisfied. In the present case, Indiamart’s function is to provide users access

to a B2B platform containing information placed by the suppliers registered

on Indiamart. IIL also provides certain value added services. However,

prima facie there is insufficient material to indicate PSE’s action is premised

on those value added services. IIL indicates certain sellers as ‘verified’.

However, it is explained that the term verified only indicates that the phone

number of the seller is verified. It would be necessary for IIL to prominently

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 50 of 61

indicate that IIL has only verified the phone number of the sellers thus, no

one is deceived to believe that IIL is offering any other assurance in this

regard. If any of the value added services, which are offered by IIL for

consideration are found to encourage infringement, the same may merit

further consideration.

84. It is PSE’s case that IIL does not observe due diligence while

discharging its duties under the IT Act. Undisputedly, if IIL fails to observe

due diligence in discharging its duties under the IT Act or fails to observe

other guidelines as may be prescribed in this behalf, the protection of

Section 79(1) of the IT Act would not be available to IIL.

85. In terms of Clause (zg) of the Sub-section (2) of Section 87 of the IT

Act, the Central Government is expressly empowered to frame the Rules

regarding rules containing “guidelines to be observed by the intermediaries

under Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the IT Act”. In exercise of said

powers, the Central Government has framed The Information Technology

(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 [IT

Rules]. Chapter-II of the said Rules sets out the “Rules regarding Due

Diligence by Intermediaries and Grievance Redressal Mechanism”. Sub-

clause (iv) of clause (b) of Rule 3(1) of the IT Rules is relevant and is set out

below:

“3. Dule diligence by an intermediary. – (1) An

intermediary, including 1 [a social media intermediary, a

significant social media intermediary and an online gaming

intermediary], shall observe the following due diligence while

discharging its duties, namely:—

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 51 of 61

*** *** ***

(b) the intermediary shall inform its rules and regulations, privacy

policy and user agreement to the user in English or any language

specified in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution in the

language of his choice and shall make reasonable efforts 1 [by

itself, and to cause the users of its computer resource to not host],

display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, store, update or share

any information that,—

*** *** ***

(iv) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary

rights;”

86. There is no dispute that IIL is required to make “reasonable efforts” to

cause sellers to not use, display or publish or transmit any information that

infringes any patent, trade mark, copyright or other proprietary rights. The

terms and conditions of use of Indiamart expressly contain an agreement to

the effect that users will not submit to IIL for display on its website any

content, material that contains fraudulent information or makes fraudulent

offers that involve sale or attempted sale of counterfeit, stolen items or items

whose sale or marketing is prohibited by applicable law, or otherwise

promotes other illegal activities. Failure to adhere to the said user terms

would entitle Indiamart to terminate the User Agreement.

87. Given the nature of the services rendered, the learned Single Judge

found that, prima facie, merely setting out the terms and conditions, which

contain the aforesaid covenants would prima facie not qualify the threshold

of “reasonable efforts” as contemplated under Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) of the IT

Rules. During the course of the arguments, it was contended by Mr. Sethi

that sellers registered with IIL also furnish an express undertaking to the

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 52 of 61

effect that no patent, copyright, trademark or other IPR’s are infringed, and

that the sellers shall comply with the applicable laws. However, the online

registration form does not prominently indicate any such undertaking. Thus,

the least that IIL can do is to ensure that each of the sellers is aware of the

requirement to not display counterfeit products and ensure that they furnish

an express undertaking to the said effect. It would also be apposite that the

same be included as a prominent part of the online registration form /

process.

88. We also consider it apposite to note Mr Sethi’s contention that

Indiamart has put in place a robust complaint redressal mechanism,

specifically enabling the complainant to escalate any complaint including in

relation to ‘IPR complaints’. There is also no dispute that IIL is required to

take down the offending listers on the same being pointed out by any person

after satisfying itself regarding the same.

89. In terms of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the IT Act, the protection

of Section 79(1) of the IT Act is not available, in case an intermediary has

conspired or abetted, aided or induced commission of an unlawful act and an

intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to the material

on receiving actual knowledge or on being notified by the appropriate

government or agency.

90. In Myspace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd.:(2017)236 DLT

478, the Division Bench of this court had examined the import of the

expression “actual knowledge” as used in Section 79(3) of the IT Act and

provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957. We consider it relevant to set out the

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 53 of 61

following observations made by the court in the said judgment:

“37. Section 51(a)(ii) contains, in the second part, an

exception, i.e of lack of knowledge or reasonable belief. Where a

party is unaware and had no reasonable ground for believing that

the works so communicated are infringing works, then, the first

part, (casting liability would be inapplicable). The Single Judge

held that a general awareness is sufficient, instead of specific

knowledge to impute knowledge. The provision of safeguard

tools and as clauses in the user agreement, concluded the single

judge disclosed MySpace's general awareness that works

uploaded (on its website) were infringing. This Court does not

agree with the “knowledge” test applied by the Single Judge.

