1

2026:CGHC:99-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 31 of 2019

(Arising out of judgment dated 14.09.2018 passed

in Sessions Trial No.15/2018 by the learned

Sessions Judge, Bemetara)

Kumar Singh Dhruv, S/o Jitan Dhruv, aged about 51 years, R/o

Village- Motimpur, Police Station- Dadhi, District- Bemetara,

Chhattisgarh

... Appellant

versus

State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station- Dadhi, District-

Bemetara, Chhattisgarh

...Respondent

For Appellant : Ms. Smita Jha, Advocate

For Respondent/State : Mr. Afroz Khan, Panel Lawyer

Division Bench

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal

2

Judgment on Board

(02.01.2026)

Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J.

1.Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court under

Section 374(2) of the CrPC, the appellant herein has

preferred this criminal appeal calling in question legality,

validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and

order of sentence dated 14.09.2018 passed by the learned

Sessions Judge Bemetara, District Bemetara (C.G.), in

Sessions Trial No.15/2018, by which the appellant has

been convicted and sentenced as under:-

Conviction Sentence & Fine

U/s 302 of the IPC Life imprisonment and to

pay fine of 100/-; in

₹

default of payment of fine, 3

months’ additional RI.

2.The prosecution case, in brief, is that accused/appellant,

Kumar Singh Dhruv, had taken the field of Arjun Thakur

on sharecropping (adhiya) located at Motimpur, Police

Station-Dadhi, Bemetara. On the date of incident,

01/01/2018, the accused Kumar Singh Dhruv went to the

field with his wife, Binda Bai, in the morning. While

working there, a dispute arose, and he killed his wife Binda

3

Bai by hitting her with an iron sharp-edged spade (Rapli).

He returned home and informed his brothers that he had

killed his wife Binda Bai. The villagers went to the field and

saw Binda Bai's body. Based on the information given by

Kotwar Makund Das (PW-1), a Merg intimation was

registered at Police Station Dadhi, and a inquest (Exhibit P-

8) was prepared. Dr. Anamika Minj (PW-10) conducted the

post-mortem and gave a report (Exhibit P-24) stating the

cause of death as "coma, multi-organ failure, severe blood

loss". Thereafter, the First Information Report (Exhibit P-2)

was registered. The police seized the iron sharp-edged

spade produced by the accused, and prepared a seizure

memo (Exhibit P-5). Statements of witnesses were recorded,

a spot map was prepared, and after completing the

investigation, a charge sheet was filed.

3.During the course of trial, in order to bring home the

offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 10

witnesses and exhibited 25 documents. Statement of the

appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in

which he denied circumstances appearing against him in

prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication.

4.After hearing both the parties, the trial Court passed the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

4

5.Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the case is

based on circumstantial evidence and the motive of the

accused has not been proved. The chain of circumstances is

not complete, and the extra-judicial confession has not

been corroborated by the accused's brother, Dharam Singh

Dhruv (PW-3). The statement made by the other brother,

Aghnuram Dhruv (PW-2), is not reliable. The extra-judicial

confession is a weak type of evidence and cannot be the

basis for conviction. No memorandum of the accused's

statement has been prepared. The seizure of the iron spade

(Exhibit P-5) has not been corroborated by independent

witnesses. The conviction cannot be based solely on the

seizure of the spade (Rapli), as it has not been proved that

the blood of the deceased and the blood found on the spade

belong to the same group. In these circumstances, the

conviction of the accused is not sustainable in law.

Therefore, the appeal may be allowed, and the impugned

judgment of conviction and order of sentence may be set

aside and the accused may be acquitted.

6.On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits

that the finding recorded by the Trial Court regarding

conviction and sentence of the appellant is based on

sufficient and reliable evidence, which does not require any

interference. Therefore, the contention made by the counsel

5

for the appellant is not acceptable, hence, the appeal may

be dismissed.

7.We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties

and perused the record with utmost circumspection.

