1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4945 OF 2006

Lal Chand … Appellant

Vs.

Union of India & Another … Respondents

WITH

Civil Appeals of 2006

CA Nos.4946, 4947, 4948, 4949, 4950, 4951, 4952, 4953, 4954, 4955,

4956, 4957, 4958, 4959, 4960, 4961, 4962, 4963, 4964, 4965, 4966,

4967, 4968, 4969, 4970, 4971, 4972, 4973, 4974, 4976, 4977, 5134,

5135, 5136, 5351, and 5890

Civil Appeals of 2007

CA Nos.23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,

40, 41, 42, 465, 603, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 1228, 1229, 1230,

1231, 1232, 1233, 1295, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1307,

1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1984, 2461,

2679, 2721, 2722, 2723, 3990, and 4693

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J U D G M E N T

R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

This batch of appeals arise out a common judgment dated

27.4.2006 of the High Court of Delhi in RFA No.751/1994 (Jas Rath vs.

Union of India) and other connected cases. They relate to determination

of market value in regard to lands situated at village Rithala on the

outskirts of Delhi, acquired for (i) construction of a supplementary drain;

(ii) construction of sewage treatment plant; (iii) re-modelling of Nangloi

drain; and (iv) planned development of Delhi. The said four acquisitions

were initiated under notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 13.3.1981

and 31.12.1981 issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 (“LA Act’ for short). The extent of lands acquired and

compensation awarded are as under:

Date of

notification

under

Sec.4(1)

Extent

notified

Bighas-Biswas

Rate awarded per Bigha (Unit of 1008 sq. yds.)

By LAO

(In Rupees)

By Reference

Court

(In Rupees)

By High Court

(impugned judgment)

(In Rupees)

13.2.1981 829 - 00 2600 (Block B)

3800 (Block A)

20,000 25,000

20.2.1981 883 - 08 2600 (Block B)

3800 (Block A)

20,000 25,000

13.3.1981 78 - 16 6500 10,800 25000

31.12.19815947 - 00 7000 (Block C)21,000 27,000

3

9000 (Block B)

10840 (Block A)

2.The awards of the reference court were challenged by the

landowners. The appeals were decided by the Delhi High Court by

judgment dated 4.9.2001 awarding Rs.67000 per bigha in regard to lands

covered by notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981 and

Rs.73,584 per bigha in regard to lands covered by notification dated

31.12.1981. For arriving at the said market value, the High Court relied

upon the allotment rates of Delhi Development Authority for plots shown

in its Brochure issued on 9.2.1981 in respect of Rohini Residential

Scheme (Phase-I), formed by acquiring part of Rithala village and

surrounding villages. The provisional rates of allotment given in the said

brochure were Rs.100, Rs.125, Rs.150, and Rs.200 per sq. m.

respectively for plots of the size of 26,32,48,60 and 90 sq. m. The High

Court took the average of those allotment rates as Rs.150 per sq. m.

Having regard to the fact that the said rate was the premium for allotment

on leasehold basis, the High Court inferred that the freehold market value

of the said plots would be at least double, that is Rs.300 per sq. m. Taking

note of the fact that considerable expenditure would have been involved

for developing the plots, the High Court took the wholesale price of

freehold plots as Rs.200 per sq. m. and after deducting 60% towards the

4

cost of development and area required for roads etc., determined the

market price at Rs.80 per sq. m. (or Rs.67/- per sq. yd.). The said rate

was awarded as compensation for the first three acquisitions. In regard to

land acquired under the last notification (dated 31.12.1981) it provided an

increase of 12% per annum and arrived at the market value as Rs.73 per

sq. yd. This worked out to Rs.67,536 per bigha in regard to the first three

acquisitions and Rs.73,584 per bigha in regard to the last acquisition.

3.Feeling aggrieved the claimants as well as the Union of India filed

appeals before this Court. This court by a common judgment dated

7.9.2005 (reported in Ranvir Singh v. Union of India – 2005 (12) SCC

59) allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and

remanded the matter to the High Court for determination of the market

value afresh. This Court held :

(a) The lease premium in respect of fully developed plots (which was

given in the DDA brochure) could not be the basis for determining the

freehold market value of undeveloped land, though the undeveloped land

may be situated adjacent to the developed plots. Therefore the DDA

brochure rates were not of assistance.

(b) The sale deeds pertaining to the acquired lands or nearby lands

would be the most relevant pieces of evidence and the High Court ought

not to have ignored the sale deeds exhibited by the parties on the ground

that neither the vendors nor the purchasers relating to the said deeds were

5

examined as witnesses, having regard to the decision of the Constitution

Bench of this Court in Cement Corporation of India Ltd. V. Purya [2004

(8) SCC 270].

(c)The claim of the land owners that the market value of the acquired

lands should be determined on the basis of acquisition of the year 1961

in the same village, by increasing the award price of Rs.7,000 per bigha

at the rate of 12% per annum for 20 years, was unacceptable.

4.After remand, parties let in further evidence. The High Court

examined various pieces of evidence placed before it. It rejected the

entire documentary evidence placed by both parties, except two

documents for determining the compensation. The first is a sale deed (Ex.

PW-1/1) dated 4/11.4.1980 under which land was sold in Rithala village

for Rs.19,000/- per bigha. The second is another sale deed (Ex. A1) dated

9.4.1981 under which one bigha of land was sold for Rs.35,000/-. The

average of the said two sale deeds, namely Rs.27,000/- per bigha was

determined as the market value in regard to the lands acquired under

notifications dated 31.12.1981. In regard to the lands that were acquired

under notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981, having

regard to the fact that the said acquisitions were about 11 to 10 months

prior to the acquisition of 31.12.1981, it determined the market value as

Rs.25,000/- per bigha.

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5.Not being satisfied with the amount awarded the appellants have

filed these appeals. According to them, the compensation awarded is low

and it ought to have been higher. They contend that the High court was

not justified in rejecting the following documents from consideration :

(i)Ex. X-1 (DDA brochure relating to Rohini Residential Scheme)

issued in 1981 showing an average premium of Rs.150/- per sq. m. in

respect of DDA plots for allotment.

