IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA 

AT CHANDIGARH 

             CRA-D No.133 of 2023 

             Reserved on : 23.09.2025 

             Pronounced on: 26.09.2025 

Kuldeep Singh 

   ….Appellant 

         versus 

State of Punjab  

  …Respondent 

CORAM:   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL  

    HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI 

Present:  Mr. K.B. Raheja, Advocate  

    for the appellant. 

    Mr. Himanshu Raj, Additional Advocate General, Punjab. 

DEEPAK SIBAL, J. 

1. The instant appeal is directed against the order dated

December 12, 2022, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I,

Kapurthala, exercising the powers of a Special Court (for short – the

Special Court), through which the appellant’s plea, for the grant of

regular bail, has been dismissed.

2. FIR No.140 dated 07.05.2020 was registered against the

appellant and others at Police Station Sultanpur Lodhi, District

Kapurthala under Sections 384, 465, 467, 468, 471, 473, 489 of the

Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), Sections 25, 54,

59 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Sections 13 and 18 of The Unlawful

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [2]

Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short – UAPA). In the said FIR,

later on, Sections 120-B, 482, 121, 121-A, 122 of the IPC and Section

19 of the UAPA were also added.

3. The aforesaid FIR was lodged on the receipt of secret

information by the police that 13 persons, including the appellant, were

in possession of imported arms/ammunition and were indulging in

dacoity, extortion, smuggling of drugs and arms/ammunition as also

were planning to commit affray in the country by plying vehicles after

affixing thereupon forged number plates. Acting on the received

information, the police conducted a raid at the house of co-accused

Lovepreet Singh wherein co-accused Baljinder Singh @ Billa,

Sukhjinder Singh, Mohit Sharma, Mangal Singh, Maninder Singh @

Happy and Lovepreet Singh @ Love were found and apprehended. The

raid also resulted in the recovery of a large cache of arms and

ammunition alongwith cash including foreign currency.

4. On being interrogated co-accused Baljinder Singh @ Billa

disclosed that he and his co-accused used to procure drugs, currency

and weapons from across the border and that he also had relations with

several banned Sikh terrorist organizations. He further disclosed that it

was the appellant who used to maintain accounts with regard to sale and

purchase of arms/ammunition and drugs by Baljinder Singh @ Billa

and his co-accused.

5. On 06.10.2020, the appellant was declared a proclaimed

offender and later arrested on 20.09.2022. Thereafter, he was

interrogated. After the investigation was complete the police filed a

report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Later, a supplementary report under

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [3]

Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. was also filed. On the basis of the aforesaid

reports, charges were framed against the appellant and his co-accused

and a trial ensued. In such trial, till date, 03 out of a total of 39

prosecution witnesses have been examined. In the meanwhile, the

appellant has undergone incarceration of 02 years, 11 months and 28

days.

6. Pending trial, through filing of an application before the

Special Court, the appellant sought regular bail, on the dismissal of

which, he has knocked the doors of this Court through filing of the

instant appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the

appellant has been falsely embroiled in this case; except the so called

secret information and the alleged disclosure statement of co-accused

Baljinder Singh @ Billa there is no evidence collected by the

prosecution which would connect the appellant with the crime he is

being tried for; this Court through order dated 25.09.2023, passed in

CRA-D-731-2022 has granted regular bail to a similarly placed co-

accused Lovepreet Singh @ Love; co-accused Sukhjinder Singh @

Bittu who also faces similar charges as the appellant has also been

granted regular bail by this Court through an order dated September 02,

2025 passed in CRA-D-1103-2022; no recovery has been effected from

the appellant; in this case the appellant was wrongly declared as a

proclaimed offender as he was not aware of registration of this case as

during such period the pandemic Covid 19 had spread; the appellant has

suffered custody for nearly 03 years and that since 36 prosecution

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [4]

witnesses still remain to be examined, the appellant’s trial will take a

long time to conclude.

8. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the

appellant has relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of

India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of

Maharashtra and another, (2024) 6 SCC 591, Vernon v. The State of

Maharashtra and another, (2023) 15 SCC 56, Sheikh Javed Iqbal @

Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 8

SCC 293 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and

another, (2024) 9 SCC 813.

9. Per contra, learned State counsel submitted that on receipt

of secret information, a raid was conducted at the house of co-accused

Lovepreet Singh resulting in the recovery of a large cache of arms/

ammunition alongwith cash, which included foreign currency; such raid

also led to the arrest of the appellant’s co-accused namely Baljinder

Singh @ Billa, Mohit Sharma, Mangal Singh, Maninder Singh @

Happy and Sukhjinder Singh; co-accused Baljinder Singh @ Billa

disclosed that it was the appellant who used to maintain the accounts

with regard to all the nefarious activities of his and his co-accused; from

the appellant’s co-accused pamphlets of a banned Sikh Terrorist

organization – Khalistan Commando Force, have also been recovered;

the appellant is involved in anti-national activities and therefore, in

terms of Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA the appellant should not be

granted bail.

