2026:HHC:10810

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 417 of 2025

Reserved on: 12.3.2026

Date of Decision: 08.04.2026.

Kewal Ram ...Petitioner

Versus

Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Agriculture and Rural

Development Bank Ltd ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No

For the Petitioner : Mr Atul Sharma, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr Narender Singh Thakur,

Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present revision is directed against the judgment

dated 26.04.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-1,

Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment

of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.09.2023, passed by

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chopal, District Shimla,

HP (learned Trial Court) were upheld (Parties shall hereinafter be

referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the

learned Trial Court for convenience.)

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2

2026:HHC:10810

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the

learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is

a bank established under the Society Registration Act 1979,

having its head office at SDA Commercial Complex, Kasumpti,

Shimla and a branch office at Chopal. It is engaged in banking

activities. The accused applied for a loan of ₹ 5 lakhs on

02/01/2016. The complaint disbursed the loan to the accused,

and the accused signed various documents to avail the loan. The

accused failed to return the amount, and he was liable to pay

₹1,77,920 till January 2021. The accused issued a postdated

cheque of ₹ 1,77,920/- dated 19/01/2020 drawn on Punjab

National Bank, Sarain (Ex. CW1/B). The complainant presented

the cheque for realisation on 03/02/2021, but it was dishonoured

with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by drawer' vide memo

(Ex.CW1/C). The complainant issued a legal notice (Ex.CW1/D)

asking the accused to pay the amount within 15 days of the

receipt of the notice. The notice was served upon the accused,

but the accused failed to pay the amount; hence, the complaint

3

2026:HHC:10810

was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per

law.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of

accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded

not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The complainant examined Narender Kumar (CW1)

to prove its complaint.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the complainant had advanced a

loan of ₹ 5 lakh in his favour and he had executed the necessary

documents in the complainant's favour. He admitted that he had

issued a postdated cheque of ₹ 1,77,920 drawn on Punjab

National Bank, Sarain, Shimla, in the complainant's favour. He

admitted that the complainant presented the cheque for

encashment, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement

'payment stopped by the drawer'. He admitted that the

complainant had issued a legal notice to him, which was duly

served upon him, and he had not paid any money to the

4

2026:HHC:10810

complainant. He stated that he had paid ₹ 45,000 and ₹ 1,50,000

to the complainant. He stated that the complainant had filed a

false complaint against him, and he was innocent. He did not

produce any evidence in defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that taking of the loan, the

issuance of the cheque, its dishonour and service of the notice

upon the accused were not disputed. A cheque carried with it a

presumption that it was issued in discharge of the debt/legal

liability. The accused admitted taking the loan, and he did not

produce any evidence to rebut the presumption attached to the

cheque. The complainant denied the suggestions made to him

during his cross-examination and denied suggestions do not

amount to any proof. All the ingredients of the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly

satisfied. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of

the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of

the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment

for three months, pay a fine of ₹2,50,000/- and in default of

payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for one

month.

5

2026:HHC:10810

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Shimla,

District Shimla, HP (learned Appellate Court). The learned

Appellate Court held that the accused had admitted the taking of

a loan, issuance of the cheque, its dishonour and the receipt of

the notice. A cheque carries with it a presumption that it was

issued in discharge of debt/legal liability. The accused claimed

that he had made the part payment, but this plea was not

proved. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied.

The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The

sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, and

no interference was required with it. Hence, the appeal was

dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed

by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to

properly appreciate the material placed before them. The

complainant failed to produce the loan document to establish

the advancement of the loan of ₹ 5 lakhs. Mr Narender (CW1)

6

2026:HHC:10810

had not produced any authority letter to establish his capacity to

depose or file the complaint. The learned Courts below had

wrongly invoked the presumption under Section 139 of the NI

Act. The service of notice was not proved. An excessive sentence

was imposed. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision

be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned

Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Atul Sharma, Ld. counsel for the

petitioner/accused and Mr Narinder Singh Thakur, Ld. counsel

for the respondent/complainant.

10. Mr Atul Sharma, Ld. counsel for the petitioner/

accused, submitted that Narender Kumar (CW1) did not produce

any authority letter to show that the bank had authorised him to

file the complaint or depose before the Court. This plea was

taken before the Ld. appellate Court but was not considered. The

complaint was not maintainable and Ld. Courts below erred in

convicting and sentencing the accused. Therefore, he prayed

that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and

order passed by the Ld Courts below be set aside.

