2026 INSC 587 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.18035 of 2025)

ISHWAR CHAND SHARMA & OTHERS … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & AN OTHER … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the

accused/appellants aggrieved by the impugned order dated

15.09.2025 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Application

U/S 528 BNSS No.34442 of 2025 wherein the High Court refused

to quash the criminal proceedings against them, arising out of

Complaint Case No.05 of 2025 pending adjudication before the

Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act)/Additional Sessions Judge,

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Meerut (hereinafter referred to as “trial court”). The said complaint

was lodged by respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred to as “the

complainant”) under Sections 65, 74, 352, 351(2), 115 of Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “BNS”) and under

Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “POCSO Act”).

Factual Background:

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that accused/appellant

No.1 is the husband of the complainant whereas the

accused/appellant No.2 is the mother-in-law of the complainant.

The accused/appellant No.3 and accused/appellant No.4 are

sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the complainant respectively.

The said accused/appellants hereinafter are collectively referred to

as “the appellants”. Appellant No.1 and his brother, one late

Praveen got married to the complainant and her younger sister

respectively in the year 2008 according to Hindu rites and

ceremonies. A daughter, the prosecutrix, was born on 08.06.2009

out of the wedlock between appellant No.1 and the complainant,

followed by a son thereafter.

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3.1 Owing to matrimonial discord between the parties, in the year

2011, the complainant and her sister left the matrimonial home

whereupon the care and custody of the two children of appellant

No.1 and the complainant continued to be undertaken by the

appellants. Following their separation, the parties were embroiled

in multiple criminal and civil proceedings against each other. The

allegations and claims contained in the said cases are not germane

for the adjudication of the present case. Suffice it to say that the

complainant had filed FIR No.93 of 2011 under Sections 498-A,

323, 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”) read

with Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in which

appellants have been granted bail. A Complaint Case No.443 of

2013 had also been filed under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and

22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Furthermore, Case No.134 of 2024 under Sections 326, 327, 323,

504, 506 and 354 IPC was filed by the complainant in which the

appellants have obtained bail. On the other hand, appellant No.1

has filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955 being Case No.1325 of 2022. Furthermore, FIR

No.105 of 2016, under Sections 307, 452, 323, 326 and 504 IPC,

FIR No.238 of 2018 under Sections 302, 328 and 329 IPC and FIR

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No.228 of 2024 under Sections 75, 352, 115(2), 351(2) and 351(3)

BNS were filed against the complainant and her family. The list of

said cases filed by the parties against each other have been placed

in a tabular format below:

S.

No.

Case No. Case Title Sections

1. FIR No.93/2011 State vs Ishwar

Chand

498A/323/324 IPC and 3/4

of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. Complaint Case

No.443/2013

XXX vs Ishwar

and ors.

12/17/18/19/20/21/22 of

the Domestic Violence Act.

3. FIR No.105/2016 State vs Rahul

and ors.

307/323/504/326/452 of

the IPC.

4. FIR No.238/2018 State vs Ashok

etc.

302/328/329 of IPC

5. HMA

No.1325/2022

Ishwar Sharma

Vs. XXX

13(1) of Hindu Marriage Act.

6. FIR No.228/2024 State vs Pankaj

etc

75/115(2)/ 351(2)

/351(3)/352 of Bhartiya

Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

7. Complaint Case

No.43/2024

XXX vs. Ishwar

and ors.

65,74,352,351(3), 115 of

BNS and section 3 & 4 of

POCSO Act.

8. Complaint Case

No.60/2024

XXX vs Ishwar

and ors.

65, 74, 352, 351(2), 115 of

BNS and Sections 3 & 4 of

POCSO Act.

9. Complaint Case

No.134/2024

Pramita vs.

Ishwar etc.

326,327,330,504, 506, 354

and 120B of IPC.

10. CR No.660/2024 Ishwar etc vs.

Pramita etc.

326,327,330,504, 506, 354

and 120B of IPC.

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3.2 Thereafter, on 10.09.2024, the complainant filed a complaint

before the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Meerut, Uttar Pradesh

against the appellants under Sections 65, 74, 115, 352, 351(2) of

BNS and Sections 3 and 4 of POCSO Act alleging that the

prosecutrix i.e. the minor daughter of the complainant and

appellant No.1 was sexually harassed by the latter and appellant

No.4 and was further abused and beaten up by the appellants. The

allegations contained in the said complaint are encapsulated as

follows:

i. Appellant No.1, the father of the victim, an alcoholic, used to

make the prosecutrix watch pornographic videos and

thereafter raped her when she was fourteen years old and

subsequently, when the prosecutrix tried to complain about

the said incident, she was brutally beaten up by appellant

Nos.2 and 3.

ii. Appellant No.1 along with appellant No.2 tried to kill the

prosecutrix and hence on 18.03.2024, she was forcefully sent

to the house of appellant Nos.3 and 4 in Meerut.

iii. Appellant No.4 also raped the prosecutrix on multiple

occasions and upon complaining about the same to appellant

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No.3, the prosecutrix was verbally abused and sexually

assaulted by appellant No.3 by beating her and inserting the

handle of a hammer into her private parts.

iv. On 06.05.2024, the prosecutrix managed to run away from the

house of appellant Nos.3 and 4 and thereafter called the

complainant who then brought her to her home after which

she became mentally and physically ill.

v. On 30.05.2024, a complaint was made by the complainant and

the prosecutrix to the SSP, Meerut regarding the said incidents

of sexual abuse and assault but no action was taken.

vi. On 03.06.2024, the prosecutrix along with her aunt went to

Ghaziabad Court for the hearing of a dowry case where she met

appellant No.1 who threatened the prosecutrix saying that if

she did not withdraw her application, he would cut her into

pieces and throw her into the canal. Upon hearing this, the

prosecutrix became terrified and feared for her life and safety.

vii. Thereafter, the present complaint was filed on 10.09.2024.