(ii) The circle rates dated 21.1.1989 issued by the Land Division of

Government of India showing a market value of Rs.400/- per square yard

for residential plots (and Rs.800/- per sq. yd. for commercial plots).

(iii) Award relating to the acquisition of land at Rithala under

notification dated 24.10.1961 at Rs.7,000 per Bigha which when

increased at a compound rate of 12% per annum for twenty years, would

give a market value of Rs.67,525/- per bigha in 1981.

(iv) Sale deeds marked as A-2, A-3, A-10 to A-13 all of the year 1981,

showing a market value ranging from Rs.35000/- per bigha to Rs.68570/-

per bigha.

The appellants contend that by taking those documents into account, the

High Court ought to have determined the market value as at least

Rs.49000/- per Bigha. The DDA has filed cross-objections in several

appeals for reducing the compensation to what was awarded by the

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reference court.

Whether DDA brochure is relevant evidence?

6.The DDA brochure (Ex.X1) dated 9.2.1981 is an invitation seeking

applications from members of public for allotment of plots on lease basis

under Rohini Residential Housing Scheme. The Brochure stated that the

plots were in a layout formed/to be formed in Rithala and the surrounding

villages. The brochure gives the following provisional rates for allotment

of plots on leasehold basis :

S.No. Plot size Category Rate

(Per Sq.m.)

1.26 sqm Economically weaker sections(EWS)Rs. 100/-

2.32 sqm Low Income Group(LIG) Rs. 125/-

3.48 sqm Low Income Group (LIG) Rs. 150/-

4.60 sqm Middle Income Group (MIG) Rs. 200/-

5.90 sqm Middle Income Group (MIG) Rs. 200/-

The appellants contend that Rs.150/- per sq. m. which is the average of

the said provisional rates, should be taken as indicative of the ruling

market price.

8

7.On careful consideration, we are of the view that such allotment

rates of plots adopted by Development Authorities like DDA cannot form

the basis for award of compensation for acquisition of undeveloped lands

for several reasons. Firstly market value has to be determined with

reference to large tracts of undeveloped agricultural lands in a rural area,

whereas the allotment rates of development authorities are with reference

to small plots in a developed lay out falling within Urbana. Secondly

DDA and other statutory authorities adopt different rates for plots in the

same area with reference to the economic capacity of the buyer, making it

difficult to ascertain the real market value, whereas market value

determination for acquisitions is uniform and does not depend upon the

economic status of the land loser. Thirdly we are concerned with market

value of freehold land, whereas the allotment “rates” in the DDA

Brochure refer to the initial premium payable on allotment of plots on

leasehold basis. We may elaborate on these three factors.

8. First factor: The percentage of 'deduction for development' to be

made to arrive at the market value of large tracts of undeveloped

agricultural land (with potential for development), with reference to the

sale price of small developed plots, varies between 20% to 75% of the

price of such developed plots, the percentage depending upon the nature

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of development of the lay out in which the exemplar plots are situated.

The 'deduction for development' consists of two components. The first is

with reference to the area required to be utilised for developmental works

and the second is the cost of the development works. For example if a

residential layout is formed by DDA or similar statutory authority, it may

utilise around 40% of the land area in the layout, for roads, drains, parks,

play grounds and civic amenities (community facilities) etc. The

Development Authority will also incur considerable expenditure for

development of undeveloped land into a developed layout, which

includes the cost of levelling the land, cost of providing roads,

underground drainage and sewage facilities, laying waterlines, electricity

lines and developing parks and civil amenities, which would be about

35% of the value of the developed plot. The two factors taken together

would be the ‘deduction for development’ and can account for as much as

75% of the cost of the developed plot. On the other hand, if the

residential plot is in an unauthorised private residential layout, the

percentage of ‘deduction for development’ may be far less. This is

because in an un-authorized lay outs, usually no land will be set apart for

parks, play grounds and community facilities. Even if any land is set

apart, it is likely to be minimal. The roads and drains will also be

narrower, just adequate for movement of vehicles. The amount spent on

10

development work would also be comparatively less and minimal. Thus

the deduction on account of the two factors in respect of plots in

unauthorised layouts, would be only about 20% plus 20% in all 40% as

against 75% in regard to DDA plots. The ‘deduction for development’

with references to prices of plots in authorised private residential layouts

may range between 50% to 65% depending upon the standards and

quality of the layout. The position with reference to industrial layouts will

be different. As the industrial plots will be large (say of the size of one or

two acres or more as contrasted with the size of residential plots

measuring100 sq.m. to 200 sq.m.), and as there will be very limited civic

amenities and no playgrounds, the area to be set apart for development

(for roads, parks, playgrounds and civic amenities) will be far less; and

the cost to be incurred for development will also be marginally less, with

the result the deduction to be made from the cost of a industrial plot may

range only between 45% to 55% as contrasted from 65 to 75% for

residential plots. If the acquired land is in a semi-developed urban area,

and not an undeveloped rural area, then the deduction for development

may be as much less, that is, as little as 25% to 40%, as some basic

infrastructure will already be available. (Note: The percentages

mentioned above are tentative standards and subject to proof to the

contrary).

11

9.Therefore the deduction for the 'development factor' to be made

with reference to the price of a small plot in a developed lay out, to arrive

at the cost of undeveloped land, will be for more than the deduction with

reference to the price of a small plot in an unauthorized private lay out or

an industrial layout. It is also well known that the development cost

incurred by statutory agencies is much higher than the cost incurred by

private developers, having regard to higher overheads and expenditure.

Even among the layouts formed by DDA, the percentage of land utilized

for roads, civic amenities, parks and play grounds may vary with

reference to the nature of layout – whether it is residential, residential-

cum-commercial or industrial; and even among residential layouts, the

percentage will differ having regard to the size of the plots, width of the

roads, extent of community facilities, parks and play grounds provided.

Some of the layouts formed by statutory Development Authorities may

have large areas earmarked for water/sewage treatment plants, water

tanks, electrical sub-stations etc. in addition to the usual areas earmarked

for roads, drains, parks, playgrounds and community/civic amenities. The

purpose of the aforesaid examples is only to show that the ‘deduction for

development’ factor is a variable percentage and the range of percentage

itself being very wide from 20% to 75%.

