1

$-

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

BEFORE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

+ CS(OS) 300/2021

LAKSHMI MURDESHWAR PURI

S/O SH.DAMODHARAN VAIDHYAN

R/O 195, GAUTAM NAGAR,

NEW DELHI-110049 ....PLAINTIFF

(Through: Mr. Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Meghna Mishra, Ms.

Palak Sharma and Mr. Rohit Kumar, Advocates.)

Versus

1. SAKET GOKHALE

S/0. SUIT AS GOKHALE

502, VIRAL, SAI KRUPA COMPLEX

THANE-401104, MAHARASHTRA.

....DEFENDANT NO.1

(Through: Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi and Mr. Harsha Vinoy, Advocates.)

2. XCORP.

THROUGH RESIDENT GRIEVANCE OFFICER

MR. VINAY PRAKASH

4TH FLOOR, THE ESTATE,

121 DICKENSON ROAD,

BANGALORE 560 042

ALSO AT:-

1355 MARKET ST #900

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94103

UNITED STATES ....DEFENDANT NO.2

(Through: None.)

2

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% Reserved on: 16.04.2025

Pronounced on: 02.05.2025

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JUDGMENT

I.A. 5123/2025 (filed by defendant No.1 seeking condonation of 184

days’ delay in filing of I.A. 5122/2025)

I.A. 5122/2025 (filed by defendant No.1 seeking recall of ex-parte

judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024)

The present suit was decreed ex parte in favour of the plaintiff/non-

applicant and against the applicant/defendant No.1 vide judgment and

decree dated 01.07.2024, whereby, this Court had directed defendant No.1 to

publish an apology in the terms specified by the Court on his Twitter handle,

from which the offending tweets were made, within a period of four (04)

weeks from the date of the judgment. The said apology was further directed

to remain published on the said Twitter handle for a continuous period of six

(06) months. Additionally, the Court had awarded damages to the tune of

₹50,00,000/- in favour of the plaintiff, payable by applicant/defendant No.1

within eight (08) weeks of the passing of the judgment and decree.

2. Subsequent to the passing of the aforesaid judgment and decree, it

appears that four applications were filed at the instance of defendant No.1

seeking various reliefs. A brief description of each of these applications is

set out below:

S. No. Application No. Description

1. I.A. 5122/2025 Filed Under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section

151 of the CPC, 1908 seeking recall of Ex-parte

judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024 on behalf of

3

applicant/defendant no.1.

2. I.A. 5123/2025 Filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

seeking condonation of delay of 184 days in

preferring application under Order IX Rule 13 on

behalf of applicant/defendant no.1.

3. I.A. 5124/2025 Filed under Section 151 of the CPC, 1908 seeking

condonation of delay of 18 days in re-filing the

application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC

seeking recall of ex-parte judgment and decree

dated 01.07.2024

4. I.A. 6121/2025 Filed seeking stay of the operation of the judgment

and decree dated 01.07.2024 during the pendency

of I.A. No. 5122/2025.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the parties have been heard on I.A.

5122/2025 and on I.A. 5123/2025. The decision on these two applications

will decide the fate of the remaining I.A.s.

Submissions on behalf of the parties

4. The submissions of Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the applicant/defendant No.1, are as follows:

4.1 The applicant/defendant No.1 had initially engaged a counsel who

filed the written statement and continued him until 10.02.2022. Thereafter,

the said counsel ceased to appear in the matter. Mr. Bedi states that,

although there appears to be certain communications allegedly sent by the

erstwhile counsel, informing his inability to appear, however, it is the

categorical position of the applicant/defendant No.1, that, he neither

received any electronic communication nor was he provided with a physical

copy of the case record.

4.2 It is further submitted that, in the absence of any instructions from the

applicant/defendant No.1, his erstwhile counsel sought discharge from the

4

matter, as noted in the order dated 23.08.2023. In the absence of such

intimation, the applicant/defendant No.1 bona fide believed that the matter

was being duly contested on his behalf, and accordingly, took no further

action.

4.3 Mr. Bedi asserts that, due to the applicant/defendant No.1 being

entangled in politically motivated and false criminal cases, he was unable to

maintain regular contact with his erstwhile counsel or effectively pursue the

matter. It is contended that, in compliance with the interim order, the alleged

objectionable tweets had already been removed, and therefore, even if the

applicant/defendant No.1 is permitted to contest the suit on merits, no

prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff.

4.4 Mr. Bedi also points out that the applicant/defendant No.1 was elected

to the Rajya Sabha in July 2023 and, since then, has not been residing at his

Mumbai address. He has been a permanent resident of Flat No. 4, Sree

Alokapuri, Srijan Enclave, Picnic Garden Road, Amrabati Kasba, Kolkata,

West Bengal – 700039, and his official residence is at Flat No. 703,

Brahmaputra, Dr. B.D. Marg, New Delhi – 110001. Despite this, no attempt

was made to serve notice at either of these addresses. It is thus the case of

the applicant/defendant No.1 that he remained unaware of the developments

in the suit due to non-service of notice at his correct postal addresses.

4.5 Additionally, learned counsel submits that the applicant/defendant

No.1 was under severe financial constraints and was unable to afford legal

representation during the relevant period. This financial hardship further

contributed to the delay in challenging the ex parte decree or filing an

application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

5

(CPC), within the prescribed limitation period. In support of this submission,

Mr. Bedi has drawn the Court‘s attention to the Income Tax Return of

applicant/ defendant No.1 for the Assessment Year 2024-25, which reflects

a total income of ₹6,44,920/-.

4.6 Mr. Bedi places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dogra

1

, to contend that suits should ordinarily be

decided on merits and not terminated by default, whether on the part of the

plaintiff or the defendant, and that the cause of justice would be better

served by allowing the matter to be adjudicated on merits.

4.7 He further relies on Tej Pratap Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

2

,

particularly paragraph 12 thereof, and also cites Esha Bhattacharjee v.

Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy

3

, to substantiate

his submission that delay in approaching the Court ought to be condoned in

the interest of substantial justice.