3.3 Upon perusing the complaint, the Trial Court by order dated

07.02.2025 proceeded to take cognizance of the same which

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culminated in Complaint Case No.05 of 2025 and thereafter, on

18.08.2025, the Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act), Meerut, Uttar

Pradesh proceeded to issue summons to appellant No s.1 and 4

under Section 65(1) BNS and Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act; and

to appellant Nos.2 and 3 under Section 115(2) of BNS for the

purpose of trial.

3.4 Aggrieved by the cognizance order dated 07.02.2025 and the

summoning order dated 18.08.2025 in Complaint Case

No.05/2025, the appellants preferred Application U/S 528 BNSS

No.34442/2025 before the Allahabad High Court praying for

quashing of the said orders.

3.5 By the impugned order dated 15.09.2025, the High Court

refused to quash the summons and other proceedings arising out

of the Complaint Case No.05/2025. While refusing to grant the

reliefs sought by the appellants herein, the High Court observed

that upon perusal of the statements made by the complainant and

prosecutrix under Sections 223 and 225 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Surakshta Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”), there

appeared no material contradictions that went to the root of the

matter so as to justify the quashing of criminal proceedings. It was

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further observed that the statement under Section 223 of BNSS of

the complainant supported the case of the prosecution and that

the prosecutrix, in her statement under Section 225 of BNSS, had

made specific allegations against appellant Nos.1 and 4 and

therefore the issues were prima facie triable. It was further held

that other defences raised by the appellants, such as, there being

no medical examination of the prosecutrix, the complaint being a

counterblast to the already long list of complaints and cross-

complaints filed by the parties, could be adjudicated by the trial

court after the conclusion of the trial. Lastly, with respect to

allegations contained in the complaint against appellant Nos.3 and

4, the High Court directed them to prefer a discharge application

at an appropriate stage before the trial court.

3.6 Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court, the

appellants have preferred the present appeal. At this juncture, we

find it apposite to mention that with respect to the appellants, the

trial court had proceeded to issue non-bailable warrants directing

them to appear before the Special Court on 18.12.2025. In the

circumstances, this Court vide order dated 15.12.2025, had

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directed stay of further proceedings arising out of Complaint Case

No.05/2025.

Submissions:

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants,

learned counsel for respondent No.1-State and the learned counsel

for the complainant.

4.1 Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that

the subject complaint was filed as a counterblast to exact revenge

upon the appellants and was a part of a string of FIRs and

complaints that were filed against them by the complainant to

pursue personal vendetta and to harass them. It was argued that

it was highly inconceivable, improbable and rather unimaginable

that appellant Nos.1 and 4 who happen to be the father and uncle

of the prosecutrix would outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix

and rape her. It was further submitted that the allegations against

the appellants contained in the complaint were vague, omnibus

and general in nature as there was no date mentioned as to when

the victim was subjected to her modesty being outraged, along with

the fact that there was no medical report available on record to

support any injury that was caused to her. Furthermore, it was

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contended that a bare perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix

revealed that she had been tutored and mentored by the

complainant and hence the same deserved to be disregarded at the

very threshold. Lastly, it was submitted that no explanation had

been given by the complainant as to why she left her children at

the matrimonial home when they were one to two years old, and

made no efforts to meet them or seek their custody during the

intervening period of fourteen years and hence a complaint after

such a long period of time reeked of mala fide intentions and ran

foul of the facts and circumstances of the case.

4.2 Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the

allegations contained in the complaint do not make out any

offences in the instant case and the complainant has sought to

wreak mayhem against the appellants herein by concocting false

allegations against them which are serious in nature. A reading of

the complaint in juxtaposition with the provisions of the Act on the

basis of which the offences are alleged against the appellants would

clearly indicate that the said offences are not at all made out

against the appellants herein. Learned counsel for the appellants

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therefore submitted that the impugned order may be set aside and

this appeal may be allowed.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 -State

vehemently opposed the plea of the appellants and submitted that

the impugned order of the High Court is perfectly valid and is in

accordance with the settled principles of law and therefore does not

merit any interference by this Court. It was submitted that as per

the statements of the complainant and the prosecutrix recorded

under Sections 223 and 225 of BNSS respectively, it was apparent

that the appellants had thrown the complainant out of her

matrimonial home; that appellant No.1 was an alcohol addict, who

used to show indecent videos to the prosecutrix after which he

proceeded to rape her. Furthermore, placing reliance upon the said

statements, learned counsel submitted that appellant Nos.2 and 3

assaulted the minor prosecutrix and threatened to kill her if she

disclosed any of the said incidents to anyone. Learned counsel also

submitted that appellant No.4 was also guilty of sexually

assaulting the prosecutrix on multiple occasions when she was

residing with him in Meerut. Subsequently, when she tried to

complain about his acts to appellant No.3, she was further

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harassed and abused after which appellant no.3 inserted the

handle of a hammer inside her vagina. Finally, it was forcefully

contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

present case and bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations

and averments made against the appellants, it was not a fit case

for the grant of relief of quashment of the proceedings but rather

this Court should permit the trial to continue and allow it to reach

its logical conclusion.

