Form No. J(2)

In the High Court at Calcutta

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present: The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

WPLRT 3 of 2026

Naba Kumar Basak

Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others

With

WPLRT 5 of 2026

Jayanta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others

Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others

For the petitioners

in both the matters : Mr. Ankit Agarwal,

Ms. Alotriya Mukherjee,

Ms. Arpita Paul Biswas

For the State in

WPLRT 3 of 2026 : Mr. Chandi Charan De, AGP,

Ms. Reshma Chatterjee

For the State in

WPLRT 5 of 2026 : Mr. Soumitra Bandopadhyay, Sr. Govt. Adv.,

Ms. Suchana Banerjee

For the respondent

no.10 in both the

matters : Mr. Mihir Kr. Das,

Mr. Swadhin Pan

For the respondent

no.11 in both

the matters : Mr. Gopal Ch. Ghosh, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Rajkrishna Mondal,

Ms. Suravi Ghosh

Heard on : 09.02.2026 and 10.02.2026

Judgment on : 10.02.2026

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Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present challenge has been preferred against a judgment of the

West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal , whereby the

learned Tribunal directed physical possession of the subject land to

be restored to the private respondents after eviction of the present

petitioners, who were held to be illegal occupants in respect of the

said land. While doing so, the learned Tribunal observed inter alia

that while a civil decree had been passed in favour of “a certain Basak

family members”, the said decree had not been executed by recourse

to due process prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure and that

there was no material to demonstrate that the decree was put into

execution, nor was there any delivery of possession recorded under

Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Tribunal

further observed that it is well-settled that a decree of declaration of

title does not ipso facto terminate possession recorded under a

statutory regime unless followed by lawful execution proceedings.

2. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the present two writ petitions

have been filed.

3. The petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 were not parties to the original

application filed by the private respondents before the Tribunal, in

respect of which the impugned order has been passed, despite being

the decree holders in the suit referred to by the Tribunal, whereas the

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petitioner in WPLRT 3 of 2026 was impleaded as party to the said

proceeding, although not a party to the said suit. Thus, since the

petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 are directly affected by the impugned

judgment of the Tribunal, as they had obtained the decree from the

civil court, inter alia declaring their title and confirming their

possession in respect of the subject land, which was virtually nullified

by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment, leave is granted to the

said petitioners to move their writ petition on the prayer made by

learned counsel for the said petitioners.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the proceedings

submits that the petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 had previously filed

a suit, inter alia, for declaration of title and confirmation of

possession, consequentially seeking a relief that the purported patta

granted in favour of the private respondents be recorded to be void,

being without any foundation. Other consequential reliefs such as

injunction were also prayed in the suit.

5. It is submitted that although initially the State as well as the private

respondents, who were all defendants in the suit, contested the suit

by filing written statements, subsequently the defendants did not

contest the suit. Accordingly, an ex parte decree was passed,

declaring the title and possession of the writ petitioners in WPLRT 5 of

2026, who were plaintiffs in the said suit, bearing Title Suit No. 177 of

2012, as well as granting consequential reliefs, including a

declaration to the effect that the purported grant of patta in favour of

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the defendants/private respondents was void, being without any basis

or foundation.

6. It is submitted that in the absence of any challenge to the said decree

by any of the defendants in the suit, the said decree attained finality.

Despite such state of affairs, it is argued that the learned Tribunal,

unlawfully, ignored the said decree merely on the ground that the civil

court did not have jurisdiction to grant such reliefs. Moreover, the

learned Tribunal recorded that the said decree was not put into

execution, which according to the petitioners, is not necessary for the

same to have a binding effect on the parties.

7. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the

learned Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in ignoring the civil court’s

decree and passing an order of eviction.

8. Learned counsel next argues that no provision, either under the West

Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (for short “the 1955 Act”), the West

Bengal Land Reforms Rules, 1965, or the West Bengal Land and Land

Reforms Manual, 1991 permit the Tribunal to pass an order of

eviction in favour of any person at the first instance.

9. It is contended that although Section 49 of the 1955 Act envisages

possession to be given to the patta holder at the first instance, after

the grant of such patta (in the present case, the private respondents

have alleged that they were in possession by dint of a patta but

subsequently were dispossessed unlawfully by the petitioners in

WPLRT 5 of 2026), the Revenue Officer does not have further

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jurisdiction to restore possession if there is a further instance of

dispossession. Thus, the authorities as envisaged under the 1955 Act

did not have any further power to grant an order of eviction or to put

the private respondents into possession, particularly in the teeth of

the valid decree of the civil court.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners cites a coordinate Bench judgment

of this Court in Khitish Chandra Kamila vs. State of West Bengal &

Ors. reported at (2004) 1 CHN 387, for the proposition that the

Tribunal had no power to nullify the decree of a civil court.

