IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

WPA 5827 of 2024

Jamiruddin Ahamed and Anr.

versus

West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. &

Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Ekramul Bari

: Sk. Imtiaj Uddin

: Mr. Alauddin Ahmed

For the State : Mr. Joydip Kar, ld. Sr. Adv.

: Dr. Madhusudan Saha Ray

: Ms. Jyoti Rauth

Heard on : 30.07.2026

Judgment on : 01.10.2026

Uploaded on : 01.10.2026

Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-

1. The petitioner says that on 29.11.1995 a meeting was held

presided over by the Sabhapati, Hemtabad Panchayat Samiti,

in presence of the land owners including the petitioner/his

father and the respondent WBSEDCL authorities, over the

issue of purchase of land for the project of the said

respondent of construction of 33/11KV Sub-Station at

Hemtabad. The petitioner further says that along with the

other agenda of the meeting it has also been resolved on that

day that the petitioner’s candidature for a job opportunity

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with the respondent authority would be recommended and

considered by the respondent.

2. The resolution dated 29.11.1995 has not been produced in

the instant writ petition. However, several orders of both the

respondent authority as well as this Court, in this regard,

have been produced, the last of which, by the Director (HR)

WBSEDCL, dated 30.01.2024, is challenged in the instant

writ petition.

3. In the said impugned order the respondent authority says

that considering the educational qualification of the writ

petitioner, he could not have been considered or appointed in

the posts, for which the respondent has recruited personnel

in the meantime, like for the posts of Assistant Engineer &

Junior Engineer in different disciplines, Assistant Manager

(HR&A) & (F&A), Jr. Executive (Finance), Office Executive,

Junior Operating Technician Cum Technical Assistant,

Pharmacist and Medical Officer. It further says that, as and

when it initiates a process of recruitment for a post, to which

the petitioner would be eligible as per his qualification, his

candidature would be considered by the respondent

authority. The respondent acknowledges the repeated orders

of this Court, regarding appointment of the writ petitioner in

terms of resolution dated 29.11.1995, and asserts its

willingness to comply with the same.

4. Mr. Bari learned advocate for the writ petitioner has

submitted that it is the dilatory and avoiding tactics of the

respondent authority, that the petitioner is yet to be given

appointment with the same. He submits that by this way the

respondent authority has made flagrant violation of the

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repeated orders of this Court in this regard. Mr. Bari strongly

relies on this Court’s orders dated 01.03.2016 [in WP No.

2685 (w) of 2016] and dated 25.4.2023 [in WPA No.2654 of

2022]. He also relies on the Appeal Court’s order dated

8.12.2023 [in MAT No. 1134 of 2023]. His contention is that

as per the direction of the Court, the respondent authority is

to allow relaxation/concession as regards the eligibility

criteria in case of the petitioner, which the respondent

neither has allowed nor is intended to allow, as it appears

from the impugned order dated 30.1.2024.

5. Mr. Bari further submits that the respondent suppresses the

very material fact in this case that in 2017 as well as in 2018,

the respondent authority has undertaken recruitment

processes for the posts of Class-III staff, for which the writ

petitioner ought to have been considered, being adequately

qualified. However, the respondent authority has not done so.

According to the petitioner, this reflects that the respondent

authority has no bona fide intention to comply with the

Court’s orders passed in this regard, as mentioned above.

According to the writ petitioner, it is only arbitrary inaction of

the respondents to comply with the Court’s orders and unfair

and high-handed stubbornness, which have restrained the

writ petitioner to harvest the fruit of several Court orders in

his favour. Hence, he submits that the petitioner seeks an

order of appointment in the instant writ petition.

6. The above contention and prayer of the writ petitioner is

strongly opposed by Mr. Kar learned Senior Advocate,

appearing for the respondent authority. He has firstly

submitted that the impugned order is an innocuous one, the

respondent having acknowledged the petitioner’s right for

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being considered for appointment with the respondent, as

against a suitable vacancy, as per his qualification. According

to Mr. Kar, learned Senior Counsel, relaxation has never been

allowed to the petitioner by the Courts, as regards his

qualification, but it can be counted only as regards the age of

the petitioner, if at all. He reiterates as stated in the

impugned order dated 30.01.2024, that no recruitment has

been held yet for a suitable post of commensurate eligibility

criteria as regards qualification, as that of the writ petitioner.

