Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

RESERVED ON : 27.02.2026

PRONOUNCED ON : 01.06.2026

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI

Crl.O.P.(MD).No.1294 of 2026

and

Crl.M.P.(MD)No.1340 of 2026

Jeyakumar

... Petitioner/Accused

Vs.

1. The State of Tamilnadu,

Rep. by the Inspector of Police,

Karimedu Police Station,

Madurai District.

Crime No.996 of 2023

.... Respondent / Complainant

2. Munees Diwagar

..... Respondent /

Defacto Complainant

Prayer : Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 528 of

BNSS, 2023, to call for the records relating to the charge sheet in

C.C.No.2158 of 2024 pending on the file of the learned Judicial

Magistrate V, Madurai and quash the same as against the petitioner.

For Petitioners: Mr.G.Karuppasamy Pandiyan

For R-1 : Mr.M.Sakthi Kumar,

Government Advocate (Crl. side)

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Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

ORDER

The present Criminal Original Petition brings before this Court

a narrow but significant question touching upon the true import of

Section 224 IPC. The petitioner, a life convict, seeks quashment of

the final report filed against him on the ground that mere escape

from custody, without any allegation of resistance or obstruction to

lawful apprehension, would not attract Section 224 IPC.

2. The petitioner attempts to derive support from the marginal

heading of the provision, whereas the prosecution places reliance

upon the substantive text of Section 224 IPC and contends that the

provision consists of two distinct limbs, the second of which

independently criminalises escape or attempt to escape from lawful

custody.

Case of the Prosecution:

3. The petitioner is a life convict and was lodged in the Central

Prison, Madurai, from 24.11.2016. According to the prosecution,

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owing to his good conduct inside the prison, the petitioner was

deputed by the prison authorities to perform work outside the prison

premises. On 29.11.2023, at about 3.00 p.m., the petitioner, along

with two other convict prisoners, was engaged in maintenance work

in the residential quarters of the jail officers. At that time, on the

pretext of going to the bathroom, the petitioner allegedly escaped

from the lawful custody of the prison authorities. It is further alleged

that the petitioner was subsequently apprehended on 22.12.2023.

4. Based on the said occurrence, the respondent police

registered the case and, after completion of investigation, filed the

impugned charge sheet in C.C.No.2158 of 2024 on the file of the

learned Judicial Magistrate No.V, Madurai, for the offence under

Section 224 IPC, corresponding to Section 262 BNS. The petitioner is

arrayed as the sole accused.

Grounds Raised for Quashment:

5. The petitioner seeks quashment of the impugned final report

mainly on the following grounds:

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5.1. Firstly, it is contended that the essential ingredients of

Section 224 IPC are not attracted, since there is no allegation that

the petitioner offered resistance or caused illegal obstruction to his

lawful apprehension.

5.2. Secondly, it is submitted that even according to the

prosecution, the allegation is only that the petitioner escaped while

he was engaged in work outside the prison premises. According to

the petitioner, mere escape, without resistance or obstruction, would

not constitute an offence under Section 224 IPC.

5.3. Thirdly, it is contended that the factual allegations

disclose, at the highest, negligence on the part of the prison officials

who were entrusted with the custody of the petitioner.

5.4. Fourthly, it is alleged that the prosecution has been

launched only to shield the prison officials from departmental or

other consequences arising out of their negligence.

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5.5. Fifthly, it is submitted that the prosecution has wrongly

invoked Section 224 IPC, though the factual matrix does not satisfy

the statutory requirements of the said provision.

5.6. Lastly, it is contended that even if the allegations in the

final report are taken at their face value, they do not disclose the

commission of the offence alleged, and therefore the case falls within

the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

1

.

Submissions on either side:

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

present prosecution is founded upon an erroneous understanding of

Section 224 IPC. According to the learned counsel, Section 224 IPC

must be interpreted in the light of its heading or marginal note,

namely, “Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful

apprehension.”

11992 Supp(1) SCC 335

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Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

7. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in N.C.Dhoundial vs. Union of India and others

2

,

particularly paragraph 15, the learned counsel submitted that the

heading or marginal note of a statutory provision may be relied upon

to clear ambiguity and to ascertain legislative intent. It was therefore

argued that when Section 224 IPC is read along with its heading, the

essence of the offence is resistance or obstruction to lawful

apprehension.

8. The learned counsel submitted that in the present case,

there is no allegation whatsoever that the petitioner offered

resistance or caused illegal obstruction to any prison official or police

officer. The learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution

cannot merely assert that the petitioner escaped. It must establish

that he was in lawful custody at the relevant point of time.