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [5]

10. In support of his submissions, learned State counsel relied

on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh v. State of

Punjab and another, (2024) 2 SCC Criminal 676.

11. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and with

their able assistance the record of the case has also been perused.

12. At the outset it would be apposite to refer to Section 43-D

of the UAPA. The same reads as follows:-

“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the

Code.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any

other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall

be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning

of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable

case” as defined in that clause shall be construed

accordingly.

(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case

involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to

the modification that in sub-section (2),-

(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days”

and “sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be

construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety

days” and “ninety days” respectively; and

(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be

inserted, namely:-

“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete

the investigation within the said period of ninety days,

the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the

Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the

investigation and the specific reasons for the detention

of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days,

extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty

days:

Provided also that if the police officer making the

investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of

investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of

any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit

stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain

the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.

(3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case

involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to

the modification that-

(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof-

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [6]

(i) to “the State Government” shall be

construed as a reference to “the Central

Government or the State Government.”;

(ii) (ii)to “order of the State Government”

shall be construed as a reference to “order

of the Central Government or the State

Government, as the case may be”; and

(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to “the

State Government” shall be construed as a

reference to “the Central Government or the

State Government, as the case may be”.

(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in

relation to any case involving the arrest of any person

accused of having committed an offence punishable

under this Act.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no

person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters

IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on

bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor

has been given an opportunity of being heard on the

application for such release:

Provided that such accused person shall not be released

on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of

the case diary or the report made under section 173 of

the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusation against such

person is prima facie true.

(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-

section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the

Code or any other law for the time being in force on

granting of bail.

(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5)

and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of

an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an

Indian citizen and has entered the country

unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional

circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in

writing.”

13. As per Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA, no person accused

of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if

in custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been

given an opportunity of being heard on the application made by him for

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [7]

such release and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report

filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is of the opinion that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against such

person are prima facie proved. Section 43-D (6) further stipulates that

restrictions for the grant of bail specified in Section 43-D (5) would be

in addition to the restrictions provided under the Cr.P.C. or any other

law for the time being in force on granting of bail.

14. After carefully analyzing the submissions made before us

and minutely scanning the entire record we find that the only evidence

collected by the prosecution and filed before the Special Court against

the appellant is a secret information allegedly received by the police

regarding the involvement of 13 individuals, including the appellant

indulging in dacoity, extortion, smuggling of arms/ ammunition and

drugs and the statement of co-accused Baljinder Singh @ Billa as per

which it is the appellant who maintains accounts with regard to the

illegal sale/ purchase of arms/ drugs by the appellant’s co-accused.

The source of the secret information, by its very nature, is

unknown. Even otherwise, the same is found to be utterly vague as it

does not refer to any specific instance. It also remains uncorroborated

qua the appellant because on acting on such secret information, when

the police raided co-accused Lovepreet’s house the appellant was not

found over there.

So far as co-accused Baljinder Singh @ Billa’s alleged

disclosure statement that it was the appellant who was maintaining

accounts for all nefarious acts of the appellant’s co-accused is

concerned the same was made by him while he was in police custody.

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [8]

Qua the appellant the same also remain uncorroborated as in pursuance

thereof no recovery whatsoever, including any account books etc., has

been effected.

In fact, it is undisputed that no recovery of any

incriminating material or arms or ammunition or drugs or currency has

also been made from the appellant.

15. In the light of the above facts, we find that there are no

reasonable grounds for believing that prima facie the accusations

against the appellant under the UAPA are made out and that being so we

find no reason to deny regular bail to the appellant even though he is

facing trial for commission of offences under the UAPA. In this regard

we may usefully refer to the following observations made by the

Supreme Court in Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India reported in

(2024) 10 SCC 574:-

“17.1 Bihar Police had received information about a plan

to disturb the proposed visit of Hon’ble Prime Minister to

Bihar by some suspected persons who had assembled in

Phulwarisharif area. On 11.07.2022 at about 19:30 hrs, on

secret information, a raid was carried out by the police

officers of PS Phulwarisharif, Patna at the rented

house/premises of Athar Parvej (A-1) and recovered 05 sets

of documents “India 2047 Towards Rule of Islamic India,

Internal Document: Not for Circulation”, Pamphlets

“Popular Front of India 20-2-2021” – 25 copies in Hindi

and 30 copies in Urdu, 49 cloth flags, 02 magazines

“Mulk ke liye Popular Front ke saath” and one copy of

rent agreement on non-judicial stamp by Farhat Bano w/o

Md. Jalaluddin Khan (A-2) with tenant Athar Parvej (A-1)

son of Abdul Qayum Ansari. The recovered articles and a

Samsung mobile phone having SIM card of accused Md.