7. He has demonstrated the respondent’s bona fide, that in the

impugned order, the respondent did not close the doors for

the writ petitioner but only postpones his consideration for

appointment till availability of a suitable post in accordance

with his qualification.

8. Mr. Kar learned Senior Counsel has submitted that while

exercising power of judicial review the Court cannot assume

seat of an appellate forum thereby entering into interfering

with the conclusions arrived at by the authority in the case of

the petitioner. He indicates that in that case the Court’s

power is limited to assess statutory violation or palpable

illegality or manifest arbitrariness or irregularity in the

process of decision making by the authority, which is not

traceable in the instant case, he says. To buttress his such

argument, Mr. Kar learned Senior Counsel has referred to the

judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka

versus N. Gangaraj [AIR 2020 SC 1878] and in Haryana

Urban Development Authority and Another versus

Roochira Ceramics and Another [(1996) 6 SCC 584].

Hence, he submits that there is only scanty or no scope for

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this Court to interfere into the order of the authority as

impugned.

9. Mr. Kar learned Senior Counsel has further relied upon M.P.

State Cooperative Bank Limited Bhopal versus Nanuram

Yadav and Others reported in (2007) 8 SCC 264, and the

portion thereof where the Court has laid down the principles

to be followed in the matter of public appointments. It is

submitted that these are settled principles in case of public

appointments, which the respondent authority is obliged to

mandatory follow.

10. The petitioner also relies on a Supreme Court decision in

Union of India and Others versus Bali Ram reported in

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1319 and says that the Court has

held that Article 226 is the reservoir of equity meant to reach

injustice wherever it is found and that technicalities cannot

trump substantive justice.

11. The background fact of the case reveals from the submissions

made on behalf of the respective parties and on perusal of

records that, the respondent authority floated a project for

construction of electric sub-stations. For the said purpose it

purchased land from the owners, including the father of the

petitioner. The price etcetra was fixed vide the resolution

dated 29.11.1995, wherein the parties also came to a

consensus of opinion that the petitioner may be considered

for appointment with the respondent authority. Though the

resolution as above has not been produced in the instant

case, however, the fact as above has remained unchallenged

and accepted.

Page 6 of 26

12. On 9.10.2012 and 15.5.2014, the respondent authority

passes orders rejecting the petitioner’s prayer for

appointment. Thereafter the Court passes the order dated

01.03.2016 [in WP No. 2685 (w) of 2016]. In its order dated

01.03.2016, this Court has recognized that as per the

resolution dated 29.11.1995, the respondent, in

consideration of the several persons agreeing to sell their

lands at a concessional rate to it, agreed that the poorest of

the concerned families should be considered for a job with

the respondent. The Court also noticed that since 2005, the

present petitioner has been pursuing an employment with the

respondent. The Court noticed that some villagers were

convinced by the revenue and other officials to surrender

their lands at a concessional rate for setting up a project in

public interest. That, since the villagers including the

predecessor of the present petitioner did not insist for the

acquisition procedure which could have taken a considerable

period of time, the Court found that the respondent obtained

considerable benefit on account of the gesture of the

petitioner. The Court further holds that when the respondent

which primarily works towards discharging public duty

purchases land at a concessional rate against a promise of

considering one of the family for future employment, at least

the consideration must be evident. The Court has considered

this to be special circumstance and held that the respondent

ought to have facilitated participation of the present

petitioner in any recruitment process, subject to eligibility

and other criteria that govern such process. Hence, the Court

disposed of the writ petition directing the present petitioner to

submit his bio-data, indicating his age educational

qualification etcetra, to the respondent. The Court further

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directed that candidature of the present petitioner in the

relevant recruitment process will be considered by giving him

weightage as a reserved category candidate with maximum

concession permissible under the Rules, irrespective of

whether the candidate is eligible for such concession. Most

importantly, the Court also directed that the respondent will

be obliged to inform the present petitioner of the next

recruitment conducted, where the petitioner may be eligible

to apply.