11. In the said case, the Division Bench was considering a situation

where the Tribunal had passed an order bypassing the binding

judgment and decree of the order of this Court on the strength of

Section 57B(2)(C) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second

Amendment) Act, 1973, which contemplates a bar to the jurisdiction

of the civil court. The learned Tribunal, upon consideration of the

same, had held in the said case that the decree will abate so far as it

relates to the matters specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c). However, the

Division Bench went on to observe that the aforesaid stand taken by

the Tribunal is not correct, either on fact or in law.

12. It was further observed, by relying on a judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India vs. K.N. Sankarappa,

reported at (2001) 1 SCC 582, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a

slightly different situation, had held that an executive or legislature,

without enacting appropriate legislation, cannot set at naught a

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judicial decree where the State authorities had taken a plea of

maintainability or abatement of the suit in view of the bar under

Section 57B(2) of the 1953 Act.

13. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in both the matters

next cites Sudharani Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.,

reported at (2003) 1 CHN 1, another co-ordinate Bench judgment of

this Court, in support of the self-same proposition.

14. Learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondents argues

that the suit filed by the petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 was not

maintainable ex facie in view of the bar contemplated in Section 61 of

the 1955 Act. It is submitted that, as such, the decree passed in such

suit was rightly held by the learned Tribunal to be a nullity

irrespective of whether any challenge was preferred to the decree of

the civil court.

15. Learned senior counsel takes this Court through the pleadings of the

plaint in the suit filed by the writ petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 and

thereby seeks to impress upon us that the plaintiffs were fully aware

of the patta having been granted in favour of the present private

respondents. Thus, it is argued that the suit was not maintainable in

law from the inception.

16. It is further argued that since a valid patta had been granted in favour

of the private respondents, the civil court’s decree could not nullify

the same.

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17. Furthermore, the private respondents contend that in aid of the said

patta, the Tribunal was well within its jurisdiction to direct possession

of the property to be handed over to the private respondent s in

implementation of the order passed by the Revenue Officer, since the

writ petitioners had dispossessed the private respondents in the first

place.

18. Learned senior counsel next cites a judgment reported at State of

West Bengal vs. Hari Mohan Dana (D) by LRs. & Ors., reported at

(2008) 17 SCC 66. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

was considering a case where, despite a proceeding being initiated by

the Revenue Officer under Section 14T(3) of the 1955 Act, a civil suit

was filed in the court of a Munsiff for declaration of title and

permanent injunction.

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the ultimate analysis, held that the

very initiation of the civil proceedings by the title suit was non est and

outside the purview of the civil court and, as such, allowed the

challenge against the judgment passed in the second appeal arising

out of such suit, granting liberty to the appellant therein to prefer a

challenge against the order of the Revenue Officer.

20. Relying on the said judgment, learned senior counsel submits that in

similar circumstances, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed

that the civil court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on a suit

for declaration of title and consequential reliefs where there is a

specific bar under the appropriate provisions of the governing land

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statute, the same proposition ought to be applied in the present case

as well.

21. The learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of

the State, argues that under Section 49, sub-sections (3) and (3A) of

the 1955 Act, ample authority has been given to the Revenue Officer

to enforce delivery of possession.

22. Thus, it is argued that the Tribunal did not travel beyond its

jurisdiction in directing such possession to be granted.

23. The learned Additional Government Pleader next argues that the suit

filed by the writ petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 was a patently mala

fide one, since the plaintiffs therein had admitted in the plaint

regarding their knowledge that the subject plots were comprised of

land vested in the State Government.

24. As such, it is argued that there was no error on the part of the learned

Tribunal in holding that the suit was not maintainable and the decree

did not operate as a bar to the Tribunal passing the impugned order.

25. The learned Additional Government Pleader reiterates that under

Section 61 of the 1955 Act, there is a specific bar of the civil court

assuming jurisdiction in matters which fall within the domain of the

authorities under the 1955 Act. A valid patta having been granted in

favour of the private respondents, it is submitted that the civil court’s

decree was a nullity.

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26. Upon a careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, we find

that there are two major issues which are required to be adjudicated

for a complete adjudication of the present lis. The first of the said

questions is whether the learned Tribunal was justified in ignoring the

civil court’s decree on the grounds as recorded in the impugned

judgment of the Tribunal. Secondly, whether the Tribunal had the

authority in law to pass a direction regarding reinstatement of the

private respondents in physical possession of the subject properties.

27. Taking first things first, it is well-settled that a decree passed by a

civil court is binding between the parties and conclusively determines

their right, title and interest inter se. Even going by the definition of

“decree” in Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is amply

clear that a decree constitutes a conclusive determination of the right,

title and interest between the parties to the suit in which the same is

passed. We cannot lose sight of the fact that in the suit filed by the

writ petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026, not only the private respondents

but also the State was a party. The defendants/respondents, although

initially having entered appearance in the suit, failed subsequently to

contest the same, due to which an ex parte decree was passed in the

same, which has not yet been challenged by any of the defendants ,

either the private respondents or the State authorities. Thus, as of

today, the said decree has attained finality.

