As per case facts, the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of an amount lent to the defendant based on a promissory note. The defendant denied executing the note and ...
RSA-2410-2012 (O&M) 1
117
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-2410-2012 (O&M)
Date of decision : 21.08.2025
JASPAL SINGH ....Appellant
Versus
RANJIT SINGH .....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ JAIN
Present : Mr. Tarunveer Vashisht, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. M.S. Khaira, Sr. Advocate (through V.C.) with
Mr. Sunil Sharma, Advocate
for the respondent.
PANKAJ JAIN, J. (ORAL)
Defendant is in second appeal aggrieved of the judgments and
decrees passed by the Courts below whereby suit filed by the plaintiff
seeking recovery of 3,00,000/- along with interest, stands decreed.
2. For convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to by their
original position before the Court of the First Instance i.e., the appellant as
‘defendant’ and the respondent as ‘plaintiff’.
3. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that an amount of 3,00,000/- was
lent by him to defendant on the basis of promissory note dated 22.08.2005
executed by defendant. He thus prayed for recovery of the amount along
with interest.
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4. The suit was contested by the defendant denying execution of
the promissory note. It was further claimed that the scribe is brother-in-law
of the plaintiff. Plaintiff in fact nurses a grudge against defendant because of
the rejection of the proposed marriage between the daughter of the plaintiff
and the son of the defendant.
5. Plaintiff in order to prove execution of the promissory note,
examined one of the attesting witnesses and scribe.
6. Defendant in order to prove that the promissory note was not
executed by him, examined handwriting expert Inderjit Singh, who appeared
as DW2.
7. The Courts below after analysing the evidence threadbare came
to the conclusion that the plaintiffs successfully proved execution of the
promissory note. There is a receipt (Exhibit P-2) acknowledging the receipt
of money and thus decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
8. Counsel for the appellant has assailed the findings recorded by
the Courts below. He submits that plaintiff having propounded promissory
note, dated 22.08.2005, was required to prove the same. He submits that
once defendant denied his signatures on the same, plaintiff was required to
prove signatures of the defendant on the promissory note by leading cogent
evidence. No evidence was led by the plaintiff to prove that the document
bears signatures of the defendant whereas, defendant examined handwriting
expert, who proved his report to the effect that the signatures on the
promissory note, were not that of defendant. He thus submits that plaintiff
RSA-2410-2012 (O&M) 3
having failed to discharge his onus, Courts below erred in decreeing the suit
filed by the plaintiff.
9. Per contra, Mr. M.S. Khaira, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for
the defendant would submit that plaintiff proved execution of promissory
note by examining attesting witness as well as scribe of the promissory note.
Receipt, Exhibit P-2, was proved. Apart from taking a false stand that the
document was not signed by defendant, defendant failed to lead any cogent
evidence to rebut the presumption in favour of the plaintiff as contemplated
under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. He further
submits that the Courts below have rightly discarded the report given by
hand-writing expert and have gone by their own analysis to hold that the
promissory note bears the signatures of defendant. He thus submits that
Courts below have rightly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
10. I have heard counsel for the parties and have carefully gone
through records of the case.
11. As per law, the promissory note was required to be proved by
plaintiff. In order to discharge his onus, plaintiff examined attesting witness
and scribe thereof. Defendant in order to dispute his signatures, examined
handwriting expert. Courts below discarded the report of the handwriting
expert and resorted to Section 72 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and
analyzed the signatures on the promissory note to hold that the same bears
the signatures of defendant.
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12. Execution of Document required by law to be attested needs to
be proved by examining at least one of the attesting witnesses (Section 67 of
the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). In cases where handwriting/
signatures of the executant are disputed, the same can be proved either:
(1) by the evidence of a handwriting expert (Section
39) or;
(2) by the evidence of a witness acquainted with the
handwriting of the person who is said to have
written the disputed writing (Section 41); or
(3) opinion formed by the Court itself on comparison
made of the disputed writings with the admitted or
specimen writings (Section 72).
13. Courts below in the present case resorted to the third mode
Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 re-enacted as Section 72 of
BSA 2023. Trite it is that the science of identification of handwriting by
comparison being not an infallible one. Before donning the hat of an expert
himself under Section 72 of BSA 2023, the Court needs to be fully satisfied
of the admitted writings which are made the basis for comparison.