13. This order of the Court dated 1.3.1016 has reached finality

and stood binding upon the parties, the same being

unchallenged and accepted by the parties. On this order of

the Court Mr. Kar learned Senior Counsel has submitted

firstly that the Court directed to follow the Rules and no

direction was issued to give appointment in exception of the

Rules; secondly that relaxation or exception even if could be

granted, should have been with respect to the age limit of the

petitioner and with regard to the qualification required for the

post. This argument was made pursuant to the respondent’s

stand that no recruitment process has been undertaken since

thereafter by the respondent to accommodate the petitioner

in terms of his educational qualification. This Court will

discuss later as to why these arguments are not acceptable.

14. Fact remains that in 2017 and 2018, the respondent

authority conducts recruitment for the Class-III category of

posts, though neither informs the petitioner about the same

nor does consider the petitioner’s candidature there, despite

the order of the Court dated 01.03.2016 having remained in

vogue. Recruitment for several other category of posts was

also done by the respondent authority in the meantime,

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eligibility criteria of which, according to the said respondent,

does not tally with the educational qualification of the

petitioner.

15. The petitioner further challenges the respondent’s alleged

inaction in writ petition No. WPA 2654 of 2022 and the Court

passes an order dated 25.4.2023, holding inter alia that the

petitioner’s candidature was to be considered as a reserved

category candidate and by affording him maximum

concession permissible under the Rules, whether or not the

candidate was eligible for such concession. The Court has

further held that age of the petitioner should be considered

as on the date of his original application, that is, on

30.12.2011, to grant him maximum relaxation in this regard.

The Court further directed for immediate consideration of the

petitioner’s prayer for recruitment, within 6 weeks from the

date of granting him an opportunity of hearing. The Court

also stipulated the time period within which the petitioner

was to be appointed, had the respondent authority

considered his prayer favourably.

16. The Appeal Court passed its order dated 8.12.2023 inter alia

affirming the above order of the Single Judge, when the said

order of the Single Bench was challenged in an appeal (No.

MAT 1134 of 2023). The Appeal Court in the said order had

declined to accept the submission of the respondent that no

recruitment process was initiated in which the present

petitioner would have been eligible to apply, hence relegation

of the matter to the authority by the Court was not proper.

17. Now the respondent authority has come up to issue the said

impugned order dated 30.1.2024, rejecting the petitioner’s

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candidature, as if for the time being and as if the same may

be considered by the respondent in future. Let the rationale

be articulated as to why the portrayal by the respondent

authority is misleading, asserting its genuine intention to

adhere to the Court's directive by contemplating the

petitioner's application for future appointment while

currently dismissing it on the purported basis of insufficient

qualifications. Before that, this Court may notice the grounds

mentioned in the said impugned order, which is as follows:

“REASONED ORDER :

Upon strict compliance of the solemn order passed in the above

referred matters I, Avijit Kumar Latua, the Director (HR), WBSEDCL

being the Respondent No.3 in WPA 2654 of 2022 requested both

the petitioners for appearing in the hearing held on 18.01.2024 &

both the petitioners were present. They submitted a bio-data along

with some documents from which it appears that the petitioner

No.2 Habib Ahamed posses the following qualification:

1. B.A. (Hons) in English - 43.75%

2. Higher Secondary -47.3%

3. One year Diploma course in Information Technology

Application from Hemtabad Youth Computer Training Centre.

The same documents were submitted by them earlier also.

The writ petition being WP 2685(w) of 2016 was disposed of on

01.03.2016 by Hon'ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee inter alia with the

following direction: ".......permitting the petitioner or the

petitioner's son to furnish his bio-data, indicating his age,

educational qualifications and the like to the Senior Manager

(HR&A,) Employee services & ER-II of Distribution Company within

a week from date. Such official along with Director (HR) of the

Distribution Company will be obliged to inform both the petitioner

and the petitioner's son of the next recruitment conducted by the

Distribution Company whereat the petitioner's son may be eligible

to apply. The candidature of the petitioner's son in the relevant

recruitment process will be considered by giving him weightage as

reserved category candidate with the maximum concession

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permissible under the rules, irrespective of whether the candidate

is eligible for such concession.

If after all that, the petitioner's son is unable to qualify for

appointment, nothing further need be done."

However, on examination of office records it is found that since the

date of passing of solemn order dated 01.03.2016 passed by

Hon'ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee, WBSEDCL has undertaken process

for recruitment from open market for the post of Assistant

Engineer & Junior Engineer in different disciplines, Assistant

Manager (HR&A) & (F&A), Jr. Executive (Finance), Office Executive,

Junior Operating Technician Cum Technical Assistant, Pharmacist

and Medical Officer. The required educational qualifications for the

above posts are given here under:

Post Required qualification (in brief)

Assistant Engineer

Full time B.E./B.Tech/B.sc

(Engineering) degree in different

disciplines.

