2026:HHC:11561

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 313 of 2016

Reserved on: 10.03.2026

Date of Decision: 16.04.2026.

Kamal ...Petitioner

Versus

State of H.P. ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes

For the Petitioner : Mr Deepak Kaushal, Senior

Advocate, with Mr Aditya

Chauhan, Advocate.

For the respondent/State :Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional

Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present revision is directed against the judgment

dated 23.09.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur

District, at Nahan (learned Appellate Court) vide which the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.01.2015

passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan,

District Sirmaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were

arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned

Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences

punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and

Sections 181, 185 and 192A of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act).

3. It was asserted that Virender Singh (PW7) was driving

the truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238 on 21.09.2011

from Kala Amb to Dehradun. He reached near Katasan at about

10:20 PM. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-71-1075 came

from Paonta Sahib at a high speed and hit the rear tyre of the

informant’s truck. The rear tyres were damaged due to the

impact. Som Chand (PW6) and Anil Kumar (PW8) were also

travelling in the informant’s truck. No person sustained any

injury in the accident. Accused Kamal was driving the tipper

bearing registration HP-71-1075, and the accident occurred

because of the high speed of the tipper and the negligence of the

accused. The tipper turned turtle after the accident, and the sand

loaded in the tipper was spilled on the road. The matter was

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reported to the police, and entry (Ext.PW9/A) was recorded in the

Police Station. HC Deep Chand (PW9) and Constable Chaman Lal

were directed to visit the spot to verify the correctness of the

entry. HC Deep Chand (PW9) visited the spot and recorded

Virender Singh’s statement (Ext.PW7/A) and sent it to the Police

Station, where FIR (Ext.PW5/A) was registered. HC Deep Chand

(PW9) investigated the matter. He found that the accused was

heavily intoxicated. HC Deep Chand (PW9) filed an application

(Ext.PW9/B) for conducting the medical examination of the

accused and obtaining his blood sample. Dr. Pankaj Gaur

conducted the medical examination of the accused and found that

he was unable to walk in a straight line, and he was having

slurring of speech and a staggering gait. He obtained the blood

sample of the accused and handed it over to the Police official

accompanying the accused. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW10/A). HC

Deep Chand (PW9) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/C). He took

the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P7) with the help of his mobile

phone. He seized the vehicle along with the documents vide

Memos (Ext. PW4/A and Ext.PW1/A). HHC Suresh Chand (PW2)

examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical

defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the

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reports (Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B). The accused could not

produce his Driving Licence or the route permit on demand. The

blood sample was sent to the SFSL, and as per the report of

analysis, the quantity of alcohol in the blood of the accused was

found to be 268.18 mg %. The final opinion was issued stating

that the accused was under the influence of alcohol. Statements

of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the

completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and

presented before the learned Trial Court.

4. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, the notice of

accusation was put to him for the commission of offences

punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and Sections 181, 185 and

192A of the MV Act to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to

be tried.

5. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its

case. Sarwan Kumar (PW1) is the witness to recovery. HHC Suresh

Chand (PW2) conducted the mechanical examination of the

vehicles. Anshul Singal (PW3) and Rajender Kumar (PW4) did not

support the prosecution's case. HC Kanwar Singh (PW5) was

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working as an MHC who signed the FIR. Som Chand (PW6) and

Anil Kumar (PW8) were the occupants of the truck. Virender

Singh (PW7) is the informant and the driver of the truck. HC Deep

Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. Dr Tapender Singh (PW10)

proved the MLC.

6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He

claimed that he only drives a tractor in the field. He admitted that

he had consumed liquor but stated that he was present at his

home. He admitted that he had been medically examined and his

blood sample was taken. He claimed that he was innocent.

However, he did not produce any evidence in his defence.

7. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of

prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There was no

reason to disbelieve the statements of the prosecution witnesses.

The accused was taken into custody immediately after the

incident. He was medically examined. His blood sample was sent

for analysis, and 268.18 mg % alcohol was found in the blood. The

identity of the accused was also established as the driver of the

vehicle. The accused negligently hit the tipper with the truck. He

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did not possess a valid driving licence or a route permit.

Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the

accused as under: -

Sections Sentences

279 of the Indian

Penal Code

The accused was sentenced to

undergo simple imprisonment for

one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and,

in default of payment of the fine,

undergo further simple

imprisonment for 15 days.

181 of Motor

Vehicles Act

The accused was sentenced to

undergo simple imprisonment for 15

days, pay a fine of ₹200/-, and, in

default of payment of the fine, to

undergo further simple

imprisonment for seven days.

185 of the Motor

Vehicles Act

The accused was sentenced to

undergo simple imprisonment for

one month, pay a fine of ₹200/-, and,

in default of payment of the fine, to

undergo further simple

imprisonment for seven days.

192-A of the Motor

Vehicles Act

The accused was sentenced to pay a

fine of ₹2000/- and, in default of

payment of the fine, to further

undergo simple imprisonment for

one month.

All the substantive sentences were ordered to run

concurrently.

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8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur (learned Appellate

Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings

recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of

prosecution witnesses corroborated each other and there was no

reason to disbelieve the statements. The accused was heavily

intoxicated at the time of the accident. He could not control his

tipper which turned turtle after the accident. The negligent

driving of the tipper by the accused was the proximate cause of

the accident. The accused did not have a driving licence or a route

permit. Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial

Court. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was not

excessive. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the

learned Trial Court were sustainable. Hence, the appeal was

dismissed.

9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

revision asserting that many prosecution witnesses failed to

support the prosecution version. The learned Courts below failed

to properly appreciate the material on record, especially the

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cross-examination conducted by the accused. Therefore, it was

prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments

and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

10. I have heard Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior

Counsel assisted by Mr Aditya Chauhan, Advocate for the

petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General for the respondent/State.

11. Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred

in appreciating the material on record. The statement

(Ext.PW7/A) made by the informant Virender Singh (PW7)

specifically mentioned that the driver of the tipper had run away

from the spot. Hence, the prosecution's version that the accused

was apprehended on the spot is not believable. The defence taken

by the accused that he was picked up from his home was highly

probable. The witness Anshul Singhal (PW3) resiled from his

statement that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. His

testimony was ignored by the learned Courts below. Rajender

Kumar (PW4), an independent witness, also did not support the

prosecution's case. The prosecution had only examined the

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occupants of the truck. The informant/truck driver was

negligently driving the truck, and he deposed falsely to save

himself from criminal liability. The other occupants supported

him. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect. Hence,

he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments

and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

12. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned

Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was

negligently driving the tipper. This is also apparent from the fact

that Tipper had turned turtle after the accident. The accused did

not have a valid Driving Licence, and he was heavily intoxicated.

There is no perversity in the judgments passed by learned Courts

below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

13. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022)

3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is

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not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect,

errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at

the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought

on record. The High Court in criminal revision against

conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like

the appellate court, and the scope of interference in

revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal

Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to

satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or

propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or

passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such

inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a

patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to

be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the

merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while

considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell

at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse

those findings.

15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The

object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an

error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has

crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460:

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of

Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained

as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to

the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order

made in a case. The object of this provision is to set

right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.

There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not

be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,

which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful

consideration and appear to be in accordance with

law. If one looks into the various judgments of this

Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can

be invoked where the decisions under challenge are

grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the

provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no

evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial

discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These

are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.

Each case would have to be determined on its own

merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional

jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one

and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of

the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against

an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to

keep in mind that the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie.

Where the Court is dealing with the question as to

whether the charge has been framed properly and in

accordance with law in a given case, it may be

reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within

the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the

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charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings

under CrPC.”

16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re-

appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the

absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of

Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala

v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC

452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid

down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

call for and examine the record of any proceedings to

satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or

propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other

words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory

jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for

correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said

revisional power cannot be equated with the power of

an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a

second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it

would not be appropriate for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion

on the same when the evidence has already been

appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions

Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought

to the notice of the High Court which would

otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice.

On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High

Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no

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hesitation in concluding that the High Court

exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the

conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the

oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and

relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in

Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,

(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that

the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction,

shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it

is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be

set aside merely on the ground that another view is

possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC

p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is

perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly

unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

relevant material or there is palpable misreading of

records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting

aside the order, merely because another view is

possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an

appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional

jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do

justice in accordance with the principles of criminal

jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under

Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that

of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose

decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse

or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly

unreasonable or where the decision is based on no

material or where the material facts are wholly ignored

or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily

or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the

decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity,

upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the

Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it

is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional

Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a

court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional

error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the

negative.”

18. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.

Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh

(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the

Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales

& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)

14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the

Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is

passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a

jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the

absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in

the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the

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concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions

Court.

19. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

20. The informant, Virender Singh (PW7), stated that he

was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238 on

21.09.2011. Anil Kumar (PW8) and Som Chand (PW6) were

travelling in the truck. When they reached near Katasan, a tipper

bearing registration No. HP-71-1075 came from the opposite side

at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road. The tipper hit

the rear tyre and the body of the truck. The tyres burst in the

accident. The accused was driving the tipper. He ran away from

the spot, but he was apprehended after some time. The tipper

turned turtle after the accident. He stated in his cross-

examination that Anil Kumar (PW8) and Som Chand (PW6) had

remained with him on the date of the accident. He had informed

the police telephonically about the accident within 5 to 10

minutes of the accident. The police reached the spot within an

hour and immediately took the photographs. The headlights of

the vehicle were switched off. The police had caught the accused

by 11:30 pm. The accused had disclosed his name as Kamal. He

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denied that Ram Singh was driving the tipper on the date of the

accident, who had run away after the accident, taking advantage

of the darkness. The accused was apprehended at a distance of 100

meters from the place of the accident. He was going towards his

home. He denied that he was making a false statement.

21. HC Deep Chand (PW9) stated that an intimation

regarding the accident was received in the Police Station on

21.09.2011 at 10:35 PM. He went to the spot to verify the

correctness of the information and recorded the informant’s

statement. The accused was heavily intoxicated on the spot, and

he was sent to the hospital for his medical examination. He stated

in his cross-examination that he had not prepared sketch of the

place of arrest or memo of arrest. He volunteered to say that the

offence was bailable and there was no requirement to inform any

person. He had apprehended the accused at a distance of 10-12

steps from the place of the accident. He denied that the accused

was sleeping in his home, and he was brought from the home.

22. The statement of this witness corroborates the

informant’s statement that the accused was caught at some

distance from the place of the accident. He has specifically denied

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the suggestions given to him that the accused was apprehended

from his home, which was a plea taken by the accused in his

statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.

23. Som Chand (PW6) stated that he was travelling in the

truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238, which was being

driven by Virender Singh (PW7). When the truck reached near

Katasan, a tipper came from the opposite side towards the wrong

side of the road and hit the truck. The rear tyre of the truck was

damaged. The accused was driving the tipper. He informed the

police, and the police reached the spot. He stated in his cross-

examination that there was darkness at the place of the accident.

The name of the accused was ascertained on the spot. The accused

was heavily intoxicated, and he was unable to walk properly. He

had told the police that he had dragged the accused out of the

tipper. He was confronted with the previous statement, where

this fact was not recorded.

24. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the

statement of this witness and the statement of the informant. He

stated that he had called the police, whereas the informant stated

that he had called the police. This contradiction shows that these

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witnesses were not making the correct statements, and the

learned Courts below erred in relying upon their testimonies. This

submission cannot be accepted. The incident occurred on

21.09.2011. The statement of Som Chand (PW6) was recorded on

08.01.2014, and the statement of Virender Singh (PW7) was

recorded on 26.06.2014, about three years after the incident. The

memories fail with the passage of time, and the contradictions

are bound to come. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State

of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the

statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the

prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It

was observed: -

“32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task.

There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the

appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved

principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a

criminal case can be enumerated as under:

“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the

approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,

read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once

that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary

for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly

keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and

infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and

evaluate them to find out whether it is against the

general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and

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whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken

as to render it unworthy of belief.