Jalaluddin (A-2) were seized in the instant case. They were

related to anti-India activities.”

xxx xxx xxx

30. Therefore, on plain reading of the charge-sheet, it is

not possible to record a conclusion that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [9]

against the appellant of commission of offences punishable

under UAPA is prima-facie true. We have taken the charge-

sheet and the statement of witness Z as they are without

conducting a mini-trial. Looking at what we have held

earlier, it is impossible to record a prima-facie finding that

there were reasonable grounds for believing that the

accusation against the appellant of commission of offences

under UAPA was prima-facie true. No antecedents of the

appellant have been brought on record.

31. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was

no reason to reject the bail application filed by the

appellant.

32. Before we part with the judgment, we must mention

here that the Special Court and the High Court did not

consider the material in the charge-sheet objectively.

Perhaps the focus was more on the activities of PFI, and

therefore, the appellant’s case could not be properly

appreciated. When a case is made out for a grant of bail,

the Courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail.

The allegations of the prosecution may be very serious.

But, the duty of the Courts is to consider the case for grant

of bail in accordance with the law. “Bail is the rule and jail

is an exception” is a settled law.

33. Even in a case like the present case where there are

stringent conditions for the grant of bail in the relevant

statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification

that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute

are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made

out for grant of bail, the Court cannot decline to grant bail.

If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will

be a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of

our Constitution.”

16. Even otherwise, as on date the appellant has undergone

actual custody of nearly 03 years and that in his trial only 03

prosecution witnesses have been examined. 36 prosecution witnesses

still remain to be examined. Therefore, the appellant’s trial is not likely

to conclude in the near future and on this ground too, the appellant

deserves to be granted bail.

17. After weighing the stringency with regard to grant of bail

to an undertrial facing charges under the UAPA vis-a-vis the rights

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [10]

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme

Court has held that right to a speedy trial was guaranteed under Article

21 of the Indian Constitution and that long custody by itself would

entail the accused being tried under the UAPA to be granted bail. In

this regard reference can be made to the following observations of the

Supreme Court in K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra):_

“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory

restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of UAPA per se does not

oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on

grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed,

both the restrictions under a Statue as well as the powers

exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well

harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings,

the Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy

against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will

melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being

completed within a reasonable time and the period of

incarceration already undergone has exceeded a

substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an

approach would safeguard against the possibility of

provisions like Section 43-D (5) of UAPA being used as the

sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of

constitutional right to speedy trial.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

19. xxxxxx

Instead, Section 43-D (5) of UAPA merely provides

another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse

bail, in addition to the well settled considerations like

gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with

evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the

accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.”

18. Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Vernon (supra)

has held that serious allegations against accused who is facing trial

under the UAPA by itself cannot be a reason to deny him bail. The

relevant extract from the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

“53. In Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) reference

was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi

Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [11]

which, citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases

of State v. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Gurcharan

Singh v. State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118), the

factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were

discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of

the offences, the character of the evidence, circumstances

which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility

of the presence of the accused not being secured at the

trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being

tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State

would be relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail.

Juxtaposing the appellants’ case founded on Articles 14

and 21 of the Constitution of India with the aforesaid

allegations and considering the fact that almost five years

have lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are

satisfied that the appellants have made out a case for

granting bail. Allegations against them no doubt are

serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied to

them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV

and VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials

available against them at this stage. These materials

cannot justify continued detention of the appellants,

pending final outcome of the case under the other

provisions of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act.”

19. Similarly, in the case of Shoma Kanti Sen (supra), the

Supreme Court held as follows:-

“44. In Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb, a three Judge

Bench of this Court (of which one of us Aniruddha Bose, J

was a party), has held that a Constitutional Court is not

strictly bound by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail

in the 1967 Act and can exercise its constitutional

jurisdiction to release an accused on bail who has been

incarcerated for a long period of time, relying on Article 21

of Constitution of India. This decision was sought to be

distinguished by Mr. Nataraj on facts relying on judgment

of this Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of

Punjab [2024 INSC 92]. In this judgment, it has been

held:-

"44. The Appellant's counsel has relied upon the

case of KA Najeeb (supra) to back its contention

that the appellant has been in jail for last five years

which is contrary to law laid down in the said case.