7

2026:HHC:10810

11. Mr Narender Singh Thakur, Ld. counsel for the

respondent/complainant, submitted that the competence of

Narender Kumar (CW1) was not disputed in the cross-

examination and this plea could not have been taken for the first

time before the Ld. appellate Court. The accused admitted to the

taking of a loan, issuance of a cheque, its dishonour and the

receipt of the notice. Therefore, all the ingredients of the

commission of an offence punishable under section 138 of the NI

Act were duly satisfied. Ld trial Court had imposed an adequate

sentence. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be

dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional

court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent

defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

207-

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at

the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

8

2026:HHC:10810

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence

brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision

against conviction is not supposed to exercise the

jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of

interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397

of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests

jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence

or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of

any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the

provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of

jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error

that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases.

It is also well settled that while considering the same, the

Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts

and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect

or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which

has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.

Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:

(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has

been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC

p. 475, paras 12-13)

9

2026:HHC:10810

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as

to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or

order made in a case. The object of this provision is

to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction

or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it

may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise

the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token

of careful consideration and appear to be in

accordance with law. If one looks into the various

judgments of this Court, it emerges that the

revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the

decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,

there is no compliance with the provisions of law,

the finding recorded is based on no evidence,

material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is

exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not

exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each

case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional

jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and

cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the

inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an

interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in

mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself

should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is

dealing with the question as to whether the charge has

been framed properly and in accordance with law in a

given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise

of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially

falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing

of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the

proceedings under CrPC.”

15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

10

2026:HHC:10810

OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the

absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of

Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala

v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC

452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of

the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court

has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

call for and examine the record of any proceedings

to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or

propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other

words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory

jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for

correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said

revisional power cannot be equated with the power

of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a

second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,

it would not be appropriate for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its

conclusion on the same when the evidence has

already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well

as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring

feature is brought to the notice of the High Court

which would otherwise amount to a gross

miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the

impugned judgment of the High Court from the

aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in

concluding that the High Court exceeded its

jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the

respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred

to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment

11

2026:HHC:10810

of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v.

Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2

SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in

the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not

interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it

is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material, the order

cannot be set aside merely on the ground that

another view is possible. The following has been

laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the

Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the

court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material or there

is palpable misreading of records, the

Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside

the order, merely because another view is

possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to

act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of

the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the

power in the court to do justice in accordance

with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.

The revisional power of the court under

Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated

with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the

court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is

shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is

grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or

where the decision is based on no material or

where the material facts are wholly ignored or

where the judicial discretion is exercised

arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not

interfere with the decision in exercise of their

revisional jurisdiction.”

12

2026:HHC:10810

16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it

is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional

Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by

a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a

jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,

therefore, in the negative.”

17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.

Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir

Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales

& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)

14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that

the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong

order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the

absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the

absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in

the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the

13

2026:HHC:10810

concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions

Court.

18. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. The accused admitted the issuance of the cheque in

his statement recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the

issuance of the cheque and the signatures on the cheque were

not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers

(2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque and

signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would

arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal

liability. It was observed: -

“9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and

considering the fact that the accused has admitted the

issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque

and that the cheque in question was issued for the second

time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that

even according to the accused some amount was due and

payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the

NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or

liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable.

However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was

required to lead evidence that the full amount due and

payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present

case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The

story put forward by the accused that the cheques were

given by way of security is not believable in the absence of

14

2026:HHC:10810

further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more

particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the

second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured.

Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in

not properly appreciating and considering the

presumption in favour of the complainant that there

exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section

139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial

court as well as the High Court have committed an error

in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the

debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption

under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above,

Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause

and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been

admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been

admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the

complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or

liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such

presumption by leading evidence.”

20. It was laid down in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao

N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under:

“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable

instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while

Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a

cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or

liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable,

meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a

probable defence.”

21. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.

Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,

PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI

ACT ARISE

15

2026:HHC:10810

15. In the present case, the cheque in question has

admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.

This Court is of the view that once the execution of the

cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of

the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for

consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of

the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said

cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or

liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to

mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge

Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,

(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge

Bench in Rangappa (supra).

