Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

        CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4945­4946 OF 2013

(arising out of SLP(C)Nos.20557­20558 of 2007)

JIJU KURUVILA & ORS. … APPELLANTS

Versus

KUNJUJAMMA MOHAN & ORS.     … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4947    OF 2013

(arising out of SLP(C)No.16078 of 2008)

THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. … APPELLANT

Versus

SMT. CHINNAMMA JOY AND ORS.     … RESPONDENTS

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4948  OF 2013

(arising out of SLP(C)No.15992 of 2008)

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. … APPELLANT

Versus

SMT. CHINNAMMA JOY AND ORS.     … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

Delay condoned. Leave granted. 

1

Page 2 2. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the  

judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High  

Court  dated 12

th

  April, 2007 in M.F.A. Nos. 1162 

and 1298 of 2001(D)  whereby compensation awarded  

to   the   claimants   by   Motor   Accident   Claims  

Tribunal,   Kottayam   (hereinafter   referred   to   as 

‘the Tribunal’, for short)  was enhanced and the  

liability for the accident was apportioned at the  

ratio of  50:50. 

3. The facts that lead to the present case are  

as follows:

On 16

th

 April, 1990,  a motor accident took  

place on  K.K. Road, near  Pampadi Mavell Store,  

whereby   the   car   driven   by   one   Joy   Kuruvila 

(deceased) had a   head on collision with a bus  

that   came   from   the   opposite   direction.     Joy 

Kuruvila  sustained serious injuries and died on  

the   way   to   hospital.     His   four   dependents,  

namely, Chinnamma Joy (widow of deceased), Jiju  

Kuruvila aged 14 years, Jaison Kuruvila  aged 11  

years   (2   minor   children   of   the   deceased)   and 

Grace Kuruvila (mother of the deceased) aged 85  

years filed a joint application under Section 140  

2

Page 3 and   166   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988  

(hereinafter   referred   to   as,   ‘the   Act’),  

claiming   compensation   of   Rs.57,25,000/­   towards  

following heads:­

(a)Funeral Expenses Rs. 

25,000/­

(b)Compensation   for   pain   and   suffering

Rs. 1,00,000/­

(c)Compensation on account of death

of   the deceased  and consequent  loss

Rs.54,00,000/­

of income to the petitioners

(d)Compensation for the loss of 

consortium to the 1

st

 petitioner

Rs. 1,00,000/­

(e)Loss of  paternal love, affection

and   guidance   to   the   2

nd 

and 3rd Rs. 1,00,000/­

petitioners

Rs.57,25,000/­

4. At the time of accident,  Joy Kuruvila was  

about   45   years   of   age     and   was   working   as   a 

Manager   in   the   Freeman   Management   Corporation, 

New York Branch in the United State of America  

for   more   than   nine   years   and   was   receiving   a 

monthly salary of 2500 US Dollars equivalent to  

Rs.43,100/­.  He was provided with quarter by the  

employer   and   was   residing   alongwith   his   wife. 

3

Page 4 Joy Kuruvila used to give Rs.30,000/­ per month  

to   his   wife   for   the   household   expenses   and 

savings after meeting his personal expenses.  He  

was healthy, energetic, otherwise, had longevity  

of life and could have continued in service upto  

the   age   of   65   years   as   per   service   conditions 

i.e. for another 20 years. 

5. The 1

st

  claimant is the wife,   2

nd

  and 3

rd 

claimants are the children and the 4

th

  claimant 

was the mother of the deceased. P.C. Kurian, who  

was the 3

rd

 respondent, was driving the bus at the  

time   of   the   accident         and   1

st

  respondent, 

Kunjujamma   Mohan   was   the   bus   owner.     It   was 

alleged that the accident occurred solely due to  

rash   and   negligent   driving   of   the   bus   driver, 

P.C. Kurian and the vehicle had valid insurance  

with   the   Oriental   Insurance   Co.Ltd..   Based   on 

such facts, the claimants claimed a sum of Rs.  