5.1 Learned counsel for the complainant vehemently argued that

the allegations of sexual abuse against the appellants have no

connection with the ongoing matrimonial and other disputes

between the parties. It was submitted that since the children were

in the sole custody of the father and his family, she had no

proximity or occasion to tutor or manipulate them. Rather, it was

argued at the bar that the minor child was taken away from

appellant No.1’s house by appellant No.3 after which she was

subjected to repeated sexual abuse by appellant No.4. It was

contended that the prosecutrix’s statement recorded by the Special

Judge has been consistent with the case of the prosecution and

therefore the defence of the appellants regarding the absence of

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medical evidence and the possibility of tutoring by the complainant

of the prosecutrix could only be gone into after the commencement

of the trial. Lastly, learned counsel for the complainant submitted

that medical examination of the prosecutrix not being done is not

fatal to the case of the prosecution as there are offences under the

POCSO Act that may not result in any physical injury and therefore

keeping the facts and circumstances of the present case in mind,

it would be in the interest of justice if this appeal preferred by the

appellants is dismissed.

Offences Alleged:

6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective

parties and upon a careful perusal of the material placed on record,

we note that in order to understand the nature of the offences and

to correlate the same with the allegations contained in the said

complaint, the relevant provisions under the BNS as well as the

POCSO Act are necessary to be extracted hereunder:

“65. Punishment for rape in certain cases. —(1)

Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years

of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a

term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which

may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural

life, and shall also be liable to fine:

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Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to

meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:

Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-

section shall be paid to the victim.

(2) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years

of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a

term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which

may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural

life, and with fine or with death:

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to

meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:

Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-

section shall be paid to the victim.”

6.1 Section 74 of the BNS provides for definition and

punishment for assault or use of criminal force to a woman with

the intent to outrage her modesty. The relevant provision is

extracted as hereunder:

“74. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with

intent to outrage her modesty.—Whoever assaults or

uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or

knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her

modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which shall not be less than one year

but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable

to fine.”

6.2 Section 115 of the BNS provides for definition and

punishment for voluntary causing hurt. The relevant provision is

extracted as hereunder:

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“115. Voluntarily causing hurt.—(1) Whoever does any

act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any

person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to

cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to

any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”.

(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section

(1) of section 122 voluntarily causes hurt, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may

extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.”

6.3 Section 351 of the BNS provides for definition and

punishment for criminal intimidation. The said provision is

extracted as hereunder:

“351. Criminal intimidation.—(1) Whoever threatens

another by any means, with any injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any

one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause

alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act

which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act

which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of

avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal

intimidation.

Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any

deceased person in whom the person threatened is

interested, is within this section

(2) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or

with both.

(3) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by

threatening to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the

destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence

punishable with death or 107 imprisonment for life, or with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years,

or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with

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imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

6.4 Further, Section 352 of the BNS provides for definition and

punishment of intentional insult with the intent to provoke breach

of peace. The said provision is extracted as hereunder:

“352. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach

of peace.—Whoever intentionally insults in any manner,

and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or

knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him

to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or

with both.”

6.5 Lastly, Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act provide for the

definition of penetrative sexual assault and its punishment thereof.

The said provisions are reproduced as follows:

“3. Penetrative sexual assault.—A person is said to

commit “penetrative sexual assault” if—

(a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina,

mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do

so with him or any other person; or

(b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the

body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or

anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or

any other person; or

(c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as

to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any

part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with

him or any other person; or

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(d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus,

urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such

person or any other person.

4. Punishment for penetrative sexual assault. —(1)

Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which shall not be less than ten years but which may

extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to

fine.

(2) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child

below sixteen years of age shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than

twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for

life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of

natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine.

(3) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just

and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical

expenses and rehabilitation of such victim”

6.6 Before proceeding with the facts of the case, it is pertinent to

underline key ingredients of the sections extracted above. An act

or an omission to be considered punishable as an offence as per

Section 65 of BNS has to satisfy the rigours of Section 63 of BNS.

Since the ingredients of Section 63 (a to d) of BNS and Section 3 of

the POCSO Act are in pari materia, they shall be dealt

conjunctively. To establish the offence of rape as per the POCSO

Act, the prosecution has to satisfy two key ingredients: first, there

was sexual assault and second, the said sexual assault was against

a minor. Sexual assault is defined in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d)

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of Section 3 of POCSO Act which explains that sexual assault is

committed when a person either penetrates his penis into vagina,

mouth, urethra or anus of a child or inserts any object or a part of

the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus

of the child or manipulates any part of the body of the child so as

to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of

body of the child or applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus,

urethra of the child. If the act of a person is proved to fall within

any of the aforementioned four categories, he is liable to be

punished under Section 4 of POCSO Act.

6.7 Now, coming to Section 74 of BNS, the said section penalises

any act or omission that outrages the modesty of a woman. To

apply the said Section, there must be an assault or use of criminal

force on a woman. Such assault or use of criminal force must be

made with an intention to outrage her modesty or with the

knowledge that her modesty is likely to be outraged. Mere

knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is

sufficient without any deliberate intention. Therefore, the essential

ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 74 of BNS are

that the person assaulted should be a woman, and the accused

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must have used criminal force on her intending thereby to outrage

her modesty. The ultimate test for ascertaining whether the

modesty of a woman has been outraged, assaulted, or insulted is

that the action of the offender should be such that it may be

perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency

of a woman.

6.8 Section 115 of BNS penalises the act of voluntarily causing

hurt whereby any voluntary act or omission either causes bodily

pain, disease or infirmity. There must be some kind of hurt,

voluntarily inflicted. A person can be convicted only when the

prosecution is able to prove that the said acts were done

intentionally or with knowledge that such acts would cause hurt to

the victim. Coming to Section 351 of BNS, it defines and punishes

the offence of criminal intimidation. The Section is divided in two

parts: the first part refers to the act of threatening another with

injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or

reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested; while the

second part refers to the intent with which the threatening is done

and this is further classified into two parts wherein the first part

relates to one’s intent to cause alarm to the person threatened and

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the second is to cause that person to do any act which he is not

legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is

legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of

threat.