II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence

had the opportunity to form the opinion about the

general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the

appellate court which had not this benefit will have to

attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the

trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and

formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence

on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the

matter of trivial details.

III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is

quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But

courts should bear in mind that it is only when

discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so

incompatible with the credibility of his version that the

court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching

the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by

taking sentences torn out of context here or there from

the evidence, attaching importance to some technical

error committed by the investigating officer, not going

to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit

rejection of the evidence as a whole.

V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations

falling in the narration of an incident (either as between

the evidence of two witnesses or as between two

statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic

approach for judicial scrutiny.

VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess

a photographic memory and to recall the details of an

incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the

mental screen.

VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken

by events. The witness could not have anticipated the

occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise.

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The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be

attuned to absorb the details.

VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to

person. What one may notice, another may not. An

object or movement might emboss its image on one

person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the

part of another.

IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a

conversation and reproduce the very words used by

them or heard by them. They can only recall the main

purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a

witness to be a human tape recorder.

X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time

duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their

estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at

the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people

to make very precise or reliable estimates in such

matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of

individuals, which varies from person to person.

XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall

accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid

succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to

get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on.

XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be

overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing

cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness,

mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of

events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of

the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness

sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking

foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving

a truthful and honest account of the occurrence

witnessed by him.

XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent

with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to

amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement

has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if

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the latter statement is at variance with the former to

some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that

witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State

of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983

SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC

525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of

UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”

25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479:

2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the

evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth

or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions,

contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of

the matter. It was observed at page 60: -

“38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it

appears that no specific question was put to him as to

whether the appellant was present at the place of

occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of

Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC

434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)

“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence

read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once

that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary

for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,

particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,

drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence

as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is

against the general tenor of the evidence given by the

witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the

evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.

Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue

importance to omissions, contradictions and

22

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discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter

and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.”

39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of

Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of

Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr

Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in

memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this

case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies.

40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of

Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this

Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32)

“30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the

discrepancies or improvements which do not materially

affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant

cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the

prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much

on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is

to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and

find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses.

Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution

case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue

significance. The normal course of human conduct

would be that while narrating a particular incident,

there may occur minor discrepancies. Such

discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to

the depositions. The improvements or variations must

essentially relate to the material particulars of the

prosecution case. The alleged improvements and

variations must be shown with respect to the material

particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such

improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is

not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The

credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution

case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor

or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard

can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi

Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v.

State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740],

23

2026:HHC:11561

Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra

[Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra,

(2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v.

State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan,

(2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain

Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of

Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961].

31. What is to be seen next is whether the version

presented in the Court was substantially similar to what

was said during the investigation. It is only when

exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the

case that the Court has to consider whether the witness

was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State

(NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].

32. These are variations that would not amount to any

serious consequences. The Court has to accept the

normal conduct of a person. The witness who is

watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten

by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-

by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and

more particularly a person who is known to or is related

to the deceased, would give all his attention to take

steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to

make every effort to provide him with medical aid and

inform the police. The statements which are recorded

immediately upon the incident would have to be given a

little leeway with regard to the statements being made

and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled

principle of law that every improvement or variation

cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the

accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to

be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard

can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok

Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC

(Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v.

State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)

777].”

24

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41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State

of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court

held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49)

“46. Then, it was argued that there are certain

discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of

the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses

have given different timings as to when they had seen

the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the

accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or

variations are traceable in the statements of these

witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether

these variations are material and affect the case of the

prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be

enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution.

***

49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should

examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and

read the said statement along with the statements of

other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational

conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in

part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any

material or serious contradiction in the statement of

these witnesses which may give any advantage to the

accused.”

42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v.

State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238],

this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)

“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence

read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once

that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary

for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,

particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,

drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence

as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is

against the general tenor of the evidence given by the

witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the

evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.

25

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Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue

importance to omissions, contradictions and

discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter

and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.”

26. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar,

2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was

observed: -

“17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions

with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries

attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of

the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the

place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the

injury on informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a

witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely

because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed

by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs.

State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while

considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony

while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held

that only contradictions in material particulars and not

minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the

testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42

of the judgment reads as under:

"42. Only such omissions which amount to a

contradiction in material particulars can be used to

discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission

in the police statement by itself would not

necessarily render the testimony of the witness

unreliable. When the version given by the witness in

the court is different in material particulars from

that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of

the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise.

Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the

statements of truthful witnesses as memory

sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation

26

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differs from person to person. The omissions in the

earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as

in the present case, the same would not cause any

dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a

contradiction of a statement of a witness on any

material point, that is no ground to reject the whole

of the testimony of such witness."

27. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426 , that the

testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration

alone. It was observed:

“24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false.

Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact

of making something larger, more important, better or

worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term

"exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth".

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or

altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions

unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an 'exaggerated

statement' lies in a fact, to which fictitious additions are

made to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration,

therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated

statement is possible without an element of truth. On the

other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon defines "false" as

"erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford

Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not

correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other

dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential

between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. An

exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity,

whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being

the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a

mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist

primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such

27

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distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate 'truth' from

'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of

exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the

chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their

separation, no real evidence survives that the whole

evidence can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab,

(2003) 7 SCC 643, 18.]

25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar

Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major

portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is

sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction can

be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi,

(1996) 9 SCC 112 held that:

"24. ...So far as this contention is concerned, it must

be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence

of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case

of eyewitnesses, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in

omnibus cannot apply, and the court has to make

efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course

true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated

in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to

involve many more accused and if that part of the

evidence is not found acceptable the remaining part

of the evidence has to be scrutinised with care and

the court must try to see whether the acceptable

part of the evidence gets corroborated from other

evidence on record so that the acceptable part can

be safely relied upon..."

26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot be

left to judicium dei. The Court, in its quest to reach the

truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of

the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the

authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best

efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of

the doubt is extended.

