REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1757  OF 2022

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8882 of 2015]

LALANKUMAR SINGH & ORS. …APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA       …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T 

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1.Leave granted. 

2.This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated

25

th

 June 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Judicature of Bombay, at Aurangabad, in

Criminal Writ Petition No.288 of 2015, thereby dismissing

the said criminal writ petition filed by the appellants herein

and upholding the order of issuance of process dated 30

th

March   2009   passed   by   the   learned   Chief   Judicial

1

Magistrate, Beed (hereinafter referred  to as  “the  learned

CJM”) and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge,

Beed dated 25

th

  November 2014   dismissing the Criminal

Revision being Criminal Revision Petition No.115 of 2013

filed by the appellants thereagainst. 

3.The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are

as under: 

3.1The   Appellants   are   the   Directors   of   M/s   Cachet

Pharmaceuticals   Private   Ltd.   (hereinafter   referred   to   as

“CPPL”).   CPPL   was   granted   permission   to   manufacture

‘Hemfer Syrup’ which falls under Schedule C & C(1) to the

Drugs & Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as

“the said Rules”).

3.2On 30

th

 August 2006, Sh. N. A. Yadav, the then Drugs

Inspector,   Food   and   Drugs   Administration,   Beed,

Maharashtra, visited the premises of M/s. Priya Agencies at

Beed and purchased ‘Hemfer Syrup’, from which he had

drawn samples of the drug.  On 31

st

 August 2006, he sent

one such sample to the Government Analyst, Maharashtra

2

State Drug Control Laboratory Mumbai so as to have the

drug tested.   On 26

th

  February 2007, he received a test

report   dated   13

th

  February   2007   from   the   Government

Analyst stating that the sample was not of standard quality

as   the   content   of  Cyanocobalamin  was   less   than   the

permissible limit, i.e., 39% of the label amount. On the

same day, the manufacturer of the drug, i.e., CPPL, was

informed by a registered post about the test report. 

3.3On 29

th

 March 2007, Sh. Vijay Jain, Deputy Manager,

QA   of   CPPL   requested   the   Drug   Inspector   to   send   the

samples again for analysis. Pursuant to an application filed

by M/s Alkem Laboratories, the distributor of CPPL, the

learned CJM, Beed sent the samples of ‘Hemfer Syrup’ for

re­analysis on 24

th

  April 2007.   On 10

th

  July 2007, the

Learned CJM, Beed received the test report from the Central

Drug Laboratory, Calcutta stating therein that the sample

was not of standard quality as it did not conform to the

accepted limits of Cyanocobalamin content.

3

3.4Vide letter dated 21

st

 August 2008, the Drug Inspector

called upon CPPL to furnish the particulars of Directors,

Articles of Association, Memorandum of Association, copies

of License to manufacture and sell drugs, particulars of

technical persons, and all such information as was needed

to be provided under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940

(hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”).  In reply to this

letter, CPPL informed the Drug Inspector that the report

dated 10

th

  July 2007 was signed by “In­Charge Director”

and not the Director of Central Drugs Laboratory and thus

requested   him   to   send   a   proper   report   signed   by   the

Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory.

3.5Vide   letter   dated   12

th

  January   2009,   the   Drug

Inspector again called upon CPPL to furnish particulars that

were previously sought.   Vide letter dated 12

th

  February

2009,   CPPL   provided   the   information   and   documents

requested by the Drug Inspector and it was categorically

stated therein that the ‘Hemfer Syrup’ was manufactured

under the supervision and technical guidance of Sh. Ashok

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Kumar, the FDA approved manufacturing chemist for liquid

orals. 

3.6Mr. Ashok Kumar (Accused No. 9) wrote an individual

letter   dated   13

th

  February   2009   to   the   Drug   Inspector

stating therein that the said batch of ‘Hemfer Syrup’ was

manufactured   under   his   supervision   and   that   the   drug

complied   with   the   requisite   standards.     Similarly,   Mr.

Naresh Roy (Accused No. 10) also wrote a letter dated 13

th

February 2009 to the Drug Inspector stating therein that

the said batch of the ‘Hemfer Syrup’ was tested under his

supervision and from the test results it appeared that the

drug complied with the requisite standards. 