16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this

presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques

as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.

17. Needless to mention that the presumption

contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is

rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the

cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is

on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.

Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].

22. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that

the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for

consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this

presumption.

23. The accused admitted to taking the loan in his

statement recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was laid

down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v.

Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC

16

2026:HHC:10810

OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the

accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed

at page 742:

“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a

statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can

constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is

administered to the accused, the statements made by the

accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why

sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render

himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers.

Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:

“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be

taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and

put in evidence for or against him in any other

inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which

such answers may tend to show he has committed.”

Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his

examination under Section 313 can be taken into

consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is

clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section.

Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4)

permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said

inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari

(1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This

Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of

M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held

that an answer given by an accused under Section 313

examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as

the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain

Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ

730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the

commission of the offence with which he is charged, the

Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to

convict him. To state the exact language in which the

three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be

17

2026:HHC:10810

advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at

pages 684-685:

“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is

material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry

or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution

have been examined and before the accused is

called upon for his defence shall put questions to

the accused person for the purpose of enabling him

to explain any circumstance appearing in the

evidence against him. Examination under Section

342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on

which evidence has been led for the prosecution to

ascertain from the accused his version or

explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the

subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By

sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused

may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or

the trial. If the accused person in his examination

under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the

offence charged against him the court may, relying

upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he

does not confess and in explaining circumstance

appearing in the evidence against him sets up his

own version and seeks to explain his conduct

pleading that he has committed no offence, the

statement of the accused can only be taken into

consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied)

Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section

(1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now

stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added

thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the

presence of the accused is dispensed with, his

examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with.

Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-

section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds

to the old sub-section (2) except for the change

necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury

18

2026:HHC:10810

system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are

concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-

section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply

with equal force.”

24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri)

1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the

accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to

the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot

form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:

27. The statement made in defence by the accused under

Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend

credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only

a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his

conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that

the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can

either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be

possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if

the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of

the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v.

State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp.

357-58, para 23)

“23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the

statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently

improbable but is contradicted by the other

evidence. According to this statement, the injury

that the appellant received was caused by the

appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal

Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim.

This was contradicted by the statement of the

accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect

that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a

19

2026:HHC:10810

herdsman. The injury found on his body when he

was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961,

negatives of both these versions. Neither of these

versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led

to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River

Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of

the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract

the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and

asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding

was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained

with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his

belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which

was discovered on his person was found to have

been stained with blood according to the report of

the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-

mortem report, this knife could have been the cause

of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like

these, there being enough evidence to reject the

exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in

Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting

the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the

other evidence to come to the conclusion that the

appellant was the person responsible for the crime.”

(emphasis supplied)

25. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of

Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC

OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section

313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be

used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at

page 275: -

“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to

put material evidence to the accused under Section 313

CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of

20

2026:HHC:10810

recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is

to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the

circumstances appearing against him as well as to put

forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he

does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law

must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this

opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313

CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution,

can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even

under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”

26. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.

State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC

OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused

recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend

corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It

was held at page 761: -

24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement,

if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various

witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries

by the firing by the accused and his associates, that

admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be

brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v.

Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held

that since no oath is administered to the accused, the

statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC

will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of

course, shall not render himself liable to punishment

merely on the basis of answers given while he was being

examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4)

says that the answers given by the accused in response to

his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken

into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court

in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951

21

2026:HHC:10810

SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the

answers given by the accused under Section 313

examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as

the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain

Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR

678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to

the commission of the offence with which he is charged,

the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to

convict him.

25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10

SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para

27)

“27. The statement made in defence by the

accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be

taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led

by the prosecution, but only a part of such

statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be

made the sole basis of his conviction.”

In this connection, reference may also be made to the

judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v.

Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185

and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC

467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions

would indicate that the statement of the accused under

Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or

confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for

finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not

making the statement on oath, but all the same the

confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of

evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence

led by the prosecution.

26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by

the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully

corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence

the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved

and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found

him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and

302 read with Section 34 IPC.”