While this argument may appear compelling at first

glance, it lacks depth and substance.

45. In KA Najeeb's case this court was confronted

with a circumstance wherein except the respondent-

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [12]

accused, other co-accused had already undergone

trial and were sentenced to imprisonment of not

exceeding eight years therefore this court's decision

to consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of

the impending sentence that the respondent accused

might face upon conviction and since the

respondent-accused had already served portion of

the maximum imprisonment i.e., more than five

years, this court took it as a factor influencing its

assessment to grant bail. Further, In KA Najeeb's

case the trial of the respondent accused was

severed from the other co-accused owing to his

absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and

was being separately tried thereafter and the NIA

had filed a long list of witnesses that were left to be

examined with reference to the said accused

therefore this court was of the view of unlikelihood

of completion of trial in near future. However, in

the present case the trial is already under way and

22 witnesses including the protected witnesses have

been examined.

46. As already discussed, the material available on

record indicates the involvement of the appellant in

furtherance of terrorist activities backed by

members of banned terrorist organization involving

exchange of large quantum of money through

different channels which needs to be deciphered

and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is

released on bail there is every likelihood that he

will influence the key witnesses of the case which

might hamper the process of justice. Therefore,

mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as

one involved in the instant case cannot on be used

as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid

argument on the behalf of the appellant cannot be

accepted.”

45. Relying on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj, submits that

bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to

be enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences

enumerated in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must

fulfill the conditions specified in Section 43D (5) thereof.

We do not accept the first part of this submission. This

Court has already accepted right of an accused under the

said offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail

founding such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of

India. This was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that

judgment, long period of incarceration was held to be a

valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the

bail-restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967

Act.

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [13]

46. Pre-conviction detention is necessary to collect

evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain purity in

the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from

being fugitive from justice. Such detention is also necessary

to prevent further commission of offence by the same

accused. Depending on gravity and seriousness of the

offence alleged to have been committed by an accused,

detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and

post-charge sheet stage has the sanction of law broadly on

these reasonings. But any form of deprival of liberty results

in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and

must be justified on the ground of being reasonable,

following a just and fair procedure and such deprival must

be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would

be the overarching principles which the law Courts would

have to apply while testing prosecution’s plea of pre-trial

detention, both at investigation and post-charge sheet

stage.”

47. As regards second part of Mr Nataraj's argument

which we have noted in the preceding paragraph, we

accept it with a qualification. The reasoning in Najeeb

case would also have to be examined, if it is the

constitutional court which is examining prosecution's plea

for retaining in custody an accused charged with bail-

restricting offences. He cited Gurwinder Singh in which the

judgment of K.A. Najeeb was distinguished on facts and a

judgment of the High Court rejecting the prayer for bail of

the appellant was upheld. But this was a judgment in the

given facts of that case and did not dislocate the axis of

reasoning on constitutional ground enunciated in Najeeb.

On behalf of the prosecution, another order of a coordinate

Bench passed on 18-1-2024, in Mazhar Khan v. NIA New

Delhi [Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 14091 of 2023]

was cited. In this order, the petitioner's prayer for

overturning a bail-rejection order of the High Court under

similar provisions of the 1967 Act was rejected by the

coordinate Bench applying the ratio of Watali judgment

and also considering Vernon. We have proceeded in this

judgment accepting the restrictive provisions to be valid

and applicable and then dealt with the individual

allegations in terms of the proviso to Section 43-D (5) of

the 1967 Act. Thus, the prosecution's case, so far as the

appellant is concerned, does not gain any premium from

the reasoning forming the basis of Mazhar Khan (supra).”

20. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the

Supreme Court held that criminals are not born but made out.

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [14]

Howsoever serious the crime may be, an accused has a right to a speedy

trial and that the purpose of bail is only to secure the attendance of the

accused at the trial and that bail is not to be withheld as a form of

punishment. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to the following

observations made by the Supreme Court:-

“11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and

again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya &

Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and

Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1

SCC 225. In the latter the Court reemphasized the right to

speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing

prolonged trial, has no option:

“84…..The State or complainant prosecutes him. It

is, thus, the obligation of the State or the

complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with

the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly,

in this country, where the large majority of accused

come from poorer and weaker sections of the

society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do

not often get competent legal advice, the

application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable.

Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands

speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a

relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot

disentitle an accused from complaining of

infringement of his right to speedy trial on the

ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a

speedy trial.”

12. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi)

reported in 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:

“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect

that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant

of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if

trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked

on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are

overcrowded and their living conditions, more often

than not, appalling. According to the Union Home

Ministry’s response to Parliament, the National Crime

Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31st

December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged

in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the

country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest

4,27,165 were undertrials.

24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that

inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [15]

described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict

Prisoner v. State, reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as “a

radical transformation” whereby the prisoner:

‘13….. loses his identity. He is known by a

number. He loses personal possessions. He has

no personal relationships. Psychological

problems result from loss of freedom, status,

possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal

life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be

dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by

ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.’

25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning

to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the

more professional the crime, more honour is paid to

the criminal” (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The

Prison Community’ published in 1940). Incarceration

has further deleterious effects - where the accused

belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate

loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of

families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation

from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive

to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal,

the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that

trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact

stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded

speedily.”

Xxxxxxx

16. Criminals are not born out but made. The human

potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any

criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental

is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and

adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a

future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is

responsible for making the offender commit the crime.

Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the

result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be,

because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation

of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with

indigence or other privations.”

21. To the same effect are the following observations of the

Supreme Court in the case of Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of

Chhattisgarh, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322:_

“10. However, many times we have made ourselves very

clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [16]

has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in

Article 21 of the Constitution.

Xxx

12. The aforesaid results in indefinite delay in

conclusion of trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecutor

to wisely exercise his discretion insofar as examination of

the witness is concerned.

Xxx

14. In this regard, the role of the Special Judge (NIA)

would also assume importance. The Special Judge should

inquire with the Special Public Prosecutor why he intends

to examine a particular witness if such witness is going to

depose the very same thing that any other witness might

have deposed earlier. We may sound as if laying some

guidelines, but time has come to consider this issue of

delay and bail in its true and proper perspective. If an

accused is to get a final verdict after incarceration of six to

seven years in jail as an undertrial prisoner, then,

definitely, it could be said that his right to have a speedy

trial under Article 21 of the Constitution has been

infringed. The stress of long trials on accused persons-

who remain innocent until proven guilty- can also be

significant. Accused persons are not financially

compensated for what might be a lengthy period of pre-

trial incarceration. They may also have lost a job for

accommodation, experienced damage to personal

relationships while incarcerated, and spent a considerable

amount of money on legal fees. If an accused person is

found not guilty, they have likely endured many months of

being stigmatized and perhaps even ostracized in their

community and will have to rebuild their lives with their

own resources.

15. We would say that delays are bad for the accused

and extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and

for the credibility of our justice system, which is valued.

Judges are the masters of their Courtrooms and the

Criminal Procedure Code provides many tools for the

Judges to use in order to ensure that cases proceed

efficiently.”

22. There is yet another reason to grant bail to the appellant

and this is because this Court through order dated 25.09.2023, passed in

CRA-D-731-2022, has granted regular bail to a similarly placed co-

accused Lovepreet Singh @ Love and through order dated September

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [17]

02, 2025 in CRA-D-1103 of 2022 granted bail to co-accused Sukhjinder

Singh @ Bittu.

23. In the light of the above discussion, subject to the

satisfaction of the Special Court/Duty Magistrate the appellant is

ordered to be released on regular bail on the following conditions:-

(i) He shall furnish bond of ₹10 lakh with two sureties

of the like amount;

(ii) He shall deposit his passport, if any, in the Trial

Court;

(iii) He shall appear before the Trial Court on each and

every date, unless specifically exempted;

(iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer, as

and when summoned;

v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any

inducement, threat or promise to any person

acquainted with the facts of the case or who is cited

as a witness;

vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity;

vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner

create third party right over immovable property or

properties owned by him;

viii) At the time of release of the appellant, the SHO of

the area where he normally resides, shall be

informed and that the appellant shall mark his

attendance before the said SHO on every Monday

till the conclusion of the trial and that

ix) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in

case of his absence, the Trial Court may proceed

with the trial and in such eventuality he shall not

claim re-examination of any witness.

24. While granting bail to the appellant, at the time of

recording its satisfaction, the Special Court/ Duty Magistrate may also

impose any further condition as it deems necessary.

CRA-D No.133 of 2023 [18]

25. If any of the above conditions or any further condition(s)

which may be imposed by the Special Court/ Duty Magistrate are

breached by the appellant it would be open to the prosecution to seek

cancellation of the bail granted to him through the instant order.

26. It is clarified that the observations made through the instant

order have been made only for the limited purpose of deciding the

present appeal for the grant of regular bail and that the same would not

be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

27. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed

in the above terms.

                (DEEPAK SIBAL) 

                       JUDGE 

              (LAPITA BANERJI) 

                        JUDGE 

26.09.2025 

gk 

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No