14. After considering legislative background of Section 73,
Supreme Court of India spelled out thereof in the case of ‘State (Delhi
Admn.) vs. Pali Ram’, (1979) 2 SCC 158, observing as under:
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“33. Since even where proof of handwriting which is in nature
comparison, exists, a duty is cast on the Court to use its own eyes
and mind to compare the admitted writing with the disputed one to
verify and reach its own conclusion, it will not be wrong to say that
when a Court seized of a case, directs an accused person present
before it to write down a sample writing, such direction in the
ultimate analysis, "is for the purpose of enabling the Court to
compare" the writing so written with the writing alleged to have
been written by such person, within the contemplation of Section
73. That is to say, the words "for the purpose of enabling the Court
to compare" do not exclude the use of such 'admitted' or sample
writing for comparison with the alleged writing of the accused, by
a handwriting expert cited as a witness by any of the parties. Even
where no such expert witness is cited or examined by either party,
the Court may, if it thinks necessary for the ends of justice, on its
own motion, call an expert witness, allow him to compare the
sample writing with the alleged writing and thus give his expert
assistance to enable the Court to compare the two writings and
arrive at a proper conclusion.
34. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that in
passing the orders dated May 20, 1972 relating to the disposal of
the application dated December 11, 1970, the learned Additional
District Magistrate did not exceed his powers under Section 73,
Evidence Act. The learned Judges of the High Court were not right
in holding that in directing the accused by his said order dated May
20, 1972, the Magistrate acted beyond the scope of Section 73 or in
a manner which was not legal.”
15. In the case of ‘State of Maharashtra vs. Sukhdev Singh,
(1992) 3 SCC 700, it was observed that:
“29.xxxxxxxxxx It is indeed true that by nature and habit, over
a period of time, each individual develops certain traits which give
a distinct character to his writings making it possible to identify the
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author but it must at the same time be realised that since hand
writing experts are generally engaged by one of the contesting
parties they, consciously or unconsciously, tend to lean in favour of
an opinion which is helpful to the party engaging him. That is why
we come across cases of conflicting opinions given by two
handwriting experts engaged by opposite parties. It is, therefore,
necessary to exercise extra care and caution in evaluating their
opinion before accepting the same. So Courts have as a rule of
prudence refused to place implicit faith on the opinion evidence of
a handwriting expert. Normally Courts have considered it
dangerous to base a conviction solely on the testimony of a
handwriting expert because such evidence is not regarded as
conclusive. Since such opinion evidence cannot take the place of
substantive evidence, Courts have, as a rule of prudence, looked
for corroboration before acting on such evidence. True it is, there is
no rule of law that the evidence of a handwriting expert cannot be
acted upon unless substantially corroborated but Courts have been
slow in placing implicit reliance on such opinion evidence, without
more, because of the imperfect nature of the science of
identification of handwriting and its accepted fallibility. There is
no absolute rule of law or even of prudence which has ripened into
a rule of law that in no case can the Court base its findings solely
on the opinion of a handwriting expert but the imperfect and frail
nature of the science of identification of the author by comparison
of his admitted handwriting with the disputed ones has placed a.
heavy responsibility on the Courts to exercise" extra care and
caution before acting on such opinion. Before a Court can place
reliance on the opinion of an expert, it must be shown that he has
not betrayed any bias and the reasons on which he has based his
opinion are convincing and satisfactory. It is for this reason that the
Courts are wary to act solely on the evidence of a handwriting
expert; that, however, does not mean that even if there exist
numerous striking peculiarities and mannerisms which stand out to
identify the writer, the Court will not act on the expert's evidence.
In the end it all depends on the character of the evidence of the
expert and the facts and circumstances of each case.
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30.xxxxxxxx
What emerges from the case law referred to above is that a
handwriting expert is a competent witness whose opinion evidence
is recognised as relevant under the provisions of the Evidence Act
and has not been equated to, the class of evidence of an
accomplice. It would, therefore, not be fair to approach the opinion
evidence with suspicion but the correct approach would be to
weigh the reasons on which it is based. The quality of his opinion
would depend on the soundness of the reasons on which it is
founded. But the court cannot afford to overlook the fact that the
science of identification of handwriting is an imperfect and frail
one as compared to the science of identification of finger-prints;
courts have, therefore, been wary in placing implicit reliance on
such opinion evidence and have looked for corroboration but that
is not to say that it is a rule of prudence of general application
regardless of the eircumstances of the case and the quality of
expert evidence. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this
behalf but the Court has to decide in each case on its own merits
what weight it should attach to the opinion of the expert.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. While dealing with the situation of denial of signatures by the
alleged executant Supreme Court in ‘K.S. Satyanarayana vs. V.R.
Narayana Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 104, observed that:
“7. A piquant situation had developed before the trial court
when the Ist defendant denied his signatures on the written
statement and Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel. Trial court
should have immediately probed into the matter. It should have
recorded statement of the counsel for the Ist defendant to find out
if Vakalatanama in his favour and written statement were not
signed by the Ist defendant whom he represented. It was apparent
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that the Ist defendant was trying to get out of the situation when
confronted with his signatures on the Vakalatnama and the written
statement and his having earlier denied his signatures on Exh.P-1
and Exh.P-2 in order to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Falsehood
of the claim of the Ist defendant was writ large on the face of it.