9. It was submitted that even according to the prosecution, the

petitioner had been taken for some work outside the usual place of

confinement. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the

2 (2004) 2 SCC 579

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Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

prosecution must produce material to show that such assignment

was lawful and that the petitioner continued to remain in lawful

custody at that time. In the absence of such material, the learned

counsel submitted that the very foundation of the charge under

Section 224 IPC is absent. On these submissions, the learned

counsel prayed that the charge sheet in C.C.No.2158 of 2024 may be

quashed.

10. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate submitted

that the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner proceeds on

an incomplete reading of Section 224 IPC. According to the learned

Government Advocate, Section 224 IPC consists of two distinct

limbs. The first limb deals with intentional resistance or illegal

obstruction to lawful apprehension. The second limb deals with

escape or attempt to escape from lawful custody.

11. The learned Government Advocate relied upon the

judgment of this Court in In Re, Kulandaivelu and another

3

,

wherein Section 224 IPC was interpreted in detail. Referring to

3 AIR 1969 Madras 408

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paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said judgment, the learned Government

Advocate submitted that the first part of Section 224 IPC requires

proof that the accused was charged with or convicted of an offence,

that his apprehension was lawful, and that resistance or illegal

obstruction was intentional.

12. However, the second part of the provision requires only

that the detention must be for an offence, that such detention must

be lawful, and that the accused escaped or attempted to escape from

such lawful custody. The learned Government Advocate further

submitted that the word “intentionally” occurs only in the first part

of Section 224 IPC and has been deliberately omitted in the second

part. Therefore, according to the learned Government Advocate, for

the offence of escaping from lawful custody, it is not necessary to

prove separate resistance or obstruction.

13. Referring to paragraph 7 of In Re, Kulandaivelu and

another

4

, the learned Government Advocate submitted that lawful

custody cannot be understood in a narrow physical sense. It was

4 Supra 3

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contended that once a person is lawfully detained, custody continues

in law wherever he is taken under lawful prison authority, unless he

is released in accordance with law.

14. The learned Government Advocate submitted that the

petitioner is admittedly a life convict and was undergoing sentence.

Therefore, his detention was lawful. The allegation that the petitioner

escaped while performing work entrusted by the prison authorities,

according to the prosecution, squarely attracts the second limb of

Section 224 IPC.

15. The learned Government Advocate also relied upon the

Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in

Virendrasingh Ramprakashsingh Khairwar vs. State of

Maharashtra

5

, wherein it was held that Section 224 IPC is wider

than the narrow contention that only resistance or obstruction would

attract the offence. It was submitted that escape from lawful custody

independently attracts Section 224 IPC, and subsequent surrender

or apprehension would not erase the offence. Therefore, the learned

5 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 953

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Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

Government Advocate prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Original

Petition.

16. Heard the learned counsels on either side and carefully

perused the materials available on record.

Point for Consideration:

17. In the light of the rival submissions, the following point

arises for consideration:

Whether the allegations in the final report, taken at their face

value, disclose the offence under Section 224 IPC, and whether the

charge sheet in C.C.No.2158 of 2024 is liable to be quashed in

exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528

BNSS?

Statutory Framework:

18. Section 224 IPC reads as follows:

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Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

“Whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal

obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself for any

offence with which he is charged or of which he has been

convicted, or escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in

which he is lawfully detained for any such offence, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”

19. The corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023, is Section 262.

20. A plain reading of Section 224 IPC shows that the provision

contains two parts. The first part deals with a person who

intentionally offers resistance or illegal obstruction to his lawful

apprehension. The second part deals with a person who escapes or

attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained

for any offence with which he is charged or of which he has been

convicted.

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21. The grammatical structure of the provision is important.

The word “or” separates the two categories of conduct. The

expression “intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction”

belongs to the first limb. The subsequent expression “escapes or

attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully

detained” constitutes a separate and independent limb. Therefore,

Section 224 IPC does not merely punish resistance or obstruction. It

also punishes escape or attempt to escape from lawful custody.

Scope of Interference in Final Report Quash Matters:

22. Before examining the facts of the present case, it is

necessary to remind oneself of the limits of the jurisdiction under

Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C. In a petition

seeking quashment of an FIR, the Court examines whether the

allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose the commission

of a cognizable offence.

23. In a petition seeking quashment of a final report, the Court

is entitled to look into the final report and the materials collected

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during investigation, but only for the limited purpose of finding out

whether the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. At this

stage, the Court cannot conduct a meticulous appreciation of

evidence. It cannot test the sufficiency, reliability or ultimate

probative value of the materials.

