CRM-M-1784-2019  (O & M)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGA RH

(122)

CRM-M-1784-2019  (O & M)

  Reserved on:10.02.2026

Date of Pronouncement: 17.02.2026 

Date of Uploading : 17.02.2026

Jagmohan Sharma  …... Petitioner

V/s

State of Haryana  ...Respondent

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI

Present: Mr. Anil Mehta, Advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. Vipul Sherwal, AAG, Haryana.

Mr. Vivek Lamba, Advocate, for the complainant. 

****

JASJIT SINGH BEDI,   

 J. (Oral)   

The prayer in the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is

for quashing of FIR No.201 dated 30.07.2011 under Sections 167, 420, 467,

468, 471, 120B and 218 IPC registered at Police Station Sector 5, Panchkula

(Annexure   P-1),   the   order   dated   03.12.2018   (Annexure   P-2)   whereby

charges have been framed under Section 467, 468, 471, 166, 120B IPC and

Sections 8 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and all consequential

proceedings arising therefrom. 

2.  The brief facts of the case are that the aforementioned FIR

(Annexure P-1) came to be registered at the instance of the complainant-

Satyavir Singh Sheoran and reads as under:-

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Application for conducting an inquiry into the forgery and

manipulating tempering the ACR of applicant and for

registration of FIR against the culprits. R/Sir, The applicant

submits as under: 1) That the applicant joined service as a

'Forest Ranger' on 07.04.1981 and further was promoted as

Haryana Forest Service on 09.07.1999 on the basis of his hard

work and having unblemished service record, dedication and

scarification to protect the Forest Wealth from "destruction"

and "annihilation" without any fear and greed. 2) That

according to Punjab Govt. letter No. 1265AS1564/2377 dated

17.01.64 read with Haryana Govt. letter No.3130535571 dated

21.05.1971 and it is settled law that the facts of the confidential

report should have brought to the notice of delinquent person

during the year of the report and since same should have been

recorded with the report itself. In absence of such information

or notice, that person is deem to be having good service record.

3) That Govt. of India vide letter No.1015/2010 ASI dated

07.10.10 has directed that Govt. of Haryana vide letter above

stated to submit the names of the officers (State Forest Service)

Haryana Cadre for promotion to IFS for the year of 2008, 2009

and 2010 and the applicant was hope full that his name will be

included in the list of these officers as his all the ACR were very

good/Excellent, but some vested interest were not happy with

the promotion to the rank of IFS Haryana Cadre) of the

applicant and when confidential report of the applicant was in

custody of Superintendent for Financial Commissioner and

Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Haryana (Forest) for the

period 01.04.2009 to 14.07.2009 and someone in the office

fraudulently with mala fide intension and to cause wrongful

loss to the applicant, forged and manipulated the ACR of the

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applicant and word "I agree, which was written by Sh. Jeet

Ram, IFS (Rtd) in the ACR of applicant (reviewing authority

added words "up to some extent but he is dishonest". 4) That

the applicant was shocked to receive the report from the office

of Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Govt. of

Haryana Forest Department vide Memo No.2995ft5III5

2011/1182 dated 01.02.2011 in regard of his ACR and then the

applicants served a legal notice u/s 80 CPC to Sh. Jeet Ram,

IFS (Rtd) and Sh. Jeet Ram, IFS (Rtd) replied in response of

this legal notice that he had written only "I agree" and the rest

of the word are not in his hand writing and somebody else has

added these words later on. 5) That the applicant under RTI

requested the office of Principal Chief Conservator of Forests,

Haryana for supply of copy of his ACR which was provided to

the applicant and applicant sent the certified copy of ACR to

Dr. JassyAnand, Forensic Expert for comparison and the expert

prepared his report with photo copy and found that in the ACR

column of remarks of reviewing authority dated 28.04.2010

there is an addition I the line "1 agree upto the extent but he is

dishonest is not in one hand and differ with I agree". 6) That

the ACR of the applicant was forged and tempered when the

name of HFS officers were sent for promotion to the post of IFS

(7 nos posts of Haryana cadre) and the candidates who were

junior in seniority to the applicant who were at Sr. No. 8 to 11

in the list will fraudulently in collusion with Suptt. / some junior

official in the office of Superintendent for Financial

Commissioner & Principal Secretary to Govt. of Haryana

Forest Department, Sector517, New Mini Sectt., Chandigarh. It

is requested to your good self that an inquiry be conducted and

those who tempered with ACR of applicant to create hurdles in

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my promotion to the post of IFS and forged the official record to

destroy the future of applicant, which is a heinous crime should

be prosecuted as per law. Applicant SD Satyavir Singh Sheoran.