12

10. Second factor: DDA and other statutory development authorities

adopt different rates for allotment, plots in the same layout, depending

upon the economic status of the allottees, classifying them as high

income group, middle income group, low income group, and

economically weaker sections. As a consequence, in the same layout,

plots may be earmarked for persons belonging to economically weaker

section at a price/premium of Rs. 100/- sq.m, whereas the price/premium

charged may be Rs.150/- per sq.m for members of low income group,

Rs.200/- per sq.m for persons belonging to middle income group and Rs.

250/- per sq. m. for persons belonging to High income groups. The ratio

of sites in a layout reserved for HIG, MIG, LIG and EWS may also vary.

All these varying factors reflect in the rates for allotment. It will be

illogical to take the average of the allotment rates, as the 'market value' of

those plots, does not depend upon the cost incurred by DDA statutory

authority, but upon the paying capacity of the applicants for allotment.

11. Third factor: Some development authorities allot plots on freehold

basis, that is by way of absolute sale. Some development authorities like

DDA allot plots on leasehold basis. Some have premium which is almost

equal to sale price, with a nominal annual rent, whereas others have lesser

13

premium, and more substantial annual rent. There are standard methods

for determining the annual rental value with reference to the value of a

freehold property. There are also standard methods for determining the

value of freehold (ownership) rights with reference to the annual rental

income in regular leases. But it is very difficult to arrive at the market

value of a freehold property with reference to the premium for a leasehold

plot allotted by DDA. As the period of lease is long, the rent is very

nominal, some times there is a tendency among public to equate the lease

premium rate (allotment price) charged by DDA, as being equal to the

market value of the property. However, in view of the difficulties referred

to above, it is not safe or advisable to rely upon the allotment

rates/auction rates in regard to the plots formed by DDA in a developed

layout, in determining the market value of the adjoining undeveloped

freehold lands. The DDA brochure price has therefore to be excluded as

being not relevant.

Whether the circle rates/guideline value rates can be relied upon to

determine the market value?

12.The appellant relied upon the notification dated 21.1.1981 issued

by the Land Division of Government of India, Ministry of Works and

14

Housing, notifying the Schedule of Market Rates of land in different parts

of Delhi and various outlying areas – showing the minimum rates

Rs.400/- per sq. yard for residential and Rs.800/- sq. yard for non-

residential plots. The question is whether the same could be relied upon

for determination of market value in regard to land acquisition. When the

matter came up before this Court in the earlier round, the counsel for the

appellant had conceded that such rates could not form the basis for

determining the market value of the acquired lands. In spite of it, the

learned counsel for appellant submitted before us that though the said

circle rates cannot be the basis for determining the market value, it may

be taken note of as one of the relevant pieces of evidence indicative of the

market value. There is some confusion as to whether such basic

rates/guideline value/minimum registration value rates could form the

basis for determining the market value.

13.This Court in Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional

Officer [1994 (4) SCC 595] and several cases following it, including

Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru vs Jasti Rohini [1995 (1) SCC 717], U.P.

Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman vs M/s. Kalra Properties (P)

Ltd. Lucknow [1996 (3) SCC 124] and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti

Sahaswan v. Bipin Kumar [2004 (2) SCC 283] held that maket value

15

under section 23 of LA Act cannot be fixed on the basis of the rates

mentioned in the Basic Valuation Registers’ maintained for the purpose

of detection of undervaluation and collection of proper stamp duty.

13.1)In Jawajee Nagnatham, the land owners had appealed to the

Andhra Pradesh High Court against the order of Reference Court,

claiming increase, relying up on the market value entered in the Basic

Valuation Register maintained by the Revenue Authorities under the

Stamp Act. The High Court rejected the claim based on the Basic

Valuation Register, as such Register had no evidentiary value or statutory

basis. In appeals by the land owners, this Court held that the Basic

Valuation Register was maintained for the purpose of collecting stamp

duty under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended in

Andhra Pradesh); that Section 47A conferred no express power to the

Government to determine the market value of the lands prevailing in a

particular area, village, block, district or region and to maintain Basic

Valuation Register for levy of stamp duty in regard to instruments

presented for registration; that there was no other statutory provision or

rule having statutory force providing for maintaining such Valuation

Register; and therefore, such Register prepared and maintained for the

purpose of collecting stamp duty had no statutory base or force and

16

cannot form the basis to determine the market value of any acquired land

under Section 23 of the LA Act. Jasti Rohini also arose from Andhra

Pradesh and followed Jawajee Naganatham and held that the Basic

Valuation Register had no statutory basis.

13.2)The case of U.P. Jal Nigam arose from Uttara Pradesh. In that

case, the land owner filed a writ petition seeking a direction to U.P. Jal

Nigam to pay compensation in regard to lands acquired on the basis of

market value assessed by the Collector, Lucknow. The High Court

allowed the petition and directed the U.P. Jal Nigam to pay compensation

at the rate determined by the Collector, on the basis of the basic valuation

circulars issued for purposes of stamp duty. This Court reversed the

decision of the High Court following its earlier decision in Jawajee

Naganatham and held that the Collector committed an error in

determining the market value on the basis of Basic Value Circulars.

Jawajee Naganatham was again followed in Bipin Kumar, which is

another case from Uttar Pradesh.

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13.3)All the four decisions rejected the value entered in the Basic

Valuation Registers, on the ground that they had no statutory basis having

regard to the provisions of stamp law applicable in the respective States

(Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) and cannot be the basis for

determination of market value under Section 23 of LA Act.

14.There are also another set of decisions considering such circle rates

could be considered as prima facie basis, for purposes of ascertaining the

market value and determining whether there was any undervaluation of

the instrument for purposes of stamp duty, which is a revenue collection

exercise. We may refer to one of those cases, that is Ramesh Chand

Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector, Ghaziabad [1999 (5) SCC 62],

wherein this Court held :

“Reading S. 47-A with the aforesaid R. 340-A it is clear that the

circle rate fixed by the Collector is not final but is only a prima facie

determination of rate of an area concerned only to give guidance to the

Registering Authority to test prima facie whether the instrument has

properly described the value of the property. The circle rate under this

Rule is neither final for the authority nor to one subjeted to pay the stamp

duty. So far sub-sections (1) and (2) it is very limited in its application as it

only directs the Registering Authority to refer to the Collector for

determination in case property is under-valued in such instrument. The

circle rate does not take away the right of such person to show that the

property in question is correctly valued as he gets an opportunity in case of

under-valuation to prove it before the Collector after reference is made.”

