2026:JHHC:18747

-: 1 :-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P.(C) No. 3469 of 2026

WITH

W.P.(C) No. 3548 of 2026

----

In W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026

Indian Bank (Allahabad), SAM Branch, incorporated under the Banking

Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, having its

Corporate Office at Chennai and one of its Office at Paras Complex, Third

Floor, Lalpur Chowk, Circular Road, PO and PS Lalpur, Town and District

Ranchi, through its Authorised Officer, Rahul Jaiswal, son of Late Narayan Pd.

Jaiswal, resident of Paras Complex, Third Floor, Lalpur Chowk, Circular Road,

PO & PS Lalpur, District Ranchi.

… … Petitioner

Versus

1. Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Private Ltd., situated at

Castair Town, Bhawan Bigha, Deoghar, PO and PS Deoghar, District

Deoghar, Jharkhand 814112.

2. Shiv Dutt Sharma son of Jwala Prasad Singh, resident of Amardham

Lane, Castair Town, Bawan Bigha, Deoghar, PO Deoghar, PS Deoghar

Town, District Deoghar.

3. Smt. Sabina Kumari wife of Shiv Dutt Sharma, resident of Amar Dham

Lane, Castair Town, Bawan Bigha, PO and PS Deoghar Town, District

Deoghar.

… … Respondents

----

In W.P.(C) No.3548 of 2026

Yashoda Hospital & Research Centre Ltd a Company registered under the

Companies Act, 2013 and having its registered Office at Kf 09, Kavi Nagar, PO

PS Ghaziabad, Ghaziabad, represented through its Authorised Signatory

Rajesh Kumar Pandey, S/o Krishna Kumar Pandey R/o Vill Jagadevpur,

Janaupur, PO PS Janaupur, Ballia 277123.

… … Petitioner

Versus

1. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, through its Chairperson,

officiating from BSNL Office, Civil Lines, PO PS Civil Lines, Prayagraj,

Uttar Pradesh 211001.

2. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi, through its Registrar, officiating from

5

th

Floor, RRDA Building, Kutchery Chowk, PO GPO, PS Kotwali,

Ranchi 834001.

3. The Authorised Officer, Indian Bank (Allahabad) SAM Branch, Ranchi,

having Office at Paras Complex, Third Floor, Lalpur Chowk, Circular

Road, PO and PS Lalpur, Town and District Ranchi.

4. Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Private Limited situated at

Bawan Bigha, Deoghar, through its Managing Director Shivdutta

Sharma, son of Sri Jwala Prasad Singh, resident of Amardham Lane,

Castair Town, Bawan Bigha, PO PS and District Deoghar 834112.

5. Smt. Sabina Kumari wife of Sri Shivdutta Sharma, resident of Amardham

Lane, Castair Town, Bawan Bigha, PO PS and District Deoghar 834112.

… … Respondents

----

CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.

----

For the Petitioners : Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate

Ms. Shweta Suman, Advocate

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 2 :-

Ms. Pragunee Kashyap, Advocate

[In W.P.(C) No. 3469 of 2026]

Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate

Mr. Ayush, Advocate

Ms. Shreya Shukla, Advocate

[In W.P.(C) No. 3548 of 2026]

For the Respondents: Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate

Mr. Amish Lal, Advocate

Ms. Shruti Shekhar, Advocate

[In W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026]

Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate

Ms. Shweta Suman, Advocate

Ms. Pragunee Kashyap, Advocate

[for Respondent No.3 In W.P.(C) No.3548 of 2026]

----

O R D E R

RESERVED ON 19.06.2026 PRONOUNCED ON 25.06.2026

These two writ petitions deal with same subject matter, wherein

issues are common, arguments are common, thus, were heard together and

this common judgment is being passed.

2. In W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026, petitioner has prayed for the

following reliefs: -

(a) For quashing and setting aside the order dated 21.04.2026

(Annexure 20) passed in M.A. No.158/2026 in Misc. Application

No.132/2026 passed by Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate

Tribunal, Allahabad, whereby and where under it has been

observed that the interim relief granted pursuant to order dated

10.04.2026 (Annexure 18) passed in Misc. Application

No.132/2026 shall be continued till the charge of DRT is taken

over.