6.9 Lastly, Section 352 of BNS seeks to punish a person who

intentionally insults to provoke breach of peace. The offence

contemplated by this Section requires intentional insult and the

said insult must be such as to give provocation to the person

insulted. Furthermore, there should be intention or knowledge that

such provocation would cause or is likely to cause the person so

insulted to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere

abuse, unaccompanied by an intention to cause breach of peace or

knowledge that breach of peace it is likely to be caused does not

come within the ambit of this section.

Discussion:

7. Coming to the facts of the present case, upon a bare perusal

of the allegations made in the complaint preferred by the

complainant, it is seen that serious and grave sexual offences have

been alleged against the father i.e. appellant No.1 and uncle i.e

appellant No.4 of the prosecutrix-minor daughter whereas the

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complainant has alleged the offence of hurt and criminal

intimidation against appellant Nos.2 and 3 who are the

grandmother and aunt respectively of the prosecutrix.

7.1 We shall first deal with the allegations of sexual assault made

against appellant Nos.1 and 4. Learned counsel for respondent

No.1-State and the complainant respectively vehemently alleged

that appellant No.1 is an alcoholic and he had raped the minor

prosecutrix when she was fourteen years of age. Upon carefully

examining the said allegation in conjunction with the materials

produced before this Court, we do not find any basis upon which

the said allegations have been made. To establish the case of rape

punishable under Section 65 of BNS or Section 4 of POCSO Act,

the prosecution has to satisfy the ingredients contained in the said

Section i.e the alleged acts fall within one of the four categories as

laid down in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Sections 3 and 4 of

POCSO Act. In other words, the material on record has to prima

facie show that there was either penetration, insertion of penis or

any object or application of mouth or any other such act committed

by the accused upon the prosecturix. Therefore, in order to invoke

the offence of rape, one has to prima facie establish that there were

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specific positive acts committed by the accused persons so as to

fall under one of the four categories as defined under Section 63 of

BNS or Section 3 of POCSO Act. Upon a perusal of the complaint

filed by the complainant, this Court is unable to discern any

specific act or series of acts that have been allegedly carried out by

appellant Nos.1 or 4 against the prosecutrix so as to qualify as rape

as defined under Section 63 of BNS.

7.2 The complainant merely alleged that the appellant No.1 was

a habitual drinker and had raped the prosecutrix. Nothing has

been said about the date of the alleged incident. Furthermore, no

detail has been mentioned as to the alleged rape or what were the

series of acts that led to the alleged acts or what was the

prosecutrix's response after the alleged behaviour. Upon further

examination of the complaint, it is apparent that the allegation of

rape is a generic one. A blanket statement stating that appellant

Nos.1 and 4 had raped the prosecutrix, cannot, without any other

supporting material, be considered sufficient to invoke such a

grave and serious charge against them. We underline that although

any complaint or FIR cannot be an encyclopaedia so as to contain

even the minutest of details but nevertheless, a complaint cannot

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be filed with allegations and averments when the same have not

been backed by any specific factual detail or prima facie material

evidence. Therefore, by merely stating that the prosecutrix was

raped by appellant Nos.1 and 4, the Courts cannot set into motion

the wheels of criminal prosecution. The Courts have to be

extremely careful before taking cognizance of complaints made

while invoking the provisions of rape, especially in cases where

parties have already been heavily embroiled in matrimonial

litigation, since the scope of manipulation, fabrication and

vexatious litigation is exponentially high due to pre-existing bad

blood between the parties who are often emotionally charged

against one another and allegations of rape becomes an aid

towards arm twisting tactics.

7.3 In the present case, the appellants and the complainant

already have more than ten civil and criminal cases pending

against each other. A casual invocation of a grave charge of rape,

that too, against the father of the prosecutrix, carries with it a

greater social taboo and stigma that cannot be washed off easily. A

man is a sum total of his reputation and how he is perceived in the

society. Such perception cannot be distorted by a mere casual

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invocation of law that has the potential of ruining his reputation,

social status and public image. A blanket statement, without

narrating any ancillary act or post facto development, in our

judicial conscience cannot be allowed to stand against the father

and uncle in the instant case. Mere throwing an allegation of a

grave and serious nature without any other supporting factual

detail cannot per se result in setting in motion a criminal

proceeding against the accused.

7.4 At this juncture, we find it pertinent to mention that the

prosecutrix had been living with the appellants for a considerable

period of time and was fourteen years of age when the impugned

complaint was filed alleging the aforesaid acts. Before the filing of

the said complaint, there has not been even a whisper of any

allegation of sexual misconduct against either appellant No.1 or 4

whereas it was only after multiple FIRs and complaints that were

filed by the parties against each other, that the present Complaint

No.05/2025 was filed before the Special Court. Therefore, after

carefully considering and distilling the averments made in the

complaint along with the surrounding attenuating circumstances,

this Court is of the opinion that merely stating that appellant No.1

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raped his daughter, is not sufficient to allow the impugned

complaint to sustain especially when there is dearth of material

facts and preliminary evidence on record to even form a prima facie

opinion.

7.5 Similarly, upon perusing the materials and documents on

record, this Court is able to discern that the complainant alleged

that appellant No.4 (uncle of prosecutrix), upon hearing about the

allegation of rape allegedly committed by appellant No.1 upon the

prosecutrix, himself proceeded to rape her on multiple occasions.