27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The

statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be

28

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analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference

between exaggeration and falsity. We find that the truth

can be effortlessly extracted from their statements. The

trial Court fell in grave error and overlooked the credible

and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless

premise that the exaggerated statements made by the

eyewitnesses belie their version.”

28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan,

2022 Cri. L.J. 374, that the testimony of a witness cannot be

discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding

some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes

falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply

in India. It was observed: -

“48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood,

the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not

have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in

our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff from

the grain has to be applied. However, when the evidence is

inseparable and such an attempt would either be

impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable, the

natural consequence would be one of avoidance. The said

principle has not assumed the status of law but continues

only as a rule of caution. One has to see the nature of the

discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies are

very material, shaking the very credibility of the witness,

leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that it is

neither possible to separate it nor to rely upon, it is for the

said court to either accept or reject."

29. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot

29

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be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies.

The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively

affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core

of the case rather than the details.

30. In the present case, the contradictions relate to

informing the police telephonically and do not affect the core of

the prosecution case, namely the accident. Therefore, this

contradiction cannot be used to discard the prosecution's case.

31. It was submitted that Som Chand (PW6) witness

deposed that he had dragged the accused out of the tipper, which

fact was not recorded in the statement recorded by the police.

Therefore, this witness has improved upon his previous version,

and his testimony is not reliable. This submission cannot be

accepted. Learned defence counsel did not ask HC Deep Chand

(PW9), whether the witness Som Chand (PW6) had told him about

dragging the accused out of the vehicle. Therefore, the omission

has not been proved as per the law. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs.

Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965 that the previous

statement has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed:

30

2026:HHC:11561

“The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show

that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in

evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom

the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as

to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is

relied upon by the accused for the purpose of

contradicting the witness; and the provisions of Section

67 of the Indian Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as

to any other similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say

that, if the particular police officer who recorded the

statement is not available, other means of proving the

statement may not be availed of, e.g., evidence that the

statement is in the handwriting of that particular officer.”

32. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385,

that if the witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is

necessary, but if the witness denies or says that he did not

remember the previous statement, the investigating officer

should be asked about the same. It was observed: -

“52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the

police statement, and we must record our emphatic

disapproval of the same. The question should have been

framed in a manner to point out that, from amongst those

accused mentioned in examination-in-chief, there were

some whose names were not mentioned in the police

statement and if the witness affirms this, no further proof

is necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does

not remember, the investigation officer should have been

questioned about it.”

33. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed

v. State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876, that if

31

2026:HHC:11561

the witness denies having made the statement, the portion

marked by the defence should be put to the investigating officer

and his version should be elicited regarding the same. It was

observed at page 1880: -

“13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention

to the above statement of the Investigating Officer and

submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before

the police and that the same, being his improved version,

cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the

learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above

contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point

in the previous statement sought to be contradicted is

placed before the witness for explanation, the previous

statement cannot be used in evidence. In other words,

drawing the attention of the witness to his previous

statement sought to be contradicted and giving all

opportunities to him for explanation are compulsory. If

any authority is to be cited on this point, we may

conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State

reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). Further,

in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR

1959 SC 1012: (1959 Cri LJ 1231) it was also held that the

statement not reduced to writing cannot be contradicted

and, therefore, in order to show that the statement sought

to be contradicted: was recorded by the police, it should be

marked and exhibited. However, in the case at hand, there

is nothing on the record to show that the previous

statement of the witness was placed before him and that

the witness was given the chance for explanation. Again,

his previous statement was not marked and exhibited.

Therefore, his previous statement before the police cannot

be used. Hence, his evidence that when he turned back, he

saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his

chest is to be taken as his correct version.

32

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14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade

us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground

that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by

his previous statement made before the police. However, in

view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been

persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to

be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the

Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the

prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by

him before the police during the investigation will be to

draw the attention of the witness to that part of the

contradictory statement which he made before the police,

and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that

statement. If the witness admits having made the

particular statement to the police, that admission will go

into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of

the witness and can be relied on by the accused as

establishing the contradiction. However, if, on the other

hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement

before the police, the particular portions of the statement

recorded should be provisionally marked for identification

as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and

when the investigating officer who had actually recorded

the statements in question comes into the witness box, he

should be questioned as to whether these particular

statements had been made to him during the investigation

by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing

his memory from the case diary the investigating officer

would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of

the Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to

B-1, B-2 to B-2, which are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext.

D. 2, etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into

evidence, and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused

as contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed in

above, the above procedure was not followed while cross-

examining the witness to his previous statements, and,

therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the

statement given by this witness before the trial Court that

33

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he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his

chest to be his correct version.”

34. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v.

State of A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284: 2000 Cri LJ

321: (1999) 2 ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness

and the witness denying the same does not amount to putting the

contradiction to the witness. The attention of the witness has to

be drawn to the previous statement, and if he denies the same,

the same is to be proved by the investigating officer. It was

observed at page 290: -

“24… As far as the contradictions put by the defence are

concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel

did not put the contradictions in the manner in which it

ought to have been put. By putting suggestions to the

witness and the witness denying the same will not amount

to putting contradiction to the witness. The contradiction

has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section

145 of the Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the

witness and it is denied by him, then his attention has to be

drawn to the statement made by such witness before the

Police or any other previous statement and he must be

given a reasonable opportunity to explain as to why such

contradiction appears and he may give any answer if the

statement made by him is shown to him and if he

confronted with such a statement and thereafter the said

contradiction must be proved through the Investigation

Officer. Then, it only amounts to putting the contradiction

to the witness and getting it proved through the

Investigation Officer.”

34

2026:HHC:11561

35. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan

Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013)

2 Cal LJ 144 and held at page 151: -

“21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali

Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487 , that if any

statement of the witness is contrary to the previous

statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers

from omission of certain material particulars, then the

previous statement can be proved by examining the

Investigating Officer who had recorded the same. Thus,

there is no doubt that to prove the previous statement

Investigating Officer ought to be examined, and the

statement of the witness recorded by him can only be

proved by him, and he has to depose to the extent that he

had correctly recorded the statement, without adding or

omitting, as to what was stated by the witness.