(b) For quashing and setting aside the order dated 10.04.2026

(Annexure 18) passed in Misc. application No.132/2026 by the

Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad

wherein and whereunder the Ld. Tribunal has directed the Debt

Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi to consider and decide the interim

application filed by the Respondents herein with regard to the sale

held on 07.04.2026 pending before it, in accordance with law most

expeditiously preferably within 10 days from the date of the order

and till then, has directed the petitioner bank to receive the entire

sale consideration from auction purchaser, however has stopped

the bank from issuing sale certificate in favour of auction

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 3 :-

purchaser.

In W.P.(C) No.3548 of 2026, petitioner has prayed for the

following reliefs: -

(a) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s), order(s) or direction(s),

including a writ in the nature of Certiorari, for quashing and setting

aside the order dated 10.04.2026 passed in Misc. App. No.132 of

2026 (Annexure- 8) and 21.04.2026 passed in M.A. No.158 of

2026 (Annexure- 9) by the learned Debts Recovery Appellate

Tribunal, Allahabad, insofar as the same restrain issuance of sale

certificate in favour of the Petitioner (Auction Purchaser);

(b) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s), order(s) or direction(s),

including a writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the

Respondent No.3 Bank to issue the sale certificate in favour of the

Petitioner in respect of the secured asset, the entire sale

consideration having already been paid by the Petitioner, in

accordance with law;

3. In W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026, the petitioner is the Bank, which had

disbursed the loan to respondent No.1 Maa Lalita Hospitals whereas

respondent No.2 is the Managing Director of respondent No.1.

In W.P.(C) No.3548 of 2026, petitioner is the Auction Purchaser of

the property of respondent No.1 of W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026.

4. BACKGROUND

Only relevant facts, which are necessary for purpose of decision in

these two writ petitions are being dealt hereinafter.

4.1 Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Private Ltd. (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Borrower’), through its Managing Director, applied for term

loan facility from Indian Bank (previously Allahabad Bank, which merged with

Indian Bank), to establish a 60 bedded Multispecialty Hospital.

4.2 The bank sanctioned a term loan of Rs.2 crore for setting up the

hospital, wherein Lalita Devi was guarantor. An equitable mortgage was

created in favour of the bank by depositing the sale deeds of properties. The

amount of the term loan was enhanced to Rs.9 crore and further three title

deeds were deposited in lieu of availing the enhanced loan.

4.3 Again an enhancement from Rs.9 crore to Rs.19.45 crore was

sought for, which was sanctioned and against the said enhancement, a fresh

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 4 :-

term loan of Rs.10 crore was sanctioned.

4.4 The borrower started defaulting and the assets were declared

NPA on 31.12.2009.

4.5 A proceeding was initiated under the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,

2002 (SARFAESI Act) by issuing demand notice under Section 13(2) of the

Act on 20.10.2010.

4.6 The borrower failed to deposit the said amount, thus, a notice for

taking possession of the property was issued. Possession of the properties,

i.e., land, building, furniture, fixtures, medical equipments, machinery, tools,

vehicles etc. etc. were taken over by the Bank, vide inventory list dated

09.12.2013.

4.7 The Bank also filed an Original Application under Section 19 of the

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 before the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, Ranchi i.e., O.A. No.125 of 2013 for recovering an amount of

Rs.27,96,56,510.14.

The borrower tried to resolve the issue with the bank, as a result

of which the borrower and the bank entered into a compromise.

4.8 An agreement was entered into on 22

nd

day of January, 2015

between the borrower, the guarantor and the bank. The settlement has been

brought on record as Annexure 3. As per the settlement, on amongst others, it

was agreed that the borrower will pay a total sum of Rs.19,37,00,000/- plus

delayed period interest from 01.04.2012 till full payment to the second party.

11 installments were fixed, which had to be paid by the borrower by depositing

the amount mentioned in the agreement.