15.In R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha [2004 (2) SCC 9], while

18

examining the issue in the context of a case relating to disproportionate

assets, this Court held :

“The guideline value is a rate fixed by authorities under the Stamp Act

for purposes of determining the true market value of the property

disclosed in an instrument requiring payment of stamp duty. Thus the

guideline value fixed is not final but only a prima facie rate prevailing in

an area. It is open to the registering authority as well as the person

seeking registration to prove the actual market value of property. The

authorities cannot regard the guideline valuation as the last word on the

subject of market value. x x x x This scheme of the enactment and the

Rules contemplate that guideline value will only afford a prima facie

basis to ascertain the true or correct market value. Undue emphasis on the

guideline value without reference to the setting in which it is to be

viewed will obscure the issue for consideration. It is clear, therefore, that

guideline value is not sacrosant as urged on behalf of the appellants, but

only a factor to be taken note of, if at all available in respect of an area in

which the property transferred lies.”

16.It should however be noted that as contrasted from the assessment

of market value contained in non-statutory Basic Value Registers, the

position may be different, where the guideline market values are

determined by Expert Committees constituted under the State Stamp

Law, by following the detailed procedure laid down under the relevant

rules, and are published in the State Gazette. Such state stamp Acts and

the Rules thereunder, provide for scientific and methodical assessment of

market value in different areas by Expert Committees. These statutes

provide that such committees will be constituted with officers from the

Department of Revenue, Public Works, Survey & Settlement, Local

Authority and an expert in the field of valuation of properties, with the

19

sub-registrar of the sub-registration district as the member secretary.

They also provide for different methods of valuation for lands, plots,

houses and other buildings. They require determination of the market

value of agricultural lands by classifying them with reference to soil, rate

of revenue assessment, value of lands in the vicinity and locality, nature

of crop yield for specified number of years, and situation (with reference

to roads, markets etc.). The rates assessed by the committee are required

to be published inviting objections/suggestions from the members of

public. After considering such objections/suggestions, the final rates are

published in the Gazette. Such published rates are revised and updated

periodically. When the guideline market values, that is, minimum rates

for registration of properties, are so evaluated and determined by expert

committees as per statutory procedure, there is no reason why such rates

should not be a relevant piece of evidence for determination of market

value. One of the recognised methods for determination of market value

is with reference to opinion of experts. The estimation of market value

by such statutorily constituted expert committees, as expert evidence can

therefore form the basis for determining the market value in land

acquisition cases, as a relevant piece of evidence. It will be however

open to either party to place evidence to dislodge the presumption that

may flow from such guideline market value. We however hasten to add

20

that the guideline market value can be a relevant piece of evidence only

if they are assessed by statutorily appointed Expert Committees, in

accordance with the prescribed assessment procedure (either street-wise,

or road-wise, or area-wise, or village-wise) and finalised after inviting

objections and published in the Gazette. Be that as it may. We have

referred to this aspect only to show that there are different categories of

Basic Valuation Registers in different states and what is stated with

reference to the stamp law in Andhra Pradesh or Uttar Pradesh, may not

apply with reference to other states where state stamp laws have

prescribed the procedure for determination of market value, referred to

above.

17.In this case, there is nothing to show the circle rates have been

determined by any statutorily appointed committee by adopting scientific

basis. Hence, the principle in Jawajee Naganatham will apply and they

will not be of any assistance for determining the market value. Further,

they do not purport to be the market value for lands in rural areas on the

outskirts of Delhi, nor the market values relating to Rithala village. The

circle rates relate to urban/city areas in Delhi and are wholly irrelevant.

Whether the award relating to acquisition on 24.10.1961 is relevant.

21

18.The appellants contend that some lands in Rithala were acquired

under section 4(1) notification dated 24.10.1961 for the planned

development of Delhi and compensation was awarded at the rate of

Rs.7000 per bigha. Their contention is that as the present acquisition is in

the year 1981, the market value of the acquired land should be

determined with reference to the market value determined for the 1961

acquisition by providing an appropriate increase at the cumulative/

compounded rate of 12% per annum.

19.This Court had occasion to examine this issue recently. In The

General Manager, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Rameshbhai

Jivanbhai Patel [2008 (11) SCALE 637], this court held :

“Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market

value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market

value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale

transactions or acquisition), where there is no evidence of any

contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable

lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where

the relied-on-sale transactions/acquisitions precedes the subject

acquisition by only a few years, that is upto four to five years. Beyond

that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What

may be a reliable standard if the gap is only a few years, may become

unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example,

for determining the market value of a land acquired in 1992, adopting

the annual increase method with reference to a sale or acquisition in

1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This is because, over the course

of years, the 'rate' of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change

apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of

stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very

standard of increase.”

22

(emphasis supplied)

Even if the relied upon transaction is only two to three years prior to the

acquisition, court should, before adopting a standard escalation, satisfy

that there were no adverse circumstances. For example, if the acquisition

is of this year 2009, it may not be possible to determine the market value,

based on the 2007 or 2008 prices, by providing an increase of 12% or

15% per year, as the newspaper reports disclose that the price of

immovable properties in most areas of the country came down by more

than 40% to 50% from the 2007 rates. Caution is therefore necessary

before increasing the price with reference to the old transactions. Be that

as it may. It is clear that the award made in regard to a 1961 acquisition

will not be of any use for determining the market value for a 1981

acquisition.

Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the sale deeds (Ex.A-

2 to A-3 and A-10 to A-13 and Ex.R3 to R7) from consideration?

