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PETITIONER:

KRISHAN KUMAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/08/1991

BENCH:

SINGH, K.N. (J)

BENCH:

SINGH, K.N. (J)

SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:

1992 AIR 1789 1991 SCR (3) 500

1991 SCC (4) 258 JT 1991 (3) 470

1991 SCALE (2)352

ACT:

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939--Section 68C--Notification dated

11. 10. 1979 to make a notified route--Delay due to conduct

of affected parties by approaching the Government and the

High Court--Coming into force of the new Act (The Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988) w.e.f. 1.7.1989--Final notification

dated 29.8. 1990 u/s. 100(3) of the new Act--Whether notifi-

cation dated 11. 10. 1979 lapsed or whether within limita-

tion.

Motor Vehicles Act. 1988--Sections 100, 217(2)--Object

of--Pending scheme under Section 68C of the old Act (The

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939)--Final notification issued under

Section 100(3) of the new Act--Limitation--Computation.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988--Sections 100, 217(2)--Harmoni-

ous construction--Reasons indicated.

Interpretation of Statutes--Harmonious

Construction--Motor Vehicles Act, 1988--Sections 100 and

217(2).

HEADNOTE:

The appellant held a Stage Carriage Permit for plying

his vehicle on the Kota-Khanpur route, which overlaps a

portion of the KotaSangod route. The State Road Transport

Corporation vide Notification dated 11.10.1979 proposed a

scheme under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 for

the exclusive operation of its vehicles on the Kota-Sangod

route.

The affected operators of the route, including the

appellant, filed their objections against the scheme before

the authority appointed by the State Government which ap-

proved the scheme.

Before the State Government could issue the final Noti-

fication under Section 68-D(3) of the old Act, the appellant

and other affected operators made representation to the

Minister for Transport for affording them a fresh opportuni-

ty of hearing.

501

Meanwhile, the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 was enforced with

effect from 1.7.1989 repealing the old Act.

The appellant, thereupon, filed a writ petition before

the High Court for restraining the State Government from

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issuing the final Notification on the ground that on the

enforcement of the new Act, the Notification dated

11.10.1979 issued under Section 68-C of the old Act had

lapsed on account of delay in finalisation of the same.

A similar writ petition had been filed earlier in re-

spect of Kishangarh-Sarwad route by one affected party, on

similar grounds. A learned Single Judge of the High Court

dismissed that writ petition holding that the draft scheme

under the old Act was saved by the new Act and the same

could legally be finalised under the provisions of the new

Act. When he filed a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division

Bench dismissed the Appeal as well as the various writ

petitions including that of the appellant by a common order,

against which the present appeal was made.

After the judgment of the High Court, the final notifi-

cation was published in the Official Gazette on 29.8.1990

u/s. 100(3) of the new Act.

The appellant, contended before the Court that since

there was undue delay of 11 years in issuing the final

Notification, the scheme as proposed under Section 68-C of

the old Act should be deemed to have lapsed and the State

Government had no authority or jurisdiction to finalise the

same or to issue Notification under Section 100(3) of the

new Act; that since the draft scheme dated 11.10.1979 was

not finalised under Section 100(3) of the new Act, the same

had lapsed after one year from the date of the notification

issued u/s. 68-C of the old Act; and that since period of

one year had already expired from the date of the publica-

tion of the scheme under Section 68-C of old Act, the scheme

automatically lapsed and the same could not be finally

published under Section 100 of the new Act.