4.9 As per the agreement, Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh) was

deposited on 22.01.2015, i.e., on the date of signing of the compromise

agreement and rest of the amount were to be deposited from 31.04.2017 to

31.10.2019 in 11 installments, as specified in the agreement.

4.10 This joint compromise was also filed in O.A. No.125 of 2013.

Considering the compromise entered into between the parties, the Original

Application was kept in abeyance. The bank also handed over to the borrower

physical possession of the property, which was earlier repossessed.

4.11 Despite entering into a settlement (the compromise), the borrower

failed to adhere to the said conditions and did not pay any further amount after

repossessing the assets.

4.12 A criminal case was also instituted against the borrower for

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 5 :-

diverting the amounts for utilizing for other purpose. As the borrower failed to

pay the amount and failed to honour the compromise, a fresh payment notice

on 10.07.2025 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued to the

borrower for recovery of balance amount of Rs.70,92,12,296/-.

4.13 Aggrieved by the aforesaid notice, on the ground that the Debts

Recovery Tribunal was not functioning, the borrower filed W.P.(C) No. 6720 of

2025, challenging the notice solely on the ground that the notice is barred by

limitation and has been issued after 16 years from the date when the account

was classified as NPA.

4.14 The said writ petition was dismissed on merits after considering

the arguments of the parties on 5

th

February, 2026.

4.15 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, an Intra Court Appeal being

L.P.A. No.145 of 2026 was filed by the borrower. The Division Bench, while

disposing of the appeal on 25.03.2026, did not interfere with the order passed

by the learned Single Judge, but held that the question of limitation was

answered by the Single Judge only in the context of the prayer of interim relief,

thus, the observation can be recorded as prima facie observation. The Division

Bench relegated the borrower to continue with the proceeding before the

Debts Recovery Tribunal in S.A. No.5 of 2026, which the borrower had already

filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

4.16 The borrower thereafter preferred a Review Application before the

Division Bench, which was numbered as Civil Review (Filing) No.3908 of 2026,

which was withdrawn on 7

th

April, 2026. It is relevant to record that on

mentioning, the Review Application was fixed on 7

th

April, 2026. At the time of

mentioning, borrower was directed by the Division Bench to come ready with

an amount of Rs.2 crore, to get a stay order on the auction sale of the

properties, but on the next date the amount was not paid, thus, the Civil

Review Application was withdrawn. Be it noted that the borrower while arguing

before this Court in these writ petitions, has admitted the aforesaid fact.

4.17 In the meantime, the Bank auctioned the properties of the

borrower to recover the balance outstanding amount of Rs.70 crore and odd,

on 07.04.2026 itself, pursuant to the sale notice dated 21.02.2026. The

amount fetched was Rs. 44.22 crores.

4.18 The borrower, thereafter approached the Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 A of the Recovery

of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal disposed of the said application, on 10.04.2026, directing

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 6 :-

the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi to decide the interim application filed by

the borrower and also passed an interim order to the effect that the bank may

receive the sale consideration from the auction purchaser but the sale

certificate should not be issued.

This order is under challenge.

4.19 The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal on 21.04.2026, extended

the interim order dated 10.04.2026, which was passed earlier by it, which is

also under challenge.

5. On the aforesaid background, the Bank has filed the writ petition

being W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Auction Purchaser, who had paid the entire money, pursuant to the said

auction, has also prayed, in their writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3548 of 2026,

for issuance of sale certificate in their favour after setting aside the interim

order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal.

ARGUMENTS OF THE BANK [PETITIONER IN W.P.(C) NO.3469 OF 2026 &

RESPONDENT NO. 3 IN W.P.C NO.3548 OF 2026]

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank submitted that

the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, by invoking power under Section 17A

of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, cannot adjudicate any

issue nor can pass any judicial order. As per the learned counsel, Section 17A

of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 is a supervisory power to

be exercised by the Chairperson of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. By

exercising supervisory power, an interim order, which is adjudicatory in nature,

could not have been passed. Further, it is submitted that the respondents have

not approached this Court and other Forums with clean hands and have

suppressed material facts. Admittedly, each and every time not only they

duped and misled the bank, but also did not comply with the order passed by

the Division Bench of this Court, thus, they were not entitled for any relief. The

relief, which the borrower failed to obtain from the High Court, because of their

own fault, has now been obtained by circuitous method, by filing an erroneous

application under Section 17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,

1993.