However, upon close inspection, we again find that the s aid

allegation in the complaint has not been supported by any other

document or material evidence on record. To support the said

allegation, learned counsel for the complainant has placed reliance

upon the statement of the prosecutrix recorded by the Special

Judge. Upon perusal and close scrutiny of the said statement of

the prosecutrix, this Court cannot but notice that the said

statement, is almost word by word similar to what the complainant

has stated in her complaint recorded by the Special Judge which

indicates the possibility of tutoring at the hands of the complainant

and her family. The contention of the counsel for the complainant

26

that she did not have custody or any access to the child so as to

allow for any fruitful or meaningful interaction to allow for such

tutoring or manipulation does not impress us because as per the

records of the case and as per the admission of the complainant

and prosecutrix, the minor girl had left the house of the appellants’

on 06.05.2024 and has been in custody of the complainant since

then, whereas the complaint was filed before the Special Judge only

on 10.09.2024 i.e. four months later.

7.6 Furthermore, the statements of the complainant and the

prosecutrix were recorded by the Special Judge only on 28.02.2025

and 18.03.2025 respectively i.e nearly six to seven months from

the date of transfer of custody of the prosecutrix from the

appellants to the complainant and therefore giving ample time and

opportunity to the complainant and her kin to sway and colour the

mind of the prosecutrix, who, due to her tender and impressionable

age was prone to such tutoring and mentoring. It is reiterated that

upon a reading of the complaint dated 10.09.2024, complainant’s

statement dated 28.02.2025 and prosecutrix’s statement dated

18.03.2025, it becomes clear that the same facts have been

narrated in all the three documents in the exact same order, tone

27

and vigour. There has been no alteration, addition or subtraction

from either of the three statements making each of them virtually

identical to one another. This is not a case of there being

consistency in all the statements but a case of verbatim

reproduction of statements almost parrot-like, as a result of

tutoring by the complainant and possibly her family.

7.7 Keeping the surrounding circumstances in mind, along with

history of litigation between the two parties, one cannot brush

away the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the

said complaint is a figment of imagination and is a piece of fiction

created by the complainant so as to implicate the appellants herein

and thereby prejudice the Courts in other proceedings. It is trite

that whenever an event is recounted and narrated by different

witnesses at different points of time, there are usua lly

dissimilarities, even contradictions that might crop up due to lapse

of memory with the passage of time and such other circumstances.

There would not be a photogenic or verbatim repetition of facts.

But in the present case, the statements reflect a stark repetition of

the same facts in the same order which gives an impression to this

Court that the same is a deliberate attempt to concoct facts with

28

collaboration, narrated with an oblique motive against the

appellants herein and therefore strikes at the very root of the case

of the prosecution.

7.8 Now, we turn our attention to the allegations made against

appellant Nos.2 and 3. Learned counsel for the complainant has

vehemently argued that the allegations qua the said appellants are

grave and serious in nature. From a perusal of the record of the

case, it is apparent that appellant No.2 is the grandmother of the

prosecutrix against whom it has been alleged that after the alleged

acts of rape were committed by appellant Nos.1 and 4 on the minor

granddaughter, appellant Nos.2 and 3 abused the prosecutrix in

filthy language and then, in order to coerce her into silence, she

was beaten up by both of them. Furthermore, it has been alleged

that when the prosecutrix complained about the alleged rape

committed by appellant No.4, appellant No.3, his wife, proceeded

to abuse the prosecutrix and thereafter inserted the handle of a

hammer into her vagina. These allegations, no doubt grave and

serious in nature, fly in the teeth of the surrounding facts and

circumstances of the case and material available on record. It is

trite law that in order to establish an offence of voluntarily causing

29

hurt, punishable under Section 115 of BNS, prosecution has to

satisfy the key ingredients of the said Section, that is to say, the

prosecution has to produce material in order to show prima facie

that bodily pain, disease or infirmity was caused by the accused

persons, in order to qualify as voluntarily causing hurt. It is

observed that no material in terms of an injury report or any

medical report has been filed so as to further substantiate the said

allegations. In this regard, the prosecution has produced merely

the statements of the prosecutrix and complainant to substantiate

their claims. Although production of an injury report is not a sine

qua non for proving an offence under Section 115 of BNS and even

if there are no visible injuries, the offence has to be established by

other evidence to show that bodily pain, disease or infirmity was

caused but at the same time, a trial cannot be allowed to proceed

merely on a bald statement of allegation that the prosecutrix was

hurt when no other detail or specific acts have been mentioned or

alleged. A mere bald allegation without any supporting detail or

materials cannot straight away lead to setting criminal law in

motion.

30

7.9 The complainant has further failed to produce any material

in support of the allegations of abuses meted out by appellant

Nos.2 and 3 to the prosecutrix. It has been merely stated that she

was abused and threatened that she may be killed. It has been time

and again held by this Court that in order to establish an offence

of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 351 of BNS

merely stating that the victim was abused is not sufficient. For the

essential ingredients to satisfy invocation of the said offence, the

prosecution has to produce material to the effect that the accused

specifically threatened the victim and that such threat consisted of

some specific injury to his person, reputation or property or to the

person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was

interested. It further needs to be satisfied that the said specific act

or omission was done with an intent to cause alarm to that person

or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally

bound to do or to omit to do any act which he or she was legally

entitled to do. A plain reading of the complaint reveals that the

same did not specify the abusive words used or anything specific

that was said to the prosecutrix. Rather, it has been merely stated

that appellant Nos.2 and 3 abused and threatened the prosecutrix.

No material has been produced which specify what the threat

31

actually was, how the said threat was carried out and what was

actually stated in terms of the threat. Vague and general

allegations are not sufficient to sustain criminal charges formed

under the said provision as there ha ve to be cogent facts,

discernible from the general accusation so as to show that the said

threat was meted out to the prosecutrix, without which, this Court

cannot allow continuance of criminal prosecution against the

appellants herein.

