2026 INSC 54 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 1544-1545 of 2026)

KANCHANA RAI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GEETA SHARMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1737 of 2026)

UMA DEVI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GEETA SHARMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. Heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Shri V. Giri, senior

counsel appearing for the respective appellants in the two

appeals and Shri Vikas Singh, senior counsel for the

contesting respondents, in both the appeals.

3. The controversy is inter se the heirs/family members of late

Dr. Mahendra Prasad who died on 27.12.2021. He had three

sons, namely, Ranjit Sharma, who passed away on

02.03.2023, Devinder Rai, husband of the appellant -

Kanchana Rai and Rajeev Sharma. It is alleged that late Dr.

Mahendra Prasad executed a registered Will on 18.07.2011,

appointing the appellant, the wife of his pre-deceased son

Devinder Rai, as the executor while bequeathing his

properties in favour of her two sons, completely ignoring his

own two sons namely Ranjit Sharma and Rajeev Sharma.

4. Smt. Geeta Sharma, Respondent No. 1, wife of one of the

sons, Ranjit Sharma, who died after the death of Dr.

Mahendra Prasad, applied for maintenance from the estate

of her father-in-law, before the Family Court under the Hindu

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Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

1. The petition was

dismissed by the Family Court as not maintainable as

Respondent no.1 was not a widow on the date of death of Dr.

Mahindra Prasad, since her husband, Ranjit Sharma was

alive at the time of his father’s demise. The High Court, in

appeal, set aside the order of the Family Court recording a

categorical finding that the petition was maintainable as

Respondent no.1 was the widow of one of the sons of late Dr.

Mahindra Prasad and as such was a dependant.

Accordingly, the High Court directed the Family Court to

consider the matter on merit and to decide about the

quantum of maintenance.

5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the High

Court dated 20.08.2025, the appellant-Smt. Kanchana Rai,

the wife of late Devinder Rai, the pre-deceased son of late Dr.

Mahindra Prasad, has preferred one of these appeals on the

issue of maintainability of the maintenance petition filed by

the Respondent No.1

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Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”

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6. The other appeal has been preferred by one Smt. Uma Devi,

the alleged partner of late Dr. Mahindra Prasad, contending

that she was in a live-in relationship with him over the last

forty years and that Respondent No. 1 had no legal right for

seeking maintenance from the estate of late Dr. Mahendra

Prasad.

7. In these facts and circumstances, a short and simple

question, which has been made intricate by legal engineering

of the legal minds, arising in these appeals is: whether a

daughter-in-law, who becomes a widow after the death of her

father-in-law, is a dependant upon the estate of the father-

in-law, and entitled to claim maintenance from his estate.

8. Since the issue which is falling for our consideration is purely

legal in nature, we intend to proceed and decide it on our own

thinking and reasoning on the simple interpretation of the

provisions of the Act, independent of the view taken by either

of the courts below i.e. the Family Court and the High Court

or on the basis of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which is

completely alien for the purposes of any interpretation of the

provisions of the present Act.

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9. The law on the grant of maintenance of Hindus has been

codified by enacting the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act,

1956. The aforesaid Act provides for the adoption as well for

the maintenance. The adoption part is dealt under Chapter

II of the Act, whereas Chapter III of the Act provides for

maintenance to the dependants of a Hindu under Sections

18 to 28.

10. The “dependants” have been defined under Section 21 of the

Act inter alia to include the following relatives of the

deceased.

“…

2 (vii). any widow of his son or of a

son of his predeceased son, so long as

she does not remarry: provided and to

the extent that she is unable to obtain

maintenance from her husband’s estate.

or from her son or daughter, if any, or his

or her estate; or in the case of a

grandson’s widow, also from her father-

in-law’s estate;

…”

11. A plain reading of the above definition of the dependants

makes it crystal clear that the relatives of the deceased,

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namely, “any widow of his son” would be a dependant

provided she is unable to maintain herself from her

husband’s estate or from her son or her daughter’s estate

and in the case of grandson’s widow, from her father-in-law’s

estate.