3.7Pursuant to the orders to take legal action against the

manufacturer of the drug by the Joint Commissioner (H.Q.)

and   Controlling   Authority,   Food   &   Drug   Administration,

Mumbai, the Complaint bearing RCC No. 233 of 2009 came

to be filed before the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed

under Section 18(a)(i) read with Sections 16 and 34 of the

said Act and punishable under Section 27(d) of the said Act.

In   the   said   complaint,   the   present   Appellants   being

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Directors of the Company were arrayed as Accused Nos. 5 to

8. 

3.8The learned CJM, Beed issued Summons to all the

accused, including the Appellants herein vide Order dated

30

th

 March 2009. The Appellants filed a Criminal Revision

Petition against the summoning order before the learned

Sessions   Judge,   Beed   on   the   ground   that   there   are   no

specific averments in terms of Section 34 of the said Act as

to the role played by the Directors and thus sought for the

Summoning  Order to  be  quashed. However, the  learned

Sessions Judge, Beed rejected the said Criminal Revision

Petition   noting   that   there   is   a   specific   averment   in   the

complaint   that   the   appellants   are   concerned   with   the

manufacture, distribution and sale of ‘Hemfer Drug’. 

3.9The   Appellants   preferred   a   Criminal   Writ   Petition

before the Bombay High Court assailing the order passed by

the   learned   Sessions   Judge.   The   High   Court,   vide   the

impugned   judgment,   dismissed   the   said   Criminal   Writ

Petition   on   the   ground   that   all   the   Directors   were

6

conducting   the   business   of   CPPL   and   thus,   they   were

involved in the manufacturing process. 

3.10 Hence, the present appeal.

4.We have heard Shri C.U. Singh and Shri Anupam Lal

Das, learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the

appellants   and   Shri   Siddharath   Dharmadhikari,   learned

counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­State   of

Maharashtra. 

5.Shri C.U. Singh and Shri Anupam Lal Das, learned

Senior Counsels submit that Section 34 of the said Act

specifically provides that only such person who, at the time

of the commission of the offence, was in­charge of, and was

responsible to the company for the conduct of the business

of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to

be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded

against and punished accordingly.  

6.Shri   C.U.   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel,   further

submits that Rule 76 of the said Rules prescribes a Form of

licence to manufacture drugs specified in Schedule C and

7

C(1), excluding those specified in Part XB and Schedule X,

or   drugs   specified   in   Schedule   C,   C(1)   and   X   and   the

conditions for the grant of such licence.  He further submits

that, before a license in Form 28 or Form 28B is granted,

certain conditions are required to be complied with by the

applicant.  He submits that under sub­rule (1) of Rule 76 of

the said Rules, the manufacture is required to be conducted

under   the   active   direction   and   personal   supervision   of

competent technical staff consisting at least of one person

who   is   a   whole­time   employee   and   who   possesses   the

requisite qualification as prescribed under the said Rules.

He further submits that under sub­rule (4) of Rule 76 of the

said Rules, an applicant is required to provide and maintain

adequate   staff,   premises   and   laboratory   equipment   for

carrying out such tests of the strength, quality and purity of

the substances as may be required to be carried out by him

under the provisions of Part X of the said Rules.  He further

states that under sub­rule (4A) of Rule 76 of the said Rules,

the head of the testing unit is required to possess a degree

in   Medicine   or   Science   or   Pharmacy   or   Pharmaceutical

8

Chemistry of a University recognised for the said purpose.

He is also required to have experience in the testing of

drugs, which in the opinion of the licensing authority is

considered adequate.  He submits that Form 28 is a license

to   manufacture   for   sale   or   distribution   of   drugs   in

accordance with Rule 76 of the said Rules.  Learned Senior

Counsel   submits   that   in   Form   28,   the   names   of   the

approved competent technical staff are required to be given.

He further submits that condition No.3 of the Conditions of

Licence   requires   that   if   there   is   any   change   in   the

competent   technical   staff,   the   same   shall   be   forthwith

reported to the licensing authority.  