28. In our view, which is strengthened by the ratio laid down in

Sudharani Maity (supra) and Khitish Chandra Kamila (supra), the

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learned Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in defying the civil court’s

decree, which conclusively determined the right, title and interest

between the parties, and proceeding to pass directions for eviction of

the writ petitioners.

29. The Tribunal, while doing so, observed in the impugned judgment

that while a civil decree has been passed in favour of “certain Basak

family members”, the said decree had not been executed by recourse

to due process prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby

ignoring the fact that the final and binding nature of a civil court’s

decree is not dependent upon whether it is executed or not. The civil

court’s decree inherently has a finality, which shines in its own light,

with or without any execution taking place in terms thereof.

30. Hence, the consideration of the learned Tribunal as to whether the

decree was put into execution was entirely beside the issue.

31. Moreover, since the decree declared the title and confirmed the

possession of the plaintiffs in the suit (petitioners in WPLRT 5 of

2026), there could not be any further occasion for an execution case

being filed to put the plaintiffs in possession, as their possession had

already been confirmed by the civil court.

32. Insofar as the judgment cited by learned senior counsel appearing for

the private respondents is concerned, conspicuously, the said matter

went up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a challenge against a decree

passed by a civil court. As held earlier, the parties aggrieved by a civil

court’s decree have every right to challenge the same by way of a

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regular appeal before the appropriate court. In Hari Mohan Dana

(supra), it was a civil court’s decree which was challenged up to the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, in which context only the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that the civil court did not have jurisdiction in view of a

bar of law as embodied in Section 61 of the 1955 Act.

33. As opposed thereto, in the present case, the precise contention of the

writ petitioners, which is justified according to us, is that the civil

court’s decree has never been challenged by any of the

defendants/respondents herein. Having not done so, the decree was

permitted to attain finality. Even going by the judgment of Hari

Mohan Dana (supra), the civil court’s decree had to be challenged

before the competent appellate court for it to be set aside on the

ground that it was non est. Without being set aside by any appellate

court and/or being held to be non est by any competent court, the

civil court’s decree cannot be bypassed by the learned Tribunal, as

reiterated time and again in Sudharani Maity (supra) and Khitish

Chandra Kamila (supra).

34. Secondly, in the case of Hari Mohan Dana (supra), the respondents

therein had not “seriously disputed” the arguments based on Section

61 of the 1955 Act relating to the bar of the civil court. Thus, in the

light of such concession, the Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded to

adjudicate on the said issue. Although we are conscious of the fact

that irrespective of counsel’s consent on law, the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court would otherwise be binding on us, in view of

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the factual distinction, inasmuch as the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s

judgment was rendered in the context of a challenge against the civil

court’s decree itself whereas in the present case no appeal has been

preferred at all against the civil court’s decree, we find that the said

decision does not come to the aid of the respondents in the present

case, where the civil court’s decree has not been challenged before the

appellate court but has been held by the learned Tribunal, entirely

without jurisdiction, to be a nullity.

35. It is to be considered further that in circumstances where the primary

relief sought in a suit is the declaration of title and possession of the

plaintiffs and only as a consequential relief, a challenge is thrown to

the recording of names in the records of rights or grant of patta or

other settlement, it is the primary relief which has to be looked into in

order to assess whether the suit is maintainable or not.

36. Proceeding from such perspective, since the primary relief claimed in

the suit filed by the writ petitioners in WPLRT 5 of 2026 was

declaration of title, the said relief, not being able to be granted by the

Tribunal or any authority under the 1955 Act, the suit could not be

said to have been barred before the civil court. Consequentially, any

ancillary relief granted by the civil court in aid of the said primary

relief could not also be held to be not maintainable. The position

might have been otherwise if the sole or primary relief sought before

the civil court by the plaintiffs was a correction of the records of

rights, or a cancellation or annulment of the patta, in which case, it

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might still have been argued that Section 61 of the 1955 Act operated

as a bar to the civil court. However, it not being so, the said bar

cannot be said to have been attracted to the suit.

37. Thus, from the above discussions, we find that the question as to

whether the civil court had jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances

of the present case is at least arguable. Hence, unless a competent

appellate court set aside such decree on the ground that the same

was without jurisdiction, the decree of the civil court remains binding

and could not be ignored at the drop of a hat by the Tribunal or by

any other forum or authority. Even otherwise, neither the learned

Tribunal nor any authority under the 1955 Act has to power to

declare the title or possession of a person, which comes squarely

within the exclusive domain of the civil court. Hence, proceeding from

such premise as well, it cannot be held that the civil court’s

jurisdiction was barred by operation of Section 61 of the 1955 Act.

