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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 185 of 2004

PETITIONER:

K. Hashim

RESPONDENT:

State of Tamil Nadu

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/11/2004

BENCH:

ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 187 OF 2004

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

Strange though it may appear increasingly our country is becoming

notorious for spiraling number of cases involving counterfeiting of

currency notes, both of our country and foreign countries and stamp

papers. It is becoming increasingly difficult for a lay man to be sure

whether what he is receiving as a currency note is genuine or a

counterfeited one. Similar is the position regarding stamp papers.

In these appeals the basic allegations against accused \026

appellants were counterfeiting of US currency of 20 dollars

denominations. Originally, there were 7 accused persons. The accused

persons are described as A-1, A-2 and so on in terms of their position

during trial. One Rajan Chettiar died during trial. Two of the accused

persons turned approvers. Out of the rest four, 2 are the appellants in

these appeals and they are A-2 and A-3. All the four accused filed

appeals before the High Court. They were each sentenced to RI for 7

years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation of two years

RI. They were separately convicted under Section 489C. Both the

sentences were directed to run concurrently. But the custodial sentence

imposed was different. For A-1, it was 5 years; for A-2 it was 7 years,

for A-3 it was 5 years and for A-4 it was 7 years. The High Court by

the impugned judgment upheld their conviction for offences punishable

under Section 120B read with Section 489A, 489C and 489D of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC').

The prosecution accusations as unfolded during trial are as

follows:

On receiving secret information, the Investigating Officer (PW-

19) conducted a raid at the house of Rajan Chettiar at No. 6,

Palaiamman Koil Street, Villivakkam, Chennai between 1.30 PM and 3.30

PM on 3.8.1982. During his search, he recovered eight bundles of

counterfeit US dollars of 20 denomination (MOs 4 to 11) under mahazar

(Ext. P1) in the presence of one Thiruvengadam (PW 3).

Immediately, a complaint was lodged which was registered as FIR

(Ex.P-28) in Crime No. 32 of 1982 on the file of Inspector of Police,

CBCID, Madras-4. Based on the information furnished by Rajan Chettiar,

PW-19 proceeded to Golden Cafi Lodge at Poonamallee High Court, Chennai

and reached the Lodge at 4.30 P.M. on 3.8.1982, conducted a search at

Room No. 72 in the presence of one P.S. Kumar (PW.4), the Manager of

Golden Cafi Lodge and arrested A-1 and A-4 and recovered three bundles

of counterfeit US dollars of 20 denomination (MO 14) under mahazar

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(Ex.P2) in the presence of PW-4.

On the basis of the confessional statement obtained from the A-1

(Ex.P-29), PW-19 proceeded to Canara Timber Corporation, No. 176,

Sydenhams Road, Periamet, Chennai, a shop owned by Ravindran (PW 1) and

recovered five bundles of counterfeit US dollars of 20 denomination (MO

1 series) from PW1, under Mahazar (Ex P30) in the presence of Thirumal

and Jain.

From Canara Timber Corporation, PW-19 proceeded to Iyyappa Lodge

at Hunters Road, Vepery, Chennai, and reached there at 6.30 P.M. where

he recovered six bundles of counterfeit US dollars of 20 denomination

from the A-2 under Ex P-31 and arrested him.

Then PW-10 proceeded to Vasantham Press at No. 96, Portuguese

Church Street, Chennai, owned by A-3 and since it was late night on

3.8.1982, he could not conduct any search in the said Press and

therefore, he arrested A-3 and sealed the premises of Vasantham Press.

On 4.8.1982, based on the confession of the A-1, PW-19 proceeded

to RJVA Press at No.27, Balakrishna Mudali Street, Vyasarapadi,

Chennai, owned by one Anjana Devi, conducted a search and recovered

printing inks in green, yellow, light green and light yellow colours

and printing blocks (MOs 35 to 42) under mahazar (Ext. P33) in the

presence of Anjana Devi, whose signature in the Mahazar (Ex.P33) was

identified by PW-6, the husband of Anjana Devi.