22

2026:HHC:10810

27. It was submitted in the memorandum of revision

that no document was produced to show that the complainant

had advanced ₹5 lakhs to the accused, and Narender Kumar

(CW1) admitted in his cross-examination that the loan was not

advanced in his presence. Therefore, there was no proof of

advancing the loan. This submission will not help the accused

because he admitted to taking a loan in his statement recorded

under Section 313 CrPC. Therefore, the taking of the loan was

never disputed and Ld. Courts below had rightly held that the

accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the

cheque.

28. It was submitted that the authority of Narender

Kumar (CW1) to file the complaint or make a statement before

the Court was not proved, and the complaint was not

maintainable. This submission is not acceptable. The

complainant had specifically asserted in para-1 of the complaint

that Narender Ghunta, the Branch manager, is authorised to file

the complaint on behalf of the bank. The accused filed an

application under section 145 (2) of the NI Act seeking

permission to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses. He

mentioned in para-2 of the application that he had issued a

23

2026:HHC:10810

blank cheque as security and paid the entire cheque amount to

the complainant. He never claimed that Narender (CW1) was not

authorised to file a complaint or depose on behalf of the

complainant. Narender Kumar (CW1) filed his proof affidavit

(CW 1/A) mentioning that he was authorised to file the

complaint. He was not cross-examined regarding this part of his

statement. Therefore, this part of the statement was accepted as

correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State

of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where

the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-

examination, the same cannot be challenged during the

arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State

of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC

OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34:

“58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a

criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is

and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by

injuring his character, although the answer to such

questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or

may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or

forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is

required to be cross-examined to bring forth

inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the

untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his

arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was

required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the

24

2026:HHC:10810

prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular

aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be

arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the

arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically

mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-

9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station,

Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2,

appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station,

Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation

as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since

the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was

given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from

the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014.

Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the

prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the

arrest, the argument that the accused was arrested on 1-

9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable.

59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne

v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of

appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, held

that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a

cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not

speaking the truth on a particular point, direct his

attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-

examination showing that imputation is intended to be

made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a

matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under:

“Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems

to me to be absolutely essential to the proper

conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest

that a witness is not speaking the truth on a

particular point, to direct his attention to the fact

by some questions put in cross-examination

showing that that imputation is intended to be

made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as

a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when

it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he

might have been able to do if such questions had

25

2026:HHC:10810

been put to him, the circumstances which it is

suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not

to be believed, to argue that he is a witness

unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always

understood that if you intend to impeach a witness

you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him

an opportunity of making any explanation which is

open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only

a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a

case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing

with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been

made upon excessive cross-examination of

witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue,

but it seems to me that cross-examination of a

witness which errs in the direction of excess may be

far more fair to him than to leave him without

cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that

he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on

which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has

had full notice beforehand that there is an intention

to impeach the credibility of the story which he is

telling.”

60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion,

held as under:

“My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the

evidence was given in this case, I cannot too

heartily express my concurrence with the Lord

Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be

conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more

absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine

witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so

as to give them notice, and to give them an

opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity

very often to defend their own character, and, not

having given them such an opportunity, to ask the

jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said,

although not one question has been directed either

26

2026:HHC:10810

to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they

have deposed to.”

61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v.

Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850, quoted

from Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the

absence of cross-examination on the explanation of

delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and

ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section

146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-

examining the witness tendered in evidence by the

opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v.

Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp.

566-67, para 13)

“13. It may be noted here that part of the statement

of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In

the absence of cross-examination on the

explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1

remained unchallenged and ought to have been

believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the

Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-

examining the witness tendered in evidence by the

opposite party. The scope of that provision is

enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by

allowing a witness to be questioned:

(1) to test his veracity,

(2) to discover who he is and what his position in

life is, or

(3) to shake his credit by injuring his character,

although the answer to such questions might tend

directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might

expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him

to a penalty or forfeiture.”

62. This Court, in a judgment reported Muddasani

Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC

288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is

obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses

of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in

27

2026:HHC:10810

cross-examination is one of essential justice and not

merely a technical one. It was held as under: (SCC pp.

294-95, paras 15-16)

“15. Moreover, there was no effective cross-

examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with

respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed.

PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to

the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross-

examination is a matter of substance, not of

procedure. One is required to put one's own version

in the cross-examination of the opponent. The

effect of non-cross-examination is that the

statement of the witness has not been disputed. The

effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has

been considered by this Court in Bhoju

Mandalv.Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906 . This

Court repelled a submission on the ground that the

same was not put either to the witnesses or

suggested before the courts below. A party is

required to put his version to the witness. If no such

questions are put, the Court would presume that

the witness account has been accepted as held in

Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.

Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440.

16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine

MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the

matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not

challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination

by another party must be accepted as fully established.

The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y.

Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has

laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in

the cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite

party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-

examination is one of essential justice and not merely

a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High

Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC

OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83 has laid down that when

28

2026:HHC:10810

attestation is not specifically challenged, and the

witness is not cross-examined regarding details of

attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the

document was attested. If the other side wants to

challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart

from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the

witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the

Patna High Court in Karnidan Sardav.Sailaja Kanta

Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has

laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised

that the system of administration of justice allows of

cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for

the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be

assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in

that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In

the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has

gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the

first appellate court as to the factum of execution of

the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.”

29. Therefore, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the

complainant that this plea could not have been raised before the

Ld. Appellate Court, and it is impermissible to raise this plea

before this Court as well.

30. The accused claimed in his statement recorded under

section 313 Cr.P.C. that he had paid ₹ 45,000/- and 1,50,000 to

the bank. However, no evidence was presented to prove this fact.

It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022)

15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead

defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in

29

2026:HHC:10810

his statement under section 313 is not sufficient to rebut the

presumption. It was observed at page 700:

“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these

documents in support of his complaints and recorded the

statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the

appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the

Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the

presumption in support of her defence available under

Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused

recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive

evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused

to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the

prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no

evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were

issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied)”

31. Ld. counsel for the accused had also not suggested to

Narender Kumar (CW1) that any payment was made by the

accused to the complainant. Therefore, this plea was not

acceptable.

32. Even if the plea of the accused is accepted to be

correct, the accused had taken the loan of ₹ 5 lakh, and after

deducting the amount of ₹1,95,000, an amount of ₹ 3,05,000

remains payable and the cheque of ₹ 1,77,920, was issued in

discharge of the legal liability.

33. The accused admitted in his statement recorded

under section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the cheque was dishonoured

30

2026:HHC:10810

with an endorsement 'payment stopped by the drawer'. It was

laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Dyechem v.

State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 283: 2012

SCC OnLine SC 970 that the dishonour of a cheque on the ground

that the drawer stopped the payment will attract the provisions

of Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed at page 388:

12. In Modi Cements Ltd. [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri)

252], a similar question had arisen for the consideration

of this Court. The question was whether dishonour of a

cheque on the ground that the drawer had stopped

payment was a dishonour punishable under Section 138 of

the Act. Relying upon two earlier decisions of this Court in

Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v.

Indian Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd.

[(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] and K.K. Sidharthan

v. T.P. Praveena Chandran [(1996) 6 SCC 369: 1996 SCC (Cri)

1340], it was contended by the drawer of the cheque that if

the payment was stopped by the drawer, the dishonour of

the cheque could not constitute an offence under Section

138 of the Act. That contention was specifically rejected

by this Court. Not only that, the decision in Electronics

Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC

739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] to the extent that the same held

that dishonour of the cheque by the bank after the drawer

had issued a notice to the holder not to present the same

would not constitute an offence, was overruled. This

Court observed: (Modi Cements Ltd. case [(1998) 3 SCC 249:

1999 SCC (Cri) 252], SCC pp. 257-58, paras 18 & 20)

“18. The aforesaid propositions in both these reported

judgments, in our considered view, with great respect,

are contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and

139 of the Act. If we are to accept this proposition, it

will make Section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving

31

2026:HHC:10810

instructions to the bank to stop payment immediately

after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, the

drawer can easily get rid of the penal consequences,

notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was

committed. Further, the following observations in

para 6 in Electronics Trade & Technology Development

Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] (SCC

p. 742)

Section 138 is intended to prevent dishonesty on the

part of the drawer of a negotiable instrument to

draw a cheque without sufficient funds in his

account maintained by him in a bank and induce

the payee or holder in due course to act upon it.

Section 138 draws the presumption that one commits

the offence if one issues the cheque dishonestly.

In our opinion, do not also lay down the law correctly.