Assistant Manager

(HR&A) & (F&A)

Graduate in any discipline &

MBA(two years)

Jr. Executive (Finance)

Graduate in any discipline & Inter

CA/ICWA.

Junior Engineer

Full time 3 years Diploma in

Electrical/Civil/ Mechanical.

Office Executive

Graduation in any discipline with

50% marks in aggregate from a

recognized university or graduation

in any discipline with 50% marks in

HS level and must have passed

1(one) years prescribed computer

course.

Junior Operating

Technician Cum

Technical Assistant

Madhyamik or equivalent and

trade certificate under NCTVT.

Pharmacist

Diploma in pharmacy from

recognized Institute by AICTE

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Medical Officer

MBBS degree from recognized

university

However, it is observed that the applicant did not fulfill criteria for

being eligible for any of the aforesaid posts. The applicant did not

possess the minimum criteria of 50% marks in HS or graduation

examination and thus he also did not come within the zone of

consideration for the post of Office Executive also, therefore on the

above score the petitioners were not informed or called.

In view of the above the petitioner could not be considered for

recruitment against any post for which open market recruitment

process have been undertaken by WBSEDCL so far and hence his

prayer could not be considered for employment at this juncture.

The petitioner however can be considered for the post of Technical

Support Hand (Trainee) as and when open market recruitment to

the said post is undertaken considering his educational

qualification.

At present there is no ongoing open market recruitment process or

contemplated open market recruitment process in the said post

where the petitioner can be considered for employment in terms of

his educational qualification, as per the recruitment rule of the

company. As and when vacancy is declared in the said post and

open market recruitment is undertaken, the petitioner will be

consequentially informed and his candidature shall be considered

for the said post in terms of solemn order dated 01.03.2016 passed

by Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee read with the solemn order

dated 25.04.2023 of Hon’ble Justice Lapita Banerji and solemn

order dated 08.12.2023 passed by Hon’ble Division Bench.

Hence the prayer of the petitioner is rejected upon due

consideration at this stage.”

18. In its order dated 01.03.2016, this Court has recognized that

as per the resolution dated 29.11.1995, the respondent, in

consideration of the several persons agreeing to sell their

lands at a concessional rate to it, agreed that the poorest of

the concerned families should be considered for a job with

the respondent. The Court also noticed that since 2005, the

present petitioner has been pursuing an employment with the

respondent. The Court noticed that some villagers were

Page 12 of 26

convinced by the revenue and other officials to surrender

their lands at a concessional rate for setting up a project in

public interest. That, since the villagers including the

predecessor of the present petitioner did not insist for the

acquisition procedure which could have taken a considerable

period of time, the Court found that the respondent obtained

considerable benefit on account of the gesture of the

petitioner. The Court further holds that when the respondent

which primarily works towards discharging public duty

purchases land at a concessional rate against a promise of

considering one of the family for future employment, at least

the consideration must be evident. The Court has considered

this to be special circumstance and held that the respondent

ought to have facilitated participation of the present

petitioner in any recruitment process, subject to eligibility

and other criteria that govern such process. Hence, the Court

disposed of the writ petition directing the present petitioner to

submit his bio-data, indicating his age educational

qualification etcetra, to the respondent. The Court further

directed that candidature of the present petitioner in the

relevant recruitment process will be considered by giving him

weightage as a reserved category candidate with maximum

concession permissible under the Rules, irrespective of

whether the candidate is eligible for such concession. Most

importantly, the Court also directed that the respondent will

be obliged to inform the present petitioner of the next

recruitment conducted, where the petitioner may be eligible

to apply.

19. This order of the Court dated 1.3.1016 has reached finality

and stood binding upon the parties, the same being

Page 13 of 26

unchallenged and accepted by the parties. On this order of

the Court Mr. Kar learned Senior Counsel has submitted

firstly that the Court directed to follow the Rules and no

direction was issued to give appointment in exception of the

Rules; secondly that relaxation or exception even if could be

granted, should have been with respect to the age limit of the

petitioner and with regard to the qualification required for the

post. This argument was made pursuant to the respondent’s

stand that no recruitment process has been undertaken since

thereafter by the respondent to accommodate the petitioner

in terms of his educational qualification. This Court will

discuss later as to why these arguments are not acceptable.