38. Coming to the second question, we do not find any provision within

the four corners of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 or the

corresponding Rules or the 1991 Land Manual empowering the

Revenue Officer or the Tribunal to direct eviction of a person and

enforcement of possession of any patta holder, except at the first

instance, when a patta is annulled.

39. Sub-section (3) of Section 49 of the 1955 Act, relied on by the learned

Additional Government Pleader, speaks of a situation where an order

has been made under sub -section (2) of Section 49, which is for

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annulment of the settlement or both the settlement and the transfer

in a case where the criteria stipulated in the said sub-section are

satisfied. Only in case of such annulment of settlement and/or

transfer, sub-section (3) of Section 49 comes into operation, by dint of

which the Revenue Officer may enforce delivery of possession of such

land to the Collector by using such force as may be required after

evicting the person in actual occupation of such land.

40. Sub-section (3A) of Section 49 is merely an enabling provision in

furtherance of sub-section (3), providing that for the purpose of

enforcing delivery of possession of any land and evicting any person, a

written requisition and other modalities for police help can be resorted

to.

41. However, such scheme of Section 49, sub-sections (2), (3) and (3A), is

not applicable when the patta holder was put in possession in the first

place, as is the case of the private respondents, and was allegedly

dispossessed subsequently. In case of such subsequent

dispossession, nothing in Section 49 or, for that matter, any other

provision in the 1955 Act, the corresponding Rules or the Land

Manual of 1991 empowers the Revenue Officer to enforce further

possession in favour of the patta holder in the event there are

subsequent instances of dispossession, ad infinitum.

42. In such a situation, the appropriate remedy before the patta holder

would be to take resort to appropriate provisions before a competent

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civil court under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and/or by

filing a regular civil suit.

43. The Rule referred to by the Tribunal is also not applicable in the

present case. Rule 20A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules, 1965

speaks about the terms and manner of settlement of lands at the

disposal of the State Government under Section 49. As per Clause

3(b)(i) of Rule 20A, the Collector or the District Land and Land

Reforms Officer or the Sub-Divisional Officer, within whose

jurisdiction the land is situated, shall deliver possession of the land to

the person with whom it has been settled, if necessary after evicting

the person in actual occupation of such land in the manner laid down

in sub-section (3) of Section 49.

44. Thus, on a plain reading of the said provision, it is clear that Rule 20A

operates within the aegis of sub-section (3) of Section 49 of the parent

statute, that is, the 1955 Act. Since we have already held that Section

49(3) itself is not applicable, there is no question of Rule 20A being

attracted as well.

45. The Tribunal apparently resorted also to the provisions of the 1991

Manual, which are also not germane in the present context.

46. Thus, the second issue is also decided in favour of the writ

petitioner,s to the effect that the Revenue Officer, within the four

corners of the 1955 Act or the corresponding Rules or Land Manual,

has no authority to evict a person and restore possession to an

16

alleged patta holder, except immediately after annulment of a

settlement or transfer.

47. Moreover, it is the Tribunal which granted eviction in the present

case. No provision within the contemplation of the 1955 Act

empowers the Tribunal, in any event, to do so. The Tribunal, it is to

be remembered, is not the Revenue Officer and in any event cannot

usurp the jurisdiction of such Officer.

48. Apart from the above two issues, there are certain sub-issues, which

cannot also be glossed over. For example, the petitioners in WPLRT 5

of 2026, who were the decree holders in the suit, the decree passed in

which was ignored by the Tribunal, were never impleaded in the

original application before the Tribunal, which, in any event, rendered

the original application bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.

However, in an oblique manner, the said writ petitioners, who were

plaintiffs in the suit, were named in a subsequent notice issued

pursuant to the impugned order of the Tribunal. Such exercise itself

smacks of mala fides.

49. Secondly, the writ petitioner in WPLRT 3 of 2026, who was not even a

party to the suit, was impleaded in the original application, which was

also erroneous due to mis-joinder of party.

50. Be that as it may, since we have already held that the impugned

judgment of the learned Tribunal was palpably de hors the law and

without jurisdiction, there is no necessity to further dwell on the other

minor issues.

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51. In view of the above observations, WPLRT 3 of 2026 as well as WPLRT

5 of 2026 are allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned

judgment dated December 02, 2025 passed by the Third Bench, West

Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in O.A. No. 2177 of 2023

(LRTT). Any action taken in pursuance of the said judgment,

including eviction of the writ petitioners, stands hereby reversed. The

respondents shall take immediate steps to ensure that the possession

of the writ petitioners in respect of the subject plots is restored within

a period of 90 days.

52. There will be no order as to costs.

53. Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made

available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)

AD-13&14

TN