20.The appellants have relied upon A-2, A-3 and A-10 to A-13

relating to sale of land in Rithala village, the details of which are as

under:

S.No.Ex. No. Date of

execution

Sale

consideration

Extent soldRate per bigha

1. A-1 09.4.198135000 1 bigha 35000

2. A-2 15.9.198135000 1 bigha 35000

23

3. A-13 15.9.198135000 1 bigha 35000

4. A-3 27.7.198149000 1 bigha 49000

5. A-10 03.11.198124000 7 biswas 68571

6. A-11 03.11.198124000 7 biswas 68571

7. A-12 01.12.198149000 1 bigha 49000

21.On the other hand, the respondents relied upon Ex.R3 to R7

relating to sale of land in Rithala Village,the details of which are as

under:

S

No.

Ex.

No.

Extent of land

Bigha-Biswas

Date of

Execution

Sale

consideration

Rate per

Bigha

1.R5 1 - 3 09.2.1981 Rs.10,800/-Rs.9,391/-

2.R7 1 - 3 09.2.1981 Rs.10,800/-Rs.9391/-

3.R4 3 - 12 05.6.1981 Rs.32,500/-Rs.9028/-

4.R6 3 – 3 17.7.1981 Rs.34,000/-Rs.10,793/-

5.R3 4 - 12 28.11.1981 Rs.46,000/-Rs.10000/-

22.The High Court, as noticed above, determined the market value as

Rs.27000/- per bigha by taking the average of the prices disclosed by

Ex.A1 dated 9.4.1981 (Rs.35000/-) and Ex. PW1/1 dated 4/11.4.1980

(Rs.19000/-). It rejected Ex. A2, A3 and A10 to A13 on the ground that

they were post-notification sales with reference to acquisitions dated

13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981. Then it examined whether the said

sale deeds were of any relevance to determine the market value in regard

24

to the acquisition under notification dated 13.12.1981. It was of the view

that Ex. A10 to A12 related to small bits of land and therefore were not of

any assistance. It referred to the fact that the sales on 3.11.1981 (Ex. A10

and A11) were at a price of Rs.68571 per bigha and sales on 27.7.1981

and 1.12.1981 (Ex.A3 and A12) were at a price of Rs.49,000/-, whereas

the market price on 9.4.1981 (Ex. A1) was only Rs.35000 per bigha,

thereby showing a steep increase in seven months. The High Court was of

the view that the increase of nearly 95% in a period of 7 months or even

a 40% increase in four/eight months demonstrated that they were not

bonafide transactions and therefore, they should be ignored. The High

Court did not consider the possibility that the steep increase may be a

genuine increase on account of the rapid urbanisation of the area, or on

account of the acquisitions in February and March, 1981 and/or on

account of the locational advantage (such as nearness to road or nearness

to developed area).

23.The High Court also rejected Ex.R3 to R7 relied upon by the

respondents, solely on the ground that the prices therein were lower than

the market value offered by Land Acquisition Collector and therefore,

they had to be excluded under section 25 of the LA Act. Section 25

provides that the amount of compensation awarded by a reference court

25

shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under

section 11. We fail to see how the said section has any relevance in

regard to determination of market value as contrasted from award of

compensation. If the sale deeds relied on by the respondents showed a

particular market value, they cannot be ignored merely because the

Collector had awarded compensation at a higher rate in regard to the

acquired land. All that section 25 requires is that courts should not award

an amount which is less than what is awarded by the Land Acquisition

Collector, even if the evidence may show a lesser market value. So, the

bar under section 25 of the LA Act is not in regard to determination of a

market value, which is less than what was awarded by the LAO. The bar

is only upon the reference court (or any higher court) reducing the

compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. The fact that

the Land Acquisition Collector has awarded compensation at a particular

rate does not mean that the sale deeds which are otherwise reliable,

cannot be relied upon to find out what was the real market value. Further

the very assumption that all awards made by the Collector were at a rate

higher than what was disclosed by the sale deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) is also

not correct. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded a sum of Rs.2600 to

Rs.3800 per bigha in regard to acquisitions under notifications dated

13.2.1981 and 20.2.1981, Rs.6500 in regard to acquisition under

26

notification dated 13.3.1981. These amounts were certainly lower than

the market value shown by Ex.R3 to R7. Even in regard to the acquisition

under notification dated 13.12.1981, the award by the Collector at

Rs.7,000/- and Rs.9000/- were lower than the value disclosed by Ex.R3 to

R7. As noticed above, these sale deeds show that the market value was

around Rs. 9000 per bigha in February to June 1981 and 10,000 to 11,000

per bigha between July, 1981 and November, 1981. The Land

Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 10,840 (which is more than the price

shown by Ex.R3 to R7) in regard to only some lands acquired under the

December, 1981 acquisition. Be that as it may. As the sale deeds (Ex.R3

to R7) relate to sales of lands in Rithala Village, they cannot be excluded

from consideration merely on the ground that what has been awarded by

the Land Acquisition Collector was higher in regard to some of the

acquired lands. We accordingly find that the ground on which the High

Court excluded the sale deeds Ex.R3 to R7 is not sound. The question

whether these deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) should be excluded on any other

relevant ground will be considered later.

24.We are therefore of the considered view that the reasons assigned

by the High Court for rejecting Ex. A2,3, A10 to A13 and Ex R3 to R7

are not sound. All the sale deeds related to Rithala village and were of the

27

year of acquisition, namely 1981. They were prior to the acquisition

under notification dated 31.12.1981, which is the largest of the four

acquisitions. The difficulty arises because of the marked difference in

value, disclosed by the sale deeds exhibited by the respondents (Ex.R3 to

R7) and the sale deeds exhibited by the appellants (Ex.A1 to A3 and A10

to A13). The sale deeds produced by the respondents (Ex. R3 to R7)

which are of the period between 9.2.1981 to 28.11.1981 disclose a value

of Rs.9028 to Rs.10791 per bigha, that is an average of Rs.10000 per

bigha. On the other hand the sale deeds, produced by the appellant (Ex.

A1 to A3 and A10 to A13) which are the period 9.4.1981 to 1.12.1981

show market values of Rs.35000/-, Rs.49000/- and Rs.68371/- per bigha,

the average being Rs.50790/- per bigha. The variation between the sale

deeds relied upon by the respondents and appellants is as much as 400%.