Simply put, that test overlooks that unlike “real” space, in

a virtual world, where millions of videos are uploaded daily, it is

impossible under available technology standards to identify the

streaming content, which actually infringes. Knowledge has a

definite connotation, i.e a consciousness or awareness and not

mere possibility or suspicion of something likely. The nature of

the Internet media is such that the interpretation of knowledge

cannot be the same as that used for a physical premise.

38. Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 16

th

Edition,

Vol 1 classifies “knowledge” as both actual knowledge and

constructive knowledge. Actual knowledge would connote, facts

such as whether the infringer turns a blind eye or adopts as a

“Nelsonian” outlook showing failure to take steps to inquire into

the kind of work it permits; this is to be seen in the context of

digital media. A general awareness or apprehension that a work

may be violative of copyright here would not pass the knowledge

test. This rule when applied to an Internet service provider attains

a different connotation. In the present case, where the system

stores millions of videos, can MySpace be attributed

with specific knowledge of infringement as to attract content

responsibility? To say so would require MySpace - to know all

owners of all works, and not just that of SCIL-a possibility not

contemplated by the Copyright Act. A further aspect to this

exception is “reason to believe” or what is referred to as

constructive knowledge. Mere suspicion is insufficient; and

similarly an apprehension is not enough. Here again would it be

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 54 of 61

reasonable to expect a defendant/content host to sift through

millions of videos or audio files to form a reasonable belief that

certain specific data infringes copyright of someone? The

requirement is to give specific information to the content host or

the website (MySpace) that infringement occurs with respect to

the specific work. A general or vague description of the works

would be insufficient as this then leaves room for MySpace to

rely guesswork as to what content has to be removed. Therefore,

the onus is upon the plaintiff to give detailed description of its

specific works, which are infringed to enable the web host to

identify them. SCIL's argument here that insertion of

advertisements or modification of content by MySpace disclosed

its knowledge-is unpersuasive. MySpace consistently states that

the advertisement insertions etc.are through automated processes-

which has not been seriously disputed. The modification made is

to the format of the video or audio file and not to its content. The

automated process does not apparently involve MySpace's actual

control. The extent of automation or for that matter the amount of

manual/human control can be discerned only at trial once

evidence is led to show how the automatic process works and to

what extent modifications are made and controlled. In the

absence of such evidence, at a prima facie level this Court is of

the opinion that if the modification/addition is entirely through an

automatic process without any human intervention then

knowledge cannot be attributed to MySpace.

39. The question of deemed or constructive notice, in the

opinion of the court, cannot be on the basis of any generalization,

without inquiry into circumstances: it is a fact dependent

exercise. For instance, in the context of even a “deemed” notice

about existence of encumbrance by way of statutory charge,

under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Supreme

Court held that “There is no principle of law imputing, to all

intending purchasers of property in municipal areas where

municipal taxes are a charge on the property, constructive

knowledge of the existence of such municipal taxes and of the

reasonable possibility of those taxes being in arrears. It is a

question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law depending on

the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Cf. Ahmedabad

Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai AIR

1971 SC 1201). Likewise, it was emphasized in a later decision

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 55 of 61

that “A person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually

knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an

inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross

negligence, he would have known it.” (R.K. Mohammed

Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (2000) 6 SCC 402).

Knowledge is to be therefore placed in pragmatically in the

context of someone's awareness (i.e a human agency); a

modification on the technical side by use of software would per

se not constitute knowledge. Nevertheless, if the software

requires some kind of approval or authorization from a person or

authority as opposed to a computer system then knowledge can

be attributed. This however has to be seen at the stage of trial and

is beyond the purview of this appeal.