20. Having considered the rival submissions and the materials on

record, this Court is of the view that the controversy cannot

be examined merely as a claim for appointment simpliciter, or

as an ordinary claim of a candidate seeking entry into public

employment. The claim of the petitioner has its genesis in a

particular and exceptional factual and legal setting. The

predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner parted with his land

for the project of the respondent, not merely upon the

ordinary incidents of a private sale, but in the backdrop of

the resolution dated 29.11.1995 and the assurance contained

therein that one of the poorest members of the affected family

would be considered for employment. The said factual

foundation was noticed by this Court in its order dated

01.03.2016. It was specifically recorded that the land had

been made available to the respondent at a concessional rate

and that, in consideration thereof, the candidature of the

petitioner was required to be facilitated in a recruitment

process. The Court, therefore, directed not merely a general

Page 14 of 26

consideration of the petitioner but imposed a positive

obligation upon the respondent to inform the petitioner of the

next recruitment in which he might be eligible to participate

and further directed that his candidature would receive the

benefit of weightage as a reserved-category candidate with the

maximum concession permissible under the Rules,

irrespective of whether he would otherwise be entitled to such

concession. The order dated 01.03.2016 has attained finality.

It was neither challenged nor modified and consequently

constituted a binding adjudication governing the rights and

obligations of both parties. The respondent could not,

therefore, treat the direction contained therein as a mere

observation or as an invitation to reconsider the petitioner's

case at some indefinite future point of time. The operative

substance of the order was that, whenever a recruitment

process was undertaken in which the petitioner could

participate, the respondent was under an obligation to bring

that recruitment to the petitioner's notice and to consider his

candidature in accordance with the special conditions

expressly stipulated by the Court. The subsequent orders

dated 25.4.2023 and 8.12.2023 further reinforced that

obligation, including the direction for maximum permissible

concession and consideration of the petitioner's age with

reference to his original application.

21. Against that background, the fact that the respondent itself

conducted recruitment to Class-III posts in the years 2017

and 2018 assumes decisive significance. The respondent has

not disputed that such recruitment processes were

undertaken. What is material is that the petitioner was

neither informed of those recruitment processes nor

Page 15 of 26

permitted to place his candidature for consideration therein,

notwithstanding the subsistence of the order dated

01.03.2016. The omission, therefore, was not an

inconsequential administrative lapse. It went to the very

heart of the mechanism prescribed by the Court for

protecting the petitioner's right. The order of 01.03.2016

specifically required the respondent to inform the petitioner of

the next recruitment in which he might be eligible to apply;

yet the respondent, while undertaking Class-III recruitment,

did not communicate the same to him. This omission is

rendered still more serious by the contents of the impugned

order dated 30.01.2024. In that order the respondent

proceeded upon the basis that, after the order dated

01.03.2016, recruitment had taken place for several posts

but that the petitioner did not fulfil the prescribed

qualifications for those posts, and consequently he had not

been informed or called. The order then proceeded to state

that the petitioner might be considered for the post of

Technical Support Hand (Trainee) when recruitment to that

post was undertaken. What is conspicuously absent from this

narration is any disclosure of the recruitment conducted in

the years 2017 and 2018 for Class-III posts. The omission is

material because Class-III recruitment was precisely the kind

of recruitment which required the respondent to examine the

petitioner's candidature in the light of the special direction of

this Court. The respondent cannot disclose only such

recruitments as suit its ultimate conclusion and remain

silent about a recruitment process which directly attracted

the obligation created by the order of 01.03.2016. In the

circumstances, this Court is unable to accept the

respondent's subsequent portrayal that there had been no

Page 16 of 26

recruitment process in which the petitioner could have been

considered. The record demonstrates otherwise. The

respondent's failure to disclose the Class-III recruitment of

2017 and 2018, despite the subsistence of the order dated

01.03.2016, amounts to suppression of a material fact

bearing directly upon the decision-making process. It also

constitutes a failure to comply with the positive obligation

imposed upon the respondent by the said order. The

significance of the omission cannot be diluted by describing

the impugned order as an innocuous or temporary rejection.