Rajan Chettair was arrested at 3.30 P.M. on 3.8.1992 at No.6,

Palaimman Koil Street, Villivakkam, Chennai, the A-1 and A-4 were

arrested at 4.30 P.M. at Room No. 72, Golden Cafi Lodge, Poonamallee

High Road, Chennai, Ravindran (PW1) was arrested at Canara Timber

Corporation, No. 176, Sydenhams Road, Periamet, Chennair, owned by him

at 6.00 P.M. on 3.8.1982, A-2 was arrested at Room No. 13, Iyyappa

Lodge, Hunters Road, Veperi, Chennai, owned by PW 7 at 6.30 P.M. on

3.8.1982 and the third accused was arrested at Vasantham Press, No. 96,

Portuguese Church Street, Chennai at late night on 3.8.1982.

Rajan Chettiar, A-1 and A-4 PW.1, A-2, PW2 and A-3 were produced

before the Magistrate on 4.8.1982 and remanded to judicial custody till

10.8.1982.

On 11.8.1982, PW-19 examined Chinnaiah (PW8) an artist and

collected further materials, based on which PW 19 conducted another

search at Vasantham Press at No. 96, Portuguese Church Street, Chennai

on 12.8.1982 at about 1.20 PM and recovered printing inks (MOs 23 to

24) under mahazar (Ex.P7) in the presence of PW 12.

During investigation, PW 19 conducted a search at about 4.00 PM

on 17.8.1982 in the house of A-2 at No. 23A, Bhawani Nagar, Red Hills,

Chennai and recovered printing blocks etc. (MOs 43 to 54) under mahazar

(Ext. P 34) in the presence of one Reddy and K.K. Arumugam.

At about 6.30 P.M. on the same day (17.8.1982), PW-19 conducted

another search in the house of Rajan Chettiar at Villivakkam, Chennai

and recovered spectacle pouch and certain incriminating receipts in the

pouch (Mos 55 and 56 respectively) under mahazar (Ex.P35) in the

presence of M.A. Kadar and Reddy.

On 20.8.1982 the confessional statements of PWs 1 and 2 (Exs. P-

20 and P-23 respectively) under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') were recorded by PW-17 based on

which, PWs 1 and 2 were pardoned, by an order dated 5.10.1983 passed

under Section 306 of the Code by PW 18.

Accordingly, FIR in Crime No. 32 of 1982 was filed against seven

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accused initially, namely the accused/appellants herein, Rajan

Chettiar, Ravindran (PW-1) and Rajendra Menon (PW-2) but since Rajan

Chettiar died even before the framing of charges, the complaint against

him stood abated and Ravindran (PW-1) and Rajedara Menon (PW-2) were

treated as approvers, as per Exs. P27 and P26 respectively.

Based on the evidence recorded and collected by the Investigating

Officer, (PW-19)charge sheet was filed.

Accused persons faced trial. During trial prosecution examined 19

witnesses including two approvers (PWs 1 and 2) and investigating

officer (PW-19). Thirty five documents were marked as exhibits and 56

material objects were produced. The accused persons pleaded innocence

and false implication. The trial Court after considering the evidence

on record found the accusations to have been established and

accordingly recorded conviction and imposed sentences as noted above.

Four appeals were filed before the High Court which did not yield

any fruitful result to the appellants and the appeals were dismissed by

the common judgment impugned in the present appeals.

The learned counsel for the appellants questioned correctness of

the judgment of the High Court on several grounds. Primarily the

challenge was to the reliance placed on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2,

the approvers and PW-19, the investigating officer. It was submitted

that for acting on the approvers' evidence corroboration on material

particulars was necessary. It was further submitted that there was no

recovery in fact or in law. In any event, the evidence relating to

alleged recovery from A-2 is scanty and should not have been acted

upon. The evidence of the approvers (PWs 1 and 2) show that they do not

corroborate each other. In order to bring in application of Section

120B, it was submitted that, there should have been evidence of the

conspiracy. There is no independent witness. Whatever PWs 1 and 2 said

related to a period prior to the alleged commission of offence and PW-

19's evidence relates to the subsequent period. There was ample chance

of tutoring PWs 1 and 2. No reason has been assigned as to why Anjana

Devi from whose business premises allegedly some recoveries were made

was not examined or even made an accused. It is also not indicated as

to why PW-8 was not implicated as an accused. The evidence relating to

recovery is also highly improbable. Even though, there was no claim

made that the alleged articles were genuine, it was incumbent on the

prosecution to prove that they were counterfeits. The reliance placed

on expert's evidence (PW-16) is also without legal sanction because the

expert was not examined to show that he had any expertise to say

anything about the articles being counterfeited. Only one person was

examined to prove the reports and he was not the author of the report

and, therefore, his evidence was really of no assistance to the

prosecution. The effect of Explanation 2 of Section 28 IPC has not been

considered in the proper perspective. Even if it is accepted that an

expert's evidence has to be considered the expertise of the expert

witness has been clearly provided and in the case at hand, prosecution

has failed to establish the expertise of the witnesses and the contents

of the report. Though reference has to be made to the role played by

one Gaja, he has not been examined. PW-14 has given the chemical

analysts report. The ink which was allegedly used for the purpose of

counterfeiting was not seized from the appellants.