3. During the course of investigation, the petitioner alongwith

other accused came to be nominated as accused and the report under Section

173(2) Cr.P.C. was submitted.  The petitioner filed petition (CRM-M-24480-

2018) for quashing of the FIR which was came to be withdrawn on

18.12.2018 with the liberty to the petitioner to raise all pleas before the Trial

Court at the appropriate stage.

4. Thereafter, charges were framed against the petitioner and his

co-accused vide order dated 03.12.2018 (Annexure P-2).

5.  The aforementioned FIR (Annexure P-1) and the order framing

charges (Annexure P-2) are impugned in the present petition.

6.  The   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   contends  that   the

petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case after 06 years on

the disclosure statement of the co-accused Virender Sharma and Devender

Kumar.  Various statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. have been recorded

much after the registration of the FIR which creates a doubt in the case of

the prosecution.  No motive lay with the petitioner to commit the offence in

question as he was already in the zone of consideration for the promotion to

the IFS.  For four promotion posts, 11 names of officers were sent.  The

complainant was at   Sr. No.5 and the petitioner was at Sr. No.10.   The

motive to fabricate the ACR lay with the officer at No.6 and not with the

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petitioner. While the petitioner had an outstanding record, the complainant’s

case was one of doubtful integrity and so he could not have been promoted

in any case.  As the petitioner is a Government servant, the investigating

agency had to seek sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. prior to the Court

taking cognizance  and therefore, charges could not have been framed.  He,

therefore, prays that the FIR (Annexure P-1) and the order framing charges

(Annexure P-2) be quashed.

7. The learned counsel for the State and for the complainant-

Satyavir Singh Sheoran, on the other hand, contend that the statement of co-

accused/Varinder Sharma-Superintendent was recorded during the course of

investigation in which he has described in detail as to how and in what

manner at the instance of the petitioner, the ACR of the complainant was

fabricated in the hand-writing of Devender Kumar-Clerk.  The statement of

Devender Kumar-Clerk has also been recorded wherein he admitted that he

had fabricated the ACR at the instance of the petitioner and Varinder

Sharma.  Similarly, the statement of  Jagdish Nain was recorded during the

course of investigation wherein he stated that to get a favourable report

regarding the hand-writing of Devender Kumar on the forged ACR, he had

paid a bribe to one Dr.Harsh Wardhan of FSL, Madhuban.   They further

contend that prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was not required in the

instant case because the petitioner, by allegedly conspiring to fabricate the

ACR of a colleagur cannot be said to be acting in discharge of his official

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duty.   In fact, there is sufficient evidence to frame charges against the

petitioner and his co-accused.   They, therefore, contend that the present

petition is liable to be dismissed.

8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

9. The parameters of quashing of an FIR have been laid down in

the judgment of ‘State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., (1992)

Supp (1) SCC 335’ and the same are  reproduced as under:-

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chaper XIV and of the

principles of law enunciated by this Court in a serious of decisions

relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226

or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have

extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of

cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be excercised

either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down

any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

"(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report

or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose

a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police

officers under Section  156(1) of the Code except under an order

of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the

Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do

not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case

against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non5cognizable offence,

no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an

order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section  155(2)of

the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

and with a view to spite him due to private and personal

grudge."

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments has held that

disputed   questions   of   fact   and   the   defence   of   an   accused   cannot   be

considered to quash an FIR and/or the report under Section 193 of BNSS.

Such disputed questions of fact and the defence of an accused can only be

adjudicated upon during the course of the Trial.  The relevant judgments in

this regard are as under:-

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In ‘Maksud Saiyed versus State of Gujarat & Ors. 2007(4)

RCR(Criminal) 406’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

6. The jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a FIR in exercise

of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure is well known. The court may not enter into

determination of a disputed question of fact at that stage. It

may, however, take note of the allegations made in the

complaint petition vis5a5vis the conduct of the parties. It is not

disputed that the bank had filed an original application before

the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad. A civil suit was filed

at Vadodara in the year 2003. In the prospectus issued, it was

stated :

"Sr.