57,25,000/­ as compensation with 18% interest and  

cost. 

6. In   spite   of   notice,     the   bus   owner,  

Kunjujamma Mohan and the driver, P.C. Kurian did  

4

Page 5 not appear before the Tribunal and the High Court  

and had not denied the allegations.  

7. The   Oriental   Insurance   Co.   Ltd.  

(hereinafter   referred   to   as   ,   “the   Insurance 

Company”)   in   its   written   statement,     admitted 

the existence of  the valid policy of bus No.KRK­

3057 in the name of  Kunjujamma Mohan but denied  

the allegation of rash and negligent driving on  

the   part   of   the   bus   driver,   P.C.   Kurian   in 

causing   the   accident.     The   age,   occupation,  

monthly income of the deceased and the claim of  

compensation   were   also   disputed.     According   to 

the Insurance Company, the accident occurred due  

to  rash and negligent driving of the deceased.  

8. The   evidence   consisting   of   testimony   of 

PW.1 to PW.3 and Ext.­A1 to Ext.­8 and Ext.B1 to  

B3 were brought on record. 

9.   During  pendency  of the  claim  before  the  

Tribunal, the 4

th

 claimant, Grace Kuruvila, mother  

of   the   deceased   expired;   the   rest   of   the  

claimants   remained   as   legal   heirs   of   the  

deceased. The 2

nd

  and 3

rd

  claimants, children of  

5

Page 6 the   deceased,     who   were   minor   at   the   time   of 

filing   the   claim   case   attained   majority   during 

the   pendency of the case and were declared as  

major. 

10.The Tribunal after hearing the parties and  

recording   evidence   held   that   the   accident   was 

caused due to rash and negligent driving of the  

bus   driver.     Considering   the     contributory  

negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased   the 

Tribunal   apportioned   the   liability   for   the  

accident in the ratio of 75:25 between the driver  

of   the   bus   and   the   deceased.       It   assessed 

compensation   to   be   Rs.   18,38,500/­   and   after 

deducting 25% towards contributory negligence on  

the part of the deceased,  awarded a sum of Rs.  

13,80,625/­   with   12%   interest   for   payment   in 

favour of the claimants.

11.The   High   Court   affirmed   the   view   of   the 

Tribunal   regarding   rash   and   negligent   driving  

both   on   the   part   of   the   bus   driver   and   the 

deceased,     but     apportioned   the   contributory  

negligence @ 50:50 for payment of  compensation.  

The   High   Court   held   that   the   Tribunal   wrongly 

6

Page 7 fixed Rs. 10,000/­   as the monthly contribution  

by the deceased to the family and observed that  

even   if   1/3

rd  

was   deducted   towards   personal  

expenses   of   the   deceased,   more   than   1600   US 

Dollars   could   be   taken   as   dependency   benefit. 

However, while determining the compensation, the  

High Court took the figure of 1500 US Dollars as  

the dependency benefit. The exchange rate as was  

prevailing   on   the   date   of   filing   of   the   claim 

petition     i.e.   April,   1990   was   taken   into  

consideration based into Ext.­A7 and  worked  out  

the contribution to the family was calculated to  

be Rs. 25,950/­ per month.   On the basis of such  

contribution,  the High Court assessed  the total  

compensation  at Rs. 47,09,500/­  and ordered to  

pay 50%  of the amount i.e. Rs. 23,45,750/­  with  

interest in favour of the  claimants.  

12.The   claimants   have   challenged   the  

determination made by the High Court mainly on  

the following terms:­  

(i)The   foreign   exchange   rate   as   was  

prevailing at the time of award i.e. May, 1993,  

and shown in Ext.­A8,  ought to have been taken  

7

Page 8 into   consideration   for   calculation   of  

compensation.     

(ii)In absence of any evidence relating to  

negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased   and   in 

view of the direct evidence on record, both the  

Tribunal and the High Court erred in holding that  

there was negligence on the part of the deceased.  

