As per case facts, Lakshay Jain was convicted for a road accident that occurred in June 2014, leading to injuries and one death, under Sections 279, 337, and 304-A IPC. ...
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M)
Reserved On: 30.10.2025
Pronounced On: 14.11.2025
Lakshay Jain ...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
State of Punjab and another ...Respondent(s)
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ
Present :- Mr. Amit Khari, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Saurav Verma, Addl. A.G, Punjab.
Mr. Ketan Chopra, Advocate for respondent no. 2
VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J.
The instant criminal revision petition has been preferred against
the judgment and order of sentence dated 17.10.2018 passed by the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana, whereby the revisionist-petitioner has been
convicted and sentenced as under:-
Name of
convict
Offence under
Section
Sentence
Lakshay
Jain
279 IPC R.I. for a period of 03 months
304-A IPC Rigorous imprisonment for two years and
fine of Rs.100/- and in default thereof to
further undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of 15 days.
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -2-
337 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for six months and
fine of Rs.100/- and in default thereof to
further undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of 15 days.
All the sentences ordered to run concurrently.
2.
Further challenge is made also to the judgment dated 30.09.2025
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, vide which appeal filed
by the petitioner has been dismissed.
3.
Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 23.06.2014, SI
Manjit Singh received a ruqa from Police Station Division No. 3 regarding
the admission of one Chander Kanta at CMC Hospital, who had sustained
injuries in a roadside accident. Upon receiving the ruqa, SI Manjit Singh met
the patient’s son, Ravi Kumar, who disclosed that the accident had occurred
in front of the PSPCL office outside Chhauni Mohalla near Shiv Mandir.
Subsequently, the ruqa was sent to Police Station Salem Tabri. On 24.06.2014
and 25.06.2014, SI Balkar Singh, along with the police party, visited CMC
Hospital and moved an application for recording the statement of Chander
Kanta; however, the attending doctor declared her unfit to make a statement.
On 28.06.2014, the complainant Ravi Kumar recorded his statement before
the Investigating Officer, stating that on 22.06.2014, he and his mother,
Chander Kanta, were returning home from Chand Cinema on his motorcycle
bearing registration number PB10BX-9697 (make Platina). At about 7:45 PM,
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -3-
when they reached near the PSPCL office adjacent to Shiv Mandir, a car
bearing registration number PB10BP-1501 came from behind at high speed,
being driven rashly and negligently, and struck their motorcycle. As a result,
both he and his mother fell onto the road, sustaining injuries. The nearby
public gathered, and both were taken to CMC Hospital in the said car. The
driver of the car fled from the spot thereafter. Later, the complainant came to
know that the name of the accused driver was Lakshay Jain. The accident was
alleged to have occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the said
accused.
4.
On the basis of aforesaid statement, FIR in the present case was
registered and investigation conducted. The spot was inspected; site plan
prepared; statements of witnesses recorded and various documents were taken
into police possession.
5.
On completion of investigation, final report under Section 173
Cr.P.C. was filed in the Court and documents were supplied to the accused-
petitioner free of costs.
6.
Finding a prima facie case having been made out, the petitioner
was chargesheet for the commission of offence punishable under Sections
279, 337, 427 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
7.
In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined nine
witnesses, namely PW-1 HC Ranjit Singh, PW-2 Rishi Kumar Chopra, PW-
3 Ravi Kumar (complainant), PW-4 Baljinder Singh, Steno, Office of the
State Transport Commissioner, Punjab, Chandigarh, PW-5 HC Sukhdarshan
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -4-
Singh, PW-6 SI Balkar Singh, PW-7 Baljinder Singh, Steno-Typist, RTO
Branch, Ludhiana, PW-8 Dr. Ramandeep Kaur, and PW-9 Dr. Paul Sudhakar
John of CMC Hospital, Ludhiana.
8.