23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms

that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved.

The words, if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused

who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting

the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness

through the police officer who has recorded the same in the

ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination

admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the

statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the

police officer who had recorded the statement is called by

the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on

this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the

prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given

situation Court can call this witness, or the accused can call

the police officer to give evidence in defence. There is no

doubt that unless the statement as per proviso to sub-

section (1) of Section 162, Cr.P.C. is duly proved, the

contradiction in terms of Section 145 of the Indian

35

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Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration by the

Court.

24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to

reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act.

“S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous

statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing,

and relevant to matters in question, without such writing

being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it intended to

contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the

writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which

are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.”

25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous

statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. is

proved, the attention of the witness must be drawn to the

portion in the statement recorded by the Investigating

Officer to bring to light the contradiction, a process called

confrontation.

26. Let us first understand what the proper procedure is. A

witness may have stated in the statement under Section

161, Cr.P.C. that ‘X murdered Y’. In Court witness state ‘Z

murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or

Court, and even prosecution if the witness is declared

hostile, having resiled from a previous statement, is to be

confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention

of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or

statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., where it was stated

that ‘X murdered Y’. Since Section 145 of the Indian

Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the

course of examination of the witness, a previous statement

or a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be

exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion

contradicted will be specified. The trial Court in the event

of contradiction, has to record as under.

27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions

A to A of the statement marked as 1, and confronted with

the portion where it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this

manner, by way of confrontation, contradiction is brought

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on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is

examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the

statement, after the Investigating Officer testifies that the

statement assigned mark was correctly recorded by him, at

that stage statement will be exhibited by the Court. Then

the contradiction will be proved by the Investigating

Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told

him that ‘X murdered Y’ and he had correctly recorded this

fact.

28. Now, a reference to the explanation to Section 162,

Cr.P.C., which says that an omission to state a fact or

circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say, for

instance, if a witness omits to state in Court that ‘X

murdered Y’, what he had stated in a statement under

Section 161, Cr.P.C. will be materia? contradiction, for the

Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the

previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the

charge of murder, omission to state ‘X murdered Y’ will be

a material omission, and amount to contradiction so far as

the defence of ‘W is concerned. At that stage also attention

of the witness will also be drawn to a significant portion of

the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which

the witness had omitted to state, and note shall be given

that attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to

A wherein it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this way,

the omission is brought on record. The rest of the

procedure stated earlier, qua confrontation shall be

followed to prove the statement of the witness and the fact

stated by the witness.

29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of

contradiction, it is necessary that the contradiction or

omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His

or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the

previous statement (in the present case statement under

Section 161, Cr.P.C)”

36. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed:

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2026:HHC:11561

“7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they

become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a

statement in his evidence before the Court which is

inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement

recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a

prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1)

or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual

aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his

prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section

164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will

be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in

his statement recorded by the Police, which he states

before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section

162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a

contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus,

every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a

contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the

explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an

omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided

in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be

followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-

examination.

8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section

162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner

provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145

reads thus:

“145. Cross-examination as to previous statements

in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to

previous statements made by him in writing or reduced

into writing, and relevant to matters in question,

without such writing being shown to him, or being

proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the

writing, his attention must, before the writing can be

proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used

for the purpose of contradicting him.”

The Section operates in two parts. The first part

provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his

previous statements made in writing without such writing

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being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be

cross-examined by asking whether his prior statement

exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a

witness. While confronting the witness with his prior

statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be

shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction

between the statement made by the witness before the

Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by

the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to

specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used

to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant

part can be put to the witness without the writing being

proved. However, the previous statement used to

contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if

the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved

can the contradictions be said to be proved. The usual

practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness

of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done

differently in different States. In some States, practice is to

mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness

with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same

alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial

Court must record that a particular portion marked, for

example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of

the prior statement is shown to the witness for

contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-

examination. If the witness admits to having made such a

prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If

the witness does not admit the portion of his prior

statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved

through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the

witness made a statement that was shown to the witness.

Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with

his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular

part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be

specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the

prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be

proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if

the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it

39

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can be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned

police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145

of the Evidence Act, of confronting the witness by showing

him the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the

witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore,

this is a rule of fairness.

9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent

with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can

be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance

with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which

reads thus:

“155. Impeaching credit of the witness. — The credit

of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by

the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by

the party who calls him—

(1) ….……………………………………

(2) ………………………………………

(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with

any part of his evidence which is liable to be

contradicted.”

It must be noted here that every contradiction or

omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to

disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trifle omission or

contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to

disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a

material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve

the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a

material contradiction or omission, depending upon the

facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction

also depends on the facts of each individual case.

10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark

decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State

of U.P.1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said

decision reads thus:

“13. The learned counsel's first argument is based

upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145

40

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of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162

of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the

Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all

relevant questions to a witness before his attention is

called to those parts of the writing with a view to

contradicting him. In support of this contention,

reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in

Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR

812]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to

contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence

Act, thus at p. 819:

Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if

the witness denies that he made the former

statement. In that event, it would be necessary to

prove that he did, and if the former statement was

reduced to writing, then Section 145 requires that his

attention must be drawn to these parts which are to

be used for contradiction. But that position does not

arise when the witness admits the former statement.

In such a case, all that is necessary is to look to the

former statement of which no further proof is

necessary because of the admission that it was

made.”

It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a

similar procedure is suggested for putting questions

under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the

said decision of this Court and similar decisions were

not considering the procedure in a case where the

statement in writing was intended to be used for

contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts:

the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a

witness as to a previous statement made by him in writing

or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to

him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-

examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other

words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first

part with cross-examination other than by way of

41

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contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by

way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that,

if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his

attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called

to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of

contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of

such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner

provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be

doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said

statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-

examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of

Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the

argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second

part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting

relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty

is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145

of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to

be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B

stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C.