5. Per contra, the submissions Mr. Maninder Singh, learned senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/non-applicant are as follows:

5.1 At the outset, Mr. Maninder Singh, submits that the

applicant/defendant No.1 was duly represented by counsel on the very first

date of hearing. Once the applicant/defendant No.1 entered appearance and

filed a written statement, there was no further requirement under law for re-

service of summons. Accordingly, the service of summons stood duly

completed. It is submitted that the applicant/defendant No.1‘s subsequent

non-participation in the proceedings amounts to a conscious and deliberate

1

(2019) 7 SCC 359

2

2018 SCC OnLine Del 8368

6

decision to remain absent, which cannot now be used as a ground to seek

recall of the decree.

5.2 Proceeding further, learned senior counsel submits that the

applicant/defendant No.1 has failed to establish that he was prevented by

―sufficient cause‖ from appearing and contesting the suit. It is emphasized

that the written statement filed by the applicant/defendant No.1 was duly

taken into account by this Court while passing the judgment dated

01.07.2024. Therefore, the decree passed cannot be regarded as ex parte in

the strict sense, but is one rendered after consideration of the pleadings filed

on behalf of the applicant/defendant No.1.

5.3 In this regard, Mr. Singh places reliance on the second proviso to

Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, which bars the recall of a decree unless the

applicant successfully establishes that he was not duly served or was

otherwise prevented by ―sufficient cause‖ from appearing. He draws the

Court‘s attention to paragraph 4(e) of the application seeking condonation

for delay, wherein the applicant/defendant No.1 himself admitted that he had

intended to file an appeal and had engaged counsel for that purpose. Thus, it

is submitted, the applicant/defendant No.1 cannot now feign ignorance of

the proceedings or plead lack of knowledge as a ground for delay.

5.4 Mr. Singh further contends that the applicant/defendant No.1 has

failed to offer any explanation for the period following the judgment dated

01.07.2024. It is only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings on

20.12.2024 that the applicant/defendant No.1 took initial steps to challenge

the decree. Even thereafter, there was no prompt action taken.

3

(2013) 12 SCC 649

7

5.5 It is pointed out that counsel for the applicant/defendant No.1 was

engaged only on 01.02.2025, and on the same day, the present application

for recall was filed. However, the application was not in order and remained

under defects in the Registry. No steps were taken to cure the said defects

for a period of 27 days. It is only on 27.02.2025, one day before the

scheduled hearing of the execution/contempt petition on 28.02.2025, that

corrective measures were undertaken, and the application was brought on

record. Notably, the execution/contempt petition, filed for non-compliance

with the judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024, was listed for hearing on

28.02.2025 and again on 04.03.2025. It is evident that the present

application for recall was pressed into service only when the hearing of the

execution/contempt petition became imminent. The conduct of the

applicant/defendant No.1 in keeping the application in defects and taking

corrective action only at the eleventh hour demonstrates a lack of bona fides.

5.6 In continuation, it is submitted that the applicant/defendant No.1 is an

active user of the internet and social media platforms, including Twitter, and

claims to have lakhs of followers. On this basis, Mr. Singh contends that the

applicant/defendant No.1 was well aware of the progress of the present

proceedings and the orders passed from time to time. It is, therefore,

apparent that the absence of the applicant/defendant No.1 from the

proceedings was not due to any bona fide reason, but rather a deliberate and

wilful disregard of the authority of this Court. Such conduct, it is submitted,

reflects a conscious non-participation and disentitles the applicant/defendant

No.1 from any relief, including seeking condonation of delay.

8

5.7 In conclusion, learned senior counsel submits that the

applicant/defendant No.1, in view of his own conduct and the sequence of

events, is not entitled to any relief under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC. In

support of his submissions, reliance is placed on the judicial

pronouncements in the case at Basant Singh v. Roman Catholic Mission

4

,

Parimal v. Veena

5

, Hira Sweets & Confectionary Private Limited and Ors..

v. Hira Confectioners

6

, Ramesh Chander Goel v. Daya Kishan Goel

7

,

Shivam Plastic Industries v. Nikhil Gupta

8

, Mohd. Shueb v. Fayza Nisar

and Anr.

9

, Strix Ltd. v. Maharaja Appliances Limited.

10

, Collector of

Balasore v. Ashutosh Roy

11

Analysis

6. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel appearing

for the parties and have perused the record.

7. Initially, notice on I.A. 5123/2025 and I.A. 5124/2025 were directed

to be issued. Pursuant thereto reply was filed by the plaintiff. However, the

parties comprehensively addressed the arguments on the merits of the

application seeking recall of the ex parte judgment and decree i.e I.A.

5122/2025. Considering the arguments presented, the Court first proceeds to

examine the law as set out in Order IX Rule 13 of CPC and its applicability

to the instant case.

4

(2002) 7 SCC 531

5

(2011) 3 SCC 545

6

(2021) 2 SCC Del 1823

7

2023 SCC OnLine Del 433

8

2023 SCC OnLine Del 972

9

2024 SCC OnLine Del 3764

10

2025 SCC OnLine Del 686

11

1962 SCC OnLine Ori 16

9

Natural Justice as the Cornerstone of Order IX Rule 13 CPC

8. The principle of natural justice is foundational to the legal system,

ensuring that every party is given a fair opportunity to be heard. In the

context of Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, this principle finds particular

relevance. This provision is designed to offer a remedy to a defendant

against whom an ex-parte decree has been passed, by allowing them to

approach the Court and seek the setting aside of such a decree. The objective

is to ensure that no party is deprived of their right to defend without due

cause and that justice is not defeated on mere technicalities.

9. However, the application of natural justice under this Rule is not

absolute but conditional. The Court must be satisfied that the defendant had

a ―sufficient cause‖ for their non-appearance on the date of hearing. Only

upon such satisfaction can the Court exercise its discretion to set aside the

ex-parte decree. Therefore, while the Rule upholds the spirit of natural

justice, it also seeks to balance it with the need for procedural discipline and

timely adjudication.