Dismissing the appeal this Court,

HELD: 1.1. The object and purpose of Section 100(4) is

to avoid delay in finalising a scheme. The Parliament was

aware that under the old Act schemes were not finalised for

long years as a result of which public interest suffered,

therefore, it prescribed a time frame for the approval and

publication of schemes. Sub-section (4) prescribes a period

of limitation during which the State Government should hear

502

and consider the objections of the objectors and finalise

the scheme and publish the same in the Official Gazette and

on its failure to do so within that period, penal conse-

quences would ensue as a result of which the scheme itself

shall stand lapsed. [507H-508A, 507F-G]

1.2. The Legislative intent is clear that the schemes

proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act pending on the

date of the commencement of the new Act should not lapse

instead those schemes should be finalised in accordance with

the provisions of Section 100 of the new Act. The pending

schemes were therefore saved and the same were to be fina-

lised within one year as contemplated by Section 100(4) of

the new Act. [509C-D]

1.3. Section 217(2)(e) has been enacted to save the

schemes published under Section 68-C of the old Act which

were pending on the date of the commencement of the Act with

a further direction that the same shall be finalised in

accordance with Section 100 of the Act. [510C ]

1.4. If the period of one year from the date of the

publication of proposed scheme is applied to the pending

schemes under Section 68-C of the old Act, the purpose and

object of saving the old schemes under Clause (e) of Section

217(2) of the new Act would be frustrated. [509E-F]

2.1. While Section 217(2)(e) permits finalisation of a

scheme in accordance with Section 100 of the new Act, sub-

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section (4) of Section 100 lays down that a scheme if not

finalised within a period of one year shall be deemed to

have lapsed. If the period of one year as prescribed under

Section 100(4) is not computed from the date of publication

of the scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act and instead

the period of one year is computed from the date of com-

mencement of the Act, both the provisions could be given

full effect. [510F-H]

2.2. While in the case of a scheme under Section 68-C of

the old Act, pending on the date of enforcement of the new

Act, namely, 1.7.1989, the period of one year as prescribed

under Section 100(4) should be computed from the date of

commencement of the new Act. [511D-E]

2.3. The appellant was himself responsible for the delay

therefore he is not entitled to complain for the delay.

Delay would not automatically render the scheme illegal.

[500G]

2.4. Since under the old Act no time frame was pre-

scribed for finalising a scheme penal consequences could not

ensue. Under the old

503

Act a scheme proposed u/s. 68 could continue to remain in

force till it was quashed. [505G-H]

2.5. Since the scheme proposed on 11.10.1979 had not

been quashed by any Court, the same continued to be in force

on the date of commencement of the new Act. In the absence

of any provision in the old Act rendering the scheme inef-

fective on the ground of delay, the scheme proposed u/s.

68-C of the old Act could not lapse ipso facto. [505H-506A]

2.6. In the instant case stay order passed by the High

Court remained in force from May to 9th August, 1990. On the

exclusion of that period the final Notification issued by

the State Government under Section 100(3) of the new Act on

29.8.1990 was well within the prescribed period. [512C-D]

Yogeshwar Jaiswal etc. v. State Transport Appellate

Tribunal & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 516; Onkar Singh & Ors. v.

Regional Transport Authority, Agra & Ors., [1986] 3 SCC 259;

Devki Nandan v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1987] SUPPL. SCC

438 and Srichand v. Government of U.P., [1985] 4 SCC 169,

distinguished.

Santosh Kumar & Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority,

CMWP No. 21773/89, decided on 16th March, 1990, over-ruled.

3. Where there appears to be inconsistency in two sec-

tions of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construc-

tion should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It

should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has

given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provi-

sions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat

those of another unless it is impossible to reconcile the

same. The essence of harmonious construction is to give

effect to both the provisions.

Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958'SC 225

at p. 268.-Followed.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3 165 of

1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.8.90 of the Rajas-

than High Court in W.P. No. 2009/90.

V.A. Bobde, and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant.

504

Satish Kr. Jain and Mrs. Pratibha Jain for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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SINGH, J. Special leave granted.

This appeal is directed against the judgment and order

of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 9.8. 1990 dismissing

the appellant's writ petition made under Article 226 of the

Constitution challenging the scheme for nationalisation of

the route in dispute.