The Bank submitted that the issue of limitation raised by the

borrower cannot be adjudicated in this application, as the issue has already

been decided by the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court and thereafter by the

Hon’ble Division Bench.

Bank submits that due is Rs.70 crore and odd, which the borrower

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 7 :-

has not paid and also is not in a position to pay and their only intention is to

linger the matter to usurp public money.

ARGUMENTS OF THE AUCTION PURCHASER [PETITIONER IN W.P.(C)

NO.3548 OF 2026]

7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Auction Purchaser

submits that the Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has got no

power to pass a judicial order and by invoking an absolute wrong provision, the

borrower has obtained stay order in their favour, which is not proper. He

submits that once the purchaser has deposited the entire amount of auction,

they are entitled to get sale certificate, which has been denied by virtue of the

interim order. He submits that Sale Certificate has to be issued and same

cannot be withheld for any reason, moreso same cannot be stayed by any

Court or Tribunal. He refers to the following judgment: -

(i) Jaipur DRT Bar Association versus Union of India &

Others [RLW 2001(1) Raj. 384]

(ii) Smt. Lal Bai Patel versus Central Bank of India [2012

SCC OnLine All 3761]

(iii) CELIR LLP versus Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private

Limited & Others [(2024) 2 SCC 1]

ARGUMENTS OF THE BORROWER [RESPONDENTS IN W.P.(C) NO.3469

OF 2026 / RESPONDENT NO.4 & 5 IN W.P.(C) NO.3548 OF 2026]

8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the borrower submits that

the notice issued by the Bank to the borrower is hopelessly barred by

limitation. In support of his contention, he has referred to the Limitation Act,

especially, Article 137. It is his submission that the application before the

Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot be said to be a suit, thus, Article 62 of the

Limitation Act cannot be applied in this case. He submits that Article 62 of the

Limitation Act is within Part V of the Act, which deals with suits related to

immovable properties. When the proceeding of recovery is not a suit, Article

137 of the Limitation Act is applicable and not Article 62. He further submits

that from perusal of the notice itself, it would be clear that the same, issued by

the Bank, is hopelessly barred by limitation. He further contends that Section

17A gives ample power to the Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal

to pass any order including an order to maintain status-quo over the property

and to grant stay. He further submits that the Chairperson, Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal has got inherent power to pass the aforesaid order. It is his

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 8 :-

contention that since Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi was not functioning, he

had to move before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal to stall the auction,

and it cannot be said that the order is illegal.

In support of his contention, he has referred to the following

judgments: -

(i) Grindlays Bank Ltd. versus Central Government

Industrial Tribunal and Others [1980 (Supp) SCC 420]

(ii) Super Cassettes Industries Limited versus Music

Broadcast Private Limited [(2012) 5 SCC 488]

(iii) Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave versus Asset

Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. & Anr [(2019) 10

SCC 572]

(iv) Vashdeo R. Bhojwani versus Abhyudaya Co-operative

Bank Ltd. & Another [(2019) 9 SCC 158]

(v) Sesh Nath Singh & Another versus Baidyabati

Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Another [(2021) 7

SCC 313]