7.10 With respect to Section 352 of BNS, the prosecution has

failed to place any material on record which supports its allegation

that there was any intentional insult made towards either the

prosecutrix or the complainant that would in turn, lead to breach

of peace. The Section is intended to deal with persons who are

responsible for breach of peace or commission of acts that incite or

abet any such incident of breach of peace. The material placed

before us fails to demonstrate how alleged abuses that were uttered

to the prosecutrix led to breach of peace. Nothing has been

specified so as to what the alleged abuses were. Mere unspecified

and vague allegation of abuse unaccompanied by any intention to

cause breach of peace or knowledge that breach of peace is likely

32

to occur does not come under the ambit of this Section and

therefore the prosecution, with respect to the said Section cannot

be allowed to proceed as the same tantamounts to an abuse of the

process of law.

7.11 Furthermore, it has been vehemently argued by learned

counsel for the complainant that as against appellant No.3 the

allegation that she inserted a hammer rod into the vagina of the

prosecutrix is specific and grave in nature and owing to the gravity

of the said offence, the appeal should be dismissed. Although, we

agree that the said allegation by itself is very grave and serious, we

fail to find any substance in the same as it has not been

substantiated by any other material, either documentary or

otherwise on record. The act of insertion of a hammer rod is a very

serious and critical act that can cause a very grave injury to the

victim for which she might require immediate medical attention

and treatment. However, the prosecution has failed to place on

record any medical evidence in the form of a medical report to

substantiate the said injury or to show that any medical assistance

was provided to the prosecutrix. The prosecution has also failed to

elaborate upon the aftereffects of the alleged injury. Rather, it has

33

been merely stated that after the said alleged offence was

committed against her, the prosecutrix was disturbed physically

and mentally. No specific details have been mentioned about

whether the prosecutrix was taken to the hospital especially when

it is stated by the complainant that after the said incident, the

prosecutrix left the house of the appellants and began living with

the complainant. It is but natural that upon narration of the said

incident by the prosecutrix to the complainant, the first instinct of

any parent would have been to have a medical examination of the

prosecutrix so as to prevent any further medical complication being

caused to her. However, nothing has been placed on record to show

that the prosecutrix was made to undergo any medica l

examination. In fact, the same is true with respect to the offence

of rape alleged against appellant Nos.1 and 4. No medical evidence

has been annexed to further substantiate the said allegations. It

has been contended by counsel for the complainant tha t a

conviction can be based upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix

but we observe that each case has to be determined and

adjudicated upon bearing in mind the peculiar facts and

circumstances of that case. In the present case, the statement of

the prosecutrix also has not been able to convince us so as to

34

permit the trial against the appellants to go on as the same, in our

opinion, would be against the interest of justice and would

tantamount to an abuse of the process of law.

8. At this juncture, we find it pertinent to make reference to the

recommendations and observations made by the Justice J.S.

Verma Committee Report on “Amendments to Criminal Law” that

was submitted on January 23, 2013. In the said report, the

Committee underlined the importance of the medical examination

and medical reports of rape victims wherein the Committee opined

as under:

“19. We are also of the opinion that the medical

examination report must be prepared, preferably

immediately after the examination, but most certainly on

the same date as the examination and must be forwarded

to the investigating agency forthwith without delay. The

DNA and other samples should be sent to the concerned

Forensic Science Labs or DNA Profiling Centres within two

days of the incident. We are also of the opinion that any

dereliction of duty on part of the examining doctor(s) to

undertake the medi cal examination properly and

forwarding the report to the IO without any delay, and any

dereliction of duty on the part of the investigating agency

in collecting the report or causing the victim to be taken to

the nearest hospital for examination, would be punishable

as offences (in respect of the investigating agency) and by

way of disciplinary proceedings (in respect of the

examining doctor).”

35

Such is the importance of the medical report and medical

examination in real time as it ensures timely collection of forensic

evidence, ensuring immediate health care and aid to the victim and

assisting in the progress of the legal proceeding in order to link the

offence to the accused person. But, in the present case, absence of

medical examination of the prosecutrix is fatal to the case of the

prosecution as the allegations have not been supported, even

remotely by any other corroborative material and therefore, in our

view, continuation of criminal proceedings in the face of such

glaring contradictions as noticed above does not subserve the

interest of justice.

8.1 Keeping the aforesaid observations and judicial dicta laid

down by this Court in mind, coupled with the lapses on the part of

the prosecution, the allegations against the accused-appellants

seem highly improbable and implausible, and therefore it is neither

expedient nor in the interests of justice to permit the continuation

of the present prosecution emanating from Complaint Case

No.05/2025.

8.2 In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in

the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)

36

SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph

102 wherein this Court observed as under:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of

the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series

of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases

by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the

Accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

same do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the Accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

37

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are

so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which

no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

Accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is

a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private

and personal grudge.”

8.3 On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial

dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the appellants

herein are not made out and therefore, the judgment of this Court

in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely applies to the facts of this case

having regard to sub-paragraphs 3, 5, and 7, and therefore, this

Court, in exercise of its discretion on the facts of this case deems

it neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the

continuation of the present prosecution emanating from Complaint

Case No.05/2025. Hence, the criminal complaint and the

38

proceeding emanating from it are liable to be quashed. At this

juncture we hasten to observe that the observations made during

the course of this judgment by this Court are strictly confined to

the facts and circumstances of the present case and in no way

should they be construed to apply generally to other cases wherein

similar allegations may have been made against accused persons

genuinely. We say so while being mindful of the fact that rape and

sexual abuse of minors and violence against women and children

remain one of the most gruesome and violent examples of human

nature that shake the very conscience and moral fabric of the

society. Therefore, courts and public authorities should come down

heavily upon perpetrators of such offences, and such cases should

be dealt with swiftly and vigorously to serve the interests of justice.