7.Learned Senior Counsel submits that Schedule M to

the said Rules provides for good manufacturing practice and

requirements   of   premises,   plant   and   equipment   for

pharmaceutical products.  Learned Senior Counsel submits

that clause 6.1 of Part I of Schedule M specifically provides

that the manufacture shall be conducted under the direct

supervision   of   competent   technical   staff   with   prescribed

qualifications   and   practical   experience   in   the   relevant

9

dosage form and/or active pharmaceutical products.  It is

further the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that

as per clause 6.2 thereof, the head of the Quality Control

Laboratory   is   required   to   be   independent   of   the

manufacturing unit.  It also requires that the testing shall

be conducted under the direct supervision of competent

technical staff, who shall be whole time employees of the

licensee. 

8.Shri Singh further submits that in the licence which is

duly   signed   by   the   designated   licensing   authority,   the

names of the approved competent technical staff are already

given.  It is further submitted that in the reply dated 13

th

February   2009   to   the   Drug   Inspector,   Food   &   Drug

Administration,   M.S.   Beed,   Mr.   Naresh   Roy,   Assistant

Manager   Q.A.   (Accused   No.10)   had   stated   that   the   raw

material was analysed in the Quality Control Department by

Mr. Aftab, Chemist under his supervision.   It is further

informed that the finished product of the said batch of the

drug   was   analysed   by   Mr.   M.K.   Sharma   under   his

supervision.     Mr.   Naresh   Roy   (Accused   No.10)   further

10

informed that he was approved by the Rajasthan FDA as a

competent person.  

9.Learned Senior Counsel submits that similarly, Mr.

Ashok   Kumar,   Assistant   Manager,   Production   (Accused

No.9)   had   also   informed   the   Drug   Inspector   by

communication   dated   13

th

  February   2009   that   he   was

approved by the Rajasthan FDA.  The goods were released

after the final approval from Quality Control.   He further

states that the manufacturing record of the said batch was

prepared by him and it bears his signature.  

10.Shri  Singh  further  submits that  merely mentioning

that   the   present   appellants,   being   the   Directors   of   the

accused company, were responsible to the company for the

conduct   of   the   business   of   the   company   would   not   be

sufficient   to   initiate   proceedings   against   them.     It   is

submitted that, unless and until there is a specific averment

as to what was the role in the conduct of the business of the

company, a person cannot be proceeded against solely on

the ground that he was a director of the company.  He relies

11

on   various   judgments   of   this   Court   in   support   of   this

proposition.  

11.Shri C.U. Singh further submits that there is no formal

order of issuance of the process passed by the learned CJM.

It is submitted that, while issuing process, a duty is cast

upon the Magistrate to arrive at a subjective satisfaction

that there is sufficient ground to proceed.  He submits that

there is no such order which would reflect the application of

mind by the learned CJM and on this ground also, the

impugned order is liable to be set aside. 

12.Shri Siddharath Dharmadhikari, learned counsel, on

the contrary, submits that perusal of the complaint, and

specifically paragraphs 3 and 25 thereof would reveal that

there is sufficient compliance of requirement of Section 34

of the said Act.  He submits that the complaint has to be

read as a whole and cannot be read in a piecemeal manner.

Learned counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the

case of U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakins

Ltd. and others

1

 in support of the proposition that there is

1 (2000) 3 SCC 745

12

no legal requirement for the trial Court to pass a detailed

order while issuing process.  He also relies on the judgment

of this Court in the case of Dinesh B. Patel and others vs.

State of Gujarat and another

2

 to buttress his submission

that the averments made in the complaint are sufficient to

proceed against the present appellants. 

13.In the case of State of Haryana vs. Brij Lal Mittal

and others

3

, this Court observed thus:

“8. Nonetheless,   we   find   that   the

impugned judgment of the High Court has

got to be upheld for an altogether different

reason. Admittedly, the three respondents

were being prosecuted as directors of the

manufacturers with the aid of Section 34(1)

of the Act which reads as under:

“34. Offences   by   companies.—(1)

Where an offence under this Act has been

committed by a company, every person

who   at   the   time   the   offence   was

committed,  was   in  charge  of,   and   was

responsible   to   the   company   for   the

conduct of the business of the company,

as well as the company shall be deemed

to be guilty of the offence and shall be

liable   to   be   proceeded   against   and

punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in

this sub­section shall render any such

2 (2010) 11 SCC 125

3 (1998) 5 SCC 343

13

person   liable   to   any   punishment

provided in this Act if he proves that

the offence was committed without his

knowledge or that he exercised all due

diligence to prevent the commission of

such offence.”