Examining the Legal Threshold of “Sufficient Cause”

10. Before dealing with the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the

CPC, it becomes necessary to refer to the guiding legal principles laid down

by the Supreme Court in Parimal v. Veena alias Bharti

12

. In the said

decision, the Court emphasized that the second proviso to Order IX Rule 13

CPC imposes a mandatory condition, requiring the Court to refrain from

setting aside an ex parte decree unless the statutory requirements are clearly

12

(2011) 3 SCC 545

10

fulfilled. The expression “sufficient cause” as used in various statutes,

including the CPC, has been judicially interpreted to mean a cause that is

adequate or enough to explain the absence or delay and must serve the

purpose intended. The term implies more than mere formality, it must meet

a standard that would satisfy a reasonable and prudent person, acting with

due care under similar circumstances. It has also been observed that

―sufficient cause‖ must reflect that the party was neither negligent nor

lacking in bona fides. The explanation offered should not suggest that the

party failed to act diligently or remained willfully inactive. Ultimately,

whether “sufficient cause” exists is to be assessed on the particular facts and

circumstances of each case, with the Court exercising its discretion in a fair,

judicious, and reasonable manner.

11. There is no gainsaying that assessing whether an applicant has

established “sufficient cause” is central to the determination of an

application for condonation of delay. In this context, it is considered

appropriate to refer to the relevant judicial decision in G. Ramegowda,

Major and Others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore

13

, where

the Supreme Court held:

“14. The contours of the area of discretion of the Courts in the matter

of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of

pronouncements of this Court. See: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v.

Rewa Coalfield Ltd.; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari; Concord

of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi; Lata Mata Din v. A

Narayanan; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is

true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its

counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of

bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why

the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case

will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts.

13

(1988) 2 SCC 142

11

However, the expression ““sufficient cause”” in Section 5 must receive

a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally

delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest

of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of

bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.

...”

12. It is also well-settled that the test of “sufficient cause” in cases of

delay is closely linked to ―reasonableness‖ and ―conduct of the

party/applicant‖. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as

a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing

―sufficient cause‖ and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away

that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is

directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. If a party has

been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be

equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued

to it in law, as a result of his acting vigilantly. (Balwant Singh (Dead) v.

Jagdish Singh and Others

14

)

13. While Courts generally adopt a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented

approach, eschewing a strictly pedantic interpretation—when considering

applications for condonation of delay, the concept of '―sufficient cause‖'

must still be assessed in its true spirit. Being both paramount and pivotal to

the exercise of judicial discretion, it cannot be given undue weight in a

mechanical manner, particularly where the applicant‘s case lacks bona fides

or the reasons cited are trivial, vague, or lacking in substance.

14. Furthermore, the policy behind the term ‗―sufficient cause‖‘ has been

analyzed by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions, including Esha

14

(2010) 8 SCC 685

12

Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy

and Others reported

15

, where reference was made to the following key

observation from Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat

Industrial Development Corporation and Another reported

16

:-

“14. …The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The

legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying

the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory

tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal

remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it

differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal

remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time,

the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if

“sufficient cause” is shown for not availing the remedy within the

stipulated time.”

15. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan

Mumbai

17

, the Supreme Court has highlighted that condonation of delay is

a discretionary power of the Court, in exercise of which the bona fides of the

applicant assume grave importance. In the said decision, it was opined:-

“23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and

justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of

power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes,

the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful

litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under

challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation

apart from the cost.

24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the

factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide

nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no

negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the

delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on

the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be

concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause,

then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the

15

(2013) 12 SCC 649

16

(2010) 5 SCC 459

17

(2012) 5 SCC 157

13

delay.”

16. Reference may also be made to the decision rendered by a Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Rojida Khatun & Ors.

18

, where the Court reiterated the significance

of assessing the bona fides of an applicant seeking condonation of delay. It

was emphasized that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

(Limitation Act) the applicant must show that they were prevented by

―sufficient cause‖ from filing the appeal, and that ―sufficient cause‖ has

consistently been interpreted by Courts as a reason beyond the applicant‘s

control.

Embargo on Setting Aside Ex-Parte Decree Solely for Irregularity in

Service of Summons under Order IX Rule 13 CPC

17. The original Rule 13 of Order IX of the CPC stipulated that if an ex-

parte decree was passed against a defendant who proved to the Court that

they had not been properly served with the summons, the Court was

obligated to set aside the decree. It was irrelevant whether the defendant

knew about the ongoing suit or was aware of the hearing date but still failed

to appear in Court.

18. The Law Commission considered the above aspect and the expression

―duly served‖. In its Twenty-seventh Report, the Commission stated:

“1. Under Order IX Rule 13, if the Court is satisfied either that the

summons has not been served, or that the defendant was prevented by

“sufficient cause” from appearing, etc., the ex parte decree should be

set aside. The two branches of the Rule are distinctive and the

defendant, whatever his position may be in respect of one branch, is

entitled to the benefit of the other branch if he satisfies the Court that

18

2015 SCC OnLine Del 10646

14

he has made good his contention in respect of the other branch.

2. Now, cases may arise where there has been a technical breach of the

requirements of „due service‟, though the defendant was aware of the

institution of the suit. It may well be, that the defendant had knowledge

of the suit in due time before the date fixed for hearing, and yet,

apparently he would succeed if there is a technical flaw. This situation

can arise e.g. where the acknowledgment on the duplicate of the

summons has not been signed. There may be small defects in relation to

affixation, etc., under Order 5 Rule 15. At present, the requirements of

the Rules regarding service must be strictly complied with, and actual

knowledge (of the defendant) is immaterial. (There are not many

decisions which hold that even where there has not been due service,

yet the decree can be maintained, if the defendant knew the date of

hearing.)

3. Where a literal conformity with CPC is wanting, the second part of

column third of Article 164, Limitation Act, 1908 (now Article 123,

Limitation Act, 1963) applies. As to substituted service, see discussion

in undermentioned decision.

4. The matter was considered exhaustively by the Civil Justice

Committee, which recommended a provision that a decree should not

be set aside for mere irregularity. Local amendments made by several

High Courts (including Allahabad, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Madras

and Orissa) have made a provision on the subject, though there are

slight variations in the language adopted by each. Such a provision

appears to be useful one, and has been adopted on the lines of the

Madras Amendment.”

19. Further, the Law Commission, in its Fifty-fourth Report, revisited the

issue and reiterated its earlier stance on Order IX Rule 13. It emphasized

that if the Court is satisfied that the summon was either not served or the

defendant was prevented by ―sufficient cause‖ from appearing, the ex parte

decree must be set aside. The Commission clarified that the two branches of

the Rule are distinct, and a defendant, regardless of their situation under one

branch, is entitled to the benefit of the other branch if they can prove their

case under that provision. Furthermore, the Commission noted that, while

several points were discussed regarding this Rule, the broad objective

15

remains to prevent a decree from being set aside solely due to irregular

service if the defendant had knowledge of the decree. This conclusion was

consistent with the findings of the earlier report, where amendments were

suggested to reflect this principle.