40. In this case, SCIL claims to have sent MySpace several

notices describing the infringing works. Despite this MySpace

did not take down the content. MySpace counters that SCIL had

supplied to it more than 100,000 songs and works in which it

held copyright. MySpace performed a scan and found that

several of these works listed SCIL's notice, were uploaded by

distributors or performers. This presented two impossibilities,

one that the list provided by SCIL did not point to specific works

nor did it provide the location where the works were accessible;

the list was vague and general and listed every work that SCIL

produced without showing whether it was available on the

appellant's site and importantly, that it completely ignored the

“fair use” aspect. In the peculiar circumstances, this court agrees

with MySpace's contentions. SCIL is under a duty to specify the

works in which it owns copyright. Merely giving the names of all

content owned by it without correspondingly stating those, which

MySpace is prima facie infringing, is contrary to the established

principles of copyright law. It is only when a specific work is

mentioned can it be said that MySpace possesses knowledge of a

work being infringed on its website. Providing long lists of all

works, tasking MySpace with identifying and removing

infringing content is not enough. It is only when MySpace has

specific or actual knowledge or when it has reasonable belief,

based on information supplied by SCIL and if despite such

knowledge or reasonable belief it fails to act can it be held liable

for infringement. It would be crucial here to highlight a grey

area, with respect to knowledge, e.g when a genuine licensee

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 56 of 61

uploads works of SCIL. In the absence of a notice containing

specific works there is possibility whereby MySpace makes a

general search to identify the plaintiff's copyrighted work, it may

come across works uploaded by authorized

distributors/promoters. The general notice would constrain it to

blindly remove the content, which can lead to disputes. In some

other instances, a licensed performer may upload a video which

is a combination of two songs or a remix-where rights in one half

originally vest with SCIL and the owner of the second could be

some person other than SCIL, makes it impossible for MySpace

to discern the nature of rights and whom it finally vests with.

There could be still other cases, where a copyrighted work may

be adapted in the form of another creation, based on the

original. In such cases, requiring removal would result in

prejudice and injury. In the absence of specific titles and

locations it would be impossible for MySpace to identify and

remove such content. In such cases it becomes even more

important for a plaintiff such MySpace to provide a specific

titles, because while an intermediary may remove the content

fearing liability and damages, an authorized individual's license

and right to fair use will suffer or stand negated. In other words,

an indiscriminate and blind acceptance of SCIL's entire list to run

a general filter and “take down” all content would result in grave

damage and result in likely multifarious disputes: with up-

loaders, many of whom are original creators in their own right

and might have used a miniscule quantum of the copyrighted

content in their larger original creation; with distributors, who

might hold genuine licenses and with others who create versions,

remixes or original titles which may have little content; still there

may be other content uploaders whose material only superficially

resembles with the titles owned by SCIL, because of the lyrics or

titles but is otherwise genuine creation with its independent

copyright. The remedy proposed by SCIL and accepted by the

single judge in such cases results in snuffing out creativity. This

court holds that in the context of the prima facie conclusion that

there was no direct infringement by MySpace, the finding by the

single judge of constructive knowledge and “secondary”

infringement, is incongruous and not tenable. For the foregoing

reasons, this court concludes that prima facie there was no

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 57 of 61

knowledge on the part of MySpace, with respect to allegations of

infringement of the plaintiff-SCIL's works.

**** **** ****

53. Here it is pertinent to mention that while Section 51 of the

Copyright Act provides for a system of “notice”, Section 79(3)

contemplates “receiving actual knowledge” or through

notification by the government or its agency. The scope was

widened in Shreya Singhal v. UOI (2015) 5 SCC 1, where actual

knowledge was held to mean a Court order in cases relatable to

Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In case of Section

51(a)(ii), the only exception is that MySpace was not aware or

had no reasonable grounds to believe that the content was

infringing. Section 79(3) perhaps is more mindful of the way the

internet functions and supplemented knowledge with the term

“actual knowledge”. Given the supplementary nature of the

provisions-one where infringement is defined and traditional

copyrights are guaranteed and the other where digital economy

and newer technologies have been kept in mind, the only logical

and harmonious manner to interpret the law would be to read

them together. Not doing so would lead to an undesirable

situation where intermediaries would be held liable irrespective

of their due diligence. By acting as mere facilitators and despite

complying with legal norms, intermediaries can attract great

liability, for no fault of theirs which in the long run would not

only discourage investment, research and development in the

Internet sector but also in turn harm the digital economy-an

economy which is currently growing at a tremendous pace and

without which life could potentially come to a standstill. Surely,

such a consequence was not intended by Parliament, which

mindful of techno-legal developments around the world created

for safe harbor provisions. Another aspect is the manner how

Internet is accessed. If a strict regime is implemented with

respect to intermediary liability, such intermediaries could

conveniently migrate to a location where data protection laws are

not as rigorous and the content would still be accessible. Under

such circumstances while the economic loss is one aspect, it

would become near impossible to trace intermediaries to take

down content.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 58 of 61

54. Section 79(3) of the IT Act specifies that when a person

has actual knowledge or upon notification by the appropriate

government or its authority fails to expeditiously remove or

disable access to an unlawful content then the immunity granted

under Section 79(1) is revoked. The knowledge contemplated

under this section is actual knowledge. In Shreya

Singhal (supra), Section 79(3) with Rule 3(4) of the Rules were

read down to mean receipt of actual knowledge from a court

order or on being notified by the appropriate government.