It is thus seen that the vicarious liability of

a person for being prosecuted for an offence

committed   under   the   Act   by   a   company

arises   if   at   the   material   time   he   was   in

charge of and was also responsible to the

company for the conduct of its business.

Simply because a person is a director of the

company it does not necessarily mean that

he fulfils both the above requirements so as

to   make   him   liable.   Conversely,   without

being a director a person can be in charge of

and   responsible   to   the   company   for   the

conduct of its business. From the complaint

in question we, however, find that except a

bald statement that the respondents were

directors of the manufacturers, there is no

other   allegation   to   indicate,   even   prima

facie,   that   they   were   in   charge   of   the

company   and   also   responsible   to   the

company for the conduct of its business.”

14.It could thus be seen that this Court had held that

simply because a person is a director of the company, it

does   not   necessarily   mean   that   he   fulfils   the   twin

requirements of Section 34(1) of the said Act so as to make

him liable.  It has been held that a person cannot be made

liable unless, at the material time, he was in­charge of and

14

was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its

business.  

15.In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta

Bhalla   and   another

4

, this   Court   was   considering   the

question as to whether it was sufficient to make the person

liable for being a director of a company under Section 141 of

the   Negotiable   Instruments   Act,   1881.     This   Court

considered the definition of the word “director” as defined in

Section 2(13) of the Companies Act, 1956.   This   Court

observed thus:

“8. ……. There is nothing which suggests

that   simply   by   being   a   director   in   a

company, one is supposed to discharge

particular   functions   on   behalf   of   a

company. It happens that a person may

be a director in a company but he may

not know anything about the day­to­day

functioning of the company. As a director

he   may   be   attending   meetings   of   the

Board of Directors of the company where

usually they decide policy matters and

guide   the   course   of   business   of   a

company.   It   may   be   that   a   Board   of

Directors   may   appoint   sub­committees

consisting of one or two directors out of

the Board of the company who may be

made   responsible   for   the   day­to­day

functions   of   the   company.   These   are

4 (2005) 8 SCC 89

15

matters which form part of resolutions of

the   Board   of   Directors   of   a   company.

Nothing is oral. What emerges from this

is that the role of a director in a company

is a question of fact depending on the

peculiar facts in each case. There is no

universal   rule   that   a   director   of   a

company   is   in   charge   of   its   everyday

affairs.   We   have   discussed   about   the

position of a director in a company in

order to illustrate the point that there is

no magic as such in a particular word, be

it director, manager or secretary. It all

depends   upon   the   respective   roles

assigned  to  the  officers  in a  company.

…..”

16.It was held that merely because a person is a director

of a company, it is not necessary that he is aware about the

day­to­day functioning of the company. This Court held that

there is no universal rule that a director of a company is in

charge of its everyday affairs.  It was, therefore, necessary,

to aver as to how the director of the company was in charge

of day­to­day affairs of the company or responsible to the

affairs of the company.   This Court, however, clarified that

the position of a managing director or a joint managing

director in a company may be different.  This Court further

held that these persons, as the designation of their office

16

suggests, are in charge of a company and are responsible

for the conduct of the business of the company.  To escape

liability, they will have to prove that when the offence was

committed, they had no knowledge of the offence or that

they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of

the offence.  

17.In the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasani vs. State

of Maharashtra and another

5

 this Court observed thus:

“17. ……   Every   person   connected   with

the Company will not fall into the ambit

of the provision. Time and again, it has

been   asserted   by   this   Court   that   only

those persons who were in charge of and

responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the

business of the Company at the time of

commission of an offence will be liable for

criminal action. A Director, who was not

in charge of and was not responsible for

the   conduct   of   the   business   of   the

Company at the relevant time, will not be

liable for an offence under Section 141 of

the NI Act. In National Small Industries

Corpn. [National Small Industries Corpn.