13.In this case, the questions which arise for  

consideration are:

(i)Whether the foreign currency amount has  

to  be converted  into  the currency  of the  

country on the basis of exchange rate as on  

the date of filing claim petition (April,  

1990)  or  as on the  date of  determination  

(May, 1993);

(ii)Whether   there   was   any   contributory  

negligence on the part of the deceased, Joy  

Kuruvila and

(iii) Whether   compensation   awarded   is  

just and proper.

14.The question as to whether the proper date  

for fixing rate of exchange at which the foreign  

currency   amount   is   to   be   converted   into   the 

currency   of   the   country,   for   determination   of 

amount payable to a claimant/plaintiff fell for  

consideration before this Court in  Forasol v. Oil 

8

Page 9 and Natural Gas Commission 1984 (Suppl.) SCC 263  

wherein this Court observed as follows:

“24.  In an action to recover an amount  

payable in a foreign currency, five dates  

compete for selection by the Court as the  

proper   date   for   fixing   the   rate   of 

exchange   at   which   the   foreign   currency 

amount   has   to   be   converted   into   the 

currency   of   the   country   in   which   the 

action   has   been   commenced   and   decided. 

These dates are:

(1) the date when the amount became due  

and payable;

(2) the date of the commencement of the  

action;

(3) the date of the decree;

(4)   the   date   when   the   Court   orders 

execution to issue; and

(5) the date when the decretal amount is  

paid or realised.

25.  In  a   case   where   a  decree   has   been 

passed by the Court in terms of an award  

made in a foreign currency a sixth date  

also enters, the competition, namely, the  

date of the award. The case before us is  

one in which a decree in terms of such an  

award has been passed by the Court.”

Taking into consideration the claim as was  

made in the said case this Court held as follows:

“70. It would be convenient if we now set  

out the practice, which according to us,  

ought to be followed in suits in which a  

sum   of   money   expressed   in   a   foreign 

currency can legitimately be claimed by  

the plaintiff and decreed by the court.  

It   is   unnecessary   for   us   to   categorize 

the cases in which such a claim can be  

made   and   decreed.   They   have   been  

sufficiently   indicated   in   the   English  

9

Page 10 decisions referred to by us above. Such  

instances   can,   however,   never,   be  

exhausted because the law cannot afford  

to be static but must constantly develop  

and progress as the society to which it  

applies, changes its complexion and old  

ideologies and concepts are discarded and  

replaced by new. Suffice it to say that  

the case with which we are concerned was  

one which fell in this category. In such  

a   suit,   the   plaintiff,   who   has   not 

received   the   amount   due   to   him   in   a 

foreign currency, and, therefore, desires  

to seek the assistance of the court to  

recover that amount, has two courses open  

to him. He can either claim the amount  

due to him in Indian currency or in the  

foreign currency in which it was payable.  