The question then is which set of sale deeds should be accepted, for

determination of the market value of the acquired lands.

25.The appellants contend that the sale transactions as per Ex.R3 to

R7 relied upon by the respondents, showing an average value of

Rs.10000 per bigha, should be excluded from consideration as they do

not reflect the true market value and as they were obviously undervalued

transactions where only a part of sale price was shown in the document,

28

the balance having been suppressed either to evade capital gains tax and

stamp duty, or to invest black money. Alternatively, it is submitted that

they may be distress sales. On the other hand the respondents submitted

that the sale deeds exhibited by them represent the true market value as

they showed a consistent price range whereas the sale deeds exhibited by

the appellants (Ex. A1 to A3 and A10 to A13) showed prices with a large

variation demonstrating that they were got up to show artificially

increased value and that it should be inferred that they were created only

for the purpose of providing proof in support of the claim for higher

compensation. It is submitted that they do not represent bona fide

transactions. It is pointed out that the residents of the locality knew in the

year 1980 itself, or at least by February, 1981 that there will be further

acquisition of lands in Rithala village for development of existing Rohini

Scheme and related purposes and therefore, these documents were

brought into existence to create evidence of a higher than real market

price. It is submitted that there is no explanation regarding the large

variance in the price disclosed by Ex.A1 to A3 and A10 to A13. This

necessitates consideration of effect of section 51A of the LA Act and the

relevance of undervalued documents.

What is the effect of section 51A of LA Act?

29

26.Before the amendment to the LA Act, introducing section 51A, it

was necessary to examine either the vendor or a vendee to exhibit a sale

deed and prove its contents. If the vendor or vendee was so examined, it

was possible to cross-examine them so as to ascertain whether the

transaction reflected by the exhibited instrument was a genuine

transaction or a transaction showing a depressed value or a boosted value.

But with the insertion of section 51A, certified copies of registered sale

deeds could be tendered as evidence without examining the vendor or

vendee thereof and the court is enabled to accept them as evidence of the

transaction recorded therein. The scope of section 51A was explained by

a Constitution Bench of this Court in Cement Corporation of India v.

Purya [2004 (8) SCC 270] thus :

“But when the statute enables a court to accept a sale deed on

the records evidencing a transaction, nothing further is required to be

done. ……… Even the vendor or vendee thereof is not required to

examine themselves for proving the contents thereof. This, however,

would not mean that the contents of the transaction as evidenced by the

registered sale deed would automatically be accepted. The legislature

has advisedly used the word ‘may’. A discretion, therefore, has been

conferred upon a court to be exercised judicially, i.e. upon taking into

consideration the relevant factors.

The submission of Mr. G. Chandrasekhar to the effect that the contents

of a sale deed should be a conclusive proof as regard the transaction

contained therein or the court must raise a mandatory presumption in

relation thereto in terms of Section 51 of the Act cannot be accepted as

the Court may or may not receive a certified copy of sale deed in

evidence. It is discretionary in nature. Only because a document is

admissible in evidence, as would appear from the discussions made

hereinbefore, the same by itself would not mean that the contents

thereof stand proved. Secondly, having regard to the other materials

30

brought on record, the court may not accept the evidence contained in

a deed of sale. When materials are brought on record by the parties to

the lis, the court is entitled to appreciate the evidence brought on

records for determining the issues raised before it and in the said

process, may accept one piece of evidence and reject the other.”

[emphasis supplied]

The following view expressed earlier in Land Acquisition Officer and

Mandal Revenue Officer vs. Narasaiah [2001 (3) SCC 530], was

approved in Cement Corporation of India (supra) and is extracted below :

"The words "may be accepted as evidence" in the Section indicate that

there is no compulsion on the court to accept such transaction as

evidence, but it is open to the court to treat them as evidence. Merely

accepting them as evidence does not mean that the court is bound to

treat them as reliable evidence. What is sought to be achieved is that the

transactions recorded in the documents may be treated as evidence, just

like any other evidence, and it is for the court to weigh all the pros and

cons to decide whether such transaction can be relied on for

understanding the real price of the land concerned".

Therefore, courts may accept and act upon certified copies of sale deeds

exhibited without examining the vendor or vendee. They may not be

relied upon if there is other acceptable evidence which throw a doubt

about the correctness of the sale price shown therein.

27.The evidence to reject an exemplar sale deed as not relevant, may

be either extrinsic or intrinsic. The statement of a witness describing the

advantageous or disadvantageous features of the land which is the subject

matter of such document will be extrinsic evidence. An absurdly low or

31

high freakish value when compared to the prevailing price disclosed by

other contemporaneous transactions may also be an extrinsic evidence.

Where the sale deed recites the financial difficulties of the vendor and the

urgent need to find money as reasons for the sale, that will be an intrinsic

evidence of a distress sale. Therefore, though a certified copy of a sale

deed may be received in evidence and exhibited even without examining

the vendor and vendee, and accepted as proof of the transaction to which

it relates, the courts have the discretion to rely upon it or reject it as

unreliable or unacceptable for reasons to be recorded.

28.But a word of caution. What Narsaiah and Cement Corporation of

India clarified was that a certified copy of a sale deed could be marked as

an exhibit and its contents may be relied upon as evidence of the sale

transaction, even without examining either the vendor or the vendee, in

view of the enabling provision in Section 51 of the LA Act. If the

acquisition is in regard to a large area of agricultural lands in a village,

and the exemplar sale deed is also in respect of an agricultural land in the

same village, it may be possible to rely upon the sale deed as prima facie

evidence of the prevailing market value, even if such land is at the other

end of the village at a distance of one or two kilometres. But the same

32

may not be the position where the acquisition relates to plots in a town or

city where every locality or road has a different value. For example in a

place like Delhi there are some areas where the plot value is many times

more than the value of plots in a neighbouring middle class locality

which in turn may be many time more than the value of plot in a

neighbouring slum area. Or the price of a property on a main road may be

many times more than the price of a property on a parallel smaller road,

though the two properties may be situated back to back. It cannot be said

that merely because two properties adjoin each other or touch each other

the value applicable to the property facing a main road, should be applied

to the property to its rear facing a service road. Therefore, while a

distance of about a kilometre may not make a difference for purposes of

market value in a rural village, even a distance of 50 metre may make a

huge difference in market value in urban properties.