No. 

Suit

details 

Date   of

Filing 

Name of the

party 

Branch Amount   claimed

(Rs. in lacs)

4  DRT, A 

'bad 

28.3.03 

M/s. 

Nagami 

Nicotine 

Pvt. Ltd. 

A.R.B. 

A'bad 

993.74  The   case   is   filed

against the Bank for

non-submission   of

export bills and non-

releasing   of   the

sanctioned limits. We

have taken plea that

since the borrower is

not clearing the dues

of   the   Bank,   Bank

has not released the

export   bills   as   per

procedure of UCPDC

rules."

In  ‘Koppisetti Subbharao @ Subramaniam versus State of A.P.

2009(2) RCR(Criminal) 860’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

25. The High Court was justified in holding that disputed

questions of fact are involved and the application under section

482 of Code has been rightly rejected. We do not find any scope

for interference with the order of the High Court. However, we

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make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the

merits of the case.

In  ‘Ashfaq Ahmed Qurereshi and another vesus Namrata

Chopra and others 2014(1) RCR(Criminal) 528’,  the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held as under:-

4. There is sufficient evidence on record to show that the

property belonged not only to the respondent Nos. 1 & 2, but

they were the owners alongwith respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The

respondent No. 3 has died and respondent No. 4 has been

deleted from the array of parties by this court earlier. There is

ample evidence on record that the permission had been sought

and obtained from Municipal Corporation of Bhopal for raising

the construction of a Club House and the land in dispute had

been shown as vacant land for parking. It is too late for the

respondent Nos. 1 & 2 to say that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4

might have forged their signatures for the reason that it is not

their case in the counter affidavit or even before the High Court

that they had ever raised any objection or filed any complaint

before the police or any competent court for forging their

signatures by someone else on the said application. More so,

there are disputes regarding partition and demarcation of

shares between the respective parties. The sale deeds are also

on record that their shares have been sold not only by

respondent Nos. 3 & 4 but also by respondent Nos. 1 & 2

subsequently and there is no land available today. No

explanation could be furnished by Mr. Prashant Kumar

appearing for respondent nos. 1 & 2 as to why this fact had not

been brought to the notice of the court.

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5. As the case raises a large number of disputed questions of

fact, we are of the considered opinion that there was no

occasion for the High Court to allow the petition under Section

482 Cr.P.C. and quash the criminal proceedings qua the said

respondents.

In  ‘Rishipal   Singh   versus   State   of   U.P.   and   another   2014(3)

RCR(Criminal) 637’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

11. This Court in Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v.

Biological E. Ltd. and Others, 2000(2) RCR (Criminal) 122 :

2000 (3) SCC 269, has discussed at length about the scope and

ambit while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and

how cautious and careful the approach of the Courts should be.

We deem it apt to extract the relevant portion from that

judgement, which reads:

"Exercise   of   jurisdiction   under   inherent   power   as

envisaged   in   section  482  of   the   Code   to   have   the

complaint or the charge sheet quashed is an exception

rather than rule and the case for quashing at the initial

stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to

scuttle   the   prosecution   with   the   lodgement   of   First

Information Report. The ball is set to roll and thenceforth

the   law   takes   it's   own   course   and   the   investigation

ensures in accordance with the provisions of law. The

jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and it's

undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In

the   event,   however,   the   Court   on   a   perusal   of   the

complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations

levelled in the complaint or charge sheet on the fact of it

does not constitute or disclose any offence alleged, there

ought   not   to   be   any   hesitation   to   rise   up   to   the

expectation of the people and deal with the situations as

is required under the law. Frustrated litigants ought not to

be indulged to give vent to their vindictiveness through a

legal process and such an investigation ought not to be

allowed to be continued since the same is opposed to the

concept of justice, which is paramount".