Trial Court could have also compared the signatures of the Ist
defendant as provided in section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.
xxx”
17. In the case of ‘Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC
583’ explaining the interplay between Section 45 and Section 73 of the 1872
Act, Supreme Court held that:
“12. Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
short 'the Evidence Act') deal with opinion of experts and
comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or
proved. Section 45 itself provides that the opinions are relevant
facts. It is a general rule that the opinion of witnesses possessing
peculiar skill is admissible. There was no challenge to the expertise
of V.K. Sakhuja. He deposed to have testified in about ten
thousand cases relating to disputed documents. Though the
employee highlighted certain adverse remarks, it cannot be lost
sight of that they were about four decades back. But we need not
go into that aspect in detail as no infirmity in the report acted upon
by the authority in the present case was noticed or could be pointed
out.
13. It is to be noted that under Sections 45 and 47 of the
Evidence Act, the Court has to take a view on the opinion of
others, whereas under Section 73 of the said Act, the Court by its
own comparison of writings can form its opinion. Evidence of the
identity of handwriting is dealt with in three Sections of the
Evidence Act. They are Sections 45, 47 and 73. Both under
Sections 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion. In the former case it
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is by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of
familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experiences.
In both the cases, the Court is required to satisfy itself by such
means as are open to conclude that the opinion may be acted upon.
Irrespective of an opinion of the Handwriting Expert, the Court can
compare the admitted writing with disputed writing and come to its
own independent conclusion. Such exercise of comparison is
permissible under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. Ordinarily,
Sections 45 and 73 are complementary to each other. Evidence of
Handwriting Expert need not be invariably corroborated. It is for
the Court to decide whether to accept such an uncorroborated
evidence or not. It is clear that even when experts' evidence is not
there, Court has power to compare the writings and decide the
matter. [See Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC
704].
xxx xxx xxx
16. It is fairly well settled that the approach and objection in
criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are
altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the
preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such
conduct as would merit action against him; whereas in criminal
proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against
him are established and if established what sentence should be
imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the modes of enquiry
and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually
different. [See State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and ors., 1996(4)
SCT 708 (SC) : (1996) 6 SCC 417)]. In case of disciplinary
enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The
doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application.
Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are
necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent
has committed misconduct.”
(emphasis supplied)
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18. In the case of ‘O. Bharathan vs. K. Sudhakaran’, (1996) 2
SCC 704 Supreme Court red flagged the practice of courts acting as experts
even though Section 73 of 1872 Act empowers them, observing that:
“18. The learned Judge in our view was not right either in
brushing aside the principles laid down by this Court in AIR 1979
Supreme Court 14 (supra) on the ground that it was not a criminal
case or taking upon himself the hazardous task of adjudicating
upon the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures in question
even without the assistance of skilled and trained person whose
services could have been easily availed of. Annulling the verdict of
popular will is as much a serious matter of grave concern to the
society as enforcement of laws pertaining to criminal offence, if
not more. Though it is the province of the expert to act as Judge or
jury after a scientific comparison of the disputed signatures with
admitted signatures, the caution administered by this Court is to
the course to be adopted in such situations could not have been
ignored unmindful of the serious repercussions arising out of the
decision to be ultimately rendered. To quote, it has been held in
AIR 1979 Supreme Court 14 (supra):
"The matter can be viewed from another angle also.
Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own
eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted
writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any
handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of
prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with
regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the
sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person
accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by
himself. It is, therefore, not advisable that a Judge should
take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted
writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two
agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain
the opinion and assistance of an expert."
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19. The necessity for adhering to the said sound advise and
guidance is all the more necessary in a case where hundreds of
signatures are disputed and the striking dissimilarities noticed by
the Court at the time of trial of the Election Petition.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. Same sentiment finds echo in ‘Ajay Kumar Parmar vs. State
of Rajasthan (2012) 12 SCC 406’ where while dealing with the provisions
of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872, Supreme Court observed that
courts should be slow to base their findings solely on comparison made by
it, observing that :
“28. The opinion of a handwriting expert is fallible/liable to
error like that of any other witness, and yet, it cannot be brushed
aside as useless. There is no legal bar to prevent the Court from
comparing signatures or handwriting, by using its own eyes to
compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing and then
from applying its own observation to prove the said handwritings
to be the same or different, as the case may be, but in doing so, the
Court cannot itself become an expert in this regard and must
refrain from playing the role of an expert, for the simple reason
that the opinion of the Court may also not be conclusive.