***

20. On a careful reading of Section 138 of the Act, we

are unable to subscribe to the view that Section 138 of

the Act draws a presumption of dishonesty against the

drawer of the cheque if he without sufficient funds to

his credit in his bank account to honour the cheque

issues the same and, therefore, this amounts to an

offence under Section 138 of the Act. For the reasons

stated hereinabove, we are unable to share the views

expressed by this Court in the above two cases, and we

respectfully differ with the same regarding the

interpretation of Section 138 of the Act to the limited

extent as indicated above.” (emphasis in original)

13. We may also, at this stage, refer to the decisions of this

Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P)

Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 234: 2002 SCC (Cri) 121], where to this

Court considering an analogous question held that even

in cases where the dishonour was on account of “stop-

payment” instructions of the drawer, a presumption

regarding the cheque being for consideration would arise

32

2026:HHC:10810

under Section 139 of the Act. The Court observed: (SCC p.

240, para 19)

“19. Just such a contention has been negatived by this

Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi

[(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252]. It has been held

that even though the cheque is dishonoured by reason

of a ‘stop-payment’ instruction, an offence under

Section 138 could still be made out. It is held that the

presumption under Section 139 is also attracted in

such a case. The authority shows that even when the

cheque is dishonoured by reason of ‘stop-payment’

instructions by virtue of Section 139, the court has to

presume that the cheque was received by the holder

for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or

liability. Of course, this is a rebuttable presumption.

The accused can thus show that the ‘stop-payment’

instructions were not issued because of insufficiency

or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his

account there were sufficient funds to clear the

amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of

the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and

that the stop-payment notice had been issued because

of other valid reasons, including that there was no

existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of

a cheque for encashment, then offence under Section

138 would not be made out. The important thing is that

the burden of so proving would be on the accused.

Thus, a court cannot quash a complaint on this

ground.”

14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in

Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza [(2003) 3 SCC 232:

2003 SCC (Cri) 603: 2003 Cri LJ 1723] where this Court held

that “stop-payment instructions” and consequent

dishonour of a post-dated cheque attract the provision of

Section 138. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 232g-233c)

“Chapter XVII, containing Sections 138 to 142, was

introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object

of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking

33

2026:HHC:10810

operations and giving credibility to negotiable

instruments in business transactions. The said

provisions were intended to discourage people from

not honouring their commitments by way of payment

through cheques. The court should lean in favour of an

interpretation which serves the object of the statute. A

post-dated cheque will lose its credibility and

acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The

purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some

accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it

is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque

should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given

to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated

cheque.

In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a

cheque is issued in the discharge of any debt or other

liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing

evidence, and the burden of proof is on the person who

wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption,

coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act, leads to

the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a

post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get

away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A

contrary view would render Section 138 a dead letter and

will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment

under legal obligations undertaken by them through

their own acts, which, in other words, can be said to be

taking advantage of one's own wrong.” (emphasis

supplied)

34. The accused admitted in his statement recorded

under section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the notice was served upon him.

Therefore, the plea taken by him in the memorandum of

revision that no notice was served upon him is not acceptable.

34

2026:HHC:10810

35. The accused did not claim that he had paid the

money to the complainant after the receipt of notice. Therefore,

the Ld. Courts below had rightly held that all the ingredients of

the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of

the NI Act were duly satisfied.

36. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to

undergo simple imprisonment for two months. It was laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar,

(2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309:

2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provision of section 138 is

a deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:

“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable

instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and

promote the use of negotiable instruments, including

cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended

to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable

instruments such as cheques without serious intention to

honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”

37. Keeping in view the deterrent sentence to be

awarded, the sentence of two months cannot be said to be

excessive, and no interference is required with it.

35

2026:HHC:10810

38. Learned Trial Court had awarded a compensation of

₹2,50,000/-. The cheque was issued on 19.01.2021. The

compensation was awarded on 29.09.2023 after the lapse of two

years and six months. The complainant lost money that it would

have gained by lending the money to someone. It had to engage

a counsel to prosecute the complaint filed by him. Therefore, it

was entitled to be compensated for its loss. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P.

Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021)

2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should

uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with

simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at

page 291: -

19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf

of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled

principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not

only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The

provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal

liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil

liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also

well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach

towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist

special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy

fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple

interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260,

para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”

36

2026:HHC:10810

39. Therefore, the compensation of ₹2,50,000/- cannot

be said to be excessive.

40. No other point was urged.

41. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it

is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications,

if any.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

8

th

April, 2026

(Nikita)