29.There would be lesser likelihood of rejection of a sale deed

exhibited to prove the market value, if some witness speaks about the

property which is the subject matter of the exemplar sale deed and

explains its situation, potential, as also about the similarities or

dissimilarities with the acquired land. The distance between the two

33

properties, the nature and situation of the property, proximity to the

village or a road and several other factors may all be relevant in

determining the market value. Mere production of some exemplar deeds

without ‘connecting’ the subject matter of the instrument, to the acquired

lands will be of little assistance in determining the market value.

Section 51A of the LA Act only exempts the production of the original

sale deed and examination of the vendor or vendee.

What is the utility or relevance of under-valued sale deeds in determing

market price?

30.This takes us to the value of “undervalued” sale deeds. When the

respondents rely upon certain sale deeds to justify the value determined

by the Land Acquisition Collector or to show that the market value was

less than what is claimed by the claimants, and if the claimants produce

satisfactory evidence (which may be either with reference to

contemporaneous sale deeds or awards made in respect of acquisition of

comparable land or by other acceptable evidence) to show that the market

value was much higher, the sale deed relied upon by the respondents

showing a lesser value may be inferred to be undervalued, or not showing

the true value. Such deeds have to be excluded from consideration as

being unreliable evidence. A document which is found to be undervalued

34

cannot be used as evidence.

31.But we have noticed a disturbing trend in some recent cases, where

a court accepts the sale deed exhibited by the claimants as the basis for

ascertaining the market value. But then, it also accepts a contention of the

claimants that the general tendency of members of public is not to show

the real value, but show a lesser value to avoid tax/stamp duty and

therefore the sale deeds produced and relied on by them, should be

assumed to be under valued. On such assumption, some courts have been

adding some fancied percentage to the value shown by the sale deeds to

arrive at what they consider to be ‘realistic market value’. The addition so

made may vary from 10% to 100% depending upon the whims, fancies,

and the perception of the learned Judge as to what is the general extent of

suppression of the price in sale deeds. Such increase, in the market value

disclosed by the sale deeds, on the assumption that all sale deeds show a

‘depressed’ market value instead of the real value, is impermissible. The

Court can either accept the document as showing the prevailing market

value, in which event it has to be acted upon. Or the Court may find a

document to be undervalued in which it should be rejected straightaway

as not reliable. There is no third way of accepting a document, by adding

to the market value disclosed by the document, some percentage to off-

35

set the under-valuation. There is no legal basis to proceed on a general

assumption that parties, without exception, fail to reflect the true

consideration in the sale deeds, that there is always undervaluation or

suppression of the true price and that consequently, all sale deeds reflect a

depressed value and not the real market value and therefore, some

percentage should be added to arrive at the real value. Such a course also

amounts to branding all vendors and purchasers as dishonest persons

without any evidence and without hearing them. It ignores the fact that

government has fixed minimum guideline values and whenever a

registering authority is of the view that a sale deed is undervalued,

proceedings are initiated for determination of the true market value. It

also ignores the fact that a large number of sale deeds are accepted by the

registering authorities as disclosing the current market value. Be that as it

may.

Whether valuation by the High Court is proper?

32.The existence of several other sale deeds showing a much higher

value and the fact that the Land Acquisition Collector chose to award a

higher rate in regard to some of the acquired lands, leads to an inevitable

inference that Ex.R3 to R7 were either undervalued or were distress sales.

Whatever be the reason, they are liable to be excluded from

36

consideration.

33.The sale transactions under Ex. A1 to A3 and A10 to A13 relate to

plots used for residential or other non-agricultural purposes. Though

these sale deeds describe the lands sold as agricultural lands, having

regard to the prevailing land reforms laws, the size of the plots show that

they were not used for agricultural purposes. For example, two of the sale

deeds - Exs. A10 and A11, relate to 7 biswas of land each (about 350 sq.

yds. each) and the purchaser is a business firm (M/s. Sant & Co.).

Obviously, the land was not sold for agricultural purpose, as it is not

possible to imagine plots measuring only 350 sq. yards being sold for

agricultural purposes. Significantly, the other sale deeds, each of which

relate to an area of one bigha and show a price of Rs.35000/- per bigha

(three deeds) and Rs.49000/- per bigha (two deeds). It is evident the plots

which were the subject matter of these sale deeds were sold as semi-urban

land for residential or other non-residential purposes. There is no

evidence or material to show that they were nominal or sham documents

intended to create evidence of a higher market value. The variation in

price between Rs.35000 to Rs.68571 may possibly be on account of

several factors. It is possible that some plots were nearer while others

were far away from roads or developed areas. In the absence of the

37

evidence of vendors/vendees of these documents, we propose to take

average of these transactions, which is approximately Rs.50,790/- per

bigha, as the market value of small plots sold for residential or non-

agricultural purposes.

34.But when the market value of such small plots intended for non-

agricultural purposes is made the basis for determining the market value

of large tracts of agricultural lands, it is necessary to make an appropriate

deduction towards ‘development’ factor. The evidence shows that the

acquired lands were at the relevant time (1981) in a rural area on the

outskirts of Delhi, with access to roads and services nearby. In fact the

Municipal Corporation of Delhi, within a few months after the

acquisition, issued a notification dated 23/4/1982, under section 507(a) of

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 declaring that Rithala in the

northern zone of Delhi shall cease to be a rural area. The appellants have

also let in evidence to show that the acquired lands were situated in an

area having a potential for development for residential use. The policy

resolution dated 27.12.1980 of Delhi Development Authority in regard to

development of Zones H7 and H8 (Rohini Scheme) in North-West Delh

shows that the area was earmarked for fast urban development. Some

facilities like roads, water, electricity had reached the area in a limited

manner. Therefore, the appropriate deduction towards development,

38

needs to be only 40% instead of the higher standard percentage of 60% to

70%.