In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that

Explanation 2 of Section 28 is very relevant. When the possession is

of an article which is likely to be used in any part of the process of

counterfeiting is proved the case is covered by Section 489A. As it

was difficult for an independent expert to say whether the foreign

currency was counterfeited, therefore, some of the seized articles were

sent to a foreign expert and it would have been practically very costly

for the expert to come and depose. The effect of Section 293 of the

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Code has been kept in view by the trial Court while accepting the

report as evidence. The charge against the accused persons was one of

conspiracy and, therefore, in the background of what has been stated in

Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence

Act') the evidence of PW-1 is very relevant.

Both the approvers have spoken about the presence of A-2 during

every transaction. He is not an innocent by-stander as was tried to be

contended. A stand was taken that there was no period indicated.

Though in the examination-in-chief nothing was stated about the period

but in the cross examination by A-2 this matter was brought on record.

The confession recorded by PW-19 amply proves the accusations. Though

much was made of the fact that some of the seized notes were not

produced in Court, prosecution has explained this by bringing on record

the fact that some of the seized notes were sent for the expert's view.

There were two reports, one of the persons who had given the report was

not available. But the authenticity of the report has been established

by the other expert who was acquainted with the signature.

It would be appropriate to deal with the question of conspiracy.

Section 120-B IPC is the provision which provides for punishment for

criminal conspiracy. Definition of "criminal conspiracy" given in

Section 120-A reads as follows :

"120-A \026 When two or more persons agree

to do, or cause to be done, -

(1) an illegal act, or

(2) an act which is not illegal means,

such an agreement is designated a criminal

conspiracy.

Provided that no agreement except an

agreement to commit an offence shall amount to

a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides

the agreement is done by one or more parties to

such agreement in pursuance thereof."

The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be (a) an

object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to

accomplish the object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or

more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed

to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied

in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the

jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a

criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the

offence is complete when the combination is framed. From this, it

necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt act

need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of

the combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an

indictable offence. Encouragement and support which co-conspirators

give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to

individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for

visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The

conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members

wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance

of the common design. (See: American Jurisprudence, Vol.II, Sec. 23,

p.559.) For an offence punishable under Section 120-B the prosecution

need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do

or cause to be done illegal act; the agreement may be proved by

necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy consists not

merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or

more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a

design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree

to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act

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of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra capable

of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or

for use of criminal means.

In view of what has been stated in Ram Narayan Popli's v. CBI (

2003 (3) SCC 641) the evidence of PWs 1 and 8 which also relates to the

earlier period is clearly covered because of the conspiracy angle and

the applicability of Section 10 of the Evidence Act.

Section 133 of the Evidence Act is also of significance. It

relates to the evidence of an accomplice. In positive terms it provides

that the conviction based on the evidence of an accomplice is not

illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of

an accomplice, because the accomplice is a competent witness.

In Bhubon Sahu v. The King (AIR 1949 PC 257) it was observed

that the rule requiring corroboration for acting upon the evidence of

an accomplice is a rule of prudence. But the rule of prudence assumes

great significance when its reliability on the touchstone of

credibility is examined. If it is found credible and cogent, the Court

can record a conviction even on the uncorroborated testimony of an

accomplice. On the subject of the credibility of the testimony of an

accomplice, the proposition that an accomplice must be corroborated

does not mean that there must be cumulative or independent testimony to

the same facts to which he has testified. At the same time the

presumption available under Section 114 of the Evidence Act is of

significance. It says that the Court may presume that an accomplice is

unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in "material particulars".