Ltd. v. Harmeet   Singh   Paintal,   (2010)   3

SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 677 : (2010)

2 SCC (Cri) 1113] this Court observed:

(SCC p. 336, paras 13­14)

5 (2014) 16 SCC 1

17

“13. Section 141 is a penal provision

creating vicarious liability, and which,

as   per   settled   law,   must   be   strictly

construed. It is therefore, not sufficient

to make a bald cursory statement in a

complaint that the Director (arrayed as

an   accused)   is   in   charge   of   and

responsible   to   the   company   for   the

conduct   of   the   business   of   the

company without anything more as to

the   role   of   the   Director.   But   the

complaint should spell out as to how

and in what manner Respondent 1 was

in charge of or was responsible to the

accused Company for the conduct of

its   business.   This   is   in   consonance

with   strict   interpretation   of   penal

statutes,   especially,   where   such

statutes create vicarious liability.

14. A company may have a number

of Directors and to make any or all the

Directors as  accused  in a  complaint

merely on the basis of a statement that

they are in charge of and responsible

for the conduct of the business of the

company without anything more is not

a sufficient or adequate fulfilment of

the requirements under Section 141.”

(emphasis in original)

18. In Girdhari   Lal   Gupta  v. D.H.

Mehta [Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta,

(1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279 :

AIR 1971 SC 2162] , this Court observed

that a person “in charge of a business”

means   that   the   person   should   be   in

18

overall control of the day­to­day business

of the Company.

19. A Director of a company is liable to

be convicted for an offence committed by

the company if he/she was in charge of

and was responsible to the company for

the   conduct   of   its   business   or   if   it   is

proved that the offence was committed

with the consent or connivance of, or was

attributable to any negligence on the part

of   the   Director   concerned   (see State   of

Karnataka v. Pratap   Chand [State   of

Karnataka v. Pratap Chand, (1981) 2 SCC

335 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 453] ).

20. In other words, the law laid down by

this Court is that for making a Director of

a   company   liable   for   the   offences

committed by the company under Section

141 of the NI Act, there must be specific

averments  against  the  Director  showing

as   to   how   and   in   what   manner   the

Director was responsible for the conduct of

the business of the company.

21. In Sabitha   Ramamurthy  v. R.B.S.

Channabasavaradhya [Sabitha

Ramamurthy v. R.B.S.

Channabasavaradhya,   (2006)   10   SCC

581 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 621] , it was held

by this Court that: (SCC pp. 584­85, para

7)

“7.   …   it   is   not   necessary   for   the

complainant to specifically reproduce

the wordings of the section but what is

19

required is a clear statement of fact so

as to enable the court to arrive at a

prima facie opinion that the accused is

vicariously liable. Section 141 raises a

legal   fiction.   By   reason   of   the   said

provision,   a   person   although   is   not

personally liable for commission of such

an offence would be vicariously liable

therefor. Such vicarious liability can be

inferred so far as a company registered

or  incorporated under  the Companies

Act,   1956   is   concerned   only   if   the

requisite   statements,   which   are

required to be averred in the complaint

petition, are made so as to make the

accused   therein   vicariously   liable   for

the offence committed by the company.”

(emphasis supplied)

By verbatim reproducing the words of the

section without a clear statement of fact

supported by proper evidence, so as to

make the accused vicariously liable, is a

ground for quashing proceedings initiated

against such person under Section 141 of

the NI Act.”

18.It could thus clearly be seen that this Court has held

that merely reproducing the words of the section without a

clear statement of fact as to how and in what manner a

director of the company was responsible for the conduct of

20

the business of the company, would not ipso facto make the

director vicariously liable.  

19.A similar view has previously been taken by this Court

in the case of K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and another

6

.  

20.In   the   case   of  State   of   NCT   of   Delhi   through

Prosecuting Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT,

Delhi   vs.   Rajiv   Khurana

7

,  this   Court   reiterated   the

position thus:

“17. The ratio of all these cases is that

the complainant is required to state in

the   complaint   how   a   Director   who   is

sought to be made an accused, was in

charge of the business of the company or

responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the

company's business. Every Director need

not   be   and   is   not   in   charge   of   the

business of the company. If that is the

position with regard to a Director, it is

needless to emphasise that in the case of

non­Director officers, it is all the more

necessary to state what were his duties

and   responsibilities   in   the   conduct   of

business of the company and how and in

what manner he is responsible or liable.”