22. The consequence of the aforesaid omission is also required to

be examined from the standpoint of the right which had

accrued to the petitioner by reason of the order dated

01.03.2016. Had the petitioner been informed of the Class-III

recruitment of 2017 or 2018, he would have had an

opportunity to place his candidature before the recruiting

authority and to avail himself of the special benefits directed

by the Court, namely, weightage as a reserved-category

candidate and the maximum concession permissible under

the Rules. The respondent cannot be permitted to take

advantage of its own failure to communicate the recruitment

and thereafter contend that the petitioner has no enforceable

claim because he did not participate in that recruitment. The

law does not permit a public authority to rely upon a state of

affairs which has been brought about by its own breach of a

legal and judicial obligation. The expression “maximum

concession permissible under the Rules, irrespective of

whether the candidate is eligible for such concession”,

occurring in the order dated 01.03.2016 assumes much

importance. It was not left to the respondent to decide afresh

Page 17 of 26

whether the petitioner deserved the concession. That

question had already been answered by the Court. Similarly,

the direction to inform the petitioner of the next recruitment

was not directory in character. It was intended to ensure that

the petitioner did not lose the very opportunity which the

Court had directed the respondent to provide. The

subsequent order dated 25.4.2023 expressly reiterated the

same principle and the Division Bench, by order dated

8.12.2023, declined to accept the respondent's contention

that there had been no recruitment process in which the

petitioner could have been eligible.

23. There is, therefore, a fundamental distinction between a case

in which a person seeks appointment merely on the strength

of an assurance or concession made by the State and the

present case. The respondent cannot rely upon the general

proposition that public employment must ordinarily be

offered in accordance with the prescribed recruitment

process, as an answer to the present claim, because the

petitioner's right was required to be worked out through the

very recruitment process in accordance with the special

conditions already judicially determined. Now by saying so,

the Court is not creating a new mode of public recruitment.

The special nature of this case requires enforcement of the

legal consequences of an existing and final judicial

determination, which the respondent was bound to obey. The

respondent is an instrumentality of the State and its actions

must conform to the discipline of Article 14 of the

Constitution. Every action of a State instrumentality must be

informed by reason and fairness; arbitrariness, unequal

treatment and disregard of relevant considerations are

Page 18 of 26

amenable to judicial review. In Mahabir Auto Stores v.

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd reported in (1990) 3 SCC 752,

the Supreme Court held that the action of a State

instrumentality, even in matters having a contractual or

commercial complexion, must satisfy the requirements of

reasonableness, fair play, natural justice and non-

arbitrariness. Likewise, in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v.

State of U.P. reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212, the Supreme

Court recognised that State action having a public element

cannot be immunised from Article 14 of the Constitution,

merely because it arises in a contractual or executive setting.

24. The Supreme Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.

Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (1979) 2 SCC

409 made it clear that the Government is not immune from

the principle of promissory estoppel merely because the

promise emanates from the executive sphere. Where a

representation or promise is made with the intention that it

should be acted upon and the promisee alters his position in

reliance upon it, the Government may be held bound by that

promise, subject always to the overriding requirement that

enforcement cannot compel an act prohibited by law or

demonstrably contrary to overriding public interest. The

principle is not invoked here to compel The respondent

authority is not compelled to do something prohibited by its

recruitment rules; rather, is prevented from defeating an

obligation which arose from its own representation and which

was subsequently translated into a specific judicial direction.

25. The circumstances attending the transfer of the land make

the equitable dimension of the matter particularly compelling.

This was not an ordinary commercial transaction in which

Page 19 of 26

the owner freely bargained for the highest available

consideration and thereafter sought an additional advantage.

The material noticed by this Court in the order dated

01.03.2016 records that villagers, including the predecessor

of the petitioner, were persuaded to make their lands

available at a concessional rate for establishment of the

respondent's public project, instead of insisting upon the

acquisition procedure which could have involved considerable

delay. The respondent thereby obtained a public project site

and the benefit of the landowners' cooperation, while the

affected family was left with the corresponding expectation

that the poorest member of the family would be considered

for employment. When a State instrumentality obtains a

citizen's property at a concessional rate in the context of a

representation that a member of the affected family would be

considered for employment, the representation is not an

incidental statement having no legal consequence. It forms

part of the factual and equitable circumstances in which the

citizen altered his position. The State, having secured the

benefit of such cooperation, cannot thereafter retain the

benefit while repudiating, diluting or indefinitely postponing

the corresponding obligation. Such conduct would offend not

merely the doctrine of promissory estoppel but the broader

constitutional requirements of fairness, non-arbitrariness,

legitimate expectation and rule of law.