However, this was in respect of restrictions under Article 19(2)

of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court was conscious

of the fact that if millions of requests for take down are made, it

would become difficult for intermediaries (such as Google) to

identify legitimate requests. In the case of copyright laws it is

sufficient that MySpace receives specific knowledge of the

infringing works in the format provided for in its website from

the content owner without the necessity of a court order.

**** **** ****

71. Though prima facie MySpace is not liable for secondary

infringement, yet there is no gainsaying that infringing works are

on its website. The court is under a duty to device an equitable

relief suited to the facts when liability has not been ascertained

fully. At the same time precious independent talent would suffer

without due recognition and monetary incentives given that

monies performers would have received by licensing content are

now available freely without payment. Despite several safeguard

tools and notice and take down regimes, infringed videos find

their way. The remedy here is not to target intermediaries but to

ensure that infringing material is removed in an orderly and

reasonable manner. A further balancing act is required which is

that of freedom of speech and privatized censorship. If an

intermediary is tasked with the responsibility of identifying

infringing content from non-infringing one, it could have a

chilling effect on free speech; an unspecified or incomplete list

may do that. In an order of relief such as that passed by the

learned Single Judge, MySpace would be in contempt of court

for not complying with an order, which is otherwise impossible

or at best onerous and cumbersome of performance. In order to

avoid contempt action, an intermediary would remove all such

content, which even remotely resembles that of the content

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 59 of 61

owner. Such kind of unwarranted private censorship would go

beyond the ethos of established free speech regimes.”

91. There is no dispute that on receipt of knowledge of counterfeiting, IIL

would be obliged to take down the link and failure to do so would be

actionable. In such circumstances, the safe harbour of Section 79(1) of the

IT Act would not be available to IIL.

92. PSE’s grievance that sellers are permitted to re-register on Indiamart

despite their listings having been taken down earlier appear justified. The

same seller in respect of the same products cannot be permitted to relist after

its listing is removed. Prima facie, failure to prevent such a seller from re-

listing itself in a case where its listing has been pulled down on account of

infringement of IPR, would fall foul of the requirement of due diligence

under Section 79(3)(a) of the IT Act. It may be a different matter if such a

seller fraudulently re-lists under a different name or furnishing different

particulars, the discovery of which may require a qualitative analysis, which

may not be feasible. However, failure to prevent him from re-listing in its

own name and with the same particulars would, prima facie, be indicative of

IIL being negligent or complicit.

93. As noted initially, in the present case, the learned Single Judge has

prima facie found that protection of Section 79(1) of the IT Act would also

be unavailable by virtue of clause (a) to sub-clause (3) of Section 79 of the

IT Act. This is because the learned Single Judge had prima facie found that

IIL had conspired, abetted and aided in infringement of the Puma Marks. As

observed above, we are unable to concur with the said prima facie finding.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 60 of 61

The fact that IIL provides an option for a seller to choose the brand of its

products specifically describing its goods cannot, prima facie, be held to be

a ground to hold that it aids and abets the infringer in displaying the

counterfeit products of a particular brand. The fact that a particular seller

displays his advertisements under a particular sub-category describing

products and services cannot lead to the conclusion that the very category is

required to be eliminated. The logical sequitur of accepting PSE’s

contention, at this stage, would be that IIL cannot accept a description of

goods by their brand. It would necessarily have to eliminate references to

brands at the time of registration. This, in our view is, prima facie,

unsustainable.

CONCLUSION

94. In our view, subject to IIL making reasonable efforts, to cause users

of Indiamart not to host, display, upload or share any information that

infringes the PUMA trademarks, as discussed earlier; IIL is not required to

be interdicted from providing options to identify the products/services by

their brands/trademarks and operating its B2B portal – Indiamart.

95. In view of the above, the impugned order is set aside to the extent that

it restraints IIL from providing an option to use the PUMA mark for the

description of any goods as a search option in the drop-down menu

presented to prospective sellers at the time of the registration on the

Indiamart platform. However, we sustain the direction that IIL shall

forthwith take down all infringing listings containing the PUMA marks on

the same being brought to its notice.

FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Page 61 of 61

96. The present appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. All pending

applications are also disposed of.

VIBHU BAKHRU, J

TARA VITASTA GANJU, J

JUNE 02, 2025

M/RK