2026 INSC 709 C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 1 of 24

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO……… OF 2026

(@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.9510 of 2023)

LAKSHMI ... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GOPI & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.,

1. Leave granted.

2. Arising out of a dispute pertaining to the execution of

the alleged last Will and testament of one Thankam, this

appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 30

th

November 2022 in RFA No. 298 of 2019 passed by the High

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 2 of 24

Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, that had in turn been preferred

against the judgment and decree dated 18

th

February 2019 in

O.S. No. 156 of 2015 delivered by the Principal Sub Court,

Thrissur

1

.

3. The facts are that the Thankam was the mother of the

plaintiff and defendant nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 before the Civil

Court. She died on 27

th

August 2011. The Civil Court records

that as per the defendant-respondents herein Thankam had

executed a registered Will as No.35 of SRO, Ollukara, dated

22

nd

March 1999 and bequeathed her property to the above-

mentioned defendant - nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. The plaintiff-

appellant herein had no knowledge of this Will and hence,

upon her mother’s death, had filed a suit for partition. It was

held that the Will could not be proved in accordance with

Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act 1925

2

. A preliminary

decree was passed directing the suit property to be divided

into 10 shares and the plaintiff-appellant being entitled to a

2/10

th

share.

3.1 The defendants approached the High Court. In a

judgment of only two paragraphs and three-and-a-half

pages, of which more than one page is spent on

extracting the reasoning of the Civil Court, the

1

Civil Court

2

ISA

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 3 of 24

judgment of the Court below has been set aside. That

apart, the judgment of the Civil Court has been termed

to be entirely lacking in as much as the Court was

unable to understand the controversy in issue and the

judge has been directed to be sent for training.

“1. The dispute involved is pertaining to the

due execution of a registered Will Ext.B1, for

which one among the propounders gave oral

evidence as DW1 and one of the attesting

witnesses was examined as DW2. During the

cross-examination, nothing was brought out to

discredit either the propounder or the attesting

witness. The testator was also introduced before

the Sub-Registrar for the purpose of its registration

by two witnesses and one among the witness is

none else, DW2. In fact, no challenge was raised

with respect to the competency of the testator. She

died in a motor vehicle accident on 27/8/2011 and

the Will was executed 12 years prior to the

abovesaid alleged accident. But the trial court on

some extraneous consideration found that there is

failure to prove the due execution of the Will and

hence granted a decree for partition. The relevant

portion of the impugned judgment (paragraphs 17

to 22) are extracted below for reference:

“17.The one attesting witness examined in

his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of

a Will by him and the other attesting witness

in order to prove there was due execution of

Will. To put in other words, if one attesting

witness can prove execution of the Will in

terms of clause (c) of Section 63 of Indian

Succession Act viz, attestation by two

attesting witnesses in the manner

contemplated therein, the examination of

other attesting witness can be dispensed

with. The one attesting witness examined, in

his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 4 of 24

a Will by him and the other attesting witness

in order to prove there was due execution of

the Will.

18. In the evidence of DW2 it is lacking that

execution of the Will by Thankam was

witnessed by him and the other attesting

witness. Therefore, it cannot be found that

the defendants proved execution of the Will

by Thankam.

19. In the cross examination DW3 stated

unequivocally that Thankam was illiterate

and she could not write or read. A document

can said to be duly executed only when it is

shown that the executant signed the

document of his own volition after fully

knowing the content of the document and at

the time of execution he was capable of

forming a rational judgment as to its effect.

In the instant case there is no evidence that

the content of the Will was read over to

Thankam before she affixed her signature.

20. The defendants have no case that

Anthony, the other attesting witness, is dead

or not subject to the process of the Court or

not capable of giving evidence. No

explanation as to why he was not examined

before the court was offered. DW3 in his

cross examination stated that Thankam did

not have acquaintance with Anthony.

21. Another suspicion surrounding

execution of the Will is that DW2 was asked

by Thankam to be witness only on

22.3.1999. If that be so the Will might have

been prepared on 22.3.1999. DW2 did not

state that he saw the Will being prepared.