20. Accepting the recommendations of the Law Commission, the Rule

was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule

13 of Order IX with effect from February 1, 1977 now reads thus:

“ORDER IX-APPEARANCE OF PARTIES AND CONSEQUENCE

OF NON-APPEARANCE

XXX XXX XXX

13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant In any case in

which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to

the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside;

and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or

that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when

the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order

setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs,

payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day

for proceeding with the suit;

Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set

aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all

or any of the other defendants also:

[Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte

merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service

of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of

hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs

claim]

Explanation.-Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed

ex-parte under this Rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any

ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the

appeal, no application shall lie under this Rule for setting aside that ex

parte decree.” (emphasis supplied)

21. It is, therefore, clear that the legal position under the amended CPC is

not whether the defendant was actually served with the summons in

16

accordance with the procedure laid down and in the manner prescribed in

Order V of the CPC, but whether (i) he had notice of the date of hearing of

the suit; and (ii) whether he had sufficient time to appear and answer the

claim, of the plaintiff. Once these two conditions are satisfied, an ex parte

decree cannot be set aside even if it is established that there was irregularity

in service of summons. If the Court is convinced that the defendant had

otherwise knowledge of the proceedings and he could have appeared and

answered the plaintiff's claim, he cannot put forward a ground of non-

service of summons for setting aside ex parte decree passed against him by

invoking Rule 13 of Order IX of the CPC. (Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of

India

19

). Following paragraph reaffirms the aforesaid position:-

―23.It is, therefore, clear that the legal position under the amended

Code is not whether the defendant was actually served with the

summons in accordance with the procedure laid down and in the

manner prescribed in Order 5 of the Code, but whether (i) he had

notice of the date of hearing of the suit; and (ii) whether he had

sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff. Once

these two conditions are satisfied, an ex parte decree cannot be set

aside even if it is established that there was irregularity in service of

summons. If the Court is convinced that the defendant had otherwise

knowledge of the proceedings and he could have appeared and

answered the plaintiff's claim, he cannot put forward a ground of non-

service of summons for setting aside ex parte decree passed against

him by invoking Rule 13 of Order 9 of the Code…..”

22. Moreover, this Court, in Pranesh Gupta v. Jagdish Bansilal

Khurana

20

, reaffirmed the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme

Court in paragraph no 10 of the judgment.

23. Further, in Sweety Gupta v. Neety Gupta

21

, the Division Bench of this

Court held that this principle finds further statutory backing in the second

19

(2008) 2 SCC 326

20

2019 SCC OnLine Del 6596

17

proviso to Order IX Rule 13, introduced by the Amending Act 104 of 1976

with effect from 01.02.1977, which expressly provides that an ex parte

decree shall not be set aside merely on the basis of an irregularity in the

service of summons. There is, therefore, no ambiguity in law that mere

procedural defects in service, when the defendant was otherwise aware of

the suit, do not justify interference with an ex parte decree. Relevant portion

of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:

“12. Thus under the amended provision it makes no difference as to

whether the defendant was actually served with the summons in

accordance with the procedure laid down and in the manner prescribed

in Order V of the Code, but whether (i) he had notice of the date of

hearing of the suit; and (ii) whether he had sufficient time to appear

and answer the claim of the plaintiff. If the answer to the aforesaid two

posers are found in the affirmative, there can be no rescinding of an ex-

parte decree even if it is proved that the summons were not duly served.

What is of importance now is that the Court is required to be convinced

that the defendant had otherwise knowledge of the proceedings and he

could have appeared to the claim of the plaintiff.”

24. The objective of the process of issuance of summons is to obtain the

presence of the defendant for final opportunity to be given to him to rebut

the claim against him. Thus, if he appears at the initial stage in a sense there

is waiver of the right to have summons served on him. This position has

been explained in the case of Sri Nath Agrawal v. Sri Nath

22

and to that

extent the principle has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Siraj Ahmad

Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor

23

. The following paragraph of the Supreme

Court decision reaffirms the aforesaid position:

21

2016 SCC OnLine Del 5668

22

AIR 1981 All 400

23

(1993) 4 SCC 406

18

“14…..The High Court said that if the defendant appears before the

Court after the registration of the suit and he is informed about the

nature of the claim and the date fixed for reply thereto, the defendant

must be deemed to have waived the right to the summons served on

him. The same legal position would arise when a defendant suo motu

appeared before the Court before the actual service of the summons. In

such a case, if some date was fixed for filing the written statement or

for the hearing of the suit it would be too technical to hold that service

of the summons in the ordinary course was still required and that

further proceedings in the suit would take place only thereafter…”

25. Further, in Basant Singh , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle

that the proviso to Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC places a clear embargo on

the setting aside of an ex parte decree solely on the ground of mere

irregularity in the service of summon, which is also reaffirmed in the

following paragraph-

“8. Second proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 casts an embargo on the Court

that a decree passed ex parte shall not be set aside merely on the

ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons.”

Factual Matrix of the Instant Case

26. Having examined the relevant legal provisions and judicial

pronouncements on the scope and applicability of Order IX Rule 13 of the

CPC, as well as the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and other

Courts, the Court now turns to the facts of the present case. It is in the

backdrop of this settled legal framework that the conduct of the parties, the

manner of service of summons, and the reasons cited for non-appearance

must be assessed to determine whether ―sufficient cause‖ has been shown to

justify setting aside the ex parte decree.

27. The facts of the case indicate that the plaintiff/non-applicant instituted

the present civil suit in relation to certain tweets posted by the

19

applicant/defendant No.1 in the public domain, which were alleged to have

defamed the plaintiff/non-applicant and her family. Without delving into

facts not directly relevant for the adjudication of the present application, it is

sufficient to note that, vide judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024, the suit

was decreed in favour of the plaintiff/non-applicant and against the

applicant/defendant No.1. The directions issued by this Court in the final

judgment are contained in paragraph nos. 104, 106, 108, and 109, which are

extracted below for ease of reference:

“104. Accordingly, the very first thing that defendant No.1 is directed to

do is to publish an apology in the following terms on his own Twitter

handle from which he had put-out the offending tweets, as also

prominently in the Times of India newspaper (Delhi Edition, size : 6 cm x

7 cm on page 3) stating the following :

“Apology

I unconditionally apologise for having put-out a series of tweets

against Amb. Lakshmi Murdeshwar Puri on 13th & 23rd June 2021,

which tweets contained wrong and unverified allegations in relation

to the purchase of property by Amb. Puri abroad, which I sincerely

regret.