The appellant holds a Stage Carriage Permit for plying

his vehicle on the Kota-Khanpur route, which overlaps a

portion of the KotaSangod route. The Rajasthan State Road

Transport Corporation, Jaipur issued a Notification on

11.10. 1979 proposing a scheme under Section 68-C of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the

'old Act') for the exclusive operation of the vehicles of

the State Road Transport Corporation on the Kota-Sangod

route. The existing operators as well as the affected opera-

tors of the route filed their objections before the hearing

authority appointed by the State Government of Rajasthan.

The hearing authority after considering those objections

approved the scheme under Section 68-D (2) of the old Act by

its order dated 30.11. 1984 and submitted the papers to the

State Government for the issue of Notification under Section

68--D (3). Before the State Government could issue Notifica-

tion under Section 68-1) (3) of the old Act, the appellant

and other affected operators made representation to the

Minister for Transport for affording them a fresh opportuni-

ty of hearing. As a result of which no final Notification

under Section 68-D (3) could be issued. Meanwhile, the Motor

Vehicles Act. 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act)

was enforced with effect from 1.7. 1989 and the old Act was

repealed. The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition

before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

for the issue of Mandamus restraining the State Government

from issuing the final Notification, mainly on the ground

that on the enforcement of the new Act, the Notification

dated 11. II). 1979 issued under Section 68-C of the old Act

had lapsed on account of delay in finalisation of the same.

A similar writ petition had been filed earlier in respect of

Kishangarh-Sarwad route by one Sardar Mohd. on similar

grounds. A learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed

that writ petition holding that the draft scheme under the

old Act was saved by the new Act and the same could legally

be finalised under the provisions of the new Act. Sardar

Mohd. filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of

the learned single Judge. A

505

Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the Letters

Patent Appeal of Sardar Mohd. as well as the various writ

petitions including that of the appellant by a common order

dated 9.8. 1990 impugned in the present appeal.

After the impugned judgment of the High Court, the State

Government approved the Scheme as proposed under 68-C of the

old Act. Final notification approving this Scheme was pub-

lished in the Official Gazette on 29.8.1990 u/s 100(3) of

the new Act, as a result of which the Kota-Sangod route has

become a notified route, consequently the appellant has no

right to ply his vehicle on the overlapping portion of that

route.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that since there

was undue delay of 11 years in issuing the final Notifica-

tion, the scheme as proposed under Section 68-C of the old

Act should be deemed to have lapsed and the State Government

had no authority or jurisdiction to finalise the same or to

issue Notification under Section 100(3) of the new Act. He

placed reliance on a number of decisions of this Court in

support of his contention that unreasonable delay in fina-

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lising a scheme proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act

rendered the same illegal. He referred to the decisions of

this Court in Yogeshwar Jaiswal etc. v. State Transport

Appellate Tribunal & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 5 16; Onkar Singh &

Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority, Agra & Ors., [1986] 3

SCC 259; Devki Nandan v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1987]

Suppl. SCC 438 and Srichand v. Government of U.P., [1985] 4

SCC 169. No doubt in these decisions the Court quashed the

schemes proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act on the

ground of inordinate delay for which there was no valid

explanation. In the instant case, the proposed scheme had

been approved by the hearing authority under Section 68-D

(2) of the old Act in 1984 within five years of the proposal

of the scheme but when the matter was placed before the

State Government for issue of final Notification Under

Section 68-D (3) of the old Act, the appellant and other

affected operators approached the Minister for Transport and

stalled the issue of final Notification as a result of which

delay was caused. The appellant was himself responsible for

the delay therefore he is not entitled to complain of the

delay. Moreover this Court has not ruled in the aforesaid

decisions, or in any other decision that delay would auto-

matically render the scheme illegal. Since under the old Act

no time frame was prescribed for finalising a scheme penal

consequences could not ensue. Under the old Act a scheme

proposed u/s 68 could continue to remain in force till it

was quashed. Since the scheme proposed on 11.10.1979 had not

been

506

quashed by any Court, the same continued to be in force on

the date of commencement of the new Act. In the absence of

any provision in the old Act rendering the scheme ineffec-

tive on the ground of delay, the scheme proposed u/s 68-C

of the old Act could not lapse ipso facto. Moreover, now

the State Government has already issued final Notification

under Section 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8. 1990, as a

result of which the route has been notified. In this view

ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Court are not

applicable to the instant case at this stage.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that under