22. The learned counsel for the defendants

submitted that the Will is a registered one. It

is true that it was registered. The fact that the

Will was registered does not relieve of the

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 5 of 24

duty of the propounder to prove its due

execution. On account of registration the

only presumption which can be drawn is that

acts for the registration was performed as

being performed.”

2. It is illustrative of what is actually going on in our

system. The trial court did not understand the actual

dispute involved and the requirement in proof of a

testament. Highly extraneous matters were taken to

reject the due execution of Will in question such as

no case was advanced that the Will was read over to

the testator and no case was advanced as to whether

the other attesting witness was alive or not. It is a

judgment rendered by an officer in the cadre of

Principal Sub Judge and that itself would show the

seriousness of the laches on the part of the officer.

Necessarily, proper training should be given to the

officer concerned. The decree and judgment of the

trial court are hence set aside and the suit is

dismissed. The appeal will stand allowed

accordingly. No costs. The Registry is directed to

forward a copy of this judgment along with the

impugned judgment to the Director (Academic),

Kerala Judicial Academy for further action.”

(emphasis supplied)

3.2 Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the plaintiff-

appellant is in appeal before this Court.

3.3 Heard learned counsel for the parties.

4. Consequently, the scope of this appeal is limited to two

aspects. One, the manner in which the first appeal has been

dealt with by the High Court; and Two, whether the remarks

against the Judge of the Civil Court are justified or not.

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 6 of 24

5. Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

3

,

permits the Court to deal with both questions of law and fact

which is reproduced below:

“96. Appeal from original decree.—(1) Save where

otherwise expressly provided in the body of this

Code or by any other law for the time being in force,

an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any

Court exercising original jurisdiction the Court

authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of

such Court.

(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree

passed ex parte.

(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the

Court with the consent of parties.

(4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law,

from a decree in any suit of the nature cognisable

by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or

value of the subject-matter of the original suit does

not exceed ten thousand rupees.”

The Court in first appeal is the final court of fact. The

facts once determined by the Appellate Court are not open to

challenge before the High Court, and even this Court does not

undertake re-appreciation of evidence under Article 136 until

and unless some glaring error such as complete misdirection

is pointed out.

In Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham

4

, O.

Chinnappa Reddy J., while dealing with the criminal appeal

3

CPC

4

(1979) 2 SCC 297

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 7 of 24

expounded as follows, about the scope of Article 136 in

general:

“4. … Article 136 of the Constitution of India

invests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of

plenary, appellate power over all Courts and

Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the sense

that there are no words in Article 136 itself

qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the

power has led the Court to set limits to itself within

which to exercise such power. It is now the well

established practice of this Court to permit the

invocation of the power under Article 136 only in

very exceptional circumstances, as when a question

of law of general public importance arises or a

decision shocks the conscience of the Court. But,

within the restrictions imposed by itself, this Court

has the undoubted power to interfere even with

findings of fact, making no distinction between

judgments of acquittal and conviction, if the High

Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted

“perversely or otherwise improperly”. ...”

In an appeal arising out of the Land Acquisition Act

1894, a coordinate bench in Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v.

State of Maharashtra

5

spoke as follows:

“27. It is not in dispute that power under Article 136

of the Constitution of India is exercisable not only

against a judgment of reversal on facts but also in

cases of concurrent findings of fact and such powers

are wide enough. …

A reading of this observation of this Court, as

quoted hereinabove and considering the

expressions used in Article 136 of the Constitution,

it would not be difficult to understand that this

Court in its discretion may grant leave to appeal

5

(2009) 11 SCC 141

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 8 of 24

from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence

or order in any cause or matter passed or made by

any court or tribunal in the territory of India which

would be apparent also in cases of judgment of

reversal and affirmance in civil proceedings.

28. It is true that the aforesaid observation was

made by this Court while dealing with a criminal

case but the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution

of India cannot be different in civil or criminal

proceedings. It is also true that this Court while

exercising its power under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India will not readily interfere with

the findings of fact given by the High Court but it

can interfere with such findings of fact if the High

Court acts perversely or otherwise improperly.”