12. Section 22 of the Act provides for the maintenance of

dependants and casts an obligation upon all the heirs of the

deceased Hindu to maintain the dependants of the deceased

out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. In

simpler words, all the heirs of the deceased Hindu are

obliged to maintain the dependants of the deceased from the

funds inherited out of the estate of the deceased.

13. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 further provides that where a

dependant of the deceased Hindu has not obtained share in

the estate of the Hindu either by testamentary or intestate-

succession, such a dependant shall be entitled to

maintenance from those who take the estate. Therefore,

anyone succeeding to the estate of the deceased Hindu is

under an obligation to maintain the dependant of the

deceased.

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14. Section 23 of the Act provides for the manner and the factors

on the basis of which maintenance to a dependant has to be

determined.

15. Section 21 of the Act, as stated earlier, is only a defining

section which defines the “dependants” of the deceased

Hindu. One of the relatives of the deceased Hindu who has

been defined as a dependant is clearly “any widow of his son”

meaning thereby a widow of the deceased son of the Hindu

is a dependant irrespective of the time she becomes a widow.

16. The above definition is quite clear and unambiguous. It is

not open for any other meaning except that a “widow of the

son” of the deceased is a dependant. In view of such a clear

definition, it is not open for anyone to infer and assign any

other meaning to the said definition so as to say that only a

widow of the predeceased son of a Hindu would be covered

by the said definition. The aforesaid definition nowhere uses

the word “widow of a predeceased son”. It simply uses the

words “any widow of a son”. The legislature in its wisdom

has deliberately avoided to use the word “predeceased”

before the “son” so as to include any widow of the son. The

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time of her becoming a widow or the death of the son is

immaterial.

17. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of law that where

the provision is clear and unambiguous, it has to be

interpreted literally provided the literal interpretation is not

in conflict with the purpose of the Act or is otherwise not

impractical.

18. This foundational principle of literal interpretation finds

unequivocal support in a consistent line of judicial

precedents.

19. In Crawford v. Spooner

2 the Privy Council observed that

the construction of an Act must be taken from its bare

words, and it is not for the courts “to add, and mend, and,

by construction, make up deficiencies” left by the legislature,

nor to “fish out what possibly may have been the intention”

if not clearly expressed. Judges must take the words as they

are and give them their natural meaning, unless controlled

or altered by the context or the preamble.

2

(1846) 4 Moo IA 179

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20. In B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal

3 this Court emphasized

that departure from the literal rule should be an exception

in very rare cases, as once courts depart from the literal rule

where the language is clear, the result would be destructive

of judicial discipline and contrary to the constitutional

scheme as the exclusive domain to legislate is upon the

legislature. The Court aptly noted that “the literal rule of

interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and

we say what we mean.” The Court further cautioned that

even if a literal interpretation results in hardship or

inconvenience, the same cannot be a ground to depart from

the plain meaning of the statutory text.

21. More recently, in Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau

4 this Court

reaffirmed that the literal rule is the first and foremost

principle of statutory interpretation. Where the words are

absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had

to any other principle. The Court explicitly held that “the

language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of

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(2011) 4 SCC 266

4

(2023) 19 SCC 126

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the legislative intent” and that judges cannot correct or make

up a perceived deficiency in the words used by the

legislature. The Court held that courts cannot correct or

supply an assumed omission in the statute, as the

legislature is presumed to have intended what it has

expressly stated.

22. In view of the language so used in Section 21 (vii) of the Act

and guided by the settled principles reiterated above, there

is hardly any scope to interpret that the words “any widow

of his son” used therein would mean “widow of his

predeceased son” only. The courts cannot add or subtract

any word from the text of the statute. The provisions of the

statute cannot be re-written by the courts by assuming or

inferring something which is not implicit from the plain

language of the statute.