Section 133 of the Evidence Act expressly provides that an

accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not illegal

merely because it proceeds on an uncorroborated testimony of an

accomplice. In other words, this section renders admissible such

uncorroborated testimony. But this Section has to be read along with

Section 114, illustration (b). The latter section empowers the Court to

presume the existence of certain facts and the illustration elucidates

what the Court may presume and makes clear by means of examples as to

what facts the Court shall have regard in considering whether or not

maxims illustrated apply to a given case. Illustration (b) in express

terms says that accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is

corroborated in material particulars. The Statute permits the

conviction of an accused on the basis of uncorroborated testimony of an

accomplice but the rule of prudence embodied in illustration (b) to

Section 114 of the Evidence Act strikes a note of warning cautioning

the Court that an accomplice does not generally deserve to be believed

unless corroborated in material particulars. In other words, the rule

is that the necessity of corroboration is a matter of prudence except

when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration must be clearly

present in the mind of the Judge. [See Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of

Bihar (AIR 1994 SC 2420)].

Although Section 114 illustration (b) provides that the Court may

presume that the evidence of an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless

corroborated, "may" is not must and no decision of Court can make it

must. The Court is not obliged to hold that he is unworthy of credit.

It ultimately depends upon the Court's view as to the credibility of

evidence tendered by an accomplice.

In Rex v. Baskerville (1916 (2) KB 658), it was observed that the

corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed

the crime; it is sufficient if there is merely a circumstantial

evidence of his connection with a crime.

G.S. Bakshi v. State (Delhi Administration) (AIR 1979 SC 569) was

dealing with a converse case that if the evidence of an accomplice is

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inherently improbable then it cannot get strength from corroboration.

Taylor, in his treatise has observed that "accomplice who are

usually interested and always infamous witnesses, and whose testimony

is admitted from necessity, it being often impossible, without having

recourse to such evidence, to bring the principal offenders to

justice". ( Taylor in "A Treatise on the Law of Evidence"(1931) Vol. 1

para 967).

The evidence of the Approver must , however, be shown to be of a

reliable witness.

In Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. State of West Bengal (1960) 1 SCR 126:

(AIR 1959 SC 1199 : 1959 Cri LJ 1492) this Court observed that there

should be corroboration in material particulars of the Approver's

statement, as he is considered as a self-confessed traitor. This Court

in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 599 : (1963

(1) Cri LJ 489) held that the combined effect of Sections 133 and 114

illustration (b)of the Evidence Act was that an accomplice is competent

to give evidence but it would be unsafe to convict the accused upon his

testimony alone. Though the conviction of an accused on the testimony

of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal, yet the Courts will, as

a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without

corroboration in material particulars. In this regard the Court in

Bhiva Doulu Patil's case (AIR 1963 SC 599 : 1963 (1) Cri LJ 489)

observed (Paras 6 and 7):

"In coming to the above conclusion we have not unmindful of

the provisions of S. 133 of the Evidence Act which reads:

Sec. 133."An accomplice shall be a competent

witness against an accused person; and a

conviction is not illegal merely because it

proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony

of an accomplice."

It cannot be doubted that under that section a conviction based

merely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may not be

illegal, the Courts nevertheless cannot lose sight of the rule of

prudence and practice which in the words of Martin B. in R. v. Boyes,

(1861) 9 Cox CC 32 "has become so hallowed as to be deserving of

respect and the words of Lord Abinger "It deserves to have all the

reverence of the law:." This rule of guidance is to be found in

illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Evidence Act which is as follows:

"The Court may presume that an accomplice is

unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in

material particulars."

The word 'corroboration' means not mere evidence tending to

confirm other evidence. In DPP v. Hester( 1972) 3 All ER 1056, Lord

Morris said :

"The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity

or credence to evidence which is deficient or suspect

or incredible but only to confirm and support that

which as evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and

credible; and corroborative evidence will only fill

its role if it itself is completely credible ......"

In D.P.P. v. Kilbourne (1973) 1 All ER 440, it was observed thus :

"There is nothing technical in the idea of

corroboration. When in the ordinary affairs of life

one is doubtful whether or not to believe a

particular statement one naturally looks to see

whether it fits in with other statements or

circumstances relating to the particular matter; the

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better it fits in the more one is inclined to believe

it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a

greater or lesser extent by the other statements or

circumstances with which it fits in."