His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement

made before the police, which contradicts his statement in

the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no

further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the

practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by

the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure

suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated

thus: If the witness is asked, “Did you say before the

police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers

“yes”, then the statement which does not contain such

recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure

involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the accused

to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the

witness stated before the police officer. If a police

officer did not make a record of a witness's statement,

his entire statement could not be used for any purpose,

whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by

this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral

statement could be brought on record. This procedure,

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therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section

162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the

illustration given by the learned counsel for the

appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary

statement made in the witness box, for the witness has

not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can

serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section,

should be between what a witness asserted in the

witness box and what he stated before the police officer,

and not between what he said he had stated before the

police officer and what he actually said before him. In

such a case, the question could not be put at all: only

questions to contradict can be put, and the question

here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer

which is contradicted by the police statement. This

argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145

of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in

considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added)

This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to

guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned

Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses'

prior statements based on which they were sought to be

contradicted in the cross-examination.”

37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Matadin v. State of U.P., 1980 Supp SCC 157, that the statement

under Section 161 Cr.PC is not detailed and is meant to be brief. It

does not contain all the details. It was observed at page 158:

“3. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the evidence of

the eyewitnesses on wrong, unconvincing and unsound

reasons. The Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed

by some insignificant omissions made by some of the

witnesses in their statements before the police, and on the

basis of these omissions, dubbed the witnesses as liars. The

43

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Sessions Judge did not realise that the statements given by

the witnesses before the police were meant to be brief

statements and could not take the place of evidence in the

Court. Where the omissions are vital, they merit

consideration, but mere small omissions will not justify a

finding by a court that the witnesses concerned are self-

contained liars. We have carefully perused the judgment of

the Sessions Judge, and we are unable to agree that the

reasons that he has given for disbelieving the witnesses are

good or sound reasons. The High Court was, therefore, fully

justified in reversing the judgment passed by the trial

court. We are satisfied that this is a case where the

judgment of the Sessions Judge was manifestly wrong and

perverse and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was

urged by Mr Mehta that, as other appellants except

Matadin and Dulare do not appear to have assaulted the

deceased, they should be acquitted of the charge under

Section 149. We, however, find that all the appellants were

members of the unlawful assembly. Their names find a

place in the FIR. For these reasons, we are unable to find

any ground to distinguish the case of those appellants from

that of Matadin and Dulare. The argument of the learned

counsel is overruled. The result is that the appeal fails and

is accordingly dismissed. The appellants who are on bail

will now surrender to serve out the remaining portion of

their sentence.”

38. Similar is the judgment in Esher Singh v. State of A.P.,

(2004) 11 SCC 585: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 320, wherein it was held at

page 601:

“23. So far as the appeal filed by accused Esher Singh is

concerned, the basic question is that even if the

confessional statement purported to have been made by A-

5 is kept out of consideration, whether residuary material

is sufficient to find him guilty. Though it is true, as

contended by learned counsel for the accused-appellant

44

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Esher Singh, that some statements were made for the first

time in court and not during the investigation, it has to be

seen to what extent they diluted the testimony of Balbeer

Singh and Dayal Singh (PWs 16 and 32) used to bring home

the accusations. A mere elaboration cannot be termed a

discrepancy. When the basic features are stated, unless the

elaboration is of such a nature that it creates a different

contour or colour of the evidence, the same cannot be said

to have totally changed the complexion of the case. It is to

be noted that in addition to the evidence of PWs 16 and 32,

the evidence of S. Narayan Singh (PW 21) provides the

necessary links and strengthens the prosecution’s version.

We also find substance in the plea taken by learned counsel

for the State that evidence of Amar Singh Bungai (PW 24)

was not tainted in any way, and should not have been

discarded and disbelieved only on surmises. Balbir Singh

(PW 3), the son of the deceased, has also stated about the

provocative statements in his evidence. Darshan Singh (PW

14) has spoken about the speeches of the accused Esher

Singh, highlighting the Khalistan movement. We find that

the trial court had not given importance to the evidence of

some of the witnesses on the ground that they were

relatives of the deceased. The approach is wrong. The mere

relationship does not discredit the testimony of a witness.

What is required is careful scrutiny of the evidence. If, after

careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be credible and

cogent, it can be acted upon. In the instant case, the trial

court did not indicate any specific reason to cast doubt on

the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses whom it had

described as the relatives of the deceased. PW 24 has

categorically stated about the provocative speeches by A-1.

No definite cross-examination on the provocative nature

of speech regarding the Khalistan movement was made, so

far as this witness is concerned.”

39. This position was reiterated in Shamim v. State (NCT of

Delhi), (2018) 10 SCC 509: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1559, where it was

held at page 513:

45

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“12. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the

approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,

read as a whole, inspires confidence. Once that impression

is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to

scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view

the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in

the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out

whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and

whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as

to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on

trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a

hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of

context here or there from the evidence, and attaching

importance to some technical error without going to the

root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of

the evidence as a whole. Minor omissions in the police

statements are never considered to be fatal. The

statements given by the witnesses before the police are

meant to be brief statements and cannot take the place of

evidence in court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify

a finding by the court that the witnesses concerned are

liars. The prosecution’s evidence may suffer from

inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but that is a

shortcoming from which no criminal case is free. The main

thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go to the

root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects

thereof. In the former case, the defence may be justified in

seeking advantage of incongruities obtained in the

evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be

available to it.”