Saket Gokhale”

Let requisite compliance be made within 04 (four) weeks. The apology so

tweeted shall be retained on defendant No.1‟s Twitter handle for a period

of 06 (six) months from the date it is put-out.

.......

106. Furthermore, defendant No.1 is restrained from publishing any

further tweet or any other content on any social-media or other electronic

platform in relation to the imputations made in the offending tweets.

.......

108. Insofar as the claim for damages is concerned, the plaintiff has

sought damages (of Rs. 5 crores) not for herself in a sense, but has instead

prayed that damages be granted to her and be then deposited in the PM

Cares Fund. This is an unusual way of claiming damages. The plaintiff

could have claimed damages and could have then disposed-of them in any

manner she pleased, including by making a donation to any charity or

20

fund. However, to ask the Court to grant damages, and to then pray that

the Court remit them to a particular fund is not tenable.

109. It is this Court‟s view, that no amount of monetary award can truly

compensate for damage to reputation, however upon a balance of all

considerations, defendant No.1 is directed to pay to the plaintiff damages

in the sum of Rs. 50 lacs within 08 (eight) weeks.”

I.A. 5123/2025

28. The Court must first consider the delay application, I.A. 5123/2025,

filed by the applicant/defendant No.1 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

It is essential to consider whether the delay in filing the application has been

sufficiently explained. For this purpose, the Court will examine the reasons

put forth by the applicant/defendant No.1 in support of the prayer for

condonation of delay.

29. It is an admitted position that the applicant/defendant No.1 became

aware of the ex parte judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024 as early as

02.07.2024. It is also undisputed that a written statement had already been

filed by the applicant/defendant No.1 in the main civil suit. Accordingly, it

is evident that the applicant/defendant No.1 was aware of both the pendency

of the civil suit and the judgment rendered therein. This knowledge is not

denied.

30. The first plea taken by applicant/defendant No.1 is premised on the

ground that on 19.08.2024, an advocate was engaged to take appropriate

proceedings. However, it is relevant to note that the period of limitation for

filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is thirty (30) days from

the date of knowledge of the decree. Despite this, no steps were admittedly

taken by the applicant/defendant No.1 to file such an application within the

21

prescribed period.

31. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there existed some

bona fide reason preventing the applicant/defendant No.1 from acting prior

to 19.08.2024, the subsequent conduct does not reflect diligence. The

application seeking recall of the judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024 was

eventually filed only on 19.02.2025, indicating a prolonged period of

inaction.

32. It has been stated that the earlier counsel did not pursue the matter

between 19.08.2024 and January 2025, following which new counsel was

engaged. This explanation appears to be an afterthought. The

applicant/defendant No.1 is admittedly an educated and responsible

individual, actively engaged in various legal proceedings, including both

civil and criminal matters. In such circumstances, any purported lapse on the

part of counsel cannot, by itself, be a ground for condonation of delay,

unless the party is able to establish due diligence and bona fides in

approaching the Court within the prescribed limitation.

33. Moreover, no material has been placed on record to indicate what

steps, if any, were taken by the applicant/defendant No.1 between

19.08.2024 and January 2025 to pursue the matter or follow up with the

previously engaged counsel.

34. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the applicant/

defendant No.1 has failed to establish a ―sufficient cause‖ for the delay of

184 days in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.

Consequently, the application seeking condonation of delay, i.e., I.A.

5123/2025, is hereby dismissed.

22

I.A. 5122/2025

35. It is further relevant to note that the civil suit was taken up for the first

time on 08.07.2021. On that day, I.A. 7944/2021, an application filed under

Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, was listed and detailed arguments were

heard. The order sheet for that date clearly records that the

applicant/defendant No.1 was duly represented by Mr. Sarim Naved, learned

counsel, on the very first date of hearing. The order passed on I.A.

7944/2021 dated 08.07.2021 reads as under:

―I.A.7941/2021in CS(OS) 300/2021

1. Subject to the plaintiff depositing the requisite Court fees within four

weeks from today, exemption is granted for the present.

2. The application is disposed of.

I.A.7942/2021in CS(OS) 300/2021

1. Subject to the plaintiff filing legible copies of any dim or illegible

documents on which it may seek to place reliance within four weeks from

today, exemption is granted for the present.

2. The application is disposed of.

I.A.7943/2021 in CS(OS) 300/2021

1. The plaintiff is permitted to file additional documents, if she chooses,

within four weeks from today.

2. The application stands disposed of accordingly.

CS(OS) 300/2021 & I.A. 7944/2021

1. Detailed arguments have been heard, as advanced by Mr. Maninder

Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff and Mr. Sarim Naved,

learned Counsel for the defendant.

2. During the course of arguments, a query was put to Mr. Naved as to

whether his client had approached any governmental or other official

authority, or even sought any clarification from the plaintiff, before

uploading the tweets with which the plaintiff is aggrieved. He answered in

the negative. He points out, however, that the defendant "tagged" the

Hon'ble Finance Minister in his first tweet which according to him,

constitutes due notice to the Hon'ble Finance Minister.

3. A second query was put to Mr. Naved as to whether the law permitted

any citizen, who had any grievance against a retired public servant or

23

against a person standing for election, regarding any declaration or

affidavit made by such person, to make allegations against such persons

on social media platforms without, in the first instance, seeking any

clarification in that regard either from the said person or from any

competent public authority. Mr. Naved's response was that "unfortunately,

that is the law".

4. Mr. Naved was, therefore, requested to provide any judgement, which

would support such a stand. He has been unable to provide any such

judgement. He candidly acknowledges that he has not come across any

judgement to the said effect, but submits that that is his understanding of

the law. 5. Before conclusion of proceedings, Mr. Naved was also directed

to take instructions as to whether his client was willing to remove the

tweets and other material against the plaintiff, as uploaded by him on the

internet. He submits that his instructions are in the negative.