Rising Trend in Vexatious Litigation:

9. In the backdrop of the facts of the present case, we wish to

underline a worrying trend that has come to our attention. Parties

involved in matrimonial or commercial relationships with one

another are resorting to filing of frivolous and vexatious claims and

allegations of a criminal nature to settle personal scores and

grudges against each other and therefore turn to nefarious/oblique

39

means to attain the said objective. We also painfully take judicial

cognizance of the fact that the courts of law are being misused and

overburdened by such vague and vexatious litigations between

spouses as many a times, the recourse to law and police is taken,

in an oblique way so as to antagonise, pressurise, hound and

harass the other spouse and their family members in order to

retaliate and exact revenge that is carried out due to sheer hatred

and disdain for the said spouse and their family members.

9.1 While we are cognizant of the fact that there are genuine and

bona fide cases in the courts wherein the aggrieved parties are

genuinely looking for relief and respite from the actions and

omissions of their spouses, that often require immediate care and

attention of the courts of law and public authorities, such cases

get frequently overshadowed and obscured by the overwhelming

number of false and frivolous cases filed by spouses against one

another as an ‘arm-twisting’ method so as to reach a more

favourable outcome or settlement or more lucrative monetary

settlement. The onus is on courts to be careful and cautious so as

to separate the wheat from the chaff and separate the genuine

cases of matrimonial oppression, rape and offences against women

40

from the cases wherein the legal process and procedure is being

used as a tool to file false and frivolous cases out of vengeance.

While doing so, care should be taken to ensure that the rights and

freedoms of innocent parties are not trampled or arbitrarily taken

away by unscrupulous and baseless litigation.

9.2 We are conscious of the fact that there are many instances

where women are gravely affected by matrimonial disputes and

violence that they have to endure at the hands of the spouse and

in-laws and other family members. Such cases deserve our utmost

attention and judicial scrutiny so as to make sure that the ends of

justice are met and the offenders do not go scot-free and rather get

the punishment they deserve. However such a zeal to meet the ends

of justice should be countenanced, by courts of law and executive

authorities of the State, with a pragmatic approach bearing in mind

the recent trend of criminal litigation in this country wherein the

legal machinery and statutes are being used as a tool by

mischievous litigants so as to create unnecessary hurdles and

punish unsuspecting and often innocent citizens particularly in

the sphere of matrimonial disputes. The litigating parties and their

advocates should also be cognizant of the fact that such vexatious

41

filing of false and frivolous claims and cases cast unnecessary

burden on the already overburdened machinery and apparatus of

the State and Judiciary. This factor also diverts the attention of

courts and its resources whereas genuine cases of the parties with

actual verifiable grievances are not being able to be adjudicated in

time owing to the time spent in adjudicating upon phantom claims

of mischievous litigators seeking to create litigation out of thin air

or in the absence of a cause to do so.

9.3 One particular offshoot or a species of vexatious and frivolous

litigation is in family disputes, particularly, a ‘matrimonial

bouquet’ that is presented by the estranged wife against the

husband and his family out of personal animosity and spite once

the relationship turns sour and rancorous and vice versa. This

‘matrimonial bouquet’ often includes claims of dowry demands;

cruelty under 498A IPC; harassment by in -laws and domestic

violence, made by the complainant against her spouse and in-laws.

This set of cases frequently include bogus and empty allegations

and false claims of harassment, cruelty and marital hardships

that, more often than not, contain little to no substance at all and

are usually not backed by any material or other documentary

42

evidence. A tell-tale sign of such vexatious cases is that often they

contain vague and sweeping general allegations that are not

specific in nature but rather are aimed at arraying several family

members if not all of the spouse’s family, including those who are

old and ailing, as accused and consequently cast the prosecution

net as wide as possible by invoking multiple provisions of law by

using general, vague and omnibus allegations that are not backed

either by fact or law. We say so while being mindful of the fact that

although any complaint or a FIR is not an encyclopaedia of

evidence and factual circumstances so as to contain all details of

the alleged incident, by no means can it be a general

conglomeration of statements made by the disgruntled spouse with

a mala fide intent, containing little or no details of the alleged

criminal acts that often lack a chronology of events. Further,

sweeping allegations and vexatious claims often fail to highlight

and elaborate upon how the alleged acts happened, the manner in

which such acts were undertaken, the aftermath of such incidents

etc.

9.4 In this regard, we would be remiss to not highlight the recent

upswing in the false and frivolous matrimonial cases which have

43

unfortunately brought to the fore the uglier side of litigation. A

recent trend in this regard is when the wife resorts to filing false

complaints and cases under POCSO Act alleging that the husband,

who is also the father of the minor child, has committed wanton

acts which are sexual in nature especially against the minor

daughter. At the centre of this sort of litigation is a child who is

often used by her mother against her father, against her will and

wishes, so as to make false and vexatious complaints against her

father and other male members of her paternal family in order to

exact revenge or as an arm-twisting tactic to obtain a higher

monetary settlement or to simply harass.

9.5 There are also instances where in cases of enmity between the

members of a family, between neighbours or business partners or

associates, or even between borrowers and lenders of financial

assistance, a weapon of harassment being resorted to is a

complaint under the POCSO Act at the instance of a parent of a

child (in most cases being the daughter) so as to wreak vengeance

or to get over civil disputes between the parties by a subdued

accused under the said Act yielding to the demands of the

complainant. Also, the threat of a false complaint under the POCSO

44

Act is used as a means to escape legal consequences arising out of

a commercial transaction, a matrimonial dispute or such other

disputes.