23. Even otherwise, any such restrictive interpretation would

fail the test of constitutional validity under Article 14 of the

Constitution. The classification sought to be made between

widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of the

husband’s death, namely, (a) those whose husbands died

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during the lifetime of the father-in-law, and (b) those whose

husbands died after him; is manifestly unreasonable and

arbitrary. Such a classification bears no rational nexus with

the object and purpose of the Act, which is to secure

maintenance to dependants who are unable to maintain

themselves. In both situations, the women are similarly

situated in so far as the object of the Act is concerned, having

suffered widowhood, being without spousal support, and

facing comparable financial vulnerability. Denial of

maintenance to one category based on a fortuitous

circumstance beyond their control is manifestly arbitrary

and violative of the guarantee of equality before law under

Article 14 of the Constitution.

24. Any interpretation contrary to one opined above, would also

infringe upon Article 21 of the Constitution, which

guarantees the right to life with dignity. The right to life has

been judicially expanded to include the right to livelihood

and basic sustenance. Denying maintenance to a widowed

daughter-in-law from the estate of her deceased father-in-

law on a narrow or technical construction of the statute

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would expose her to destitution and social marginalization,

thereby offending her fundamental right to live with dignity.

The provisions of the Act must, therefore, be read

purposively and in conformity with constitutional values, so

as to advance social justice and protect the dignity of

vulnerable dependants rather than defeat it.

25. Section 4 of the Act has an overriding effect but it does not

erase away fundamental principles of Hindu law particularly

where some doubt is raised about the codified provisions.

The Hindu law specially Manu Smriti vide Chapter 8, verse

389 says:

“न माता न पिता न स्त्री न िुरस्त््यागमर्हतत।

्यजन्नितततानेतान राज्ञा दण्ड्यः शतातन षट”।।

No mother, no father, no wife, and no son deserves to be

forsaken. A person who abandons these blameless (relatives)

should be fined six hundred (units) by the king. This verse

emphasizes duty of the family head to support female family

members.

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26. A son or the legal heirs are bound to maintain all the

dependant persons out of estate inherited i.e. all persons

whom the deceased was legally and morally bound to

maintain. Therefore, on the death of son, it is the pious

obligation of the father-in-law to maintain widowed

daughter-in-law, if she is unable to maintain herself either

on her own or through the property left behind by the

deceased son. The Act does not envisage to rule out the

above obligation of the father-in-law to maintain his

widowed daughter-in-law, irrespective of the fact when she

became a widow whether prior or after his death.

27. Though, it may not be very much in context to refer to

Section 19 of the Act but we consider it proper to refer to it

as the Courts below have considered and dealt with it and

some arguments on its basis have been advanced before us.

28. Section 19 of the Act provides for the maintenance of

“widowed daughter-in-law” of the deceased Hindu. It simply

contemplates that a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained

after the death of her husband by her father-in-law. Thus, it

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casts an obligation upon the father-in-law to maintain his

daughter-in-law. The said obligation subsists only during

the lifetime of the father-in-law as the aforesaid provision

nowhere contemplates that the daughter-in-law would be

entitled to maintenance from the estate of the father-in-law.

In other words, Section 19 contemplates for the

maintenance of the daughter-in-law during the lifetime of

father-in-law, whereas, Section 22 contemplates

“maintenance of dependants” including “widowed daughter-

in-law” from the estate of her father-in-law meaning thereby

that a claim under Section 22 can be raised only after the

death of the father-in-law.

29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are

clearly of the opinion that “any widow of the son” of a

deceased Hindu is a dependant within the meaning of

Section 21 (vii) of the Act and is entitled to claim

maintenance under Section 22 of the Act. Therefore, no

illegality has been committed by the High Court in passing

the impugned order holding the petition of Respondent no.1,

who is a widow of the son of the deceased, to be maintainable

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and in directing the Family Court to consider it on merits in

accordance with law.

30. The appeals as such lack merits and are dismissed with no

order as to costs.

…..………………………..J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

…..………………………..J.

(S.V.N. BHATTI)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 13, 2026