6. Orders are reserved to be pronouneed on 13

th

July, 2021 at 10.30 A.M.‖

36. A perusal of the record further reveals that an interim injunction was

granted in favour of the plaintiff/non-applicant vide judgment dated

13.07.2021, whereby the non-applicant/plaintiff's application under Order

XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC was disposed of.

37. In paragraph 33 of the said order, this Court, inter alia, directed the

applicant/defendant No.1 to immediately delete from his Twitter account all

tweets referred to in the plaint, as well as any related tweets forming part of

the same thread or sequence. The applicant/defendant No.1 was also

expressly restrained from posting any defamatory, scandalous, or factually

incorrect content against the plaintiff/non-applicant or her husband. In the

alternative, directions were issued to Twitter, Inc. to take down the specified

tweets available at the URLs mentioned, along with any related tweets

forming part of the trail, as detailed in paragraph 33(iii) of the said order.

38. Following the initial interim directions issued by this Court, the

record reflects that the applicant/defendant No.1 was represented by counsel

24

on multiple dates during the pendency of the suit. The appearance of counsel

for applicant/defendant No.1 is recorded as under:

Sr. No. Date Represented by

1. 09.09.2021 Ms. Suroor Mander and

Ms. Ashu Davar, Adv.

2. 10.09.2021 Ms. Anshu Davar, Adv

with Mr. Kamran Javed,

Adv.

3. 24.11.2021 Ms. Anshu Davar, Adv.

39. The proceedings of 24.11.2021 further indicate that a written

statement was filed on behalf of applicant/defendant No.1 and was taken on

record. It was also noted on the same date that the interim order dated

13.07.2021 had been duly complied with by the said defendant.

40. Thereafter, on 07.02.2022, there was no appearance on behalf of

applicant/defendant No.1. However, on 10.02.2022, appearance was again

marked by Mr. Sarim Naved, Ms. Anshu Davar, and Mr. Kamran Javed,

Advocates, on behalf of applicant/defendant No.1.

41. The plaintiff/non-applicant also filed a replication to the written

statement of applicant/defendant No.1, and the learned Joint Registrar

recorded that pleadings stood completed qua applicant/ defendant No.1.

42. Subsequently, counsel for the applicant/defendant No.1 ceased to

appear in the matter. There was no representation before this Court on

various dates, including 13.04.2022, 06.07.2022, 06.10.2022, 11.01.2023,

and 30.05.2023. In light of continued non-appearance, on 14.07.2023, the

25

learned Joint Registrar directed issuance of Court notice to

applicant/defendant No.1 and his counsel.

43. Thereafter, on 07.08.2023, it was recorded that the Court notice had

been served on counsel for applicant/defendant No.1. It was further noted

that Ms. Anshu Davar, Advocate, made a statement on behalf of Mr. Sarim

Naved, Advocate, that although he had represented applicant/defendant No.1

earlier, a no-objection had already been given to the said defendant in March

2022 for engaging another counsel.

44. When the matter was listed before the Court on 23.08.2023, counsel

appearing for applicant/defendant No.1 formally sought discharge, citing

lack of instructions. Consequently, the Court directed issuance of fresh

Court notice to the said defendant through all permissible modes.

45. Moreover, on 25.09.2023, the learned Joint Registrar perused the

office note, which recorded that notice had been issued to

applicant/defendant No.1 through WhatsApp and e-mail.

46. In view of continued non-appearance, vide order dated 19.12.2023,

this Court proceeded ex parte against applicant/defendant No.1. Paragraphs

2 to 7 of the said order record the rationale for proceeding ex parte, and read

as under:

―2. In view of the non-appearance on behalf of defendant no.l on the previous few

dates of hearing, vide order dated 23.08.2023, it was inter-alia directed as

under:-

"4. If there is no appearance on behalf of defendant no. 1 even on

the nextdate of hearing, the said defendant shall be proceeded ex-

parte."

3. On 23.08.2023, learned counsel for the defendant no.l had also taken a

discharge in the matter on the ground that he had not received instructions

from the defendant no.l. Consequently, Court notice was directed to be

26

issued to the defendant no. 1.

4. Subsequently, on 25.09.2023, there was again no appearance on behalf

of the defendant no.l. The learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) after taking

note that the Court notice had been served upon the defendant no.l, re-

notified the matter for 08.11.2023.

5. Again, on 08.11.2023, there was no appearance of defendant no.l.

Learned Joint Registrar (Judicial), took note of the additional affidavit of

service filed on behalf of plaintiff, wherein it was sought to be brought out

that the defendant no.l had been duly served, reference was also made in

the said affidavit to the application filed by the learned counsel for the

defendant no.l seeking discharge in the matter. The said application, as

noticed herein above, stood allowed on 23.08.2023. Taking note of these

circumstances, the Learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) once again re-

notified the matter.

6. In the above circumstances, and in view of the continuous

nonappearance on the part of the defendant no. 1, the said defendant no.l

is directed to be proceeded ex-parte.

7. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on 20.12.2023, the date

already fixed.”

47. Subsequently, ex parte evidence was led by the plaintiff/non-

applicant. Upon consideration of the material placed on record, this Court,

vide judgment dated 01.07.2024, decreed the Civil Suit in favour of the non-

applicant/plaintiff and against applicant/defendant No.1, in terms of the

directions already extracted in the preceding paragraphs.

48. Even in the present application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC,

i.e., I.A. 5122/2025, the applicant/defendant No.1 has admitted the

following aspects:

―3. The Applicant, at the outset, submits that he entered appearance on

08.07.2021 upon advance notice and filed his written statement on

09.09.2021 through counsel Sh. Sarim Naved.

4. The Written Statement was taken on record vide order dated

10.02.2022. Accordingly, the pleadings stood completed qua the

Defendant No. 1/Applicant herein. The counsel for the Applicant was

appearing before the Court till this date.‖

27

49. A perusal of the averments made in the present application, coupled

with the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf

of applicant/defendant No.1, reveals that an attempt has been made to

establish that no Court notice was ever received by the said defendant. It is

further contended that no formal intimation regarding the discharge of

counsel, who had been duly engaged by applicant/defendant No.1, was

communicated to him.