9.6 While we are conscious of the fact that there are instances

and a plethora of cases that are true and deserve the utmost

attention and deft handling on the side of authorities and Courts

and which should be pursued vigorously to reach a logical

conclusion, on the other side of the spectrum, are cases invoking

such serious and heinous allegations which are prima facie vague,

omnibus and general in nature and thereby lacking any material

backing or evidence which should be shunned at the very

threshold. We say so for the reason that if a person is made an

accused and forced to face a criminal trial on general and sweeping

allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of

criminal conduct, it would tantamount to an abuse of the process

of law and court. Hence, legal practitioners who tender advice in

such cases must restrain parties from filing such false/frivolous

complaints when requested to do so. Further, lawyers/advocates

must also not advise filing of criminal complaints which are

false/concocted so as to keep the opposite parties under a tight

45

leash so that they could come forward for a settlement on the terms

dictated by their parties or else, to face a criminal prosecution

which can prolong for years. When such is the trend, on the other

side, efforts are made to seek anticipatory bail by pers ons

apprehending arrest owing to a false/frivolous complaint being

lodged which sometimes reach the portals of this Court after being

unsuccessful at the level of the trial court and High Court. Also,

steps are taken for seeking quashing of such false/friv olous

complaints before the High Court which has its own saga of

uncertainties causing undue pressure, harassment, stress and

tension on the so-called accused. The consequence of all this is

docket explosion and burden on Courts resulting in genuine

complaints and cases not being given due time and attention that

they need.

9.7 Courts then owe a duty to subject the allegations levelled in

the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to ascertain if a prima facie

case is made out or not, and whether there is any kernel of truth

in the allegations or whether the said allegations have been made

only with the sole intent of spite so as to harass the opposite party

with a prolonged process of criminal litigation, arrest and

46

sometimes a conviction which later on may result in an acquittal

by a higher Court or in a worse case, no relief at all being given to

an innocent party. This stands more true when prosecution arises

from a matrimonial dispute.

9.8 We are also cognisant of the fact that a genre of matrimonial

litigation is on the rise in this country which inevitably includes,

within its ambit, a rise in filing of false, frivolous and vexatious

cases with a mala fide intent and ulterior motive to wreck havoc

and vengeance on the spouse and in the bargain seek the best

compromise. Therefore, the Courts have to exercise utmost caution

and restraint while entertaining such suits and criminal

proceedings as any misstep and overreach can have a cascading

effect on the health, both mental and physical, of the parties

involved and the sanctity of the institution of marriage itself. At

this juncture, we find it appropriate to quote the observations of

this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Bihar,

(2025) 3 SCC 735 which is extracted as under:

“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a

criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without

specific allegations indicating their active involvement

should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact,

borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a

tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s

47

family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial

discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations

unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised

allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution.

Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent

misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid

unnecessary harassment of innocent family members…

xxx

30. … However, in recent years, as there have been a

notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country,

accompanied by growing discord and tension within the

institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a

growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A

of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta

against the husband and his family by a wife. Making

vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial

conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal

processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting

tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse

is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the

husband and his family in order to seek compliance with

the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this

Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting

the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima

facie case against them.”

9.9 In this aspect, we also find it pertinent to highlight some

important reflections made in Geddam Jhansi vs. State of

Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263 wherein this Court,

speaking through one of us, observed:

“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with

penal consequences involving coercive measures, which

can be permitted only when specific act(s) which

constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or

any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the

accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with

48

equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic

disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific

allegations and credible materials to support the same

may have disastrous consequences for the institution of

family, which is built on the premise of love, affection,

cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family

constitutes the core of human society. ...”

10. Before parting we observe that Indian society treats the

institution of marriage as sacrosanct and as a sublime union of two

individuals. This status or position ascribed to marriage comes

from deep historical and sociological roots where the institution of

marriage is considered the very foundation of society and family

being the most fundamental social unit and conglomeration of

humans.

10.1 Vexatious litigation in the realm of matrimonial disputes

based on frivolous and false allegations should be discouraged by

the courts and the members of the bar. Advocates ought to advise

their clients against the initiation of frivolous criminal proceedings

against their spouses rather than encouraging them to do so. In

this aspect, we find it appropriate to quote the observations of this

Court in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756

wherein this Court observed that:

“... the learned members of Bar have enormous social

responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fiber

49

of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must

ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should

not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the

complaints are filed either on their advice or with their

concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong

to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions

and should treat every complaint under section 498A as a

basic human problem and must make serious endeavour

to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of

that human problem. They must discharge their duties to

the best of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace

and tranquility of the society remains intact. The members

of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should

not lead to multiple cases.”

10.2 It is pertinent to underscore the important role played by the

legal fraternity in bringing down the overall pendency of the cases

in the Family Courts and criminal cases which are an adjunct to

matrimonial disputes by weeding out unimportant and vexatious

proceedings undertaken in pursuance of a personal vendetta by

unscrupulous litigants so as to fillip attention of the courts towards

genuine litigation and pressing issues and adjudication of claims.

This would lead to increasing the overall efficiency and disposal of

cases while at the same time preventing infraction of the interests

of justice and abuse of process of law.

11. In the aforementioned circumstances, keeping the judicial

dicta laid down by this Court in mind, the impugned order dated

15.09.2025 of the High Court is set aside and consequently,

50

Complaint Case No.05 of 2025 dated 10.09.2024, cognizance order

dated 07.02.2025 and the summoning order dated 18.08.2025

before the Court of Special Judge (POCSO Act)/Additional District

& Sessions Judge, Meerut thereto stand quashed qua the

appellants herein.

11.1 It is needless to observe that the observations made in the

present appeal shall not come in the way of any matrimonial or

other proceedings pending between the parties herein which shall

be decided on their own merits and in accordance with law.

11.2 The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

…………………………………..J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 29, 2026.