If he chooses the first alternative, he  

can only sue for that amount as converted  

into Indian rupees and his prayer in the  

plaint can only be for a sum in Indian  

currency. For this purpose, the plaintiff  

would   have   to   convert   the   foreign  

currency   amount   due   to   him   into   Indian 

rupees. He can do so either at the rate  

of exchange prevailing on the date when  

the   amount   became   payable   for   he   was 

entitled   to   receive   the   amount   on   that 

date or, at his option, at the rate of  

exchange   prevailing   on   the   date   of   the 

filing of the suit because that is the  

date   on   which   he   is   seeking   the  

assistance   of   the   court   for   recovering 

the amount due to him. In either event,  

the   valuation   of   the   suit   for   the  

purposes of court­fees and the pecuniary  

limit of  jurisdiction of the court will  

be the amount in Indian currency claimed  

in the suit. The plaintiff may, however,  

choose the second course open to him and  

claim in foreign currency the amount due  

to him. In such a suit, the proper prayer  

for the plaintiff to make in his plaint  

would be for a decree that the defendant  

do pay to him the foreign currency sum  

claimed   in   the   plaint   subject   to   the 

permission   of   the   concerned   authorities 

under   the   Foreign   Exchange   Regulation  

Act, 1973, being granted and that in the  

event of the foreign exchange authorities  

1

Page 11 not granting the requisite permission or  

the defendant not wanting to make payment  

in   foreign   currency   even   though   such 

permission   has   been   granted   or   the  

defendant not making payment in foreign  

currency   or   in   Indian   rupees,   whether 

such permission has been granted or not,  

the defendant do pay to the plaintiff the  

rupee equivalent of the foreign currency  

sum   claimed   at   the   rate   of   exchange 

prevailing on the date of the judgment.  

For   the   purposes   of   court   fees   and 

jurisdiction   the   plaintiff   should,  

however, value his claim in the suit by  

converting   the   foreign   currency   sum  

claimed by him into Indian rupees at the  

rate of exchange prevailing on the date  

of   the   filing   of   the   suit   or   the   date 

nearest   or   most   nearly   preceding   such 

date,   stating   in   his   plaint   what   such 

rate   of   exchange   is.   He   should   further 

give an undertaking in the plaint that he  

would   make   good   the   deficiency   in   the 

court­fees, if any, if at the date of the  

judgment,   at   the   rate   of   exchange   then 

prevailing, the rupee equivalent of the  

foreign   currency   sum   decreed   is   higher 

than that mentioned in the plaint for the  

purposes of court­fees and jurisdiction.  

At   the   hearing   of   such   a   suit,   before 

passing the decree, the court should call  

upon the plaintiff to prove the rate of  

exchange   prevailing   on   the   date   of   the 

judgment or on the date nearest or most  

nearly   preceding   the   date   of   the  

judgment. If necessary, after delivering  

judgment on all other issues, the court  

may stand over the rest of the judgment  

and the passing of the decree and adjourn  

the   matter   to   enable   the   plaintiff   to 

prove such rate of exchange. The decree  

to be passed by the court should be one  

which orders the defendant to pay to the  

plaintiff   the   foreign   currency   sum  

adjudged   by   the   court   subject   to   the 

requisite   permission   of   the   concerned  

authorities   under   the   Foreign   Exchange 

Regulation Act, 1973, being granted, and  

in   the   event   of   the   foreign   exchange 

authorities   not   granting   the   requisite 

permission or the defendant not wanting  

1

Page 12 to make payment in foreign currency even  

though such permission has been granted  

or   the   defendant   not   making   payment   in 

foreign   currency   or   in   Indian   rupees, 

whether such permission has been granted  

or   not,   the   equivalent   of   such   foreign 

currency sum converted into Indian rupees  

at the rate of exchange proved before the  

court as aforesaid. In the event of the  

decree   being   challenged   in   appeal   or 

other   proceedings   and   such   appeal   or 

other proceedings being decided in whole  

or in part in favour of the plaintiff,  

the appellate court or the court hearing  

the application in the other proceedings  

challenging the decree should follow the  

same procedure as the trial court for the  

purpose   of   ascertaining   the   rate   of  

exchange   prevailing   on   the   date   of   its 

appellate decree or of its order on such  

application   or   on   the   date   nearest   or 

most   nearly   preceding   the   date   of   such 

decree or order. If such rate of exchange  

is different from the rate in the decree  

which   has   been   challenged,   the   court 

should   make   the   necessary   modification 

with respect to the rate of exchange by  

its appellate decree or final order. In  

all such cases, execution can only issue  

for the rupee equivalent specified in the  

decree, appellate decree or final order,  

as the case may be. These questions, of  

course, would not arise if pending appeal  

or   other   proceedings   adopted   by   the  

defendant the decree has been executed or  

the   money   thereunder   received   by   the 

plaintiff.”