In similar terms was Mangla Ram v. Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd.

6

, which stated:

“16. … We are conscious of the fact that in an

appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution,

ordinarily this Court will not engage itself in

reappreciation of the evidence as such but can

certainly examine the evidence on record to

consider the challenge to the findings recorded by

Tribunal or the High Court, being perverse or

replete with error apparent on the face of the record

and being manifestly wrong.”

6. That being the position, the importance of

determination by the First Appellate Court is underscored.

Order 41 rule 31 of CPC provides for the particulars that ought

to be present in the judgment that challenges a decree. It reads

as under:

6

(2018) 5 SCC 656

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 9 of 24

“Order 41 Rule 31. Contents, date and signature

of judgment.— The judgment of the Appellate

Court shall be in writing and shall state—

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or

varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled;

and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed

and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring

therein.”

The scope of the first appeal and its essentials have time and

again engaged the attention of this Court. From a perusal of

those judgments, the following principles/aspects can be

deduced:

(i) First appeals must be decided in accordance with

the provisions of CPC;

(ii) In a first appeal, which is a valuable right of the

party, it is open for the whole case to be re-heard, on

both facts and law. Anything less than this, has been

stated to be unjust to the litigant;

(iii) The judgment of the Court must - (a) reflect

application of mind; and (b) support its conclusion by

reasons.

(iv) When the Court agrees with the judgment

impugned in appeal, the entire factual matrix need not

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 10 of 24

be laboriously restated and general agreement

nonetheless accompanied by some reasons thereto,

shall suffice. However, this cannot overshadow the

duty of the Court itself. It cannot therefore pass a

cryptic order in either situation.

(v) In a case of reversal, the Court must give due

consideration to the appraisal of evidence by the Trial

Court, and on its own evaluation, should it arrive at a

different conclusion, reasons therefor must be stated;

(vi) The First Appellate Court is a final Court of

facts. In a sense, it is also the final Court of law also,

unless the question presented on second appeal is a

substantial question of law;

(vii) The First Appellate Court must deal with all the

issues and evidence led by parties in arriving at its

findings; and

(viii) In ordinary circumstances, the First Appellate

Court shall frame points for determination. However,

not doing so will not vitiate the judgment itself so long

as reasons are recorded.

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 11 of 24

[See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari

7

; Madhukar v. Sangram

8

;

H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith

9

; B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa

Murthy

10

; SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd.

11

; SBI v. Emmsons

International Ltd.

12

; K. Karuppuraj v. M. Ganesan

13

; Kurian Chacko

v. Varkey Ouseph

14

; Somakka v. K.P. Basavaraj

15

; Mahender Pal

Chabra v. Subhash Aggrawal

16

; Kiranmal Zumerlal Borana Marwadi

v. Dnyanoba Bajirao Khot

17

; Laliteshwar Prasad Singh v. S.P.

Srivastava

18

7. Whether or not the impugned judgment satisfies the

above principles, is a question we will return to, but at this

juncture we must discuss one of the important facets above -

the necessity of giving reasons. It is unquestionably well

established that reasons are the life blood of law. Without this,

the old adage ‘justice is not only to be done but it also must

be seen to be done’ loses its vitality. Even though the position

is well established, occasions such as the present one

necessitate its restatement:

7.1 In the context of the Central Excise and

Salt Act 1944, a coordinate Bench in Travancore

7

(2001) 3 SCC 179

8

(2001) 4 SCC 756

9

(2005) 10 SCC 243

10

(2010) 13 SCC 530

11

(2011) 12 SCC 174

12

(2011) 12 SCC 174

13

(2021) 10 SCC 777

14

1968 SCC OnLine Ker 101 as approved in

15

(2022) 8 SCC 261

16

(2024) 14 SCC 767

17

(1983) 4 SCC 223

18

(2017) 2 SCC 415

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 12 of 24

Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India

19

, held that when an

executive authority exercises judicial

functions, reasons are absolutely necessary:

“11. … Necessity to give sufficient reasons which

disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be

solved, and the mental process by which the

conclusion is reached, in cases where a non-

judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is

obvious. When judicial power is exercised by an

authority normally performing executive or

administrative functions, this Court would require

to be satisfied that the decision has been reached

after due consideration of the merits of the dispute,

uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of

policy or expediency. The Court insists upon

disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two

grounds: one, that the party aggrieved in a

proceeding before the High Court or this Court has

the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons

which persuaded the authority to reject his case

were erroneous; the other, that the obligation to

record reasons operates as a deterrent against

possible arbitrary action by the executive authority

invested with the judicial power.”