24. The Court is not expected to hold a mini trial. If the

allegations disclose the basic ingredients of the offence and require

adjudication on evidence, the proceedings cannot be interdicted at

the threshold. The principles laid down in State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal

6

undoubtedly guide the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

However, the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

7

categories are not

weapons to terminate a prosecution merely because the accused

disputes the prosecution version.

25. Quashment is justified only when the allegations, even if

accepted in entirety, do not constitute any offence, or when the

6Supra 1

7Supra 1

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proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, or where

continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process.

Analysis:

26. The principal submission of the petitioner is that Section

224 IPC is attracted only when there is resistance or obstruction to

lawful apprehension. This submission is founded substantially upon

the heading of the provision. It is true that a heading or marginal

note may, in a given case, assist the Court in resolving ambiguity.

The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner,

in N.C.Dhoundial vs. Union of India and others

8

, does recognise

that marginal notes or headings can be used as internal aids in

appropriate circumstances.

27. However, such an aid cannot be used to cut down the plain

and unambiguous language of the substantive provision. The

heading of a section cannot override the body of the section. Where

the words of the enactment are clear, the heading cannot be used to

8 Supra 2

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restrict their natural meaning. Section 224 IPC, in its substantive

text, expressly uses the words “or escapes or attempts to escape from

any custody in which he is lawfully detained.”

28. These words cannot be rendered otiose. To accept the

petitioner’s submission would mean that the second limb of Section

224 IPC has no independent existence. Such an interpretation would

be contrary to settled principles of statutory construction. A penal

provision must undoubtedly be strictly construed. But strict

construction does not mean that clear words of the statute should be

ignored or reduced into redundancy.

29. The first limb of Section 224 IPC contemplates a situation

where a person resists or obstructs his lawful apprehension. The

second limb contemplates a different situation where a person,

already in lawful custody, escapes or attempts to escape from such

custody.

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30. The petitioner’s case does not fall under the first limb. The

prosecution does not allege resistance or obstruction. But that, by

itself, is not decisive. The real question is whether the allegations

attract the second limb of Section 224 IPC. The petitioner is

admittedly a life convict. He was lodged in the Central Prison,

Madurai. He was undergoing a sentence imposed by a competent

Court. Therefore, his detention in prison was lawful.

31. The prosecution allegation is that on 29.11.2023, he was

deputed for maintenance work in the residential quarters of jail

officers along with two other convict prisoners, and that he escaped

on the pretext of going to the bathroom. If this allegation is accepted

at face value, the petitioner was not a free man. He was not at liberty

to go wherever he pleased. He was not released by any judicial or

statutory order. He was under prison authority.

32. Merely because he was engaged in work outside the

immediate prison enclosure or outside the ordinary place of

confinement, it cannot be said at the threshold that legal custody

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had ceased.Custody, in criminal law, is not always synonymous with

physical handcuffing or physical enclosure within four walls. A

prisoner who is taken outside for lawful prison work, medical

treatment, court production or other authorised purpose continues

to remain in legal custody.

33. Lawful custody is a legal status. It does not evaporate

merely because physical restraint is relaxed for administrative,

humanitarian or institutional reasons. A convict undergoing

sentence cannot transform himself into a free citizen by walking

away from a place where he was lawfully taken by prison authorities.

34. The submission that the prosecution must produce

material to show that the petitioner was lawfully assigned such duty

is a matter which may arise during trial. At the stage of quashment,

the prosecution case is that he was a life convict, lodged in prison,

entrusted with work by prison authorities, and escaped therefrom.

These allegations are sufficient to prima facie disclose lawful custody.

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35. Whether there was negligence on the part of prison officials

is a separate matter. Even if prison officials were negligent, such

negligence would not legally absolve the petitioner from the allegation

of escape. Negligence of a custodian and culpability of a prisoner who

escapes from lawful custody are not mutually destructive concepts.

Both may co-exist. The possible departmental liability of prison

officials does not obliterate the penal liability of a convict who

allegedly escapes.

36. The petitioner’s contention that the prosecution was

launched only to shield prison officials is, at this stage, a matter of

inference. No unimpeachable material has been placed before this

Court to hold that the prosecution is manifestly mala fide. The

reliance placed by the learned Government Advocate on In Re,

Kulandaivelu and another

9

is apposite. The said decision explains

the distinction between the two limbs of Section 224 IPC and

recognises that escape from lawful custody constitutes an

independent punishable act.