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

9. The facts are admitted in this case, which have been mentioned at

paragraph 4 and its sub paragraphs. From those facts, it transpires that there

is huge amount outstanding against the borrower, which is Rs.77 crore and

odd. As he failed to repay the loan, earlier a proceeding was initiated. Another

glaring and admitted fact is that the said borrower insisted for compromise and

on his insistence, a compromise was entered into by the Bank, but he failed to

honour the same, thus, the compromise failed. Be it noted that on execution of

the joint compromise deed, the borrower repossessed the property, but

thereafter did not honour the compromise. Further, a writ petition was filed by

the borrower, taking a plea of limitation. The writ petition was dismissed and

the order was not interfered with by the Division Bench of this Court. The

Division Bench held that findings on the point of limitation was for the purpose

of interim order. As the property was supposed to be auctioned, immediately a

review application was filed before the Division Bench. All the counsel

admitted that while mentioning the Review Application for listing, the Division

Bench of this Court directed the borrower to deposit only Rs.2 crore, but on the

next date when the review application was listed, the borrower expressed

inability to pay the same, thus, he had no other option, but to withdraw the

Review Application. The aforesaid facts, which are admitted, clearly reflects

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 9 :-

the intention of the borrower. Where the balance outstanding is Rs.77 crore

and odd, inspite of order passed by the Court, the borrower has failed to

deposit Rs.2 crore also would but naturally suggest about his financial

condition.

10. These two writ petitions are filed by the Bank and Auction

Purchaser. Their grievance is that Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate

Tribunal under Section 17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,

1993 has passed a judicial order on adjudication and stayed issuance of sale

notice, which is illegal. Further, the Auction Purchaser has also prayed for a

direction to issue sale certificate in his favour. This Court in the writ petition

filed by these petitioners, is confining to the prayer made in these writ petitions

only.

11. Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 was promulgated by

the Parliament.

The object of the said Act is to ease out the difficulties, which the

banks and financial institutions face in recovering the loan amounts and

enforcement of securities charged with them.

12. Section 2(a) of the Act defines “Appellate Tribunal” as an

Appellate Tribunal established under sub-section (1) of Section 8. Section 8 of

the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 deals with establishment of

Appellate Tribunal. For better appreciation, Section 8 of the Recovery of Debts

and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 is quoted hereinbelow: -

8. Establishment of Appellate Tribunal. – (1) The Central

Government shall, by notification, establish one or more

Appellate Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and

authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act:

Provided that the Central Government may authorize the

Chairperson of any other Appellate Tribunal, established under

any other law for the time being in force, to discharge the

functions of the Chairperson of the Debts Recovery Appellate

Tribunal under this Act in addition to his being the Chairperson

of that Appellate Tribunal.

(1-A) The Central Government shall, by notification,

establish such number of Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals to

exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeal

against the order made by the Adjudicating Authority under Part

III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

(2) The Central Government shall also specify in the

notification referred to in sub-section (1) the Tribunals in relation

to which the Appellate Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 10 :-

(1) and (2), the Central Government may authorize the

Chairperson of one Appellate Tribunal to discharge also the

functions of the Chairperson of other Appellate Tribunal.

As per Section 8, the Appellate Tribunal has to exercise

jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Appellate Tribunal, by or

under such Act. This means that the Appellate Tribunal has to function and

exercise strictly as per the authority and power, which have only been

conferred upon them by the Statute.

Section 2(ea) defines “Chairperson” as a Chairperson of an

Appellate Tribunal appointed under Section 9. Section 9 of the Recovery of

Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 deals with composition of the Appellate

Tribunal. For better appreciation, Section 9 of the Recovery of Debts and

Bankruptcy Act, 1993 is quoted hereinbelow: -

9. Composition of Appellate Tribunal. – An Appellate Tribunal

shall consist of one person only (hereinafter referred to as the

Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal to be appointed, by

notification, by the Central Government.

As per the above provision, the Appellate Tribunal consists of only

one person, who is the Chairperson. It is a single person Tribunal.

Section 17 of Chapter III of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy

Act, 1993 deals with the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal. For

better appreciation Section 17 is quoted herein, which reads as under: -

17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. – (1) A

Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the

jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide

applications from the banks and financial institutions for

recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.

(1-A) Without prejudice to sub-section (1), -

(a) the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the date to be

appointed by the Central Government, the jurisdiction, powers

and authority to entertain and decide applications under Part III

of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;

(b) the Tribunal shall have circuit sittings in all district

headquarters.

(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the

appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain

appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made,

by a Tribunal under this Act.

(2-A) Without prejudice to sub-section (2), the Appellate Tribunal

shall exercise, on and from the date to be appointed by the

Central Government, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to

entertain appeals against the order made by the Adjudicating

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 11 :-

Authority under Part III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,

2016.