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12. This Court in plethora of judgments has laid down the

guidelines with regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,

1991(1) RCR (Criminal) 383 : 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, this

Court has listed the categories of cases when the power under

Section 482 can be exercised by the Court. These principles or

the guidelines were reiterated by this Court in (1) Central

Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd.,

1996(3) RCR (Criminal) 60 : 1996 (5) SCC 592; (2) Rajesh

Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, 1999(2) RCR (Criminal) 160 :

1999 (3) SCC 259 and; (3) Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd.

v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Anr., 2004(4) RCR (Criminal) 937 :

(2005) 1 SCC 122. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceuticals Ltd.,

observed that:

"The power under section 482 of the Code should be used

sparingly and with to prevent abuse of process of Court,

but not to stifle legitimate prosecution. There can be no

two opinions on this, but if it appears to the trained

judicial mind that continuation of a prosecution would

lead to abuse of process of Court, the power under

section  482  of   the   Code   must   be   exercised   and

proceedings must be quashed". Also see Om Prakash and

Ors. v. State of Jharkhand, 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 662 :

2012(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 127 : 2012 (12)

SCC 72.

What emerges from the above judgments is that when a

prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the tests

to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted

allegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the

case. The Courts have to see whether the continuation of the

complaint amounts to abuse of process of law and whether

continuation of the criminal proceeding results in miscarriage

of justice or when the Court comes to a conclusion that

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quashing these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of

justice, then the Court can exercise the power under Section

482 Cr.P.C. While exercising the power under the provision, the

Courts have to only look at the uncontroverted allegation in the

complaint whether prima facie discloses an offence or not, but

it should not convert itself to that of a trial Court and dwell into

the disputed questions of fact.

In ‘Tilly Gifford versus Michael Floyd Eshwar & Anr. 2018(1)

RCR (Criminal) 350’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

4. A perusal of the order of the High Court released on

21.05.2015 would indicate that the High Court has gone far

beyond the contours of its power and jurisdiction under Section

482 Cr.P.C., 1973 to quash a criminal proceeding, the extent of

such jurisdiction having been dealt with by this Court in

numerous pronouncements over the last half century. Time and

again, it has been emphasised by this Court that the power

under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 would not permit the High

Court to go into disputed questions of fact or to appreciate the

defence of the accused. The power to interdict a criminal

proceeding at the stage of investigation is even more rare.

Broadly speaking, a criminal investigation, unless tainted by

clear mala fides, should not be foreclosed by a Court of Law.

In   ‘Ravi   Karumabaiah   versus   State   and   Anr.   2015(37)

RCR(Criminal) 751’, the Delhi High Court held as under:-

19. As alleged by the petitioner, there are disputed questions of

facts which can be considered by learned Trial Court during

trial. The petitioner will get the liberty to defend his case, but at

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this stage the trial cannot be stopped by quashing the

proceedings, as sought by petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner

has failed to establish any illegality or perversity in the orders

passed by learned Trial Court as well as learned Revisional

Court. Therefore, I am not inclined to exercise inherent powers

under Section 482 Cr P C of this Court.

In ‘Sumit Bansal versus M/s MGI Developers And Promoters

And Another 2026(1) RCR(Criminal) 419’,  the Supreme Court held as

under:-

28. On these lines, it is apt clear that even though the powers

under Section 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment

requires the High Court to be more cautious and diligent. While

examining any complaint or FIR, the High Court exercising its

power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the

genuineness of the allegations made. The Court must only

consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed

against the accused or not.

XXXX XXXX XXXX

34. Whether those cheques were issued as alternative or

supplementary instruments, or represented fresh undertakings,

is a disputed question of fact requiring evidence at the time of

trial and cannot be resolved at the threshold. Questions such as

whether the firm's cheques were issued in substitution of the

personal cheques, whether the parties treated them as

alternative securities, and whether both were intended to be

simultaneously enforceable, are all mixed questions of fact. The

inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the

Cr.PC cannot be used to decide such disputed issues.

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11. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that an FIR

and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom can be quashed where a

bare perusal of the FIR and the uncontroverted allegations do not constitute

an offence or where the allegations levelled are completely absurd and

improbable on the face of it.   The defence of the accused and disputed

questions of fact cannot be examined in proceedings under the 482 Cr.P.C.

(528 of BNSS, 2023).