6 (2009) 10 SCC 48

7 (2010) 11 SCC 469

21

21.Recently, in the case of Ashoke Mal Bafna vs. Upper

India Steel Manufacturing and Engineering Company

Limited

8

, this Court observed thus:

“9. To   fasten   vicarious   liability   under

Section 141 of the Act on a person, the

law   is   well   settled   by   this   Court   in   a

catena   of   cases   that   the   complainant

should specifically show as to how and in

what   manner   the   accused   was

responsible. Simply because a person is a

Director of a defaulter Company, does not

make him liable under the Act. Time and

again, it has been asserted by this Court

that only the person who was at the helm

of affairs of the Company and in charge of

and responsible for the conduct of the

business at the time of commission of an

offence will be liable for criminal action.

(See Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of

Maharashtra [Pooja   Ravinder

Devidasani v. State   of   Maharashtra,

(2014) 16 SCC 1 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ)

384 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 378 : AIR 2015

SC 675] .)

10. In other words, the law laid down by

this Court is that for making a Director of

a   Company   liable   for   the   offences

committed   by   the   Company   under

Section 141 of the Act, there must be

specific   averments   against   the   Director

showing as to how and in what manner

8 (2018) 14 SCC 202

22

the   Director   was   responsible   for   the

conduct of the business of the Company.”

22.In the light of these observations, let us examine the

averments made in the complaint insofar as the present

appellants are concerned:

“3.   That,   Accused   no.   5   to   8   are   the

Directors   of   the   M/s   Cachet

Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. village Thana

Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh dist. Solan (H.P.)

Pin   code   173205   head   office   415,

Shahanahar,   Worli,   Mumbai   ­   400018,

and looking after day to day activities of

the company. 

That,   Accused   no.   4   is   the   Pvt.   Ltd.

Company and is doing the   business of

manufacturing, buying, selling, importing

and   exporting   of   and/or   dealers   in

Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics, Beauty aids,

Oils,   Chemicals,   Food   products   and

provisions,   Veterinary   and   Surgical

Equipments,   Medicinal   preparations

including Spirit.

That, Accused no. 4 has mfg. unit at no.

(1) Village Thana Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh

Dist. Solan (H.P.) Pin code 173205 and

no. (2) at C­582, Ricco Ind. Area Bhiwadi,

Dist. Alwar, Rajasthan. 

That, Accused no.4 are holding drug mgf.

License No. MNB/05/267 in form 25 and

licence   no.   MB/05/268   in   form   28

granted   on   17.3.2006   valid   upto

16.3.2011.

23

*********

25. That, on 12.2.2009, the complainant

visited and inspected the premises of M/s

Cachet Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. village

Thana Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh Dist. Solan

(H.P.) Pin code 173205 that is accused

no.4.  At the time of inspection, Shri Ajay

Prakash Gupta Vice President Technical,

accused   no.   9   and   10   were   present.

During   enquiry,   it   was   revealed   that

Accused   no.   4   to   10   manufactured

"Hemfer   syrup   Mfg.   Lic.   No.

MB/05/268/B.   No.   HMS/6015   CMfg.

Date May­2006 which has been declared

to be NOT OF STANDARD QUALITY at

the   premises   of   M/s   Cachet

Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. village Thana

Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh Dist. Solan (H.P.)

Pin   code   173205   that   is   accused   no.4

under licence No. MB/05/268 and sold

the   above   said   drugs   to   M/s   Priya

Agencies   Behind   Dr.   Vaidya   Hospital

Jalna   Road,   Beed,   Dist.   Beed   through

M/s Alkem Laboratories Ltd. situated at

reality   warehousing   Pvt.   Ltd.,   Gut

No.2323/1 property no. 115, Pune Nagar

road, At. Post Wagholi, Tai. Haveli, Dist.

Pune ­ 412207.”

23.It   can   thus   be   seen   that   there   are   no   specific

averments insofar as the present appellants are concerned.

It is further to be noted that the present appellants are

24

neither the managing director nor the whole­time directors

of the accused company.  

24.It is further to be noted that, in accordance with the

provisions of Rule 76 of the said Rules read with Form 28,

the Accused Nos. 9 and 10 have specifically been approved

by the licensing authority in Form 28.   Accused No.9 was

approved as a person under whose active direction and

personal supervision the manufacture would be conducted

as required under sub­rule (1) of Rule 76 of the said Rules.

Similarly, Accused No.10, who was approved as a head of

the testing unit, was to be in­charge for carrying out the test

of the strength, quality and purity of the substances as may

be required under the provisions of Part X of the said Rules.