Section 100(4) of the new Act, if a draft scheme is not

finalised and the final notification is not issued within

one year from the date of the publication of the proposed

scheme, the same would lapse. Since in the instant case the

draft scheme dated 11.10.1979 was not finalised under Sec-

tion 100(3) of the new Act the same had lapsed after one

year from the date of the notification issued u/s 68-C of

the old Act. In order to appreciate this contention it is

necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the new

Act. Chapter VI of the new Act contains special provisions

relating to State Transport Undertakings. Section 99 confers

power on the State Government to propose a scheme for oper-

ating the vehicles of the State Transport Undertakings to

the exclusion of other persons. The proposed scheme is

published in the Gazette. Section 100 which provides for

filing of the objections before the State Government and the

issue of final notification, is as under:

"100. Objection to the proposal--

(1) on the publication of any proposal regard-

ing a scheme in the Official Gazette and in

not less than one newspaper in the regional

language circulating in the area or route

which is to be covered by such proposal any

person may, within thirty days from the date

of its publication in the Official Gazette,

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file objections to it before the State Govern-

ment.

(2) The State Government may, after consider-

ing the objections and after giving an oppor-

tunity to the objector or his representatives

and the representatives of the State Transport

Undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they

so desire, approve or modify such proposal.

(3) The scheme relating to the proposal as

approved or

507

modified under sub-section (2) shall be pub-

lished in the Official Gazette by the State

Government making such scheme and in not less

than one newspaper in the regional language

circulating in the area or route covered by

such scheme and the same shall thereupon

become final on the date of its publication in

the Official Gazette and shall be called the

approved scheme and the area or route to which

it relates shall be called the notified area

or notified route:

Provided that no such scheme which relates to

any interState route shall be deemed to be an

approved scheme unless it has the previous

approval of the Central Government.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this

section, where a scheme is not published as an

approved scheme under sub-section (3) in the

Official Gazette within a period of one year

from the date of publication of the proposal

regarding the scheme in the Official Gazette

under sub-section (1), the proposal shall be

deemed to have lapsed.

Section 100 provides for filing of objections before the

State Government within 30 days from the date of the publi-

cation of the proposed scheme in the Official Gazette. Under

sub-section (2) the State Government may approve or modify

the proposed scheme after considering the objections and

hearing the objectors. Under sub-section (3) the State

Government is required to publish the approved scheme in the

Official Gazette and also in one newspaper. On the publica-

tion of the approved scheme in the Official Gazette, the

area or route to which it relates shall be called the noti-

fied area or notified route. Sub-section (4) lays down that

if a scheme is not published as an approved scheme in the

Gazette within one year from the date of publication of the

proposed scheme in the Official Gazette, the proposed scheme

shall be deemed to have lapsed. Sub-section (4) in our

opinion prescribes a period of limitation during which the

State Government should hear and consider the objections of

the objectors and finalise the scheme and publish the same

in the Official Gazette and on its failure to do so with in

that period, penal consequences would ensue as a result of

which the scheme itself shall stand lapsed. The object and

purpose of Section 100(4) is to avoid delay in finalising a

scheme. The Parliament was aware that under the old Act

schemes were not

508

finalised for long years as a result of which public inter-

est suffered, therefore, it prescribed a time frame for the

approval and publication of schemes.