12. As   regards   requirement   of   sanction   for   prosecution   under

Section 197 Cr.P.C., the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Om Prakash Yadav

versus Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay & Ors. 2024 INSC 979’, held as under:-

65. Thus, the legal position that emerges from a conspectus of

all the decisions referred to above is that it is not possible to

carve out one universal rule that can be uniformly applied to

the multivarious facts and circumstances in the context of which

the protection under section 197 CrPC, 1973 is sought for. Any

attempt to lay down such a homogenous standard would create

unnecessary rigidity as regards the scope of application of this

provision. In this context, the position of law may be

summarized as under: 5

(i) The object behind the enactment of section 197 CrPC,

1973 is to protect responsible public servants against

institution   of   possibly   false   or   vexatious   criminal

proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed

by them while they are acting or purporting to act in their

official capacity. It is to ensure that the public servants

are not prosecuted for anything which is done by them in

the   discharge   of   their   official   duties,   without   any

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reasonable cause. The provision is in the form of an

assurance to the honest and sincere officers so that they

can perform their public duties honestly, to the best of

their ability and in furtherance of public interest, without

being demoralized.

(ii) The expression "any offence alleged to have been

committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duty" in section  197 CrPC, 1973

must neither be construed narrowly nor widely and the

correct approach would be to strike a balance between

the   two   extremes.   The   section   should   be   construed

strictly to the extent that its operation is limited only to

those acts which are discharged in the "course of duty".

However, once it has been ascertained that the act or

omission   has   indeed   been   committed   by   the   public

servant in the discharge of his duty, then a liberal and

wide construction must be given to a particular act or

omission so far as its "official" nature is concerned.

(iii) It is essential that the Court while considering the

question of applicability of section 197 CrPC, 1973 truly

applies its mind to the factual situation before it. This

must be done in such a manner that both the aspects are

taken care of viz., on one hand, the public servant is

protected   under   section  197  CrPC,   1973   if   the   act

complained of falls within his official duty and on the

other, appropriate action be allowed to be taken if the act

complained of is not done or purported to be done by the

public servant in the discharge of his official duty.

(iv) A public servant can only be said to act or purport to

act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such

that it lies within the scope and range of his official

duties.   The   act   complained   of   must   be   integrally

connected or directly linked to his duties as a public

servant for the purpose of affording protection under

section 197 CrPC, 1973. Hence, it is not the duty which

requires an examination so much as the "act" itself.

(v) One of the foremost tests which was laid down in this

regard was - whether the public servant, if challenged,

can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue

of his office.

(vi) Later, the test came to be re-modulated. It was laid

down that there must be a reasonable connection between

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the act done and the discharge of the official duty and the

act must bear such relation to the duty such that the

accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or

fanciful claim, that his actions were in the course of

performance of his duty. Therefore, the sine qua non for

the   applicability   of   this   section   is   that   the   offence

charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be

committed by the public servant either in his official

capacity or under the color of the office held by him such

that there is a direct or reasonable connection between

the act and the official duty.

(vii) If in performing his official duty, the public servant

acts in excess of his duty, the excess by itself will not be

a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from

protection under section  197  CrPC, 1973 if it is found

that there existed a reasonable connection between the act

done and the performance of his official duty.

(viii) It is the "quality" of the act that must be examined

and the mere fact that an opportunity to commit an

offence is furnished by the official position would not be

enough to attract section 197 CrPC, 1973.

(ix) The legislature has thought fit to use two distinct

expressions "acting" or "purporting to act". The latter

expression means that even if the alleged act was done

under the color of office, the protection under section 197

CrPC, 1973 can be given. However, this protection must

not   be   excessively   stretched   and   construed   as   being

limitless.   It   must   be   made   available   only   when   the

alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of

his official duty and not merely a cloak for doing the

objectionable act.

(x) There cannot be any universal rule to determine

whether there is a reasonable connection between the act

done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down

such a rule. However, a "safe and sure test" would be to

consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the

public servant to commit the act complained of would

have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of

his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the

affirmative, the protection under section 197 CrPC, 1973

can be granted since there was every connection with the

act complained of and the official duty of the public

servant.