We are therefore of the considered view that the complaint

is totally lacking the requirement of Section 34 of the said

Act.  

25.The impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set

aside on another ground also. 

25

26.Perusal   of   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single

Judge of the High Court would itself reveal that the learned

CJM has not even cared to pass a formal order of issuance

of process.  It will be relevant to refer to the following part of

the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the

High Court:

“….Though, it is true that on the certified

copy produced by the petitioners there is

no   such   formal   order   but   copy   of

Roznama (daily notings of the proceeding)

shows that such order was made on 30­

3­2009. The Roznama dated 30­3­2009

reads as follows :

(i) Complaint filed by Vilas Vishwanath 

Dusane.

(ii) Copy of list of documents containing 

44 document.

Order was made on Exhibit 1 (of issue

process).   Take   entry   in   register   of

criminal   cases   and   issue   summons

against   accused.   List   the   matter   for

appearance of accused on 18­6­2009.

This record is sufficient to infer that the

order   of   issue   process   was   made   and

after that summons were issued against

accused to ask them to appear in the

Court.”

26

27.It could thus clearly be seen that the learned Single

Judge of the High Court held that though there was no

formal   order   of   issuance   of   process,   the   record   was

sufficient to infer that the order of issue process was made.

28.The   order   of   issuance   of   process   is   not   an   empty

formality.  The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as

to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the

case or not.  The formation of such an opinion is required to

be stated in the order itself.  The order is liable to be set

aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the

conclusion   that   there   is   a  prima   facie  case   against   the

accused.  No doubt, that the order need not contain detailed

reasons.  A reference in this respect could be made to the

judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal

vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

9

, which reads thus:

“51. On the other hand, Section 204 of

the Code deals with the issue of process,

if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking

cognizance   of   an   offence,   there   is

sufficient   ground   for   proceeding.   This

section   relates   to   commencement   of   a

criminal   proceeding.   If   the   Magistrate

9 (2015) 4 SCC 609

27

taking cognizance of a case (it may be the

Magistrate receiving the complaint or to

whom   it   has   been   transferred   under

Section 192), upon a consideration of the

materials before him (i.e. the complaint,

examination of the complainant and his

witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry,

if any), thinks that there is a prima facie

case   for   proceeding   in   respect   of   an

offence, he shall issue process against the

accused.

52. A wide discretion has been given as

to grant or refusal of process and it must

be  judicially  exercised. A person  ought

not   to   be   dragged   into   court   merely

because a complaint has been filed. If a

prima facie case has been made out, the

Magistrate ought to issue process and it

cannot   be   refused   merely   because   he

thinks that it is unlikely to result in a

conviction.

53. However,   the   words   “sufficient

ground   for   proceeding”   appearing   in

Section 204 are of immense importance.

It is these words which amply suggest

that an opinion is to be formed only after

due   application   of   mind   that   there   is

sufficient basis for proceeding against the

said accused and formation of such an

opinion is to be stated in the order itself.

The order is liable to be set aside if no

reason is given therein while coming to

the conclusion that there is prima facie

case   against   the   accused,   though   the

order need not contain detailed reasons.

28

A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if

the reason given turns out to be ex facie

incorrect.”

29.A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case

of Ashoke Mal Bafna (supra).  

30.In   the   present   case,   leaving   aside   there   being   no

reasons in support of the order of the issuance of process,

as a matter of fact, it is clear from the order of the learned

Single Judge of the High Court, that there was no such

order passed at all.  The learned Single Judge of the High

Court, based on the record, has presumed that there was an

order of issuance of process. We find that such an approach

is unsustainable in law.  The appeal therefore deserves to be

allowed.  

31.In the result, the appeal is allowed.   The impugned

order of issuance of process dated 30

th

 March 2009 passed

by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Beed and the order

passed   by   the  learned   Sessions  Judge,  Beed  dated   25

th

November   2014   dismissing   the   Criminal   Revision   being

Criminal Revision Petition No.115 of 2013 are quashed and

29

set aside.  The complaint against the present appellants is

dismissed.     Needless   to   state   that   the   complaint   shall

proceed against rest of the accused in accordance with law.

..............................J. 

[B.R. GAVAI]

 .............................J. 

[ C.T. RAVIKUMAR] 

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 11, 2022

30