(emphasis supplied)

7.2 Y.V. Chandrachud CJ, writing for a

Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Jagdev

Singh Talwandi

20

, held that when a detenue under the

National Security Act 1980 is released, the subjective

19

(1969) 3 SCC 868

20

(1984) 1 SCC 596

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 13 of 24

satisfaction of the concerned authority must be

displayed by recording reasons:

“30. We would like to take this opportunity to

point out that serious difficulties arise on account

of the practice increasingly adopted by the High

Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a

reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final

order which the High Court intends to pass should

not be announced until a reasoned judgment is

ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example,

that a final order without a reasoned judgment is

announced by the High Court that a house shall be

demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be

handed over to one parent as against the other, or

that a person accused of a serious charge is

acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as

in the instant case, that a detenu be released from

detention. If the object of passing such orders is to

ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is

more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a

special leave petition in this Court against the

order passed by the High Court. That places this

Court in a predicament because, without the

benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is

difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be

implemented. The result inevitably is that the

operation of the order passed by the High Court

has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned

judgment.”

(emphasis supplied)

7.3 In the context of Section 386 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure 1973, this Court in Raj Kishore

Jha v. State of Bihar

21

, where the findings of the Trial

21

(2003) 11 SCC 519

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 14 of 24

Court were reversed by the High Court in appeal,

observed that:

“19. … non-reasoned conclusions by appellate

courts are not appropriate, more so, when views of

the lower court are differed from. In case of

concurrence, the need to again repeat reasons may

not be there. It is not so in case of reversal. Reason

is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the

same, it becomes lifeless.”

7.4 In Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul

22

, a co-

ordinate Bench took exception to the approach of the

High Court in not passing a reasoned order on

account of the fact that the counsel appearing in a

matter did not press for the same. The effect thereof,

was that this Court did not have the benefit of the

reasons of the High Court and, therefore, had to

decide the matter on the basis of the material

available on record.

7.5 A revision petition preferred by the Assistant

Commissioner, Income Tax, came to be dismissed of

by the High Court by way of what can be termed as a

‘catchall statement’ and nothing further. On appeal,

this Court set aside the impugned order and remanded

22

(2004) 13 SCC 234

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 15 of 24

the matter for fresh hearing observing as follows in

CCT v. Shukla & Bros.

23

:

“24. Reason is the very life of law. When the

reason of a law once ceases, the law itself

generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is

the significance of reasoning in any rule of law.

Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well

as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps

in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of

reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an

element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give

entirely different dimensions to the questions of

law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In

our view, the court should provide its own grounds

and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party

whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission

stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise

they may be.

25. … Reasons for an order would ensure and

enhance public confidence and would provide due

satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our

justice dispensation system. It may not be very

correct in law to say, that there is a qualified duty

imposed upon the courts to record reasons.”

(emphasis supplied)

7.6 In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood

Ahmed Khan

24

this Court after considering a number

of judicial pronouncements culled out the following

principles whereby it has been underscored that both

23

(2010) 4 SCC 785

24

(2010) 9 SCC 496

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 16 of 24

judicial and quasi-judicial authorities must give

reasons in their orders:

“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court

holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to

record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if

such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons

in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to

serve the wider principle of justice that justice

must not only be done it must also appear to be

done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid

restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of

judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative

power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been

exercised by the decision-maker on relevant

grounds and by disregarding extraneous

considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable

a component of a decision-making process as

observing principles of natural justice by judicial,

quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial

review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries

committed to rule of law and constitutional

governance is in favour of reasoned decisions

based on relevant facts. This is virtually the

lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying

the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these

days can be as different as the judges and

authorities who deliver them. All these decisions

serve one common purpose which is to

demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors

have been objectively considered. This is

important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the

justice delivery system.