40. Similar is the judgment in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot

v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347,

wherein it was observed at page 564:

“22. We also do not find any substance in the argument of

the learned counsel that there are major contradictions in

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the deposition of PWs 18 and 19. The contradictions which

are sought to be projected are minor contradictions which

cannot be the basis for discarding their evidence. The

judgment of this Court in Mohar [Mohar v. State of U.P.,

(2002) 7 SCC 606: 2003 SCC (Cri) 121], relied on by the

learned counsel for the respondent State, supports the case

of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court

has held that convincing evidence is required to discredit

an injured witness. Para 11 of the judgment reads as under:

(SCC p. 611)

“11. The testimony of an injured witness has its own

efficacy and relevancy. The fact that the witness

sustained injuries on his body would show that he was

present at the place of occurrence and had seen the

occurrence by himself. Convincing evidence would be

required to discredit an injured witness. Similarly, every

discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot be

treated as fatal. A discrepancy which does not affect the

prosecution’s case materially cannot create any

infirmity. In the instant case, the discrepancy in the

name of PW 4 appearing in the FIR and the cross-

examination of PW 1 has been amply clarified. In cross-

examination, PW 1 clarified that his brother Ram Awadh

had three sons: (1) Jagdish, PW 4, (2) Jagarnath, and (3)

Suresh. This witness, however, stated that Jagarjit had

only one name. PW 2 Vibhuti, however, stated that at

the time of occurrence, the son of Ram Awadh, Jagjit

alias Jagarjit, was milking a cow, and he was also called

as Jagdish. Balli (PW 3) mentioned his name as Jagjit

and Jagdish. PW 4 also gave his name as Jagdish.”

23. The learned counsel for the respondent State has

also relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of

U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216]. In

the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the

evidence of injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside

without assigning cogent reasons. Paras 27 and 30 of the

judgment, which are relevant, read as under: (SCC pp. 333-

34)

47

2026:HHC:11561

“27. The evidence of an injured witness must be

given due weight, being a stamped witness; thus, his

presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally

considered to be very reliable, and it is unlikely that he

has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely

implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured

witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has

sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence,

and this lends support to his testimony that he was

present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of

an injured witness is accorded a special status in law.

The witness would not like or want to let his actual

assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third

person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus,

the evidence of the injured witness should be relied

upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his

evidence on the basis of major contradictions and

discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of

Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719:

(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], Balraje v. State of Maharashtra

[Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673: (2010)

3 SCC (Cri) 211] and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul

Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259: (2010) 3 SCC

(Cri) 1262])

***

30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are

bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to

normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory

due to lapse of time or due to mental dispositions such

as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where

the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating

serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and

other witnesses also make material improvement while

deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to

rely upon. However, minor contradictions,

inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on

trivial matters which do not affect the core of the

prosecution case, should not be made a ground on

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which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The

court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the

witness and record a finding as to whether his

deposition inspires confidence.

‘9. Exaggerations, per se, do not render the evidence

brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test the

credibility of the prosecution version when the entire

evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the

touchstone of credibility.’ [Ed.: As observed in Bihari

Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p.

192, para 9: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435]

Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements

of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements, as the

same may be elaborations of the statement made by the

witness earlier. The omissions which amount to

contradictions in material particulars, i.e. go to the root

of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the

prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness

liable to be discredited. (Vide State v. Saravanan [State v.

Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580],

Arumugam v. State [Arumugam v. State, (2008) 15 SCC

590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], Mahendra Pratap Singh v.

State of U.P. [Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.,

(2009) 11 SCC 334 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1352] and Sunil

Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil

Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra,

(2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375]”

24. Further, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of

Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of

Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], this

Court has considered the effect of the minor contradictions

in the depositions of witnesses while appreciating the

evidence in a criminal trial. In the aforesaid judgment, it is

held that only contradictions in material particulars and

not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the

testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42

of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 483)

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“42. Only such omissions that amount to a

contradiction in material particulars can be used to

discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in

the police statement by itself would not necessarily

render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When

the version given by the witness in the court is different

in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier

statements, the case of the prosecution becomes

doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are

bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses,

as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of

observation differs from person to person. The

omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of

trivial details, as in the present case, the same would

not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if

there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on

any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole

of the testimony of such witness.”

41. Therefore, the testimony of Som Chand (PW6) cannot

be discarded simply because he had not narrated this fact to the

police.

42. It was consistently stated by the informant and this

witness that the tipper had turned turtle. This fact is also

corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW9/C), wherein the truck has

been shown to have turned turtle. The photographs (Ext.P1, Ext.

P4, Ext. P2 and Ext.P6) also show that the tipper had turned

turtle. Therefore, somebody must have helped the driver to come

out of the tipper, and the statement of Som Chand that he had

taken the accused out of the truck is believable.

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43. Anil Kumar (PW8) stated that he was employed as a

conductor in a Truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238. The

truck was going towards Dehradun on 21.09.2011. When the truck

reached near Katasan, a tipper being driven by the accused came

from the opposite side towards the wrong side of the road. The

tipper hit the rear tyre of the truck and turned turtle. The accused

was caught subsequently. He was heavily intoxicated. The police

came to the spot and investigated the matter. He stated in his

cross-examination that he did not possess a conductor's licence

on the date of the accident. The truck was going uphill at a speed

of about 20 km per hour. The road was 7-8 meters wide. The

police reached the spot after one hour. The photographs were

taken on the next day. The accused was surrounded by 5-7

persons. He denied that Ram Singh was driving the tipper on the

date of the accident, and he had wrongly disclosed his name as

Kamal.

44. The statement of this witness corroborates the

statements of the informant and the owner of the truck. Nothing

was suggested to these witnesses in their cross-examination to

show that they were making false statements. Therefore, learned

Courts below had rightly accepted their testimonies.

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2026:HHC:11561

45. Anshul Singhal (PW3) stated that he is the owner of

the truck bearing registration No. HP-71-1075. He was permitted

to be cross-examined. He denied in the cross-examination by the

learned APP that the accused was intoxicated and the accident

occurred because of the high speed of the tipper. He was informed

by the driver that the truck was damaged in the accident. He

admitted that he did not possess the permit for the tipper. He

denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated

that he had employed Ram Singh as a driver.

46. It was submitted that this witness has not supported

the prosecution's case, and this is sufficient to acquit the accused.