8.The first question, for consideration, as to whether the

death of deceased was homicidal in nature has been

answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the

post-mortem report (Exhibit P-24), proved by Dr. Anamika

Minj (PW-10), according to which, cause of death was stated

to be coma, multi organ failure and severe blood loss and

death was homicidal in nature, which in our considered

opinion is a correct finding of fact based on evidence

available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to

the record and accordingly, we hereby affirm the said

finding.

9.In the instant case, there is no direct evidence available on

record and case of the prosecution is solely based on

circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles which

constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on

circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their

Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

1

which must

1(1984) 4 SCC 116

6

be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis of

circumstantial evidence. The relevant paragraph 153 of the

said judgment reads as under: -

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the

following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against

an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be'

established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal

distinction between 'may be proved' and "must be or should

be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao

Bobade v. State of Maharashtra

2

where the following

observations were made:

Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused

must be and not merely may be guilty before a court

can convict and the mental distance between 'may

be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague

conjectures from sure conclusions.

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that

is to say, they should not be explainable on any

other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive

2(1973) 2 SCC 793

7

nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis

except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as

not to leave any reasonable ground for the

conclusion consistent with the innocence of the

accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by the

accused."

10.The prosecution has not proved any motive for the

accused's conviction. The primary basis for the accused's

conviction is that he made an extra-judicial confession

before his brother and villagers. Examining the evidence on

record, it is clear that other witnesses have mentioned the

extra-judicial confession made by the accused to the police,

which is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian

Evidence Act. A key witness to the extra-judicial confession

is Dharam Singh Dhruv (PW-3), the accused's brother, who

stated that the accused had told his son (name not

specified) that he had killed Binda Bai. Dharam Singh

Dhruv's statement reveals that the accused did not make

an extra-judicial confession before him. In these

circumstances, Dharam Singh Dhruv's (PW-3) statement

does not support the prosecution's case for the accused's

8

conviction.

11.The second key witness to the extra-judicial confession is

Aghnuram Dhruv (PW-2), the accused's brother. Aghnuram

stated in his Court testimony that the accused had gone to

the field with his wife around 8:00 am to work, and after

two hours, the accused returned alone and said he had

killed his wife Binda Bai, whose body was lying in the field

which they had taken on sharecropping (adhiya). Notably,

the villagers were already aware that the body was lying in

the field, meaning thereby the recovery of the body was not

based on the accused's information.

12. In the matter of Sahadevan and another Vs. State of

Tamil Nadu

3

, their Lordships of the Supreme Court further

considered the earlier decisions including Balwinder Singh

Vs. State of Punjab

4

and pertinently laid down the

principle in paragraphs 15.1, 15.8 and 16 as under :-

"15.1. In Balwinder Singh (supra) this Court stated

the principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10)

"10. An extra-judicial confession by its very

nature is rather weak type of evidence and

requires appreciation with a great deal of

care and caution. Where an extra- judicial

3(2012) 6 SCC 403

41995 Supp (4) SCC 259

9

confession is surrounded by suspicious

circumstances, its credibility becomes

doubtful and it loses its importance."

15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established

to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of

mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear,

unambigous and should clearly convey that the

accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-

judicial confession can be accepted and can be the

basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility.

The extra-judicial confession should inspire

confidence and the court should find out whether

there are other cogent circumstances on record to

support it. (Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B.

5

and

Pancho v. State of Haryana

6

.)

The principles

16. Upon a proper analysis of the above referred

judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to

state the principles which would make an extra-

judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence

capable of forming the basis of conviction of an

accused. These percepts would guide the judicial

mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where

the prosecution heavily relies upon alleged accused:

an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been

made by the accused:

(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak

5(2011) 11 SCC 754

6(2011) 10 SCC 165

10

evidence by itself. It has to be examined by

the court with greater care and caution.

(ii) It should be made voluntarily and

should be truthful.

(iii) It should inspire confidence.

(iv)An extra-judicial confession attains

greater credibility and evidentiary value if it

is supported by chain of cogent

circumstances and is further a corroborated

by other prosecution evidence.

(v) For an confession to be extra-judicial the

basis of conviction, it should not suffer from

any material discrepancies and inherent

improbabilities.

(vi) Such statement essentially has to be

proved like any other fact and in accordance

with law."