Section 17(2) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993

quoted hereinabove deals with the power, which the Appellate Tribunal

exercises. As per the provision of Section 17(2), the Appellate Tribunal has the

authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain appeals against any orders made

or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal under this Act. As per Section

17(2-A), it has also the power to entertain appeals against the order made by

the Adjudicating Authority under Part III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Code, 2016.

13. Thus, as per the aforesaid provisions of law, the power to

entertain and adjudicate appeals has been conferred upon the Appellate

Tribunal. This is the adjudicating power, which the Tribunal has specially been

conferred with by the Statute. Further, the Appellate Tribunal not only has the

power to entertain, hear and decide appeals against any order made, but also

against an order deemed to have been made by the Tribunal. Thus, a deemed

order, which is not specifically incorporated in the order, but deemed to have

been made, can be challenged by the aggrieved person.

14. Section 17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993

deals with the powers of the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal. Section

17A is quoted herein, which reads as under: -

17-A. Power of Chairperson of Appellate Tribunal. – (1) The

Chairperson of an Appellate Tribunal shall exercise general

power of superintendence and control over the Tribunals under

his jurisdiction including the power of appraising the work and

recording the annual confidential reports of Presiding Officers.

(1-A) For the purpose of exercise of general powers of

superintendence and control over Tribunals under sub-section

(1), the Chairperson may –

(i) direct the Tribunals to furnish, in such form, at such

intervals and within such time, information relating to pending

cases both under this Act and the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), or under any other law for the

time being in force, number of cases disposed of, number of new

cases filed and such other information as may be considered

necessary by the Chairperson;

(ii) Convene meetings of the Presiding Officers of

Tribunals periodically to review their performance.

(1-B) Where on assessment of the performance of any

Presiding Officer of the Tribunal or otherwise, the Chairperson is

of the opinion that an inquiry is required to be initiated against

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 12 :-

such Presiding Officer for misbehavior or incapacity, he shall

submit a report to the Central Government recommending action

against such Presiding Officer, if any, under section 15, and for

reasons to be recorded in writing for the same.

(2) The Chairperson of an Appellate Tribunal having

jurisdiction over the Tribunals may, on the application of any of

the parties or on his own motion after notice to the parties, and

after hearing them, transfer any case from one Tribunal for

disposal to any other Tribunal.

15. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that a power

has been conferred upon the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal to

supervise and to have control over the Tribunal, which are under his

jurisdiction. This includes the power to appraise the work and recording of

Confidential Reports. It gives power to convene meeting of the Presiding

Officers and direct them to submit forms and assess their performance.

Section 17A(2) gives power to the Chairperson to transfer any case from one

Tribunal, for disposal, to another Tribunal. Thus, Section 17A is a power

conferred upon the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal, which is

administrative in nature and is no way related to any judicial or adjudicatory

function, which is bestowed under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and

Bankruptcy Act, 1993. Section 17A(2) only gives power to the Chairperson to

transfer one case from one Tribunal to another. This is a special and limited

power granted to the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal. This cannot be

strictly said to be adjudicatory in nature, rather is purely administrative. In this

context, it is pertinent to mention here that while invoking power under Section

17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, Chairperson can not

act as an Appellate Tribunal even though the Tribunal is a one man Tribunal.

This is strengthened and supported by these two provisions of law, i.e.,

Section 17 and Section 17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act. If

these two provisions are carefully read, it will be clear that by virtue of Section

17, power and authority is vested with the “Appellate Tribunal” and not with

the “Chairperson”. The legislature, in its own wisdom has not used the word

‘Chairperson’, rather used the word “Appellate Tribunal”. On the contrary, if we

see Section 17A, legislature has consciously used the word “Chairperson of

the Appellate Tribunal”. Thus, if the Chairperson exercises a judicial power, it

will be under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993,

which will mean that it is the Tribunal, which is exercising the jurisdiction. As a

