W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 1 of 19

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 10.09.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 25.09.2026

Judgment uploaded on: 25.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010336622025

+ W.P.(C) 7254/2025 and CM APPL. 32667/2025

JAIWANTI .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Bharat Bhushan, Ms. Nidhi

Gupta and Mr. Anuay Mishra,

Advs.

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Raj Kumar Yadav & Ms,

Preeti Gothwal, Advs. for R-

1/UOI.

Ms. Monica Benjamin, SSC

with Ms. Laiba Arif and Ms.

Prerika Narang, Advs. for R-2

and R-4.

Ms. Vaishali Gupta, Panel

Counsel (Civil) GNCTD with

Ms. Rashi Aggarwal, Adv. for

R-3.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV

J U D G M E N T

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:

1. More than three years after the Petitioner‟s husband died, the

Department issued a Show Cause Notice

1

to the Petitioner proposing

penalties for acts allegedly committed by him during his lifetime.

Through the present Writ Petition, the Petitioner challenges that

1

For short, the „Notice‟ or „SCN‟

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 2 of 19

Notice and the Order-in-Original

passed pursuant to it, insofar as they

proceed against her.

2. Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

2

provides for tax, interest or penalty being “determined after his death”.

The question is whether those words permit proceedings to be

commenced after death, or only the completion of proceedings already

commenced during the deceased‟s lifetime.

3. For the reasons that follow, this Court holds that Section 93

does permit proceedings to be commenced after death, provided the

conditions prescribed by the provision are satisfied. Whether those

conditions were satisfied when the Department proceeded against the

Petitioner is a separate matter and does not depend on the existence of

the statutory power under Section 93 of the Act.

4. The Petitioner also challenges the constitutional validity of

Section 93(1)(b) of the CGST Act, which exposed the Petitioner to

such proceedings and seeks release of ₹15,40,000/- retained by the

Department. These issues fall for separate consideration.

FACTUAL MATRIX

5. The proceedings arise from an investigation conducted by the

Directorate General of GST Intelligence („DGGI‟) concerning alleged

fraudulent availment and passing on of Input Tax Credit and refund of

Integrated Goods and Services Tax on the strength of invoices without

corresponding supply of goods.

2

For short, the „CGST Act‟

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 3 of 19

6. The Show Cause Notice attributes a role to the Petitioner‟s

husband, late Sh. Ankit Dabas in relation to, inter alia, three entities,

M/s P.C. International, M/s Satguru Corporation and M/s B.K.

Enterprises. The present Writ petition is confined to the penalty

proposed in respect of his alleged acts and the liability sought to be

enforced against the Petitioner as his legal representative.

7. On 23.07.2020, the residential premises of late Sh. Ankit Dabas

at Dwarka, New Delhi were searched. Cash amounting to ₹15,40,000/-

was found during the search. The SCN records that the amount was

voluntarily submitted by the husband of the Petitioner with the

Department till completion of the investigation, as security against any

tax liability which might arise or for any other purpose permitted by

law. It further records that the amount was thereafter kept in a fixed

deposit with the State Bank of India, R.K. Puram Branch, New Delhi.

The Petitioner disputes the legality of the taking and continued

retention of the said amount.

8. Sh. Ankit Dabas died on 06.05.2021. During the investigation,

the Department was informed of his death through a letter dated

05.10.2021 from his cousin, Sh. Sachin Dabas, along with a copy of

the death certificate. The communication also requested that any

inquiry relating to late Sh. Ankit Dabas be forwarded to the Petitioner

at her address in Sector-106, Gurugram, Haryana.

9. On 31.07.2024, the SCN was issued to several noticees,

including the Petitioner. Insofar as the Petitioner is concerned, it

proposed separate penalties under Section 122(3)(a) of the CGST Act

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 4 of 19

and the corresponding provisions referred to therein, by invoking

Section 93 against her as the legal representative of her late husband.

The Notice stated that the proposed penalty was in respect of the “acts

and deeds of Late Sh. Ankit Dabas”. It also proposed appropriation of

₹15,40,000/- towards the proposed liability.