HC Ranjit Singh (PW-1) deposed that during patrolling on
03.07.2014 with ASI Balkar Singh, a Swift car was stopped on suspicion at
Old Sabzi Mandi, Ludhiana. The driver, identified as Lakshay Jain, was found
to be wanted in FIR No. 128 dated 28.06.2014 at Police Station Salem Tabri
for further investigation.
9.
Further, prosecution examined PW-2 Rishi Kumar Chopra who
deposed that on 22.06.2014, his elder brother, Ravi Chopra, was riding a
motorcycle (PB10BX-9697) with their mother, Chander Kanta, as a pillion
rider when a Swift car (PB10BP-1501) struck them near the PSPCL office,
causing serious head and facial injuries to his mother, who was admitted to
CMC Hospital and later died on 02.07.2014. He identified her body and
proved his statement as Ex. PW2/A. In cross-examination, he admitted that he
had not witnessed the accident himself and had learned of the incident from
his brother.
10.
Further, prosecution examined PW-3 Ravi Kumar, the
complainant and eyewitness, who deposed in the lines of his initial version as
given to the Police and the contents of the same are not repeated here for the
sake of brevity. However, in cross-examination, he admitted that his
motorcycle was facing toward Jagraon Bridge when the car hit them from
behind. He stated that he didn’t see the offending vehicle and came to know
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -5-
the number of the offending Swift car and the name of the accused on the
same day after noting down the vehicle’s registration number.
11.
Further, prosecution examined PW-4 Baljinder Singh, Steno
from the State Transport Commissioner’s Office, Punjab, Chandigarh, who
deposed that the Swift car bearing registration No. PB10BP-1501 was duly
registered. He verified the registration record as correct and proved the
documents as Ex. PW4/A and Ex. PW4/B.
12.
Further, prosecution examined PW-5 HC Sukhdarshan Singh,
deposed that he mechanically examined the Swift car (PB10BP-1501) and the
motorcycle (PB10BX-9697) at the police station on the instructions of ASI
Balkar Singh. He proved his reports as Ex. PW5/A and Ex. PW5/B.
13.
Further, prosecution examined PW-6 SI Balkar Singh who
deposed that on 24.06.2014, he visited CMC Hospital, Ludhiana, to record the
statement of injured Chander Kanta but the doctor declared her unfit. Similar
attempts on 25.06.2014 and 28.06.2014 also failed as she remained unfit for
a statement. On 28.06.2014, however, Ravi Kumar’s statement was recorded
and proved as Ex. PW3/A, duly signed and attested. He also proved the FIR,
site plan, and related documents. On 03.07.2014, after Chander Kanta’s death,
he prepared the necessary forms, added Section 304-A IPC to the case, and
handed over the dead body to her son Ravi Chopra. He proved various memos,
including the recovery memo of the motorcycle, arrest memo, and personal
search memo. In cross-examination, he confirmed that the site plan was
prepared based on Ravi Kumar’s demarcation and that Chander Kanta had
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -6-
died on 03.07.2014.
14.
Further, prosecution examined PW-7 Baljinder Singh, Steno
Typist from the RTO Office, Ludhiana, deposed that as per official records,
driving licence No. PB1020100015093 was issued in the name of Lakshay
Jain, son of Vipin Kumar Jain, and he proved the licence record as Ex. PG.
15.
Further, prosecution examined PW-8 Dr. Ramandeep Kaur from
the Department of Pathology, Government Medical College, who deposed
that she conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of deceased
Chander Kanta and placed on record the post-mortem report as Ex. PW8/A
along with the accompanying pictorial diagram as Ex. PW8/B.
16.
Further, prosecution examined PW-9 Dr. Paul Sudhakar John
from CMC Hospital, Ludhiana, who deposed that patient Chander Kanta was
admitted under his care on 22.06.2014 around 9:00 PM and was treated for
the injuries sustained. He produced the relevant medical record, admission
slips, and injury report, which were proved as Ex. PW9/A to Ex. PW9/E. In
cross-examination, he stated that the patient had arrived at the hospital
between 8:30 PM and 9:00 PM and admitted that the injuries could possibly
have occurred due to an impact with a hard surface such as the ground.