Tribunal, even though it is a one man Tribunal, consisting only of the

Chairperson, he has to exercise the powers within the four corners of Section

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 13 :-

17, which is an adjudicatory power. If that same person, i.e., Chairperson

exercises the power, which is conferred upon him under Section 17A of the

Act, it will be deemed that he is passing the said order as the Chairperson of

the Appellate Tribunal on administrative side, but not as the Appellate Tribunal,

exercising judicial power. Thus, even if the person is same, both the

jurisdictions are different. Once the jurisdiction is different, same person has to

act in accordance with different jurisdiction and power conferred upon him

under different provision of the Act. Acting as a Chairperson of the Tribunal by

invoking power under Section 17A, he cannot pass any order, which is

exclusively bestowed upon the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 17 of the

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act though the person exercising the

power may be same.

16. Considering the aforesaid provisions of law, now it has to be seen

as to what is the nature of order, which has been passed in this case.

Admittedly, the borrower approached the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal,

by invoking its jurisdiction under Section 17A(2) of the Recovery of Debts and

Bankruptcy Act, 1993. As per the said provision, the Chairperson does not

exercise the power of an Appellate Tribunal. He exercises the power of the

Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal. As per Section 17A(2), the power is

only limited to transferring any case from one Tribunal to another Tribunal,

after hearing the parties. In this case, it is admitted that prayer, which was

made by invoking the aforesaid provision by the borrower is to transfer his

case from Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi to any other Tribunal on the

ground that Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi was not functional. Further, the

borrower had also prayed to stay issuance of sale certificate in favour of the

Auction Purchaser. The relief sought from the Debts Recovery Appellate

Tribunal is at page 211 of the writ petition [W.P.(C) No.3469 of 2026], , which

reads as under: -

6. RELIEF(S) SOUGHT –

In view of the abovementioned facts and grounds the Applicants

most respectfully prays:-

a. That the present Application may kindly be allowed and

restrained the respondent Bank for issuing the sale

certificate in favour of the auction purchaser till disposal of

the interim Application Dy. No.176 of 2026 pending before

the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi.

b. Any other direction or order in addition to and/or in

substitution of what has been prayed above as may be found

expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case.

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 14 :-

c. May be pleased to award cost of the present Application

7. INTERIM ORDER, IF PRAYED FOR:

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case

restrained the respondent Bank for issuing the sale

certificate in favour of the auction purchaser till disposal

of the Interim Application Dy. No. 176 of 2026 pending

before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi.

17. From the aforesaid relief sought for, it is clear that the borrower

has prayed to stay the issuance of sale certificate. Granting a stay is a judicial

discretion, which needs to be judiciously exercised considering several

aspects and facts. The same cannot be done by exercising an administrative

power, which is not vested upon the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal in

terms of Section 17A or 17A(2) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,

1993, rather is a judicial power vested in terms of Section 17 of the Recovery

of Debts and Bankruptcy Act. This type of judicial order cannot be passed by

the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal by invoking provisions of Section

17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act. Further, it is pertinent to

note that an express order can also be challenged and the deemed order also

can be challenged. It is an admitted case that a writ petition was earlier filed

challenging the notice, which was dismissed. In the Intra Court Appeal also the

Division Bench had not interfered with the order passed by the Writ Court. The

borrower approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal and as property was about

to be auctioned, he also filed a Review Application, but as he did not comply

the direction given by the Division Bench, the Review Application was

withdrawn by the borrower.

18. It is pertinent to mention here that to invoke the jurisdiction under

Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, which is judicial in

nature, a defaulter has to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter IV of the

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. Section 20 in the said Chapter

provides for filing of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Section 21 of the said

Act provides that where an appeal is preferred, from whom the amount of debt

is due from the bank, the appeal will not be entertained by the Appellate

Tribunal, unless the defaulter deposits 50% of the amount, which is due from

him as determined by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19. In this case,

though the Tribunal has not determined any dues, but the fact remains that

earlier, there was a compromise between the bank and this borrower, which

suggests that the borrower has also admitted that there are huge dues.