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 17 of 24

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both

judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not

candid enough about his/her decision-making

process then it is impossible to know whether the

person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of

precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,

clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or

“rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a

valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the

sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial

powers. Transparency in decision-making not only

makes the judges and decision-makers less prone

to errors but also makes them subject to broader

scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of

Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review

731-37] .)

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons

emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in

decision-making, the said requirement is now

virtually a component of human rights and was

considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence.

See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553]

EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of

Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the

Court referred to Article 6 of the European

Convention of Human Rights which requires,

“adequate and intelligent reasons must be given

for judicial decisions”.

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments

play a vital role in setting up precedents for the

future. Therefore, for development of law,

requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of

the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.

8. On the anvil of the principles summarised supra,

regarding the jurisdiction and responsibility in first appeal as

also the necessity of reasoned orders, we test the impugned

judgment. In our considered view, the said judgment does not

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 18 of 24

stand true to these well recognised principles. Points for

determination have not been framed; reasons for not framing

them have not been provided; nor are there reasons recorded

to show how the Court below had erred in law with reference

to judicial pronouncements.

9. After all, the findings of the Civil Court were being

overturned. Had it been a case of agreement, in view of

Santosh Hazari (supra) general agreement would have

sufficed but that is not the case. Granted that the High Court

is a higher Court and exercises supervision over the Courts

under its jurisdiction, but it too is first and foremost a Court

of law. If orders such as these are permitted to stand, it sends

a wrong message of the judgments of the Civil Courts/Trial

Courts being able to be set aside without due effort and

application of mind. That, needless to say, would be a grave

error.

10. The least that could have been expected of the Court

was to discuss, what it termed as “extraneous consideration”,

after referring to the evidence as adduced by the parties. All

that was done was to extract the reasoning of the civil court

and by way of a mere observation that the Court did not

understand the actual dispute, the reasoning of the Court

below was sought to be brushed aside. However erroneous the

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 19 of 24

reasoning of the Civil Court may be, the Appellate Court

while in a correcting course, which is its duty, is expected to

do so by giving its own reasons for what it believes to be the

correct application of law as laid down by this Court or as

provided by the statute.

11. In this context let us deal, albeit briefly, with what a

Court is required to do when it is confronted with the question

of genuineness of the Will. It has to be proved like any other

document except for additional requirements under ISA. To

restate, the Civil Court had refused to accept the Will and the

High Court as the First Appellate Court was to decide on both

questions of fact and law. The requirements below are in the

light of Section 67, 68 of the Evidence Act 1872

25

and

Section(s) 59 and 63 of ISA.

(1) Since the proving of the \Will is necessarily an

event after the death of the testator there is a certain

level of sanctity that is attached to the same;

(2) If the will has been signed by the testator, the

same has to be established according to Section 67 IEA

with recourse to Section 45 and 47 thereof, if required;

(3) The will in order for it to be proved to be the last

will of testator, has to be attested in accordance with

25

IEA

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 20 of 24

Section 63 ISA either by signing/affixing his mark or

signed by a third party upon his direction and in his

presence in which situation not one but two attesting

witnesses would be required to be examined;

(4) The testator must be of sound mind within the

meaning of Section 59 of ISA and it has to be proved

accordingly;

(5) At least one attesting witness has to be examined

in court to prove its execution;

(6) Three questions need to be asked by the Court

and the answer so produced should be to the satisfaction

of a prudent mind. Mathematical precision is not to be

looked for. They are: (a) has the testator signed the

Will?; (b) Did he/she understand the nature? ; and (c)

the effect of the dispositions in the Will; and (d) Did he

/she put his/her signature on the Will knowing what it

contained?

[See: H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma

26

;

Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan

27

; Parvathi Nairthi

(Dead) and Ors. v. Laxmi Nairthy (Dead) Through Lrs. and

Ors.