10. The Order-in-Original dated 01.02.2025

3

records that the

adjudication arose from the aforesaid SCN as well as a corrigendum

dated 16.12.2024 issued by the Additional Director, DGGI

Headquarters. The corrigendum has not been placed on record before

this Court.

11. The Petitioner did not participate in the adjudication

proceedings. She maintains that she did not receive the Notice and

consequently filed no reply. The Respondents dispute this assertion

and rely upon the modes of service stated to have been adopted under

Section 169 of the CGST Act. The Adjudicating Authority proceeded

ex parte against those noticees who had not responded.

12. In the operative portion of the Impugned Order, clause AD

imposes a penalty of ₹1,50,000/- upon the Petitioner. The immediately

succeeding clause AE, however, contains a statement that no penalty

is being imposed upon the Petitioner and also contains inconsistent

language concerning appropriation of ₹15,40,000/-.

SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES

13. Learned counsel representing the Petitioner submits that the

3

For short, the „Impugned Order‟, or „OIO‟

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 5 of 19

expression “is determined after his death” occurring in Section 93(1)

of the CGST Act permits only completion of proceedings which had

already commenced during the lifetime of the deceased. According to

him, fresh proceedings proposing a penalty for the alleged acts of late

Sh. Ankit Dabas could not have been initiated against the Petitioner

more than three years after his death.

14. It is further submitted that liability for aiding or abetting under

Section 122(3)(a) is founded upon the personal conduct of the alleged

wrongdoer. The Petitioner also relies upon Section 126(3) and

contends that a legal representative cannot meaningfully answer

allegations concerning matters within the personal knowledge of a

person who is no longer alive. On this foundation, Section 93(1)(b) of

the Act, insofar as it permits determination of a penalty after death, is

also assailed as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution. The Petitioner additionally disputes service of the Notice

and the continued retention of ₹15,40,000/- by the Department.

15. Per contra, Ms. Monica Benjamin, learned Senior Standing

Counsel representing the Respondents, submits that Section 93

expressly contemplates determination of tax, interest or penalty after

death and contains no requirement that adjudicatory proceedings must

have commenced during the lifetime of the deceased. It is emphasised

that the investigation had commenced during the lifetime of late Sh.

Ankit Dabas and his statement had also been recorded.

16. The Respondents further contend that the penalty contemplated

under Section 122 of the CGST Act is a civil liability and that

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 6 of 19

principles governing abatement of criminal proceedings are

inapplicable. They dispute the plea of non-service and maintain that

the SCN was served through the modes contemplated by Section 169

of the Act. An objection is also raised to the entertainment of the

present Writ Petition in view of the statutory remedy of Appeal under

Section 107. The Respondents also contend that the Petitioner has

only approached this Court as the ordinary period of three months

prescribed for filing such Appeal had already expired.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

17. The objection regarding availability of an alternative statutory

remedy requires a distinction to be drawn between the questions raised

in the present Writ Petition. The construction of Section 93, including

whether proceedings may be commenced after the death of the person

whose alleged conduct gives rise to the proposed liability, is a

question of law. The challenge to the constitutional validity of Section

93(1)(b) also requires consideration by this Court. In Godrej Sara Lee

Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority

4

, the

Supreme Court distinguished the maintainability of a Writ Petition

from the discretion to entertain it and recognised that a pure question

of law may be examined notwithstanding the availability of an

alternative remedy. This Court, therefore, proceeds to examine these

questions.

18. The same consideration does not require this Court to undertake

an appellate examination of the Impugned Order in all respects.

4

Civil Appeal No.5393/2010, decided on 01.02.2023

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 7 of 19

Whether the SCN was duly served, whether the material on record

establishes the alleged contravention, whether the requirements of

Section 93(1)(b) are satisfied on the facts, the computation of the

penalty and the effect of the operative clauses of the OIO concern the

individual adjudication. These are matters which can appropriately be

examined in the statutory Appeal. The exercise of jurisdiction under

Article 226 ought not to substitute the appellate mechanism for

determination of such issues.