The provisions of Section 100 are applicable to the

schemes proposed under the new Act. The question is whether

it would apply to a scheme proposed under Section 68-C of

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the old Act. The Legislature was conscious that a number of

schemes proposed under the old Act were pending approval on

the date of the commencement of the Act, it therefore made a

provision for saving those schemes by enacting Section 2 17

of the Act, which is as under:

"217. Repeal and savings--(1) The Motor Vehi-

cles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corre-

sponding to that Act in force in any State

immediately before the commencement of this

Act in that State (hereinafter in this Section

referred to as the repealed enactments) are

hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding the repeal by

sub-section (1) of the repealed enactments--

(a) any notification, rule, regula-

tion, order or notice issued, or any appoint-

ment or declaration made or exemption granted,

or any confiscation made, or any penalty or

fine imposed, any forfeiture cancellation or

any other thing done, or any other action

taken under the repealed enactments, and in

force immediately before such commencement

shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with

the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have

been issued, made, granted, done or taken

under the corresponding provision of this Act;

......................................

.....................................

(e) any scheme made under section 68-C of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) or under

the corresponding law, if any, in force in any

State and pending immediately before the

commencement of this Act shall be disposed of

in accordance with the provisions of section

100 of this Act;

(f) the permits issued under sub-section (I-A)

of section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1939 (4 of 1939), or under

509

the corresponding provisions, if any, in force

in any State immediately before the commence-

ment of this Act shall continue to remain in

force until the approved scheme under Chapter

VI of this Act is published.

...................................

Under sub-section (1) the old Act has been repealed but

under subsection (2) inspite of repeal the Parliament has

made provisions for saving the schemes proposed under Sec-

tion 68-C of the old Act. Clause (e) of Section 217 (2) of

the new Act provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the

old Act a scheme proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act,

if pending immediately before the commencement of the Act

shall be finalised in accordance with the provisions of

Section 100 of the new Act. The Legislative intent is clear

that the. schemes proposed under Section 68-C. of the old

Act pending on the date of the commencement of the new Act

should not lapse instead those schemes should be finalised

in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the new

Act. The pending schemes were therefore saved and the same

were to be finalised within one year as contemplated by

Section 100 (4) of the new Act. Section 100 (4) lays down

that if the proposed scheme is not finalised within one year

from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, it

shall be deemed to have lapsed but that applies to a scheme

proposed under the new Act and not to a scheme proposed

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under Section 68-C of the old Act. If the period of one year

from the date of the publication of the proposed scheme is

applied to the pending schemes under Section 68-C of the old

Act, the purpose and object of saving the old schemes under

Clause (e) of Section 2 17 (2) of the new Act would be

frustrated.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that since Section

17(2)(e) provides for the finalisation of a pending scheme

published under the old Act in accordance with the provi-

sions of Section 100 of the new Act, the period of limita-

tion of one year prescribed under sub-section (4) of that

section would also apply. He further urged that since period

of one year had already expired from the date of the publi-

cation of the scheme under Section 68-C of old Act, the

scheme automatically lapsed and the same could not be final-

ly published under Section 100 of the Act.

If the appellant's contention is accepted the schemes

published under Section 68-C of the old Act would lapse

after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of

the publication of the scheme in

510

the Official Gazette in accordance with the provisions of

the old Act. On the other hand we find that Section 2

17(2)(e) permits finalisation of a scheme published under

Section 68-C of the old Act if the same was pending on the

date of the commencement of the new Act. The old Act did.

not provide any period of limitation consequently a number

of schemes published under Section 68-C of the old Act were

pending on the date of commencement of the new Act although

a period of one year had already expired. If the Parliament

intended to apply the limitation of period of one year to

the pending schemes published under Section 68-C of the old

Act, the new Act could have made provisions to that effect.

On the contrary Section 217(2)(e) has been enacted to save

the schemes published under Section 68-C of the old Act

which were pending on the date of the commencement of the

Act with a further direction that the same shall be fina-

lised in accordance with Section 100 of the Act. Sub-section

(4) of Section 100 provides that where a scheme is not

published as approved under sub-section (3) within period of

one year from the date of publication of the proposal in the

Official Gazette under sub-section (1), the proposal shall

be deemed to have lapsed. A scheme published under Section

68-C of the old Act pending on the date of commencement of

the Act could not be a scheme proposed under sub-section (1)

of Section 100, therefore, the rigour of period of one year

as applicable to a scheme proposed under sub-section (1) of

Section 100 could not apply to a scheme under Section 68-C

pending on the date of commencement of the Act. It was not

meant that a scheme u/s 68-C of the old Act pending on the

date of commencement of the new Act may be approved or

finalised with leisure without any time limit.