In R. V. Baskerville( supra), which is a leading case on this

aspect, Lord Reading said :

"There is no doubt that the uncorroborated evidence

of an accomplice is admissible in law ..... But it

has long been a rule of practice at common law for

the judge to warn the jury of the danger of

convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony

of an accomplice or accomplices, and, in the

discretion of the judge, to advise them not to

convict upon such evidence; but the judge should

point out to the jury that it is within their legal

province to convict upon such unconfirmed evidence

...... This rule of practice has become virtually

equivalent to a rule of law, and since the Court of

Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, came into operation this

Court has held that, in the absence of such a warning

by the judge, the conviction must be quashed ......

If after the proper caution by the judge the jury

nevertheless convicts the prisoner, this Court will

not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that

the testimony of the accomplice was uncorroborated."

In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1952 SC 54), Bose, J.,

after referring to the rule laid down in Baskerville case with regard

to the admissibility of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,

held thus :

"That, in my opinion, is exactly the law in India so

far as accomplices are concerned and it is certainly

not any higher in the case of sexual offences. The

only clarification necessary for purposes of this

country is where this class of offence is sometimes

tried by a judge without the aid of a jury. In these

cases it is necessary that the judge should give some

indication in his judgment that he has had this rule

of caution in mind and should proceed to give reasons

for considering it unnecessary to require

corroboration on the facts of the particular case

before him and show why he considers it safe to

convict without corroboration in that particular

case."

Justice Bose in the same judgment further observed thus :

"I turn next to the nature and extent of the

corroboration required when it is not considered safe

to dispense with it. Here, again, the rules are

lucidly expounded by Lord Reading in Baskerville case

at pages 664 to 669. It would be impossible, indeed

it would be dangerous, to formulate the kind of

evidence which should, or would, be regarded as

corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily

vary with circumstances of each case and also

according to the particular the offence charged. But

to this extent the rules are clear.

First, it is not necessary that there should be independent

confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the

independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the

complainant or the accomplice, should in itself be sufficient to

sustain conviction. As Lord Readings says -

'Indeed, if it were required that the accomplice

should be confirmed in every detail of the crime, his

evidence would not be essential to the case, it would

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be merely confirmatory of other and independent

testimony.'

All that is required is that there must be some additional

evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice (or

complainant) is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it.

Secondly, the independent evidence must not only make it safe to

believe that the crime was committed but must in some way reasonably

connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some

material particular the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that

the accused committed the crime. This does not meant that the

corroboration as to identify must extend to all the circumstances

necessary to identify the accused with the offence. Again, all that is

necessary is that there would be independent evidence which will make

it reasonably safe to believe the witness's story that the accused was

the one, or among those, who committed the offence. The reason for this

part of the rule is that -

"a man who has been guilty of a crime himself will

always be able to relate the facts of the case, and

if the confirmation be only on the truth of that

history, without identifying the persons, that is

really no corroboration at all ...... It would not at

all tend to show that the party accused participated

in it."

Thirdly, the corroboration must come from independent sources and

thus ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient

to corroborate that of another. But of course the circumstances may be

such as to make it safe to dispense with the necessity of corroboration

and in those special circumstances a conviction so based would not be

illegal. I say this because it was contended that the mother in this

case was not an independent source.

Fourthly, the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the

accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely

circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime. Were it

otherwise, "many crimes which are usually committed between accomplices

in secret, such as incest, offences with females' (or unnatural

offences) 'could never be brought to justice". [See M.O. Shamsudhin v.

State of Kerala (1995 (3) SCC 351)]

Judged on the background of the legal position as stated above

the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 does not suffer from any infirmity to

warrant rejection for their evidence is not really uncorroborated as is

submitted by learned counsel for the appellants. The evidence of PWs 8

and 19 clearly provides the materials. As noted above, even

circumstantial evidence can provide the corroboration. In the instant

case, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 therefore clearly meets the

requirements of Section 114 (b) in the background of Section 133 of the

Evidence Act.

Further question that was raised is whether the essential

ingredients of Section 489A, C and D are satisfied. The said

provisions read as follows:

"489A- Counterfeiting currency notes or bank notes:

Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part

of the process of counterfeiting, any currency note

or bank note shall be punished with imprisonment for

life or with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to ten years and shall also be

liable to fine.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section

and of sections 489B, 489C, 489D and 489E the

expression 'bank note' means a promissory note or

engagement for the payment of money to bearer on

demand issued by any person carrying on the business

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of banking in any of the world, or issued by or under

the authority of any State or Sovereign Power, and

intended to be used as equivalent to, or as a

substitute for money.