15. In  Renusagar   Power   Co.   Ltd.   v.   General 

Electric   Co.   1994   Suppl   (1)   SCC   644,  similar 

question   came   for   consideration.     In   the   said 

case,   a foreign award was under consideration  

and   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   awarded   the   same   in 

U.S.   Dollars   with   interest.     In   the   said   case 

1

Page 13 relying   on   decision   of   this   Court   in  Forasol 

(supra),  it was held as follows:

“143. In accordance with the decision in  

Forasol case the said amount has to be  

converted into Indian rupees on the basis  

of   the   rupee­dollar   exchange   rate  

prevailing at the time of this judgment.  

As   per   information   supplied   by   the  

Reserve Bank of India, the Rupee­Dollar  

Exchange (Selling) Rate as on October 6,  

1993 was Rs 31.53 per dollar.

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146. In the result, C.A. Nos. 71 and 71­A  

of   1990   and   C.A.   No.   379   of   1992   are 

dismissed   and   the   decree   passed   by   the 

High Court is affirmed with the direction  

that in terms of the award an amount of  

US   $   12,333,355.14   is   payable   by  

Renusagar   to   General   Electric   out   of 

which   a   sum   of   US   $   6,289,800.00   has 

already   been   paid   by   Renusagar   in  

discharge of the decretal amount and the  

balance amount payable by Renusagar under  

the   decree   is   US   $   6,043,555.14   which 

amount on conversion in Indian rupees at  

the   rupee­dollar   exchange   rate   of   Rs 

31.53 per dollar prevalent at the time of  

this   judgment   comes   to   Rs  

19,05,53,293.56. Renusagar will be liable  

to pay future interest @ 18 per cent on  

this   amount   of   Rs   19,05,53,293.56   from 

the date of this judgment till payment.  

The parties are left to bear their own  

costs.”

16.In   the   present   case,     admittedly   the  

claimants   filed   a   petition   in   April,   1990  

(affidavit sworn on 24

th

 March, 1990) and claimed  

compensation   in   INR   i.e.   Rs.57,25,000/­.   Such  

1

Page 14 compensation   was   not   claimed   in   U.S.   Dollars. 

For the said reason and in view of  the  decision  

of this Court in  Forasol (supra) as followed in 

Renusagar Power Co.Ltd.(supra),  we hold  that the 

date   of   filing   of   the   claim   petition   (April, 

1990) is the proper date for fixing the rate of  

exchange at which foreign currency amount has to  

be converted into currency of the country (INR).  

The   Tribunal   and   the   High   Court   have   rightly 

relied on Ext.­A7, to fix the rate of exchange as  

Rs.17.30 (as was prevailing in April, 1990). 

17.The   second   question   is   relating   to  

contributory   negligence   of   the   deceased.  

According to the claimants, accident occurred due  

to rash and negligent driving on the part of the  

bus   driver,     P.C.   Kurian   and   there   was   no 

negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased,   Joy 

Kuruvila. 

Per   contra,   according   to   the   Insurance  

Company, the accident took place due to negligent  

driving on the part of the deceased, who was in  

the intoxicated condition.  They relied on Ext.­

A5, the post­mortem report. 

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Page 15 18.Three   witnesses,   PW.1   to   PW.3   deposed  

before the Tribunal.  Parties placed documentary  

evidence,   Ext.A­1   to   Ext.A­8,   Ext.   B1   and   B2. 

On behalf of the claimants, they relied on the  

oral evidence and   documentary evidence to show  

rash and negligent driving on the part of the bus  

driver. On behalf of the  Insurance Company,  the  

counsel relied on   Ext.­B2 ‘Scene Mahazar’ and  

Ext.­A5, post mortem report to suggest negligence  

on the part of the deceased.  

19.The   High   Court   based   on   Ext.­B2   ‘Scene 

Mahazar’   and   Ext.­A5,   post   mortem   report   held 

that there was also negligence on the part of the  

deceased as well.   