28

26

1958 SCC OnLine SC 31

27

(2023) 9 SCC 734

28

2026 INSC 521

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 21 of 24

The High Court ought to have in its judgment discussed the

above aspects, more so, because it took a view contrary to the

Court below. Had it done so, its conclusion that the judgment

impugned before it was erroneous, would have been far more

palatable. The attitude to be adopted by appellate Courts

should be that of a friend, philosopher and a guide rather than

wielding the heavy-handed baton of superior authority

pointing out errors committed by its underlings.

12. Let us now turn to the last part of the impugned order

where the Principal Sub Judge of the Principal Sub Court,

Thrissur, had been directed to be sent for training. We only

wonder whether the learned Single Judge had kept in mind the

principles in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim

29

, which are

reproduced as under:

“11. …If there is one principle of cardinal importance in

the administration of justice, it is this: the proper

freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates

must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform

their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue

interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same

time it is equally necessary that in expressing their

opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by

considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not

infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very

purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially

recognised that in the matter of making disparaging

remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct

comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to

be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether

29

1963 SCC OnLine SC 22

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 22 of 24

the party whose conduct is in question is before the court

or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;

(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that

conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is

necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part

thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been

recognised that judicial pronouncements must be

judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from

sobriety, moderation and reserve.”

(emphasis supplied)

And also in S.K. Viswambaran v. E. Koyakunju

30

,

where it has been observed:

“…It is indeed regrettable that the High Court should

have lightly passed adverse remarks of a very serious

nature affecting the character and professional

competence and integrity of the appellant in purported

desire to render justice to Respondents 2 and 3 in the

petition filed by them for expunction of adverse remarks

made against them.”

We may only observe that in yet another instance of

dealing with disparaging remarks one of us (Sanjay Karol, J.)

had the occasion to lay down the following principles in State

of Punjab v. Shikha Trading Co.

31

:

“19. The three principles laid down in Naim [State

of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 22 :

AIR 1964 SC 703] deal with what is required of the

court, prior to, finding it fit to pass adverse remarks.

19.1. It has been reasserted time and again that

remarks adverse in nature, should not be passed in

ordinary circumstances, or unless absolutely

necessary which is further qualified by, being

30

(1987) 2 SCC 109

31

(2023) 20 SCC 113

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 23 of 24

necessary for proper adjudication of the case at

hand [Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar, (1986)

2 SCC 569 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 196 (two-Judge

Bench); Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa, 1995

Supp (4) SCC 169 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 175 (two-

Judge Bench); A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar

Gupta, (1990) 2 SCC 533 (two-Judge Bench).] .

19.2. Remarks by a court should at all times be

governed by the principles of justice, fair play and

restraint [Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh

Madhav Gosavi, (1987) 1 SCC 227 (three-Judge

Bench).] . Words employed should reflect sobriety,

moderation and reserve. K.G. Shanti [K.G.

Shanti v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 5

SCC 511 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 66]

19.3. It should not be lost sight of and per contra,

always be remembered that such remarks, “due to

the great power vested in our robes, have the ability

to jeopardise and compromise independence of

Judges”; and may “deter officers and various

personnel in carrying out their duty”. It further

flows therefrom that “adverse remarks, of serious

nature, upon the character and/or professional

competence of a person should not be passed

lightly”. E. Koyakunju [S.K. Viswambaran v. E.

Koyakunju, (1987) 2 SCC 109 : 1987 SCC (Cri)

289]”

13. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated

30.11.2022 in RFA No.298 of 2019 on the whole, and the

direction against the learned Principal Sub Judge of the

Principal Sub Court, Thrissur, are set aside. The first appeal is

restored to the file of the High Court of Kerala, to be heard

afresh leaving all contentions open for the parties to agitate.

Appeal is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances,

however, there shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.9510 of 2023 Page 24 of 24

Pending application(s) if any, shall stand disposed of.

………………… …………..J.

SANJAY KAROL

……………………… …....J.

VIPUL M. PANCHOLI

New Delhi;

July 15, 2026