50. In light of the above legal position and judicial pronouncements, it is

evident that the essential test under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, post-

amendment, is not limited to the technicality of formal service of summons

but centers on whether the applicant/defendant No.1 had actual notice of the

proceedings and adequate time to respond. Once these conditions are

satisfied, the plea of irregular service cannot be used as a ground to set aside

an ex parte decree. In the present case, the applicant/defendant No.1

proceeded to file his written statement, it clearly establishes that he had

sufficient knowledge of the suit and ample opportunity to defend himself.

Therefore, he cannot now take recourse to Order IX Rule 13 to challenge the

proceedings on the ground of non-service or irregular service of summons

51. Furthermore, no provision of law has been brought to the attention of

this Court that mandates repeated issuance of Court notices during the

pendency of proceedings merely because a party has chosen to abandon its

participation. The issuance of Court notice, appears to have been resorted to

out of abundant caution rather than legal necessity. What truly matters is that

the applicant/defendant No.1 had notice of the plaint and the claims made

therein, an aspect which remains undisputed. Accordingly, the contention

28

that the Court notice was not duly served holds no merit. Even otherwise,

the applicant/defendant No.1 has to blame himself for the alleged non-

service.

52. In accordance with Chapter III, Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court

(Original Side) Rules, 2018 (2018 Rules), every initial pleading, petition, or

application must mandatorily state the address for service in the prescribed

manner. While the term ―pleading‖ is not defined under the 2018 Rules,

recourse must be taken to Order VI Rule 1 of the CPC, which defines a

―pleading‖ as a ―plaint‖ or ―written statement‖.

53. In the present case, the applicant/defendant No.1 provided the address

in the written statement i.e ―502, Viral, Sai Krupa Complex, Thane-401104,

Maharashtra‖. However, no effort was made by the said applicant/defendant

No.1 to update the changed address in the record. As per the procedural

mandate, unless the concerned party formally places the change of address

on record, it cannot later claim that service of notice at the previously

declared address is invalid or ineffective.

54. Moreover, Order VI Rule 14A of the CPC aligns with broader

procedural reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and efficiency in Court

proceedings. This Rule mandates that each party must provide a statement or

address for service, thereafter only any document served at that address is

considered to be properly delivered. It reinforces the procedural framework

by promoting efficiency, supporting digitization, and ensuring greater

accountability in the legal process.

29

55. In line with the aforesaid position, this Court in Institute of Chartered

Accountants of India v. Shree Raj Travels & Tours Ltd.

24

, emphasized that

it has been deliberately put in Order 6 Rule 14A CPC, as a statutory

obligation that if the party to suit shifts his address, then it is incumbent

upon such a party to file fresh address so that whenever and wherever the

fresh notices have to be served, is known. A person cannot take advantage of

his own wrong, more so, in failing to comply of the statutory obligation to

give fresh address.

56. Moreover, it is also, urged that applicant/defendant No.1, who was

simultaneously defending himself in multiple criminal cases pending in the

State of Gujarat, was unable to diligently pursue or monitor the proceedings

in the present civil suit. In support of this plea, reference is made to

paragraphs 17 to 23 of the application I.A. 5122/2025, which encapsulate

the detailed grounds and circumstances relied upon by applicant/defendant

No.1 to justify the delay and seek recall of the ex parte judgment.

―17.It is also relevant to submit that Applicant/Defendant no.1 during

the pendency of the aforesaid suit became victim of several political

prosecutions wherein following cases were registered and are pending

against him:

a. Cyber Crime Police Station Crime Registration No.

11191067220154/2022 (Criminal Case No. 25338/2023) registered in

Ahmedabad City for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420,

465, 467, 468, 471 and 120- B of the Indian Penal Code read with

sections 66(c) and 66(d) of the Information Technology Act (“Cyber

Crime FIR”).

 Defendant no.1 was arrested in the said case on 06.12.2022 and was

released on bail on 08.05.2023 after the directions of Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in SLP (CRl.) No. 2779/2023. Copy of Bail order dated

08.05.2023 is annexed as DOCUMENT NO.15.

24

2014 SCC OnLine Del 3659

30

 Trial in said case begun on 08.10.2023 wherein 53 hearings have taken

place, and Applicant has attended 43 of said 53 hearings. Copy of case

status and order sheets showing the presence of Defendant no.1 on

such hearings is DOCUMENT NO.16.

b. Based on said Cyber Crime FIR, PMLA – SPECIAL CASE no.

2/2023 under Sec. 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,

2002, wherein 59 hearings have taken place, and Applicant has

attended 43 of said 59 hearings. Copy of case status and order sheets

showing the presence of Defendant no.1 on such hearings is

DOCUMENT NO.17 (Colly)

c. Defendant no.1 is also placing on record plane tickets evidencing his

travel for such hearings which is annexed as DOCUMENT NO.18.

18.On the basis of said service report, the Defendant no.1 was

proceeded ex-parte on 19.12.2023. Thereafter, without framing any

formal issues, matter was heard on final submissions on 21.02.2024,

13.03.2024, 16.05.2024 and matter was reserved for Judgment.

19.It is submitted that because of being engrossed in politically

motivated false criminal prosecutions against him, the

Applicant/Defendant no.1 could not pursue or follow up with erstwhile

counsel.

20.It is submitted that the Applicant was made aware of the passing of

the ex-parte judgment and order dated 01.07.2024 on 02.07.2024.

However, the Applicant was facing multiple cases in the State of

Gujarat as detailed supra and he was focused on protecting his life and

liberty and was thus not able to concentrate on the present suit.

21.However, he did engage in the services of an Advocate named

Brajesh Tomar and approached him to challenge the order on

19.08.2024. Copy of exchange of communications via WhatsApp are

annexed as DOCUMENT NO.19

22.He further transferred an amount of Rs. 4,500 towards engaging his

services and kept on receiving assurance that his appeal was being

drafted, and he need not worry as no adverse orders can be passed

since he is now seized of the matter. In fact,Mr. Brajesh Tomar applied

for the certified copy of the order dated 01.07.2024 vide Diary No.