17.
No other prosecution witness/evidence was examined or
produced and lastly the evidence of prosecution was got closed.
18.
The statement of the petitioner was recorded under Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein all incriminating circumstances
and evidence appearing on record were put to him. The petitioner denied the
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -7-
allegations in their entirety, described the prosecution case and evidence as
false and fabricated, and asserted his innocence.
19.
In his defence evidence, petitioner examined DW-1 Anil Kumar
who deposed that on 22.06.2014, around 7:30–7:45 PM, he was at a petrol
pump to refuel his scooter when he witnessed a motorcycle, reportedly a
Platina bearing a number resembling 9697, lying on the road with three
injured persons after being hit by an unidentified vehicle. He, along with
others, tried to assist the victims and stopped a Maruti Swift car (PB10BP-
1501) coming from the direction of Chand Cinema, requesting its driver to
help transport an elderly injured woman and her son to the hospital. In cross-
examination, he admitted that he had not seen the actual accident occur but
saw the victims lying on the road near Shiv Mandir. He stated that he did not
know the victims or the accused personally and was appearing as a summoned
witness. He further added that the petrol pump was opposite the site of the
accident and that the accused had taken the injured persons to the hospital
with his and other bystanders’ assistance.
20.
No other defence evidence/witness was produced by accused
during the phase of his defence evidence and lastly the defence evidence of
accused as got closed.
21.
After considering the arguments advanced, the testimonies of
witnesses, and the evidence placed on record, the Trial Court, vide judgment
dated 17.10.2018, held the petitioner guilty of offences punishable under
Sections 279, 337, and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, while acquitting
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -8-
him of the charge under Section 427 IPC, and accordingly sentenced him as
stated above.
22.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and sentence,
the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 777 of 2018 before the Court of
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana. However, vide judgment
dated 30.09.2025, the said appeal was dismissed, thereby affirming the
conviction and sentence, hence, the present revision petition.
23.
After arguing the matter at some length, counsel for the petitioner
does not press the present revision petition on merits and contends that he
would confine his challenge only to the quantum of punishment that has been
so awarded. He submits that the claim of the petitioner for being given benefit
of probation has not been considered even though he fulfilled all the pre-
requisites for such benefit. The following mitigating circumstances are
pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner.
(i)
The incident in question occurred in June 2014, and more than
eleven years have since elapsed. At the time of the incident, the
petitioner was approximately 21 years and 11 months old and he
has prior to the above accident or since then not been involved in
any other criminal activity.
(ii)
That the incident in question was an unfortunate and purely
accidental occurrence, having taken place without any intention
or overt act on the part of the petitioner.
(iii)
The petitioner has endured the ordeal of a prolonged criminal trial
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -9-
spanning over eleven years.
(iv)
The matter has been amicably settled between the petitioner and
the family members of the deceased. They have acknowledged
that the incident was purely accidental and devoid of any
criminal intent on the part of the petitioner.
(v)
The present case is not one of hit-and-run as the petitioner
himself took the injured to the hospital in his own car and ensured
that she received quick medical treatment.
(vi)
The petitioner is the sole earning member of his family, on whom
his aged parents and dependents rely for sustenance. His
prolonged incarceration has caused severe hardship to them, and
his small business, which was the family’s only source of
livelihood, has also suffered significant losses during his
confinement.
(vii)
The family of the deceased has already received compensation in
the proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
(MACT).
24.
Counsel for the petitioner also relies upon the judgment dated
31.07.2014 passed by this Court in Rajeev Kanojia v. State of U.T. bearing
No. CRR-1250-2006 in support of his contention that the sentence may be
reduced to the period already undergone where the petitioner expresses
willingness to compensate the aggrieved party and has no other criminal case
pending against him, and the mitigating circumstances warrant leniency.