Therefore, when the Court takes such a task upon itself, and
findings are recorded solely on the basis of comparison of
signatures or handwritings, the Court must keep in mind the risk
involved, as the opinion formed by the Court may not be
conclusive and is susceptible to error, especially when the exercise
is conducted by one, not conversant with the subject. The Court,
therefore, as a matter of prudence and caution should hesitate or be
slow to base its findings solely upon the comparison made by it.
However, where there is an opinion whether of an expert, or of any
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witness, the Court may then apply its own observation by
comparing the signatures, or handwritings for providing a decisive
weight or influence to its decision.”
20. Similar view has been expressed in the case of ‘A. Srinivasulu
vs. State of T.N.’ (2023) 13 SCC 705 wherein Supreme Court held that:
“137. For invoking Section 73, there must first have been some
signature or writing admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the
Court, to have been written or made by that person. The Section
empowers the Court also to direct any person present in Court to
write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to
compare the words or figures.”
21. Thus, the following legal proposition emerges from the afore
discussed views expressed in binding precedents:
(A) In cases where handwriting is disputed, the same can be
proved either:
(1) by the evidence of a handwriting expert (Section 39 of
BSA 2023) or;
(2) by the evidence of a witness acquainted with the
handwriting of the person who is said to have written the
disputed writing (Section 41 of BSA 2023); or
(3) opinion formed by the Court itself on comparison made
of the dispute writings with the admitted or specimen
writings (Section 72 of BSA 2023);
(B) the science of identification of handwriting by
comparison is not an infallible one;
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(C) the opinion of a handwriting expert is fallible like that of
any other witness, and yet, it cannot be just brushed aside
as useless. The court while analysing the opinion of
expert may apply its own observation by comparing the
signatures, or handwritings for providing a decisive
weight or influence to its decision
(D) there is no legal bar preventing the court from comparing
signatures or handwriting, by using its own eyes to
compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing.;
(E) the court, as a matter of prudence and caution should
hesitate or be slow to base its findings solely upon the
comparison made by it;
(F) for the purpose of comparison of handwriting by court or
by expert, existence of admitted handwriting is sine qua
non;
(G) the opinion formed by the court is also susceptible to
error and is not conclusive. It is also to be considered
only as a corroborative piece of cogent evidence and not
relied upon;
(H) the court cannot simply conclude that it has seen the
signatures and finds it to be or doesn’t find the same to
be that of executant. Once Court decides to adorn the hat
of an expert, the opinion expressed by court has to be
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backed by reasons. It cannot be merely conclusions
without being backed by reasons. In cases where court
assumes role of comparing signatures, he can seek
assistance of an expert.
22. Applying the aforesaid parameters to the present case, this
Court finds that the Lower Appellate Court after comparing the signatures of
the defendant on the promissory note with the admitted signatures on
vakalatnama, concluded as under:
“17. Upon weighting the evidence led by both the parties, I find
that the plaintiff has led sufficient evidence to establish the due
execution of the pronote inasmuch as apart from examining
himself, he has examined both the attesting witnesses and the
scribe, who have all lent corroboration to the testimony of the
plaintiff regarding execution of pronote dated 22.8.2005 and
regarding receipt of Rs. Three lacs by the defendant. Nothing
substantial ould be elicited during the course of cross- examination
of aforesaid witnesses. The defendant has attempted to make a dent
in the case of the plaintiff by asserting that the pronote does not
bear his signatures. In order to hammer forth the said assertions,
the defendant is mainly banking upon the evidence of Hand
Writing Expert i.e. DW2 Inderjit Singh. Upon perusal of
signatures of defendant as is existing on the pronote and by
comparing the same with naked eye with the signatures of
defendant as existing on the Vakalatnama and on the affidavit
tendered in the court, I do find that there is some distinction in the
same. However, it cannot be ruled out that a deliberate attempt
may have been made he stepped in the court SO as to avoid his
liability. It is not uncommon that hand writing expert do have
tendency to depose in favour of their pay master. In any case, this
court does not find any ground to discard the testimony of two
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attesting witnesses and the scribe. There is nothing on record to
show that they had any enmity with the defendant so as to have
deposed falsely.”
23. Evidently, the conclusion arrived at is backed by reasons
recorded. Thus, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the well
reasoned findings recorded by the courts below.
24. So far as the issue of scribe being close relative of plaintiff is
concerned, the argument raised is without merit. The moment scribe entered
into witness-box, the plea that he is a close relative of plaintiff, lost its sting.
His testimony cannot be brushed aside merely referring to his relation with
the plaintiff once he has offered himself for cross-examination and has
successfully withstood the test thereof. Counsel could not point out any
infirmity in the testimony of scribe
25. Pure findings of fact have been recorded by the Courts below.
Finding no question of law in the present appeal, the same is ordered to be
dismissed.
26. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.
August 21, 2025 (Pankaj Jain)
Dpr Judge
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : Yes
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