Borrower also undertook to pay Rs.19,37,00,000/- plus delayed period interest

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 15 :-

from 01.04.2012 till full payment. Thus, to invoke the provisions of Section 20

read with Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, the

borrower had to deposit some amount as pre-deposit. Without doing so, in a

circuitous manner, he invoked Section 17A of the Recovery of Debts and

Bankruptcy Act and prayed for a relief, which only could have been granted on

the judicial side. Ultimately, he got the same. Be it noted that from the relief, as

prayed by him and quoted above, though in the petition he has mentioned that

Debts Recovery Tribunal is not functioning in Ranchi but in the relief portion he

has not sought for the said relief, rather he prays to dispose of his interim

application. This is a very clever tactics adopted by the borrower, which is

strictly deprecated by this Court. By any means, the borrower is trying to stall

the recovery process, where the recovery to be made is Rs.77 crore and odd.

The money, which has been disbursed to the borrower is nothing but public

money and the same needs to be recovered, definitely, as per law. The

borrower, herein, has taken all the effort to stall the recovery proceeding, but

has not taken any effort to repay the loan amount.

19. From what has been discussed above, the Chairperson, acting as

a Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 17A, has exceeded

his jurisdiction while granting the relief to the borrower, i.e. staying the

issuance of sale certificate, which can only be done on the judicial side and

that too, after following due procedure of law. The said order could only have

been passed in terms of Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy

Act. Powers under Section 17 and 17A of the Recovery of Debts and

Bankruptcy Act are different and operate in different circumstances. Both

cannot be equated. If the same is equated and merged, there would not have

been any occasion for the legislation to make two sets of provisions to be

exercised by the same person, i.e., Section 17 and Section 17A of the Act.

20. The judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the borrower

on the point that the Chairperson has got power to pass an interim order to

maintain status quo of the property does not fit to the facts of this case.

Respondent herein, i.e., the borrower had taken a plea that the proceeding

and the notice is time barred. This argument, in this writ petition filed by the

Bank and the Auction Purchaser, cannot be looked into, when exactly this

point was raised in writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 6720 of 2025, filed by the

borrower, which was subsequently taken in Letters Patent Appeal. In the writ

petition which was filed by the borrower, the Court held that the claim and

notices are within the period of limitation, thus declined to give interim

2026:JHHC:18747

-: 16 :-

protection. The Division Bench in the Intra Court Appeal also held that the

findings on limitation given by the Single Judge is prima facie finding and is on

interim prayer. The Division Bench did not set aside the order of the Single

Judge, which means that the issue was set at rest till the Debts Recovery

Tribunal decides the issue, which is evident from paragraph 10 of the order

dated 25.03.2026 passed in L.P.A. No.145 of 2026, which reads as under: -

10. Once again, we clarify that the observations in the impugned

order, including the observations on the issue of limitation,

being prima facie, would not affect any of the parties, and the

D.R.T. would have to decide all these issues on their own merits

without being influenced by such observations.

Thus, if this Court again entertains the same plea taken by the

borrower, it would amount to sitting over the order passed by the Single Judge

and also by the Division Bench, which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. It

will also amount to judicial impropriety. It will also amount to overruling the

order of the Single Judge and the Division Bench,. Be it noted that against the

order passed in Letters Patent Appeal, the borrower had not approached the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, thus, the issue, which has been raised by the

respondent-borrower cannot be looked into.

21. Considering what has been discussed and held above, I hold that

the Appellate Tribunal has transgressed his jurisdiction while granting stay by

invoking Section 17A of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act. The order

passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal dated 10.04.2026 passed in

Misc. Application No.132 of 2026, whereby the Debts Recovery Appellate

Tribunal has stayed issuance of sale certificate, is hereby set aside.

Consequently, the consequential order dated 21.04.2026 passed by the Debts

Recovery Appellate Tribunal in M.A. No.158 of 2026 in Misc. Application

No.132 of 2026 is also set aside, as the initial order of the Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal has been set aside. There is no impediment to issue sale

certificate by the Bank in favour of the Auction Purchaser. Both these writ

petitions stand allowed. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand

disposed of.

(Ananda Sen, J.)

High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi

Dated 25

th

June, 2026

Kumar/Cp-02

AFR

Uploaded on 25.06.2026