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -10-
25. State counsel, on the other hand, contends that both the Courts
have examined the evidence brought on record and concurrently recorded a
finding of conviction against the petitioner. In a revisional jurisdiction, neither
new line of defence can be adopted nor any reappreciation of the evidence can
be undertaken. There is no illegality or perversity that has been pointed out by
the petitioner, hence, there is no occasion that would call for upsetting the
findings recorded or the sentence awarded and affirmed by the Courts.
26.
Counsel for the complainant however submits that the matter has
been amicably resolved and he has no objection to an indulgence being
extended to the petitioner.
27.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone
through the impugned judgments.
28.
Before considering the plea of the petitioner for grant of
probation, the legal position for availing the benefit of probation needs to be
kept in mind.
29.
As per the settled principles of law governing the grant of
probation, the benefit of probation is ordinarily extended to cases where the
circumstances indicate a mere minor conflict with law instead of inherent
criminal propensity or conduct reflecting a hardened or incorrigible
disposition. The object of the Probation of Offenders Act is reformative and
rehabilitative and not punitive. It aims to reintegrate an offender into the
mainstream of society where such reintegration appears feasible. The aims
and object of the Probation Act came to be decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -11-
in the case of Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar reported as (1972) 2
SCC 633. Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of the
Probation Act has held as under: -
“6. The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958
with a view to provide for the release of offenders of certain
categories on probation or after due admonition and for matters
connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent the
conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a
result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age
in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo
imprisonment in jail. The above object is in consonance with the
present trend in the field of penology, according to which effort
should be made to bring about correction and reformation of the
individual offenders and not to resort to retributive justice.
Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is a born
criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of socio-
economic milieu. Although not much can be done for hardened
criminals, considerable stress has been laid on bringing about
reform of young offenders not guilty of very serious offences and
of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act
gives statutory recognition to the above objective. It is, therefore,
provided that youthful offenders should not be sent to jail, except
in certain circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -12-
can be invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person even
though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an offence
punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear from the
language of Section 6 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of that section
reads as under: -
“When any person under twenty-one years of age is found
guilty of having committed an offence punishable with
imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the
Court by which the person is found guilty shall not
sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that,
having regard to the circumstances of the case including
the nature of the offence and the character of the offender,
it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3
or Section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of
imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons
for doing so.”
30.
The aforesaid position was reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Chellammal and Another v. State reported as 2025 SCC Online
SC 870. The relevant extract of the judgment is as under: -
“26. On consideration of the precedents and based on a
comparative study of Section 360, Cr. P.C. and subsection (1) of
Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the latter
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -13-
is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former. Inter alia,
while Section 360 permits release of an offender, more twenty-
one years old, on probation when he is sentenced to
imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of the
Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in any
case where the offender is found to have committed an offence
such that he is punishable with any sentence other than death or
life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante clause in sub-
section gives overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 4 over
any other law for the time being in force. Also, it is noteworthy
that Section 361, Cr. P.C. itself, being a subsequent legislation,
engrafts a provision that in any case where the court could have
dealt with an accused under the provisions of the Probation Act
but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special
reasons therefor.
27. What logically follows from a conjoint reading of
sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361,
Cr. P.C. is that if Section 360, Cr. P.C. were not applicable in a
particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the Probation
Act would not be attracted.
28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that
while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as
a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -14-
provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several
decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4
of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is
excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection
(1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has
no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the
offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast
upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants
releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated
circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be
decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion
decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon
considering the report of the probation officer impose such
conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be
in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to
record the reasons therefor.”
31.
In the present case, there is nothing on record to reflect that the
petitioner possesses a criminal bent of mind or that his conduct poses any
threat to society. Hence, by the broader principles of criminal jurisprudence,
no adverse presumption can be drawn against him.
32.
The imposition of punishment is a refined judicial function that
demands a careful harmonization of its underlying purposes namely,
retribution, deterrence, and reformation. This balance must reflect not only
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -15-
the reasoning of the Court but also the ethical standards and social context in
which justice is administered. As societal values and circumstances evolve,
the prominence accorded to each of these aims necessarily varies, requiring
the Court to adapt its emphasis in response to the changing demands of justice.
