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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5909 OF 2022

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 22443 of 2019)

LIFE INSURANCE COR PORATION .…APPELLANT

OF INDIA

Versus

SANJEEV BUILDERS PRIVATE ….RESPONDENT S

LIMITED & ANR.

J U D G M E N T

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is at the instance of a defendant in a suit filed by

the respondents herein (original plaintiffs) for the specific

performance of contract based on an agreement dated 08.06.1979

and is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 13.12.2018 in the Appeal [L]

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No. 499 of 2018, arising from the order passed by a learned Single

Judge on its ordinary original civil jurisdiction side in the Chamber

Summons No. 854 of 2017 in the Suit No. 894 of 1986 dated

11.09.2018. The Chamber Summon s was allowed by the High Court

at the instance of the plaintiffs, permitting the plaintiffs to amend the

plaint. The order passed by the High Court in the Chamber Summons

came to be affirmed by a Division Bench in the Appeal [L] No. 499 of

2018. The High Court permitted the plaintiffs to amend the plaint,

seeking to enhance the amount towards the alternative claim for

damages.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. It appears from the materials on record that the respondents

herein are the original plaintiffs and the appellant herein is the

original defendant in the Suit No. 894 of 1986, pending as on date in

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its original side. The said

suit has been instituted seeking specific performance of the

agreement dated 08.06.1979. In the alternative, the plaintiffs have

also prayed for damages. The plaintiffs moved the Chamber

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Summons No. 854 of 2017, inter alia, seeking enhancement of the

amount towards damages on the grounds, more particularly, set out

in the affidavit filed in support of the said chamber summons.

4. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the chamber

summons referred to above, vide the order dated 11.09.2018, keeping

the issue of limitation open and also permitting the defendant ,

appellant herein, to file additional written statement.

5. The appellant herein preferred an appeal against the said order

which came to be dismissed vide the impugned order dated

13.12.2018.

6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order

passed by the High Court referred to above, the appellant (original

defendant) is here before this Court with the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,

vehemently, submitted that the High Court committed a serious error

in passing the impugned order. He would submit that the High Court

overlooked the order passed by this Court in the Life Insurance

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Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2018)

11 SCC 722 between the same parties, arising from the same suit

proceedings.

8. The learned counsel would submit that the High Court should

not have permitted the plaintiffs to amend the plaint after a period of

thirty-one years, more particularly, when the earlier amendment

seeking to implead the assignee as the plaintiff No. 3 in the suit was

declined by this Court vide the judgment and order dated 24.10.2017

passed in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra).

9. The learned counsel would submit that the High Court failed to

consider that the amendment was hit by the provisions of Order II

Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, the ‘CPC’). He

would submit that the amendment could be said to be even hit by

the principle of constructive res judicata.

10. The learned counsel pointed out that at the time when the suit

came to be instituted, the damages to the tune of Rs. 1,01,00,000/-

[Rs. One Crore & One Lakh only] in the alternative was prayed for.

By way of amendment the damages now prayed for is to the tune of

Rs. 4,00,01,00,000/- [Rs. Four Hundred Crore & One Lakh only].

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11. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant (original defendant) prayed that there

being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the impugned

order passed by the High Court may be set aside and the original

amendment application filed by the plaintiffs be rejected.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

12. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents

herein (original plaintiffs) on the other hand, submitted that no error,

not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed

by the High Court in passing the impugned order. It is submitted that

the question of limitation has been kept open by the High Court that

may be agitated by the defendant in the trial and the defendant has

also been permitted to file its additional written statement.

13. The learned counsel would submit that the suit is yet to be

adjudicated; and in such circumstances, the delay in amending the

plaint for the purpose of enhancing the amount towards damages

would not cause any serious prejudice to the defendant.

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14. The learned counsel further submitted that the provisions of

Order II Rule 2 of the CPC cannot be made applicable to an

application seeking amendment of plaint.

15. The learned counsel in the last submitted that the decision of

this Court rendered in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of

India (supra) between the same parties was altogether in a different

context. In the said appeal before this Court, the issue was whether

the assignee could have been impleaded as one of the plaintiffs in the

suit after a period of twenty-seven years from the date of institution

of the suit?

16. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel

appearing for the plaintiffs prays that there being no merit in this

appeal, the same may be dismissed with costs.

ANALYSIS

17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

having gone through the materials on record, the following questions

of law fall for the consideration of this Court:

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1. Whether the High Court committed any material

irregularity or jurisdictional error going to the root of the

matter in passing the impugned order?

2. Whether the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC can be

made applicable to an amendment application?

3. Whether the amendment of plaint for the purpose of

enhancing the amount towards damages could be said to

be hit by the doctrine of constructive res judicata?

4. Whether the judgment and order passed by a coordinate

Bench of this Court in the case of Life Insurance

Corporation of India (supra) between the same parties has

any bearing on the present appeal?

5. Whether the present appeal is covered by the proviso to

Section 21(5) and Section 22(2) resply of the Specific Relief

Act, 1963 (47 of 1963) (for short, ‘the Act 1963’)?

18. Before adverting to the rival contentions canvassed on either

side and before we deal with the orders passed by the High Court

permitting the plaintiffs to amend the plaint with respect to the

prayer clause, let us consider, the laws on the question of allowing

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or rejecting a prayer for amendment of the pleadings, more

particularly, when the plea of limitation was taken by one of the

parties.

19. It is well settled that the court must be extremely liberal in

granting the prayer for amendment, if the court is of the view that if

such amendment is not allowed, a party, who has prayed for such an

amendment, shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. It is also equally

well settled that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a

relief is barred because of limitation, amendment should not be

allowed. It is always open to the court to allow an amendment if it is

of the view that allowing of an amendment shall really sub-serve the

ultimate cause of justice and avoid further litigation. In L.J. Leach

& Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357,

this Court at paragraph 16 of the said decision observed as follows:

"16. It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule,

decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the

amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date

of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into

account in exercise of the discretion as to whether

amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the

power of the court to order it, if that is required in the

interest of justice….."

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20. Again in T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity

Board & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 392, this Court observed as follows:

"2. …..The law as regards permitting amendment to the

plaint, is well settled. In L.J. Leach and Co.

Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. [AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957

SCR 438] it was held that the Court would as a rule

decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the

amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date

of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into

account in exercise of the discretion as to whether

amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the

power of the court to order it.

3. It is not disputed that the appellate court has a

coextensive power of the trial court. We find that the

discretion exercised by the High Court in rejecting the

plaint was in conformity with law.”

21. So far as the answer to the specific plea that the claim of

damages is barred by limitation and cannot be permitted at this stage

is concerned, it becomes necessary to examine the various judicial

pronouncements of this Court. The principles governing an

amendment which may be permitted even after the expiry of the

statutory period of limitation were laid down by the Privy Council in

its judgment in Charan Das & Ors. v. Amir Khan & Ors., AIR 1921

PC 50. In this case, the Privy Council laid down the principles thus:

“…..That there was full power to make the amendment

cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not

as a rule be exercised where its effect is to take away

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from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him

by lapse of time, yet there are cases: se e for

example Mohummud Zahoor Ali v. Rutta Koer, where

such considerations are outweighed by the special

circumstances of the case, and their Lordships are not

prepared to differ from the Judicial Commissioner in

thinking that the present case is one.”

22. It would be useful to also notice the observations of this Court

in, Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil & 2

Ors., 1957 SCR 595 : AIR 1957 SC 363, wherein this Court

considered an objection to the amendment on the ground that the

same amounted to a new case and a new cause of action. In this case,

this Court laid down the principles which would govern the exercise

of discretion as to whether the court ought to permit an amendment

of the pleadings or not. This Court approved the observations of

Batchelor, J., in the case of Kisandas Rupchand & Anr. v.

Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant and Ors. reported in ILR (1909) 33

Bom 644, when he laid down the principles thus:

“10. …..“All amendments ought to be allowed which

satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to

the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose

of determining the real questions in controversy between

the parties … but I refrain from citing further authorities,

as, in my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same

doctrine. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that

amendments should be refused only where the other

party cannot be placed in the same position as if the

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pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment

would cause him an injury which could not be

compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this

general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by

setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action

which since the institution of the suit had become barred

by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it

would be to cause the defendant an injury which could

not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good

defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still

remains the same : can the amendment be allowed

without injustice to the other side, or can it not?”…..”

23. This Court has repeatedly held that the power to allow an

amendment is undoubtedly wide and may be appropriately exercised

at any stage in the interests of justice, notwithstanding the law of

limitation. In this behalf, in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Ors.,

(1974) 2 SCC 393, this Court held thus:

“22. …..The power to allow an amendment is

undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately

exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation

notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching

discretionary powers is governed by judicial

considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to

be the care and circumspection on the part of the

Court…..”

24. Again in M/s Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram , (1978) 2 SCC

91, this Court laid down the principles thus:

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“4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main

rules of pleadings that provisions for the amendment of

pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of

all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet

exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended

for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating

them. Even if a party or its Counsel is inefficient in setting

out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be

removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party

which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or

expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The

error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial

steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued.”

25. The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are

equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The

courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the written

statement as question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that

event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defense

which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed

amendment other side should not be subjected to injustice and that

any admission made in favor of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All

amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary

for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the

proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of

action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or defense

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taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the

admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts

should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to

the pleadings. The proposed amendment should not cause such

prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs.

No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates in

defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of

lapse of time. The delay in filing the application for amendment of the

pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or

mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for

rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written

statement. (See South Konkan Distilleries & Anr. v. Prabhakar

Gajanan Naik & Ors., (2008) 14 SCC 632)

26. But undoubtedly, every case and every application for

amendment has to be tested in the applicable facts and

circumstances of the case. As the proposed amendment of the

pleadings amounts to only a different or an additional approach to

the same facts, this Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that

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such an amendment would be allowed even after the expiry of

statutory period of limitation.

27. In this behalf, in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley

Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 : (1966) 1 SCR 796, this Court held

thus:

“7. …..a new case or a new cause of action particularly

when a suit on the new case or cause of action is

barred: Weldon v. Neale [19 QBD 394]. But it is also well

recognised that where the amendment does not constitute

the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different

case, but amounts to no more than a different or

additional approach to the same facts, the amendment

will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory

period of limitation:…..”

28. In entitled, G. Nagamma & Anr. v. Siromanamma & An r.,

(1996) 2 SCC 25, this Court considered the proposed amendment of

the plaint and noticing that neither the cause of action would change

nor the relief would be materially affected, allowed the same. This

Court in this case noticed that in the plaintiff's suit for specific

performance, the plaintiff was entitled to plead even inconsistent

pleas and that in the present case, the plaintiffs were seeking only

the alternative reliefs. It appears that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for

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specific performance of an agreement of re-conveyance. By the

application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC for amendment of the

plaint, the appellants were pleading that the transactions of

execution of the sale deed and obtaining a document for re -

conveyance were single transactions viz. mortgage by conditional

sale. They also wanted to incorporate an alternative relief to redeem

the mortgage. At the end of the prayer, the plaintiff sought

alternatively to grant of a decree for redemption of the mortgage. This

amendment was permitted by this Court.

29. In Pankaja & Anr. v. Yellappa (dead) by lrs. & Ors., (2004)

6 SCC 415, this Court held that it was in the discretion of the court

to allow an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking

amendment of the plaint even where the relief sought to be added by

amendment was allegedly barred by limitation. The Court noticed

that there was no absolute rule that the amendment in such a case

should not be allowed. It was pointed out that the court's discretion

in this regard depends on the facts and circumstances of the case

and has to be exercised on a judicial evaluation thereof. It would be

apposite to notice the observations of this Court in this

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pronouncement in extenso. The principles were laid down by this

Court thus:

“12. So far as the court's jurisdiction to allow an

amendment of pleadings is concerned, there can be no

two opinions that the same is wide enough to permit

amendments even in cases where there has been

substantial delay in filing such amendment applications.