26. The principle that a person cannot take advantage of his own

wrong has particular application here. The respondent's

omission deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to

participate at the point of time when the recruitment process

was actually available. Having caused that deprivation, the

Page 20 of 26

respondent cannot subsequently rely upon the passage of

time, alteration of recruitment conditions or the absence of a

presently advertised vacancy as reasons for defeating the

petitioner's claim. To permit such a course would enable the

respondent to convert its own breach into a defence against

enforcement. Such a result would reduce the solemnity of

judicial directions to an empty formality and would permit a

State instrumentality to defeat a citizen's right through

administrative inaction. The petitioner also possessed the

requisite educational qualification for the Class-III

recruitment which the respondent conducted in 2017 and

2018. The very foundation of the respondent's impugned

decision—that no recruitment had taken place for a post

commensurate with the petitioner's qualification—therefore

becomes unsustainable once the Class-III recruitment is

taken into account. The petitioner was not seeking to be

placed in a post for which he admittedly lacked the requisite

qualification. His grievance is that when a recruitment was

undertaken for a category for which he was qualified, the

respondent failed to inform him and thereby frustrated the

very opportunity which the Court had directed it to provide.

27. In these peculiar circumstances, the right which initially

arose as an enforceable right of consideration has, by the

subsequent conduct of the respondent and the suppression

of the material recruitment process, moved beyond the stage

of a mere abstract or contingent expectation. The petitioner

had a judicially recognised right to participate in the relevant

recruitment with the prescribed weightage and maximum

permissible relaxation. That opportunity was lost solely

because of the respondent's failure to comply with the

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binding direction. The petitioner cannot now be placed in the

same position as an ordinary applicant who voluntarily failed

to apply. In substance, the respondent prevented the

condition upon which the petitioner's consideration was

predicated from ever occurring. Equity and constitutional

fairness therefore require that the petitioner be placed, so far

as practicable, in the position in which he would have stood

had the respondent complied with the order dated

01.03.2016. The Court is conscious that public employment

ordinarily attracts the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of

the Constitution and that a writ court cannot ordinarily

direct appointment merely on the basis of sympathy,

concession or a private promise. But the relief contemplated

herein does not rest upon sympathy. Nor does it create a

general right in favour of land-losers to seek appointment

dehors the recruitment rules. The present case rests upon a

narrow and exceptional combination of circumstances:- the

respondent's acquisition of the land in the backdrop of the

promise recorded in the resolution dated 29th November,

1995; the final order dated 1st March, 2016 directing the

respondent to facilitate the petitioner's participation; the

subsequent reaffirmation of that direction by the orders dated

25th April, 2023 and 8th December, 2023; the petitioner's

qualification for the Class-III recruitment; the actual conduct

of such recruitment in 2017 and 2018; the respondent's

failure to inform the petitioner thereof; and the consequent

frustration of the very right which this Court had protected.

28. It is in this narrow sense that the petitioner's right to

appointment can now be said to have crystallised. The Court

is not retrospectively conducting a selection which never took

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place. Rather, the Court is required to prevent the respondent

from profiting from its own non-compliance with a binding

judicial mandate. Once it is established that the petitioner

was qualified for the Class-III recruitment and that he was

wrongfully excluded from the opportunity of consideration

despite a specific judicial direction, the subsequent passage

of time cannot be permitted to extinguish the right which was

lost by reason of the respondent's own default. The

respondent cannot first deny the petitioner the opportunity of

consideration and thereafter contend that the opportunity no

longer exists. The power under Article 226 is sufficiently wide

to mould relief in order to secure complete justice and to

prevent an administrative authority from defeating a

judicially recognised right by its own inaction. While the

ordinary rule is that mandamus issues to compel

performance of a public duty where a corresponding legal

right exists, the present case satisfies that principle because

the respondent's duty arises not merely from an executive

representation but from a binding judicial command

governing the manner in which the petitioner's candidature

was required to be dealt with. The classical limitation on

mandamus, namely, that the Court cannot compel an

authority to exercise a discretion in a particular manner

where no legal right exists, cannot be employed as a shield by

an authority which has already been directed by the Court to

exercise its power in a particular legally prescribed manner

and has failed to do so. The writ petitioner’s claim arises from

a final judicial determination which created a corresponding

obligation upon the respondent and prescribed the precise

manner in which the petitioner was to be considered. The

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present relief is consequently directed towards enforcing, and

not creating, the public obligation.