3867/2024 and thereafter, the Applicant was informed that necessary

steps will be undertaken to file an appeal against the order dated

01.07.2024. Proof of payment on Advocate Brajesh Kumar is annexed

as DOCUMENT NO.20

23.Finally, on 20.12.2024, on receipt of notice by Plaintiff in Execution

Petition i.e. 112/2024, Defendant no.1 came to know that his lawyer

had not filed the appeal against order dated 01.07.2024 as discussed,

and therefore approached various lawyers, but none was interested in

31

taking on the case. Finally, the present counsel for the Applicant was

engaged in the month of January 2025 and the instant Application is

being preferred.‖

Besides, the reasons explained as to why ex-parte judgment and decree

deserves to be set aside, the delay in filing the said application within

limitation has been explained in paragraph 4 of I.A. 5123/2025. The

paragraph no.4 of the same reads as under: “4. In that regard, the

Applicant submits that he could not prefer the said application for

recall within 30 days of Judgment and Order dated 01.07.2024 in as

much as:

a. The Applicant was not served at all and in none of the modes as

acknowledged in the office noting i.e. through either Whatsapp or

through email. It is nobody's case that the Applicant was served on his

postal address. Further, the Compliance Affidavit in terms of Order

dated 25.09.2023 filed by the Plaintiff is categorically denied and

disputed by the Applicant/Defendant no. I

b. It is further relevant to submit that the Applicant was elected to

Rajya Sabha in July 2023 and has ever since not been residing at his

Mumbai address and has been permanent resident of Flat no. 4, Sree

Alokapuri, Srijan Enclave, Picnic Garden Rd. Amrabati Kasba,

Kolkata, West Bengal 700039 and official resident of Flat No.703,

Brahmaputra, Dr. B.D. Marg, New Delhi - 110001. However, no efforts

were made to serve on any of his postal address.

c. It is submitted that because of being engrossed in politically

motivated false criminal prosecutions against him, the

Applicant/Defendant no. 1 could not pursue or follow up with erstwhile

counsel.

d. It is submitted that the Applicant was made aware of the passing of

the ex-parte judgment and order dated 01.07.2024 on 02.07.2024.

However, the Applicant was facing multiple cases in the State of

Gujarat as detailed supra and he was focused on protecting his life and

liberty and was thus not able to concentrate on the present suit.

e. However, the Applicant did engage in the services of an Advocate

named Brajesh Tomar and approached him to challenge the order on

19.08.2024. He further transferred an amount of Rs. 4,500 towards

engaging his services and kept on receiving assurance that his appeal

was being drafted, and he need not worry as no adverse orders can be

passed since he is now seized of the matter. In fact, Mr. Brajesh Tomar

applied for the certified copy of the order dated 01.07.2024 vide Diary

No. 3867/2024 and thereafter, the Applicant was informed that

necessary steps will be undertaken to file an appeal against the order

dated 0I .07.2024.

32

f. Finally, on 20.12.2024, on receipt of notice by Plaintiff m Execution

Petition i.e. 112/2024, Defendant no. I came to know that his lawyer

had not filed the appeal against order dated 01.07.2024 as discussed,

and therefore approached various lawyers, but none was interested in

taking on the case.

g. Finally, the present counsel for the Applicant was engaged in the

month of January 2025 and the instant Application is being preferred.”

57. Upon cumulative appraisal of the material on record and the

submissions made, the following factual position emerges:

i. The applicant/defendant No. 1 entered appearance in the civil suit

through duly engaged counsel, who filed a Vakalatnama—an

engagement which is undisputed.

ii. A written statement was filed on behalf of the applicant/defendant

No. 1.

iii. The address furnished along with the written statement has

remained unchanged throughout the proceedings, with no steps

taken to update it.

iv. On 02.07.2024, the applicant/defendant No. 1 became aware of

the judgment and decree passed in the suit on 01.07.2024.

v. Despite such knowledge, no action was taken until 19.08.2024 to

challenge the judgment—well beyond the thirty (30) day

limitation prescribed for filing an application under Order IX

Rule 13 CPC.

vi. No specific or sufficient explanation has been offered for this

delay in approaching the Court.

33

vii. Furthermore, the applicant/defendant No. 1 received notice of the

execution petition (EX. P. 112/2024) on 20.12.2024.

viii. The following step came only in January 2025, when the

applicant/defendant No. 1 claims to have engaged counsel for

drafting the present application, indicating a prolonged and

unexplained gap between August 2024 and January 2025.

58. In conclusion, while ―sufficient cause‖ for the purposes of Order IX

Rule 13 of CPC must be interpreted flexibly, the Court is bound to consider

the overall circumstances of each case. Ordinarily, if a defendant approaches

the Court promptly within the limitation, and their absence was shown to be

bona fide and not malafide or intentional, discretion may be exercised.

However, in cases where a party is fully aware of the pendency of

proceedings, as well as the judgment and decree rendered, and willfully

refrains from taking timely legal action, they must bear the consequences of

conscious inaction.

59. Furthermore, once a party is represented in a case, it is his/her

responsibility to remain apprised of the progress of the matter. In the present

era of e-Courts and e-filing systems, where all proceedings are accessible

through the Court's website, the applicant/defendant No. 1, being an

educated person, had ample opportunity to stay informed. The fact that

applicant/defendant No. 1 was aware of the suit and filed his written

statement but failed to follow up with the progress of the case until it was

too late demonstrates a lack of diligence. Thus, the applicant/defendant No.1

cannot now claim that his absence was in good faith.

34

60. In light of these considerations, this Court finds that the

applicant/defendant No. 1 has failed to establish any ―sufficient cause‖ of

his non-appearance. The reasons provided are superficial and unconvincing,

pointing instead to a deliberate abandonment of the proceedings. The

negligence and lack of bona fide efforts on the part of applicant/defendant

No. 1 cannot be accepted.

61. Consequently, the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, being

I.A. 5122/2025, is also liable to be and is accordingly dismissed.

I.A. 5124/2025 (filed by defendant No.1 seeking condonation of delay of

18 days in re-filing I.A. 5122/2025)

I.A. 6121/2025 (filed by defendant No.1 seeking stay of the operation of

the judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024 during the pendency of

I.A.5122/2025)

62. In view of the order passed in the I.A. 5122/2025 and I.A. 5123/2025,

the instant applications have rendered infructuous and, accordingly, stand

dismissed.

(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)

JUDGE

MAY 02, 2025

nc/aks/sph