20.On   hearing   the   parties   and   perusal   of 

record,  the following facts emerge:­

The owner of the vehicle Kunjujamma Mohan  

and the driver of the bus,  P.C. Kurian who were  

the   first   and   third   respondents   before   the  

Tribunal   and   High   Court,   had   not   denied   the 

allegation that the accident occurred due to rash  

and   negligent   driving   on   the   part   of   the   bus 

driver. 

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Page 16 21.PW­3,   an   independent   eye   witness   was  

accompanying the deceased during the journey on  

the fateful day.  He stated that the bus coming  

from the opposite direction hit the car driven by  

the   deceased   and   the   accident   occurred   due   to 

rash and negligent driving of the bus driver.  

22.Ext.­A1,  FIR  registered  by  Pampady  Police  

against   the   bus   driver,   P.C.   Kurian,   under  

Sections   279,   337   and   304A   IPC   shows   that   the 

accident   occurred   due   to   rash   and   negligent  

driving on the part of the bus driver.   After  

investigation,   the   police   submitted   a   charge­

sheet   (Ext.­A4)   against   the   bus   driver   under 

Section   279,   337   and   304A   IPC   with   specific 

allegation that the bus driver caused the death  

of     Joy   Kuruvila   due   to   rash   and     negligent 

driving of the bus on 16

th

 April, 1990 at 4.50P.M.  

In view of the direct evidence,  the Tribunal and  

the   High   Court   held   that   the   accident   was  

occurred due to rash and negligent driving on the  

part of the bus driver.   

23.There is no evidence on record to suggest  

any   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased. 

Ext.­B2,   ‘Scene   Mahazar’   also   does   not   suggest 

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Page 17 any rash and negligent driving on the part of the  

deceased.

24.The   mere   position   of   the   vehicles   after 

accident,  as  shown in  a Scene Mahazar, cannot  

give   a   substantial   proof   as   to   the   rash   and 

negligent   driving   on   the   part   of   one   or   the 

other.   When two vehicles coming from   opposite  

directions collide,  the position of the vehicles  

and   its   direction   etc.   depends   on   number   of 

factors like speed of   vehicles,   intensity of  

collision, reason for collision, place at which  

one vehicle hit the other, etc.  From the scene  

of the accident, one may suggest or presume the  

manner in which   the accident caused,   but in  

absence of any  direct or corroborative evidence,  

no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there  

was   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   driver.   In 

absence of such direct or corroborative evidence,  

the Court cannot give any specific finding about  

negligence on the part of any individual. 

25.Post   Mortem   report,   Ext.­A5   shows   the  

condition of  the  deceased at the time of death.  

The said report reflects that the deceased had  

already taken meal as his stomach was half full  

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Page 18 and contained rice, vegetables and meat pieces in  

a fluid with strong smell of spirit.

26.  The   aforesaid   evidence,   Ext.­A5   clearly 

suggests that the deceased had taken liquor but  

on the basis of the same, no definite finding can  

be given that the deceased was driving the car  

rashly and negligently at the time of accident.  

The   mere   suspicion   based   on     Ext.­B2,   ‘Scene 

Mahazar’     and   the   Ext.­A5,   post   mortem   report 

cannot   take     the   place   of     evidence,  

particularly,     when   the   direct   evidence   like  

PW.3,   independent   eye­witness,   ,   Ext.­A1(FIR),  

Ext.­A4(charge­sheet)     and   Ext.­B1(   F.I.  

statement)  are on record. 

In view of the aforesaid,  we,  therefore,  

hold that the Tribunal and the High Court erred  

in   concluding   that   the   said  accident   occurred 

due   to   the   negligence   on   the   part   of   the 

deceased as well,   as the said conclusion was  

not   based   on   evidence   but     based   on   mere 

presumption and surmises. 

27.  The   last   question     relates   to   just   and 

proper compensation.   Both the Tribunal and the  

High Court have   accepted that the deceased was  

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Page 19 45 years of age at the time of accident;  he was  

working   as     manager,   Freeman   Management  

Corporation,   New   York   Branch,   U.S.A.   and   was 

getting a monthly salary of 2500 U.S. Dollars.  