29. The constitutional Court must also be mindful that the rule

of law requires not only citizens but State instrumentalities to

abide by their representations and, more importantly, by

orders of the Court. If an authority can disregard a judicial

direction to inform an eligible person of a recruitment

process, suppress the occurrence of that recruitment, allow

the process to conclude, and thereafter defeat the person's

claim by pleading that the recruitment is over or that a

suitable recruitment may take place at some uncertain future

date, the result would be manifestly inequitable. It would

permit administrative inaction to nullify judicial protection.

Such a consequence is incompatible with the constitutional

ethos of accountable government.

30. The facts of the present case thus constitute a compelling

instance for moulding the relief under Article 226. The

petitioner had already been recognised as falling within a

specially protected class for the purpose of consideration; the

respondent had been directed to notify him of the relevant

recruitment; the respondent admittedly conducted Class-III

recruitment in 2017 and 2018; the petitioner was not

informed; his candidature was consequently never

considered; and the respondent's subsequent decision failed

to disclose that material circumstance. In such

circumstances, a mere direction to “consider” the petitioner

in some future recruitment would perpetuate the very

injustice which has continued for years and would reward the

respondent for its own failure to comply with the judicial

mandate. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the present

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case is not one where the petitioner is merely asking the

Court to substitute its discretion for that of the appointing

authority. The essential eligibility and the special mode of

consideration have already been judicially recognised. What

has been frustrated is the opportunity which the petitioner

was entitled to receive. The Court is, therefore, empowered in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a

mandatory direction so as to give meaningful effect to the

orders already passed and to prevent the respondent from

taking advantage of its own wrong.

31. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated

30.1.2024 cannot be sustained. The respondent cannot be

permitted to rely upon its failure to inform the petitioner of

the Class-III recruitment undertaken in 2017 and 2018, nor

can it indefinitely postpone the petitioner's claim by directing

him to await some future recruitment. The petitioner's

candidature is required to be given effect to in accordance

with the order dated 01.03.2016, read with the subsequent

orders dated 25.04.2023 and 08.12.2023, including the

benefit of the prescribed weightage and maximum permissible

relaxation. In the exceptional facts of the present case, and in

order to ensure that the petitioner does not suffer for the

respondent's admitted failure to comply with the judicial

mandate, a mandatory direction for appointment in an

appropriate Class-III or any other subordinate post, subject

to verification of the petitioner's identity, original qualification

and other formal requirements consistent with the aforesaid

judicial orders, would constitute the effective and lawful

relief. The critical feature of the case is that the respondent

was under a specific, final and binding judicial obligation to

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inform the petitioner of the next recruitment in which he

could participate, and the respondent admittedly conducted

Class-III recruitment in 2017 and 2018, but did not inform or

consider him. The respondent’s subsequent stand that no

suitable recruitment had taken place therefore becomes

materially misleading and having a destructive effect upon

the judicial protection granted to the petitioner. By saying so,

the Court is not creating a general exception to Articles

14/16 of the Constitution, but is granting exceptional

mandatory relief to undo the consequence of the respondent's

own breach of a final judicial direction.

32. The entire discussion as made above prompt this Court to

allow the instant writ petition, with the following directions:

i. The impugned order dated 30.01.2024 passed by the

Director (HR) WBSEDCL is set aside.

ii. Let the respondent immediately appoint the writ

petitioner in an appropriate Class-III or any other

subordinate post subject to verification of his identity,

original qualification and other formal requirements

consistent with the judicial orders passed earlier in

connection with the prayer of the petitioner.

iii. The respondent authority/Senior Manager (HR & H)

Employees Services and ER-II/Director (HR)/The

Chairman as the case may be, is directed to comply with

the order as above, maximum within a period of three (03)

weeks from the date of communication of this order.

33. The writ petition No. WPA 5827 of 2024 is allowed and

disposed of.

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34. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite

formalities.

(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)