489C- Possession of forged or counterfeit currency

notes or bank notes- Whoever has in his possession

any forged or counterfeit currency note or bank note,

knowing or having reason to believe the same to be

forged or counterfeit and intending to use the same

as genuine or that it may be used as genuine, shall

be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to seven years or with

fine or with both.

489D- Making or possessing instruments or materials

for forging or counterfeiting currency notes or bank

notes- Whoever makes, or performs, any part of the

process of making, or buys or sells or disposes of,

or has in his possession any machinery, instrument or

material for the purpose of being used, or knowing or

having reason to believe that it is intended to be

used, for forging or counterfeiting any currency note

or bank note, shall be punished with imprisonment for

life or with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be

liable to fine.

The expression 'counterfeit' is defined in Section 28 IPC. The

same reads as follows:

"28-Counterfeit: A person is said to 'counterfeit'

who causes one thing to resemble another thing,

intended by means of that resemblance to practice

deception, or knowing it to be likely that deception

will thereby be practiced.

Explanation 1: It is not essential to counterfeiting

that the imitation should be exact.

Explanation 2: When a person causes one thing to

resemble another thing, and the resemblance is that

a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be

presumed until the contrary is proved, that the

person so causing the one thing to resemble the

other thing intended by means of that resemblance to

practice deception or knew it to be likely that

deception would thereby be practiced."

Sections 489 A to 489 E deal with various economic offences in

respect of forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes. The

object of legislature in enacting these provisions is not only to

protect the economy of the country but also to provide adequate

protection to currency notes and bank notes.

Section 489A not only deals with complete act of counterfeiting

but also covers the case where the accused performs any part of the

process of counterfeiting. Therefore, if the material shows that the

accused knowingly performed any part of the process of counterfeiting,

Section 489A becomes applicable.

Similarly Section 489 B relates to using as genuine forged or

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counterfeited currency notes or bank notes. The object of Legislature

in enacting this section is to stop the circulation of forged notes by

punishing all persons who knowing or having reason to believe the same

to be forged do any act which could lead to their circulation.

Section 489C deals with possession of forged or counterfeit

currency notes or bank notes. It makes possession of forged and

counterfeited currency notes or bank notes punishable. Possession and

knowledge that the currency notes were counterfeited notes are

necessary ingredients to constitute offence under Section 489 C and 489

D. As was observed by this Court in State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese

and Ors. (AIR 1987 SC 33) the expression 'currency notes' is large and

wide enough in its amplitude to cover the currency notes of any

country. Section 489C is not restricted to Indian currency note alone

but it includes dollar also and it applies to American dollar bills.

The wording of Section 489D is very wide and would clearly cover

a case where a person is found in possession of machinery, instrument

or materials for the purpose of being used for counterfeiting currency

notes, even though the machinery, instruments or materials so found

were not all the materials particular required for the purpose of

counterfeiting.

Section 28 defines the word 'counterfeiting' in very wide terms.

The main ingredients of counterfeiting as laid down in Section 28 are:

(1) causing one thing to resemble another thing;

(2) intending by means of that resemblance to practise

deception, or

(3) knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be

practised.

Thus, if one thing is made to resemble another thing and the intention

is that by such resemblance deception would be practised or even if

there is no intention but it is known to be likely that the

resemblance is such that deception will thereby be practised there is

counterfeiting. (See The State of Uttar Pradesh v. I. Hafiz Mohd.

Ismail (AIR 1960 SC 669)

In the said case it was observed that there is no necessity of

importing words like "colourable imitation" therein. In order to apply

Section 28 what the Court has to see is whether one thing is made to

resemble another thing and if that is so and if the resemblance is such

that a person might be deceived by it, there will be a presumption of

the necessary intention or knowledge to make the thing counterfeit,

unless the contrary is proved.

"Counterfeit" in Section 28 does not connote an exact

reproduction of the original counterfeited. The Explanation 2 of

Section 28 is of great significance. It lays down a rebuttable

presumption where resemblance is such that a person might be deceived

thereby. In such a case the intention or the knowledge is presumed

unless contrary is proved.

In view of the credible, cogent and reliable evidence tendered,

the inevitable conclusion is that the appellants have been rightly

convicted under Section 120B read with Sections 489A, 489C and 489D,

IPC and separately under Section 489C of the Code. The sentences as

imposed do not warrant interference, particularly in view of the object

for which these provisions have been enacted.

The appeals are dismissed.