19. There is one further aspect concerning the availability of that

remedy. The Impugned Order is dated 01.02.2025, whereas the

present Writ Petition was instituted on 23.05.2025. Section 107(1) of

the Act prescribes a period of three months from “communication of

the decision or order” for filing an Appeal, and sub-section (4) permits

the Appellate Authority, upon sufficient cause being shown, to allow

it to be presented within a further period of one month. Even if, for the

limited purpose of examining the chronology, the date of the

Impugned Order itself is taken as the date of its communication, the

present Writ Petition was instituted before expiry of that further

period. The Petitioner has thereafter been prosecuting her challenge

before this Court. Having regard to these circumstances, after deciding

the questions of law noticed above, the Petitioner shall be relegated to

the Statutory remedy of Appeal under Section 107 of the Act in

respect of the remaining objections to the Order-In-Original. The

Petitioner can appropriately seek condonation of delay, if any remains,

after excluding the period spent in prosecuting this Writ Petition and

the period of four weeks given for filing the Appeal.

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 8 of 19

20. Section 93(1) of the CGST Act, insofar as relevant, reads as

follows:

“93. Special provisions regarding liability to pay tax, interest or

penalty in certain cases.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in the

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), where a

person, liable to pay tax, interest or penalty under this Act, dies,

then––

(a) if a business carried on by the person is continued after

his death by his legal representative or any other person,

such legal representative or other person, shall be liable to

pay tax, interest or penalty due from such person under this

Act; and

(b) if the business carried on by the person is discontinued,

whether before or after his death, his legal representative

shall be liable to pay, out of the estate of the deceased, to the

extent to which the estate is capable of meeting the charge,

the tax, interest or penalty due from such person under this

Act,

whether such tax, interest or penalty has been determined before his

death but has remained unpaid or is determined after his death.”

(Emphasis supplied)

21. Three features of the provision are significant. First, Section 93

includes a penalty. Secondly, it contemplates a liability which is

determined after the death of the person concerned. Thirdly, the nature

and extent of representative liability depend upon whether clause (a)

or clause (b) is attracted. Under clause (b), payment is confined to the

estate of the deceased and only to the extent that the estate is capable

of meeting the charge.

22. The construction urged by the Petitioner, in essence, would

require the words “is determined after his death” to be read as

meaning “is determined after his death in proceedings already

commenced during his lifetime”. The provision contains no such

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 9 of 19

qualification. Its concluding words distinguish a liability determined

before death but remaining unpaid from one determined thereafter.

They do not make a Notice during the deceased‟s lifetime a condition

precedent to the latter determination.

23. The opening words “where a person, liable to pay tax, interest

or penalty under this Act, dies” do not lead to a different conclusion.

Those words cannot be confined to a liability already quantified

before death, for the provision itself contemplates the tax, interest or

penalty being determined thereafter. The underlying liability must, of

course, arise from conduct attributable to the deceased under the

substantive provisions of the Act. Section 93 enables that liability to

be determined and, where its conditions are satisfied, enforced through

the legal representative in the manner prescribed therein.

24. The fact that investigation had commenced and the statement of

late Sh. Ankit Dabas had been recorded during his lifetime does not

constitute the source of this power. Investigation and adjudication are

distinct stages. It is unnecessary to treat the investigation itself as

commencement of penalty proceedings in order to sustain a post-death

determination. The authority to make a determination after death must

be found in the statute itself and, in the present case, follows from

Section 93. The material collected during the lifetime of the deceased

may nevertheless form part of the evidentiary record in the

adjudication.

25. Section 93 must at the same time be kept distinct from Section

122(3)(a) of the Act. Section 122(3)(a) applies to a person who aids or

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 10 of 19

abets any of the offences specified in clauses (i) to (xxi) of Section

122(1) and provides for a penalty which may extend to ₹25,000/-.

Whether late Sh. Ankit Dabas committed the alleged acts is one

question. Whether the pecuniary consequence of any such proved

contravention can thereafter be enforced through Section 93 is

another. Section 93 of the Act is not an independent penal provision

against the legal representative.

26. Those conditions remain integral to representative liability.

Clause (a) concerns a business continued after death, whereas clause

(b) concerns a business which stands discontinued. In the latter

situation, liability is expressly confined to the estate of the deceased

and to the extent that the estate is capable of meeting the charge.