The aforesaid principle found early articulation in the writings of Justice
Caldwell, who, in his authoritative work “Criminology,” observed that:
“If the infliction of pain is to have its greatest effect upon the
behavior of a person, it must follow soon after the act for which
it is given. But punishment always takes place weeks or even
months after the offense has been committed, since the offender
must first be apprehended, tried, and convicted. Such delay tends
to disconnect the punishment from the offense in the mind of the
offender, and it may well be considered as merely another
painful experience in an unjust world.”
33.
Moreover, Italian criminologist and jurist Cesare Beccaria, in his
seminal treatise “On Crimes and Punishments,” propounded the doctrine of
penal parsimony, emphasizing that the justification of any criminal justice
system rests upon its capacity to inflict the least possible evil necessary to
achieve its ends. The underlying premise is that punishment, being in itself a
necessary evil and devoid of inherent virtue, must be confined strictly within
the bounds of necessity. The imposition of suffering or restriction upon an
offender cannot extend beyond what is indispensable for the preservation of
social order.
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -16-
34. While ‘retributive’ object of sentencing is seen regressive, in
modern day sentencing jurisprudence for its focus on punishing proportionally
for the harm done and caters to the negative senses of spite and anger against
a wrongful act, the rehabilitative/reformative approach examines the
circumstances surrounding the offender on social, economical, physical and
psychological level so as to reintegrate the offender in the social mainstream.
The law extends the benefit of good and perceives a probability and possibility
of reform. It aims at capitalising a perceived social liability. The expectation
of law is based on the surrounding circumstances to distinguish between a
‘criminal’ and an ‘offender’.
35.
While the pre-requisites of crime do not distinguish two persons,
on the legal scale, this aspect is significant for sentencing. A mere
involvement of a person in crime may not necessarily mark a person as a
‘criminal.’ ‘Criminality’ in mind and action has to be determined from the
totality of circumstances including the mode and manner in committing an
offence, the conduct pre and post the offence, the criminal antecedents, nature
of involvement, influence of peers etc. and not just from an isolatory
consideration of commission of an offence. A Court of law would not assume
every offender to be beyond reform and differentiate in punishment on
considering whether the offences arise due to human error or that stem from
actions propelled by mens rea.
36.
The case in hand is yet another where interest of justice would
warrant a reformative approach in precedence to a punitive or retributive
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -17-
approach. It is not the function of the judges to seek the transformation of
human nature itself, but rather to shape the framework within which
individuals perceive that adherence to the law aligns with their own best
interests.
37.
Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the
present case and the mitigating circumstances enumerated above, I deem it
appropriate to direct release of the petitioner on probation on furnishing an
undertaking of keeping peace and good behaviour for two years to the
satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner shall also remain under
the supervision of the concerned probation officer during the aforesaid period.
In the event of the petitioner failing to comply with the said direction or
committing breach of the undertaking given by him, he shall be called upon
to undergo the remaining period of sentence imposed upon him in the present
case.
38.
As Montesquieu observed, the certainty of mild yet consistent
punishment serves as a far greater deterrent than the transient severity of harsh
sentences. Guided by this enduring principle, it is directed that the petitioner
shall also be liable to perform community service of plantation of 50
indigenous trees by approaching the Divisional Forest Officer, Ludhiana and
for their maintenance for a period of 05 years.
39.
In the event of the petitioner not being in the capacity to deposit
the cost of maintenance for a period of 05 years, he shall offer his services to
the department of forests to set off the said cost as per the wages of an
CRR-2697-2025 (O&M) -18-
unskilled workers equal to adequate labour men hours for the equivalent
period as prescribed by the concerned Deputy Commissioner.
40.
The instant petition is partly allowed.
41.
Pending misc. application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed
of accordingly.
14.11.2025. (VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
Mangal Singh JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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