This submission cannot be accepted. He was contradicted by his

previous statement, which was subsequently exhibited by HC

Deep Chand (PW9). HC Deep Chand (PW9) specifically stated that

he has recorded the statement of Anshul Singhal (Ext.PW9/D) as

per his version. Anshul Singhal (PW3) had mentioned in his

previous statement that he had employed Kamal as a driver, and

Kamal was intoxicated. Thus, he is shown to have made two

inconsistent statement: one before the police that he had

employed Kamal as a driver and the other before the Court that he

had employed Ram Singh as a driver. Both these statements

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cannot stand together, and his credit has been impeached under

Section 155 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727

that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by

confronting him with the previous statement, his statement

cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some

portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to

that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It

was observed:

“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that

even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-

examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by

the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of

law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for

the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a

result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the

witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be

believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge

finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not

been completely shaken, he may, after reading and

considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with

due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other

evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he

finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case,

the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and

in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally

discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence,

discard his evidence in toto.”

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47. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman

versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:

“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been

called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-

examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses

credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We

find support for the view we have taken from the various

authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State

(Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the

Apex Court observed:

"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has

been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be

cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the

result of that course being adopted is to discredit this

witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part

of his testimony.

48. Therefore, his testimony cannot be relied upon and

cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s version.

49. Further, his conduct does not support his testimony.

He claimed that he had employed Ram Singh as a driver. However,

he failed to produce any document showing the employment of

Ram Singh. He stated that he came to know after receipt of the

summons that a false case was made against the accused.

However, he had not protested regarding this fact. Thus, his

conduct does not justify his statement that he had employed Ram

Singh as a driver and not the accused.

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50. Rajender Kumar (PW4) stated that he saw a tipper

having turned turtle on the road. The accident did not occur in his

presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied

that a tipper bearing registration No. HP-71-1075 came from

Paonta Sahib side and hit the truck bearing registration No.

HP17B-8238. He denied that the driver of the tipper was heavily

intoxicated. He denied the previous statement recorded by the

police.

51. HC Deep Chand (PW9) has also proved that the

statement of Rajender Kumar (Ext.PW9/E) was written as per his

version. Rajender Kumar (PW4) had told the police that the

accident had occurred in his presence, and the accused was

driving the tipper at the time of the accident. Thus, he has also

made contradictory statements, his credibility has been

impeached, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony.

52. The statements of the informant Som Chand (PW6)

and Anil Kumar (PW8) that the tipper was being driven towards

the wrong side of the road are duly corroborated by the site plan

(Ext.PW9/C), wherein the truck is shown towards the extreme

left-hand side of the road, whereas the tipper is shown towards

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its right side. Thus, the site plan duly proved that the tipper was

being driven towards the right side of the road, which was the

proximate cause of the accident.

53. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the

Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule

2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as

close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall

allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction

to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs.

State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side

of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:

“The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of

nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on

the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on

its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming

on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the

opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus

is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more

than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have

avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of

the road.”

54. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar

2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right

side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:

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“The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A

on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks

and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the

place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of

the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil

Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to

Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is

almost on the extreme right side of the road.”

55. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj

2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:

“16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in

light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In

the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width

of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the

left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7

ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft.

kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft.

The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and

was walking on the left side of the road. This has been

stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is

also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the

injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the

edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it

has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated

that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is

apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state

that they were on the extreme left side, and the

motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit

them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the

motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and

therefore on the wrong side.”

56. In the present case, the driver of the tipper had

breached the rule and the regulation which led to the accident,

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and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused

was negligently driving the tipper.

57. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under

Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was medically examined and his

blood sample was taken. The blood sample was sent to the SFSL,

and the report (Ext.PW9/G) was issued, in which it was

mentioned that the quantity of alcohol in the blood was 268.18

mg %. Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that if a

person drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle having alcohol

exceeding 30 mg per 100 ml in his blood, he shall be punishable

with imprisonment, which may extend to six months or the fine

which may extend to ₹2000/- or with both. In the present case,

the quantity of alcohol found in the blood of the accused was

much more than 30 mg per 100 ml, and he was rightly held guilty

of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of

the MV Act.

58. The accused did not produce his driving licence.

Therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 181 of the MV Act.

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59. Anshul Singhal (PW3) admitted that he did not

possess any permit for the tipper. Section 192-A of the MV Act

punishes a person driving a motor vehicle without a valid permit

required under Section 66(1) of the MV Act.

60. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly

convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable

under Section 279 of the IPC and Sections 181, 185 and 192A of the

MV Act.

61. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo

simple imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of ₹500/-,

and in default of payment of fine to undergo further

imprisonment of 15 days for the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 279 of IPC. It was submitted that the

learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the

Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. This submission

cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a

deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash

or negligent driving. It was observed:

“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made

based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted

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person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have

proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping

up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor

suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this

Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of

road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the

Indian highways are among the top killers of the country,

the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is

today. So, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said

decision, thus:

"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not

absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the

law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of

negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency

of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding

menaces."

12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC

538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on

a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain

in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said

sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of

driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human

being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to

rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a

fine.

13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in

India and the devastating consequences of visiting the

victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the

nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the

benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While

considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the

offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of

automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be

deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of

the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He

must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to

have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his

leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and

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should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need

not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident

occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any

human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be

convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is

convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He

must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is

convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human

being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot

escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the

Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for

lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the

callous driving of automobiles.”

62. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder

Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: -

“13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of

correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they

must have better training in traffic laws and moral

responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury

to human life and limb. Considering the increased number

of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has

reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences

relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the

nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting

the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of

Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by

this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri)

1208].

63. Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh

Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC

278, wherein it was observed at page 196:

“25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to

observe that India has a disreputable record of road

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accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the

drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they

survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving,

where other people become their prey. The poor feel that

their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of

uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant

fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious

attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger

than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe

that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the

sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with

immense anguish.”

64. Therefore, a deterrent sentence was required to be

imposed, especially because the accused was driving with alcohol

in his blood exceeding the legal limit. Thus, no interference is

required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.

65. No other point was urged.

66. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is

dismissed.

67. The present revision stands disposed of and so are the

pending miscellaneous application(s) if any.

68. The record of the learned Courts below be returned

with a copy of the judgment.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

16

th

April, 2026

(Nikita)