The High Court accepted that the deceased,   as  

per conditions of service,  could have continued  

the employment upto the age of 65 years.

28.Ext.­A6,   is   a   certificate   issued   by   the 

employer   of   deceased,   i.e.,Freeman   Management  

Corporation, U.S.A. dated 23

rd

  April, 1990 which  

shows   that   his   annual   salary   was   30,000  

U.S.Dollars.   He   was   in   their   employment   for   9 

years   and   had   an   excellent   standing   and   his 

employment   was   of   a   permanent   nature.   The  

deceased would have continued in service upto the  

age of 65 years. Ext.­A6 was attested by Notary  

Public   and   counter   signed   by   the   Consulate  

General of India, New York, as per Section 3 of  

the   Diplomatic   and   Consular   Officers(Oaths   and 

Fees) Act, 1948. 

29.On the basis of the aforesaid annual income  

and exchange rate of Rs. 17.30 per US Dollar  as  

applicable in April, 1990 (Ext.­A7),  the annual  

income   of   the   deceased   if   converted   in   Indian 

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Page 20 currency will be  30,000 x 17.30 = 5,19,000/­ at  

the time of death. The deceased was 45 years of  

age, therefore, as per decision in  Sarla Verma & 

Ors.   V.   Delhi   Transport   Corporation   &   Anr.,  

(2009)   6   SCC   121,  multiplier   of   14   shall   be 

applicable.  But the High Court and the Tribunal  

wrongly held that   the multiplier of 15 will be  

applicable.  Thus, by applying the multiplier of  

14,   the   amount   of   compensation   will   be  

Rs.5,19,000 x 14 = Rs.72,66,000/­. The family of  

the deceased consisted of 5 persons i.e. deceased  

himself, wife, two children and his mother.   As  

per  the  decision   of this   Court  in  Sarla  Verma 

(supra)  there being four dependents at the time  

of   death,   1/4

th

    of   the   total   income   to   be 

deducted towards personal and living expenses of  

the deceased.    The High Court has also noticed  

that out of 2,500 US Dollars,  the deceased used  

to spend 500 US Dollars i.e. 1/5

th

 of his income. 

Therefore, if  1/4

th

  of the total income i.e. Rs.  

18,16,500/­   is deducted   towards   personal and  

living   expenses   of   the   deceased,     the  

contribution   to   the   family     will   be     (Rs.  

72,66,000   –   Rs.   18,16,500/­   =)   Rs.54,49,500/­. 

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Page 21 Besides the aforesaid compensation, the claimants  

are   entitled   to   get   Rs.1,00,000/­   each   towards 

love   and   affection   of   the   two   children   i.e. 

Rs.2,00,000/­and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ towards  

loss   of   consortium   to   wife   which   seems   to   be 

reasonable. Therefore, the total amount comes to  

Rs.57,49,500/­. 

30.The claimants are entitled to get the said  

amount of compensation alongwith interest @ 12%  

from the date of   filing of   the petition till  

the   date   of   realisation,   leaving   rest   of   the 

conditions as  mentioned in the award intact. 

31.We, accordingly, allow the appeals filed by  

the   claimants   and     partly   allow   the   appeals 

preferred by the Insurance Company,  so far as it  

relates to the application of the multiplier is  

concerned. The impugned judgment dated 12

th

 April, 

2007 passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala  

High Court in M.F.A. Nos.1162 and 1298 of 2001  

and the award passed by the Tribunal are modified  

to the extent above. The amount which has already  

been paid to the claimants shall be adjusted and  

rest of the amount with interest as ordered above  

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Page 22 be paid within three months. There shall be no  

separate order as to costs. 

……………………………………………….J.

              ( G.S. SINGHVI )

……………………………………………….J.

              (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

NEW DELHI,

JULY 2, 2013.

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