9 Supra 3

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37. The Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court

reported in Virendrasingh Ramprakashsingh Khairwar vs. State

of Maharashtra

10

also fortifies the position that Section 224 IPC is

not confined only to acts of resistance or obstruction. The argument

that there must be resistance or obstruction in every case under

Section 224 IPC cannot be accepted, for it would make the words

“escapes or attempts to escape from any custody” meaningless.

38. The expression “escapes” in the second limb is not

dependent upon proof of violence, resistance or obstruction. The

essence of the second limb is gaining liberty otherwise than by due

process of law. The petitioner was a life convict. His custody was not

casual, accidental or doubtful. It flowed from a judicial sentence. If

he walked away from such custody without lawful permission, the

allegation squarely falls within the second limb of Section 224 IPC.

39. The fact that he was apprehended later on 22.12.2023

does not efface the alleged offence. Subsequent apprehension may be

relevant for sentence or factual appreciation, but not for quashing

10 Supra 5

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the prosecution at the threshold. The offence, if otherwise made out,

is complete when the accused escapes or attempts to escape from

lawful custody.

40. This Court is also conscious that quashment of a final

report in a matter involving escape by a life convict from prison

custody requires circumspection. Prison discipline and lawful

custody are not mere administrative arrangements. They are part of

the criminal justice system.

41. When a convict undergoing sentence is entrusted with

work on the basis of good conduct, such trust is institutional and

conditional. If such a convict abuses that limited relaxation and

escapes, the prosecution cannot be quashed merely on the ground

that no overt act of resistance is alleged. Therefore, the contention

that the ingredients of Section 224 IPC are absent is untenable.

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42. The petitioner relies upon the celebrated judgment in

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

11

. The State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal

12

principles empower the High Court to quash criminal

proceedings where the allegations do not disclose any offence, or

where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, or

where continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of

process.

43. However, in the present case, the final report alleges that

the petitioner was a life convict, was lawfully lodged in Central

Prison, Madurai, was taken for work under prison authority, and

escaped from such custody. These allegations, if proved, constitute

the offence under the second limb of Section 224 IPC.

44. Therefore, this is not a case where the allegations do not

disclose any offence. This is also not a case where the prosecution

materials are so absurd or inherently improbable that no prudent

11Supra 1

12Supra 1

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person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding.

45. The defence of the petitioner that there was no lawful

custody at the exact place of work, or that the prison officials were

negligent, or that he did not offer resistance, are matters which

cannot be conclusively adjudicated in a petition under Section 528

BNSS. Hence, the case does not fall within any of the categories

warranting quashment under the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

13

principles.

46. On a careful consideration of the statutory language of

Section 224 IPC, the allegations in the final report, and the rival

submissions, this Court is of the view that the impugned prosecution

cannot be quashed at the threshold. The petitioner’s argument seeks

to confine Section 224 IPC to its first limb alone. Such an

interpretation is impermissible. The second limb of Section 224 IPC

independently covers escape or attempt to escape from lawful

custody.

13 Supra 1

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47. The petitioner, being a life convict, was under lawful

custody. The allegation that he escaped while being entrusted with

prison-related work prima facie attracts Section 224 IPC.Whether the

prosecution will ultimately establish the charge beyond reasonable

doubt is a matter for trial. At this stage, the final report discloses the

basic ingredients of the offence alleged.

48. The liberty of an individual is precious; but liberty obtained

otherwise than by due process of law is not liberty in the eye of law.

A convict undergoing sentence remains under the command of law

until law itself restores his freedom. The criminal law does not permit

a prisoner to take advantage of the trust reposed in him by prison

administration and thereafter contend that, because he did not resist

or obstruct anyone, his escape is beyond the reach of Section 224

IPC. The law draws a clear distinction between obstruction to

apprehension and escape from custody. Both are separate mischiefs.

Section 224 IPC addresses both.

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49. In the present case, the prosecution alleges escape from

lawful custody. Such allegation must be tested in trial and cannot be

extinguished at the threshold by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of

this Court.

50. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is dismissed.

The learned Judicial Magistrate No.V, Madurai, shall proceed with

C.C.No.2158 of 2024 in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any

observation made herein, except for the limited purpose of disposal

of this Criminal Original Petition.

01.06.2026

NCC : Yes / No

Index : Yes / No

Internet : Yes/ No

Sml

To

1. The Inspector of Police,

Karimedu Police Station,

Madurai District.

2. The Additional Public Prosecutor,

Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,

Madurai.

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Crl.OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J.

Sml

CRL OP(MD)No.1294 of 2026

01.06.2026

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