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(xi) The provision must not be abused by public servants

to camouflage the commission of a crime under the

supposed   color   of   public   office.   The   benefit   of   the

provision must not be extended to public officials who try

to take undue advantage of their position and misuse the

authority vested in them for committing acts which are

otherwise not permitted in law. In such circumstances,

the acts committed must be considered dehors the duties

which   a   public   servant   is   required   to   discharge   or

perform.

(xii) On an application of the tests as aforesaid, if on

facts, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for

which the accused has been charged has a reasonable

connection with the discharge of his official duty, the

applicability of section  197 CrPC, 1973 cannot be denied.

In  ‘Shadakshari versus State of Karnataka & Anr. 2024(1)

RCR (Criminal) 730’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

18. As per sub section (1) of Section 197 where any person who

is or was a judge or magistrate or a public servant not

removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the

Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been

committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of

such offence except with the previous sanction of the Central

Government or the State Government, as the case may be.

19. The ambit, scope and effect of Section 197 Cr.PC has

received considerable attention of this court. It is not necessary

to advert to and dilate on all such decisions. Suffice it to say

that the object of such sanction for prosecution is to protect a

public servant discharging official duties and functions from

undue harassment by initiation of frivolous criminal

proceedings.

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20. In State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC

40, this court explained the underlying concept of protection

under Section 197 and held as follows:

"7. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect

responsible   public   servants   against   the   institution  of

possibly   vexatious   criminal   proceedings   for   offences

alleged to have been committed by them while they are

acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy

of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to

public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for

anything done by them in the discharge of their official

duties   without   reasonable   cause,   and   if   sanction   is

granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to

exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This

protection has certain limits and is available only when

the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably

connected with the discharge of his official duty and is

not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in

doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but

there is a reasonable connection between the act and the

performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a

sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the

protection. The question is not as to the nature of the

offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an

element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a

public servant, but whether it was committed by a public

servant   acting   or   purporting   to   act   as   such   in   the

discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can

be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned

was   accused   of   an   offence   alleged   to   have   been

committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which

requires examination so much as the act, because the

official act can be performed both in the discharge of the

official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must

fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the

public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act

which is important and the protection of this section is

available if the act falls within the scope and range of his

official   duty.  There   cannot   be   any   universal   rule   to

determine   whether   there   is   a   reasonable   connection

between the act done and the official duty, nor is it

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possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test

in this regard would be to consider if the omission or

neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act

complained of could have made him answerable for a

charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to

this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such

act was committed by the public servant while acting in

the discharge of his official duty and there was every

connection with the act complained of and the official

duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that

the concept of Section   197  does not get immediately

attracted on institution of the complaint case."

21. This aspect was also examined by this court in Shambhu

Nath Misra (supra). Posing the question as to whether a public

servant who allegedly commits the offence of fabrication of

records or misappropriation of public funds can be said to have

acted in the discharge of his official duties. Observing that it is

not the official duty to fabricate records or to misappropriate

public funds, this court held as under:

"5. The question is when the public servant is alleged to

have committed the offence of fabrication of record or

misappropriation of public fund etc. can he be said to

have acted in discharge of his official duties. It is not the

official duty of the public servant to fabricate the false

records   and   misappropriate   the   public   funds   etc.   in

furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties.

The official capacity only enables him to fabricate the

record or misappropriate the public fund etc. It does not

mean   that   it   is   integrally   connected   or   inseparably

interlinked with the crime committed in the course of the

same transaction, as was believed by the learned Judge.

Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the

view expressed by the High Court as well as by the trial

court on the question of sanction is clearly illegal and

cannot be sustained."

22. Even in D. Devaraja (supra) relied upon by learned counsel

for respondent No. 2, this court referred to Ganesh Chandra

Jew (supra) and held as follows:

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"35. In State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew [State of

Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 : 2004

SCC (Cri) 2104] this Court interpreted the use of the

expression   "official   duty"  to   imply   that   the   act   or

omission must have been done by the public servant in

course of his service and that it should have been in

discharge of his duty. section  197 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 does not extend its protective cover to

every act or omission done by a public servant while in

service. The scope of operation of the section is restricted

to only those acts or omissions which are done by a

public servant in discharge of official duty."