There appears to be some apparent conflict between

Section 100(4) and Section 217(2)(e) of the Act. While

Section 217(2)(e) permits finalisation of a scheme in ac-

cordance with Section 100 of the new Act sub-section (4) of

Section 100 lays down that a scheme if not finalised within

a period of one year shall be deemed to have lapsed. If the

appellant's contention is accepted then Section 217(2)(e)

will become nugatory and no scheme published under Section

68-C of the old Act could be finalised under the new Act. On

the other hand if the period of one year as prescribed under

Section 100(4) is not computed from the date of publication

of the scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act and instead

the period of one year is computed from the date of com-

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mencement of the Act both the provisions could be given full

effect.

It is settled principle of interpretation that where there

appears

511

to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the

principle of harmonious construction should be followed in

avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed

that what the Parliament has given with one hand, it took

away with the other. The provisions of one section of stat-

ute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is

impossible to reconcile the same. In Venkataramana Devaru v.

State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 225 at p. 268, this Court

observed:

"The rule of construction is well-settled that

when there are in an enactment two provisions

which cannot be reconciled with each other,

they should be so interpreted that, if possi-

ble, effect should be given to both. This is

what. is known as the rule of harmonious

construction."

The essence of harmonious construction is to give effect to

both the provisions. Bearing these principles in mind it is

legitimate. to hold that Section 100(4) prescribed period of

limitation of one year in respect the scheme proposed under

the provisions of the new Act, while in they case of a

scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act, pending on the

date of enforcement of the new Act, namely, 1.7. 1989, the

period one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) should be

computed from the date of commencement of the new Act. This

interpretation would give full effect to both the

Sections--Section 100(4) and Section 2 17(2)(e) of the new

Act.

Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a

Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in

Santosh Kumar & Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority, CMWP

No. 2 1773/89, decided on 16th March, 1990. In that case a

Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that a draft

scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act published in 1986

shall be deemed to have lapsed on the date of the enforce-

ment of the new Act in view of the absolute prohibition

contained in Section 100(43 of the new Act against the

continuance of any scheme after one year. We have gone

through the judgment of the Division Bench carefully but in

our opinion the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad is

unsustainable in law. The learned Judges constituting the

Bench failed to notice the legislative intendment under

Section 217(4)(e) of the new Act which kept alive the scheme

published under Section 68-C of the old Act for the purposes

of being finalised under the new Act. We are therefore

clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the Allahabad

High Court is incorrect.

In the instant ease, the appellant had filed a writ petition

in May,

512

1990 and obtained an interim order from the High Court

restraining the State Government from publishing the final

Notification under Section 100(3) of the new Act. The State

Government published the final notification under Section

100(3) of the new Act on 29.8. 1990 after the dismissal of

the writ petition by the Division Bench of the High Court.

The period of one year with regard to the pending scheme

expired on 1.7.1990 but since the appellant had obtained

stay order from the High Court, the State Government could

not publish final notification. Explanation to Section

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100(4) of the new Act lays down that in computing the period

of one year any period during which the publication of the

approved scheme under Section 100 is held up on account of

any stay or order of any court, shall be excluded. On the

application of the Explanation the period during which the

appellant had obtained stay order against the State Govern-

ment is liable to be excluded in computing the period of one

year. Admittedly in the instant case stay order passed by

the High Court remained in force from May to 9th August,

1990. On the exclusion of that period the final notification

issued by the State Government under Section 100(3) of the

new Act on 29.8.1990 was well within the prescribed period.

In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion

that the High Court rightly dismissed the appellant's writ

petition. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with

costs.

V.P.R. Appeal

dismissed.

513