13.In light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in

the above-mentioned judgment, examining the facts and

evidence on record, it is clear that the extra-judicial

confession corroborated by brother Aghnuram Dhruv (PW-

2) is a weak type of evidence and cannot be considered

sufficient for conviction.

14.The second basis for the accused's conviction is that the

11

investigating officer, Inspector Ajay Singh Bais (PW-9),

seized the iron spade (Rapli) allegedly used in the crime

and prepared Exhibit P-5 when the accused was produced.

The FSL report (Exhibit P-23) states that human blood was

found on the iron spade.

15.The seizure of the iron spade (Exhibit P-5) stated by

Inspector Ajay Singh Bais (PW-9) is not corroborated by

Jaykaran Yadav (PW-5). Kotwar Makund Das (PW-1) stated

in response to a leading question that the police had told

the accused to produce any weapon available at home, and

then the police themselves entered the accused's room,

took out the spade, and seized it. This witness did not

confirm whether there were any bloodstains or marks on

the spade. No memorandum was prepared after recording

the accused's statement. Thus, the seizure is not proved

beyond doubt.

16.According to the FSL report (Exhibit P-23), blood group 'A'

was found on the deceased's saree, whereas the blood

group on the iron spade allegedly seized from the accused

could not be determined.

17.Furthermore, though the blood stained spade has been

seized from the accused, but it is well settled law that

12

disclosure alone would not automatically lead to conclusion

that offence was also committed by accused and burden

lies on prosecution to establish a close link between

discovery of material object and its use in commission of

offence. In this regard, Their Lordships of the Supreme

Court in the matter of Mustkeem Alias Sirajudeen v.

State of Rajasthan

7

, held as under :

25. With regard to Section 27 of the Act, what is

important is discovery of the material object at the

disclosure of the accused but such disclosure alone

would not automatically lead to the conclusion that

the offence was also committed by the accused. In

fact, thereafter, burden lies on the prosecution to

establish a close link between discovery of the

material objects and its use in the commission of

the offence. What is admissible under Section 27 of

the Act is the information leading to discovery and

not any opinion formed on it by the prosecution.

27. The scope and ambit of Section 27 were also

illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King

Emperor

8

reproduced hereinbelow:-

7(2011) 11 SCC 724

8AIR 1947 PC 67

13

".....it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered'

within the section as equivalent to the object

produced; the fact discovered embraces the

place from which the object is produced and

the knowledge of the accused as to this, and

the information given must relate distinctly to

this fact. Information as to past user, or the

past history, of the object produced is not

related to its discovery in the setting in which

it is discovered. Information supplied by a

person in custody that 'I will produce a knife

concealed in the roof of my house' does not

lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were

discovered many years ago. It leads to the

discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed

in the house of the informant to his

knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have

been used in the commission of the offence,

the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to

the statement the words be added 'with which

I stabbed A' these words are inadmissible

since they do not relate to the discovery of the

knife in the house of the informant."

14

18.Furthermore, in the matter of Raja Naykar v. State of

Chhattisgarh

9

the Supreme Court has clearly held that

only on the basis of sole circumstance of recovery of blood-

stained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has

discharged its burden of proving the case beyond

reasonable doubt. In that view of the matter, the appellant

could not have been convicted mainly on the basis of

recovery of blood stained weapon without establishing the

fact that it was used for commission of offence.

19.In light of the above-mentioned judgments, based on the

evidence on record, it is not proved beyond doubt that the

spade was seized from the accused, and it is also not

established that the spade had any direct connection with

Binda Bai's murder.

20.In view of the above, the impugned judgment of conviction

and order of sentence dated 14.09.2018 is set aside. The

appellant stands acquitted giving him benefit of doubt from

the charge framed against him for the offence under Section

302 of I.P.C. The appellant is already on bail, he need not

surrender; however, his bail bond shall remain in force for a

period of six months in view of the provision contained in

Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.

92024 SCC OnLine SC 67

15

21.In the result, this criminal appeal is allowed.

22.Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original

record be transmitted to the concerned trial Court

forthwith for information and necessary action, if any.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)

Judge Judge

Shubham