Whether the requirements of clause (b) are established on the facts of

the present case is distinct from the question whether proceedings may

at all be commenced after death. As noticed above, the former is a

matter which may appropriately be examined in the statutory Appeal.

27. In Shabina Abraham v. Collector of Central Excise and

Customs

5

, the Supreme Court found no machinery in the applicable

Excise legislation for assessment against the legal representatives of a

deceased individual. A provision for recovery of sums already payable

could not supply that omission. The decision requires statutory

authority for determination against an estate, and it does not establish

that fiscal proceedings invariably abate upon death.

28. Here, Section 93 itself provides for determination after death

5

(2015) 10 SCC 770

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 11 of 19

and identifies the representative and the permissible source of

payment. It operates alongside the Act‟s adjudicatory provisions.

Section 122 supplies the substantive penalty, Section 126 requires a

hearing and disciplines its imposition. Explanation 1(ii) to Section 74

recognises connected proceedings against persons liable to penalty

under Section 122. These provisions operate within their respective

fields. The power to determine liability after death follows from

Section 93 read with that scheme, rather than from a rule or a recovery

provision alone.

29. The Petitioner also relies upon Commissioner of Income Tax v.

Late Dr. K.C.G. Verghese

6

. There, penalty proceedings under the

Income Tax Act were initiated after the death of the assessee, and the

Madras High Court upheld deletion of the penalty. The Court

observed, inter alia, that no penalty proceedings had been initiated

against the assessee during his lifetime and that the assessment had

not been made in the hands of the legal representatives. Significantly,

Section 159(2)(b) expressly permits „any proceeding which could

have been taken against the deceased if he had survived‟ to be taken

against the legal representative. Despite that language, the Court

concluded that the penalty proceedings could not be sustained. The

decision undoubtedly supports the Petitioner‟s submission that the

death of the alleged wrongdoer may have consequences for

subsequent penalty proceedings.

30. The proposition cannot, however, be treated as a rule operating

independently of the statutory scheme. The Allahabad High Court in

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 12 of 19

Kalawati Devi v. Income Tax Officer

7

took a different view while

construing the same statutory provision of the Income Tax Act. There,

the legal representative contended that she could not reasonably

explain the inaccurate particulars furnished by the deceased, since the

relevant facts were within his personal knowledge. The Court

nevertheless held that penalty proceedings for a default committed by

the deceased could be commenced or continued against the legal

representatives. The Court relied upon the express legislative

extension of liability to sums which the deceased would have been

liable to pay had he survived.

31. This Court does not read Dr. Verghese (supra) as laying down a

rule applicable irrespective of the statutory scheme. Section 93 of the

CGST Act itself answers the question. By contemplating a penalty

being “determined after his death”, the provision permits liability

attributable to the deceased‟s conduct to be adjudicated through his

legal representative, subject to the conditions prescribed therein. A

Show Cause Notice issued during the lifetime of the person concerned

would neither establish the alleged contravention nor determine the

penalty. The alleged contravention would still have to be established

in adjudication. The CGST Act does not make issuance of such a

notice during lifetime a condition precedent to a determination after

death. This conclusion follows from the language of the provision and

scheme of the CGST Act itself, without recourse to the deeming

provisions contained in the Income Tax Act.

6

(2019) 416 ITR 155 (Mad).

7

(1981) 21 CTR (All) 62

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 13 of 19

32. The decision of this Court in Lal Chand Verma v. Union of

India, W.P.(C) 8184/2023, decided on 08.01.2025, as relied upon by

the Petitioner, arose in a different factual setting. The notice was

issued in the deceased assessee‟s name despite intimation of his death,

and this Court specifically noted that no notice under Section

159(2)(b) had been issued to the legal heir. Its observations must be

read in that setting. Here, the SCN identifies the Petitioner and

invokes Section 93 in her representative capacity. Whether the Notice

was validly served is, as already noticed, a separate question.

33. The constitutional challenge requires consideration on this

construction. Section 93(1)(b) must therefore be examined on the

grounds of discrimination and denial of a meaningful defence as

advanced by the Petitioner.