35.On deduction of 40% from Rs.50790/- per bigha which the market

value of small plots, the market value for the large tracts of lands

acquired in December, 1981 would be Rs.30,474/- (rounded off to

Rs.30500/-) per bigha. As the earlier three acquisitions were of the same

year, but were in February and March (that is on 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981

and 13.3.1981) which are about 10 to 11 months earlier, the

compensation in regard to the three earlier acquisitions is determined as

Rs.28000/- per bigha. To this extent, the award of the High Court requires

to be modified.

36.The learned counsel for DDA contended that market value

determined by the High Court required to be reduced with reference to

the market value of the acquired lands in the neighbouring village. He

relied upon the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Ram Phool –

2003 (10) SCC 167, which related to acquisition of 5484 bighas of land

in revenue village Poothkalan on the outskirts of Delhi, in regard to

which the preliminary notification was issued on 11.12.1981. The

reference court had, after referring to several sale transactions,

determined the market value as Rs.15,700/- per bigha in one case and

39

Rs.18,500/- per bigha in another case. On appeal by the claimants, the

High Court excluded several sale transactions relied upon by the

reference court as not inspiring confidence, and on the basis of a solitary

transaction dated 10.9.1981 in regard to a small area of one bigha,

increased the market value to Rs.30,000/- per bigha. This Court held that

the High Court erred in relying upon a single sale deed relating to a small

extent of one bigha to determine the market value of a large extent of

5484 bighas. It further held that if that sale deed was excluded, there was

no other evidence to support the increase in compensation made by the

High Court. Consequently, this Court set aside the increase awarded by

the High Court and restored the market value determined by the reference

court. The learned counsel for DDA submitted that a rate in that range

(Rs.15700 to Rs.18500 per bigha) should therefore be adopted for the

Rithala lands also. But that decision relating to Poothkalan is not of any

assistance with reference to the Rithala acquisitions for the following

reasons:

(i)It is now well settled that sale transactions or awards relating to

neighbouring village will not be relied on when acceptable evidence by

way of contemporaneous sale transactions or awards are available in

regard to the very village where the acquisition took place. (Where there

are no contemporaneous sale deeds or awards relating to the same village,

then the sale transactions or awards of the same period relating to the

40

neighbouring village can be considered provided there is evidence to

show that the acquired lands and the lands covered by the exemplar deeds

of the neighbouring village are similarly situated).

(ii)The decision in Ram Phool itself lays down as follows:

‘Contemporaneous award no doubt is a useful guide for every court to

determine the market value but that award must be taken into evidence in

accordance with law by giving an opportunity to the other side for

rebutting the same and that has not been done in the case on hand.’ In this

case while the learned counsel for respondents contended that the lands at

Rithala and Poothkalan were similar, the learned counsel for the

appellants submitted that the acquired lands in Rithala were far more

valuable than the lands in Poothkalan and that Rithala was nearer to the

city when compared to Poothkalan. Neither stand is supported by any

evidence or material on record. In the absence of any evidence, we cannot

assume that acquired lands in Rithala and lands acquired in Poothkalan

were similarly situated.

(iii)In Ram Phool, this Court set aside the decision of the High Court

and restored the award of reference court, not because it came to the

conclusion that the market value was only Rs.15,700/-/Rs.18,500/- as

decided by the reference court, but because the only piece of evidence

that was relied on by the High Court to fix the market value of

Rs.30,000/- was found to be not reliable and no other evidence was

available. Therefore, decision of this Court in Ram Phool was not a

positive determination of market value of Poothkalan lands, but the

rejection of a determination of a higher value by High Court for want of

acceptable evidence.

41

Conclusion :

37.We accordingly increase the compensation, in regard to acquisition

dated 31.12.1981 from Rs.27000/- to Rs.30,500/- per bigha. We also

increase the compensation in regard to the acquisition dated 13.2.1981,

20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981 from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.28,000/- per bigha. The

statutory benefits and interest awarded are not disturbed.

38.The appeals by the claimants are partly allowed increasing the

compensation as per para 37 above. As a consequence, the cross

objections by DDA seeking reduction of the compensation are rejected

without going into the question whether such cross objections are

maintainable. Parties to bear their respective costs.

......................................J.

(R V Raveendran)

New Delhi; ....................................J.

August 12, 2009. (B. Sudershan Reddy)

42

Not Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1853 OF 2007

Karam Singh (dead) Through LRs & Ors. … Appellants

Vs.

Union of India & Anr. … Respondents

WITH

Civil Appeal Nos.1981 of 2007, 4118 to 4124 of 2008, 4283 of 2008,

5429 of 2008 and 551 of 2009

AND

CA No. 5792 of 2009 (@ SLP(C)No.1684/2007)

CA No. 5361 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.6560/2007)

CA No. 5362 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.6563/2007)

CA No. 5363 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.8259/2007)

CA No. 5364 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12121/2007)

CA No. 5365 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12746/2007)

CA No. 5366 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12933/2007)

CA No. 5367 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12935/2007)

CA No. 5368 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12936/2007)

CA Nos. 5369-5370 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12937-12938/2007)

CA No. 5371 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12939/2007)

CA No. 5372 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12940/2007)

CA No. 5373-5374 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12942-12943/2007)

CA No. 5375 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.14313/2007)

CA No. 5377 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.14314/2007)

CA No. 5378 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.14315/2007)

43

CA No. 5379 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.16352/2007)

CA No. 5380 of2009 (@ SLP(C) No.16353/2007)

CA No. 5381 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.4334/2008)

CA No. 5382 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.13579/2008)

CA Nos. 5383-5384 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.16207-16208/2008)

CA No. 5385 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.28889/2008)

J U D G M E N T

R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

2.These appeals are by claimants for increase in compensation in

regard to acquisitions of lands situated at Rithala village initiated under

preliminary notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981, 13.3.1981, and

31.12.1981.

3.These matters are covered by the judgment in Lal Chand vs. Union

of India [Civil Appeal No.4945 of 2006] and connected cases, decided

today. Following the decision and in terms of it, these appeals are

allowed in part.

......................................J.

(R V Raveendran)

New Delhi; ....................................J.

August 12, 2009. (B. Sudershan Reddy)