23. Thus, this court has been consistent in holding that Section

197 Cr.PC does not extend its protective cover to every act or

omission of a public servant while in service. It is restricted to

only those acts or omissions which are done by public servants

in the discharge of official duties.

XXXX XXXX XXXX

25. The question whether respondent No.2 was involved in

fabricating official documents by misusing his official position

as a public servant is a matter of trial. Certainly, a view can be

taken that manufacturing of such documents or fabrication of

records cannot be a part of the official duty of a public servant.

If that be the position, the High Court was not justified in

quashing the complaint as well as the chargesheet in its

entirety, more so when there are two other accused persons

besides respondent No.2. There is another aspect of the matter.

Respondent No.2 had unsuccessfully challenged the complaint

in an earlier proceeding under Section 482 Cr.PC. Though

liberty was granted by the High Court to respondent No.2 to

challenge any adverse report if filed subsequent to the lodging

of the complaint, instead of confining the challenge to the

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chargesheet, respondent No.2 also assailed the complaint as

well which he could not have done.

26. That being the position, we are of the unhesitant view that

the High Court had erred in quashing the complaint as well as

the chargesheet in its entirety. Consequently, we set aside the

order of the High Court dated 25.11.2020 passed in Criminal

Petition No. 4998/2020. We make it clear that observations

made in this judgment are only for the purpose of deciding the

present challenge and should not be construed as our opinion

on merit. That apart, all contentions are kept open.

13. A reading of the aforementioned judgments would show that

forgery of a document cannot be said to be done in the discharge or

purported discharge of official duties.  In fact, the act committed must be

integrally connected or perfectly linked to the duties of a public servant for

being accorded to the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C.

14. As regards framing of charges in ‘Union of India versus

Prafulla Kumar Samal and another 1979 AIR Supreme Court 366’, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that grave suspicion is sufficient to frame

charges.

15.  Coming back to the facts of the present case, the contention of

the petitioner that he had no motive to commit the offence in question being

at Sr. No.10 as against the complainant who was at Sr. No.5 cannot be

adjudicated upon in summary proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (528

BNSS).  Similarly, the contention that the complainant could not have been

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considered for promotion due to his ACRs not being up to the mark as

against the petitioner who was an outstanding officer which fact establishes

that the petitioner did not have the motive to commit the offence cannot be

gone into in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 BNSS) as it

would amount to adjudicating upon disputed questions of fact which is the

domain of the Trial Court.

Prima facie, the statements of Varinder Sharma-Superintendent

and  Devender  Kumar-Clerk show that at  the   behest of  the  petitioner,

Devender Kumar forged the ACR of the complainant and then paid accused-

Jagdish   Nain   to   obtain   a   favourable   hand-writing   report   from   FSL

Madhuban. 

For the offences of forgery etc., sanction under Section 197

Cr.P.C. is not required, moreso, in a case when it pertains to the forgery of an

ACR of a colleague.  In fact, the petitioner could not be said to be acting in

discharge of his official duty while conspiring to forge the said ACR.  

As   regards   the   challenge   to   the   order   framing   charges

(Annexure P-2), the material on record is sufficient to frame charges against

the petitioner and his co-accused as  there  is grave suspicion that the

petitioner and his co-accused have committed the offences in question.

16. It may not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner

had   initially   filed   CRM-M-24480-2018   seeking   quashing   of   the   FIR

(Annexure P-1).  It appears that when the Court was not inclined to quash

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the same, he withdrew the petition with liberty to approach the Trial Court.

Thereafter, charges came to be framed, pursuant to which the instant second

petition had been filed.  Nothing new has come on record to persuade this

Court to take a different view then that taken earlier.  On the contrary, 05 out

of the 38 prosecution witnesses already stand examined.  At this stage, the

question of quashing of the FIR (Annexure P-1) or the order framing charges

(Annexure P-2) does not arise. 

16. In view of the aforementioned discussion, I find no merit in the

present petition.  Therefore, the same stands dismissed.

17.  The Trial Court is directed to expedite the hearing of the case

and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible but preferably within a

period of 06 months from the next date of hearing fixed before it.

18. The pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of

accordingly.

February  17, 2026    ( JASJIT SINGH BEDI)

sukhpreet    JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether reportable :  Yes/No