34. The provision preserves liabilities attributable to the deceased‟s

lifetime conduct for lawful determination and satisfaction from his

estate. Death creates the need for someone to represent that estate. The

resulting distinction bears a direct relation to the statutory purpose.

Section 93 does not deem the representative to have committed the

alleged wrong, and clause (b) confines payment to the estate‟s

capacity to meet the charge. The underlying contravention and the

conditions of representative liability must still be established by the

Adjudicating Authority.

35. The loss of the person possessing first-hand knowledge may

seriously affect the explanation available to the representative and the

weight that can fairly be attached to the evidence. Section 126(3) of

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 14 of 19

the CGST Act in fact requires an effective opportunity of hearing. The

representative must receive the relied-upon material and be permitted

to contest the alleged contravention, the statutory basis and the

proposed amount. Inability to give a personal account of the

deceased‟s affairs cannot be treated as an admission. The statute also

preserves an Appeal against an adverse determination.

36. These safeguards answer the contention that Section 93 confers

unguided power or necessarily denies a defence. A particular

adjudication may fail for want of evidence or a fair opportunity. That

does not establish that every determination after death must be unfair.

The presumption of constitutionality and the latitude recognised for

economic legislation in R.K. Garg v. Union of India

8

, do not exclude

scrutiny under Article 14. Here, the statutory purpose, representative

procedure and limitation to estate assets provide a rational basis for

the provision.

37. The Petitioner‟s reliance upon Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v.

A.V. Visvanatha Sastri

9

, does not alter this conclusion. That decision

concerned materially different procedures applied to comparable

classes of tax evaders. Section 93(1)(b) does not withdraw ordinary

adjudicatory safeguards from a selected class. It provides for

representation after death while limiting the source of payment. On the

grounds urged, the provision is neither discriminatory nor manifestly

arbitrary. The constitutional challenge is accordingly rejected.

38. The conclusions reached above answer the questions

8

(1981) 4 SCC 675

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 15 of 19

concerning the scope and constitutional validity of Section 93. Insofar

as the merits of the Impugned Order are concerned, there is a

fundamental uncertainty in the operative portion of the Impugned

Order. Clauses AD and AE therein read as under:

―AD. I impose Penalty of Rs. 1,50,000/- on Mrs. Jaiwanti Dabas, w/o

Late Sh. Ankit Dabas, for each instance of contravention of CGST Act,

IGST Act & respective State GST Acts and rules thereof in respect of

M/s P C International, M/s Satguru Corporation and M/s B.K

Enterprises under provisions of Section 122 (3)(a) of the CGST Act,

2017 and corresponding provisions of respective State GST Acts, 2017

read with Section 20 of the IGST Act, 2017, for his acts and deeds

detailed supra.

AE. I refrain from imposing any penalty upon Mrs. Jaiwanti Dabas,

w/o Late Sh. Ankit Dabas. I order appropriation of Cash amount of Rs

15.40 Lakhs voluntarily submitted by Late Sh. Ankit Dabas with the

department, should not be appropriated against the aforesaid

liability.‖

39. The apparent inconsistency between clauses AD and AE of the

Impugned Order was not addressed by either side during the course of

hearing. It would not be appropriate to make an issue which was not

argued before this Court an independent ground for interfering with

the Impugned Order. The questions based on facts and those touching

upon the merits of the Impugned Order-In-Original („OIO‟) can

appropriately be examined by the Appellate Authority.

40. The claim concerning ₹15,40,000/- requires separate

consideration. The Department describes the amount as voluntarily

submitted pending investigation and records its placement in a fixed

deposit. The Petitioner disputes that description. The Department must

establish a subsisting lawful basis for the continued retention and

account for the money and its earnings.

9

AIR 1955 SC 13

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 16 of 19

41. In K.M. Food Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Director General,

DGGI Headquarters, W.P.(C) 328/2024 and W.P.(C) 363/2024,

decided on 13.02.2024, this Court directed return of cash with the

interest earned on fixed deposits after finding no lawful justification

for its taking and retention. The factual position here differs because

voluntariness is disputed. Even on the Department‟s account,

however, a deposit pending investigation does not establish a right to

indefinite retention.

42. In view of the aforesaid, rather than adjudicating the disputed

factual questions concerning the taking of the money or construing

clauses AD and AE in these proceedings, the appropriate course is to

require the Respondents to furnish a complete account of the amount

and disclose the subsisting legal authority relied upon for retaining or

appropriating any part thereof. The Petitioner‟s claim may thereafter

be considered by the competent authority by a reasoned decision,

subject to the directions issued hereafter. This exercise shall not

amount to rectification, review or modification of the OIO, the effect

of which remains open for consideration in the statutory Appeal.

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

43. For these reasons, the contention that the Show Cause Notice

dated 31.07.2024 is without jurisdiction solely because it was issued

after death is rejected. The challenge to Section 93(1)(b) on the

constitutional grounds urged is also rejected. These conclusions do not

establish that the conditions of clause (b) are satisfied, that abetment

stands proved, or that the Notice is otherwise sustainable. The lapse of

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 17 of 19

three years after death does not create a bar under Section 93, but this

judgment confers no exemption from any applicable limitation

requirements.

44. No finding is returned on the merits of the Petitioner‟s

remaining objections thereto, including the service of the Notice,

proof of the alleged contravention, satisfaction of the conditions

prescribed by Section 93(1)(b), computation of the penalty, or the

meaning and effect of clauses AD and AE of the Impugned Order. All

such contentions of the parties are left open for consideration in

Appeal.

45. The Petitioner is granted liberty to institute an Appeal under

Section 107 of the CGST Act against the Impugned Order within a

period of four weeks from today. If such Appeal is instituted within

the aforesaid period, it shall be entertained and decided on merits and

shall not be rejected on the ground of limitation.

46. The Appellate Authority shall examine the issues left open

independently and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any

observation which may be construed as touching upon their merits.

The findings in the present judgment are confined to the questions

specifically decided herein concerning the interpretation and

constitutional validity of Section 93 of the CGST Act.

47. Independently, within three weeks from today, the Respondents

shall furnish to the Petitioner a complete account of ₹15,40,000/-,

including its present status, particulars of the fixed deposit, interest

earned thereon, and details of any withdrawal, appropriation, transfer

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 18 of 19

or release, together with the supporting records.

48. For every amount claimed to be lawfully retained or

appropriated, the Respondents shall identify the precise statutory

provision and order relied upon, the liability sought to be secured or

discharged, its computation, and the basis on which it is asserted to be

enforceable against the estate of late Sh. Ankit Dabas. A general

reference to the Impugned Order shall not constitute sufficient

compliance with this direction. If reliance is placed upon that Order,

the Respondents shall explain how it is said to authorise retention or

appropriation of the whole amount. They shall separately address the

entitlement to return of any balance, together with the interest

attributable thereto. This disclosure shall set out the Respondents‟

position for the Petitioner to answer and it shall neither enlarge the

liability under the Impugned Order nor operate as its rectification,

review or modification.

49. The Petitioner may submit her response within two weeks of

receipt of the aforesaid disclosure. After affording her an opportunity

of hearing, the competent authority shall pass and communicate a

reasoned decision upon her claim for return of the amount within four

weeks of receipt of the response. If no reply is submitted within the

period granted, the decision shall be taken within four weeks of its

expiry after due intimation of the hearing.

50. Any amount for which no subsisting lawful basis of retention or

appropriation is established shall be released to the Petitioner, in her

capacity as the legal representative of late Sh. Ankit Dabas, within two

W.P.(C) 7254/2025 Page 19 of 19

weeks of the aforesaid decision, together with the interest actually

earned thereon in the fixed deposit. Such release shall remain without

prejudice to the inter se rights, if any, of the legal heirs or successors

of late Sh. Ankit Dabas.

51. The directions concerning ₹15,40,000/- shall not be construed

as determining the effect of clauses AD and AE of the Impugned

Order or as authorising its rectification, review or modification. The

Petitioner‟s right to challenge any decision passed upon her claim

concerning the said amount, in accordance with law, is preserved.

52. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, disposed of in the aforesaid

terms. The pending Application stands closed.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

VIMAL KUMAR YADAV , J.

SEPTEMBER 25, 2026

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