This Court in numerous cases has held that the dominant

purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the

litigation, therefore, if the facts of the case so permit, it is

always open to the court to allow applications in spite of

the delay and laches in moving such amendment

application.

13. But the question for our consideration is whether in

cases where the delay has extinguished the right of the

party by virtue of expiry of the period of limitation

prescribed in law, can the court in the exercise of its

discretion take away the right accrued to another party

by allowing such belated amendments.

14. The law in this regard is also quite clear and

consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case

where a relief is barred because of limitation an

amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such

cases depends on the facts and circumstances of the

case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment

being discretionary, the same will have to be exercised on

a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in

which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an

amendment really subserves the ultimate cause of justice

and avoids further litigation the same should be allowed.

There can be no straitjacket formula for allowing or

disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case

depends on the factual background of that case.

xxx xxx xxx

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16. This view of this Court has, since, been followed by a

three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of T.N. Alloy

Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity Board [(2004) 3 SCC

392]. Therefore, an application for amendment of the

pleading should not be disallowed merely because it is

opposed on the ground that the same is barred by

limitation, on the contrary, application will have to be

considered bearing in mind the discretion that is vested

with the court in allowing or disallowing such amendment

in the interest of justice.

xxx xxx xxx

18. We think that the course adopted by this Court

in Ragu Thilak D. John case [(2001) 2 SCC 472] applies

appropriately to the facts of this case. The courts below

have proceeded on an assumption that the amendment

sought for by the appellants is ipso facto barred by the

law of limitation and amounts to introduction of different

relief than what the plaintiff had asked for in the original

plaint. We do not agree with the courts below that the

amendment sought for by the plaintiff introduces a

different relief so as to bar the grant of prayer for

amendment, necessary factual basis has already been

laid down in the plaint in regard to the title which, of

course, was denied by the respondent in his written

statement which will be an issue to be decided in a trial.

Therefore, in the facts of this case, it will be incorrect to

come to the conclusion that by the amendment the

plaintiff will be introducing a different relief.”

30. From the above, therefore, one of the cardinal principles of law

in allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of the pleading

is that the courts generally, as a rule, decline to allow amendments,

if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation

on the date of filing of the application. But that would be a factor to

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be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion as to whether

the amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of

the court to order it, if that is required in the interest of justice.

31. In Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan & Ors., (2001) 2

SCC 472, this Court also observed that where the amendment was

barred by time or not, was a disputed question of fact and, therefore,

that prayer for amendment could not be rejected and in that

circumstances the issue of limitation can be made an issue in the

suit itself like the one made by the High Court in the case on hand.

32. In a decision in Vishwambhar & Ors. v. Laxminarayan

(Dead) through Lrs. & Anr., (2001) 6 SCC 163, this Court held that

the amendment though properly made cannot relate back to the date

of filing of the suit, but to the date of filing of the application.

33. Again, in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera , (1984) 3

SCC 352 : AIR 1985 SC 817, this Court held that if a prayer for

amendment merely adds to the facts already on record, the

amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of

limitation.

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IMPUGNED ORDERS

34. We now proceed to look into the two orders passed by the High

Court i.e. one by the learned Single Judge and the other in the appeal

by the Division Bench.

35. The learned Single Judge in Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom

15283, while allowing the Chamber Summons and permitting the

plaintiffs to amend the plaint, observed thus:

“5. It is the case of the applicant as submitted by Ms.

Panda that while filing the suit, plaintiffs quantified the

estimated damages likely to be caused to them by reason

of non performance at Rs. 1,01,00,000/- The value of the

suit property increased during the pendency of the suit.

According to plaintiffs' estimate, the value of the property

today can be estimated to be Rs. 400,01,00,000/- and if

the court is not inclined to grant specific performance,

then the damages which plaintiffs would suffer on

account of non performance by the defendants under the

agreement should be Rs. 400,01,00,000/ -. Therefore,

there is already claim for damages but what plaintiffs are

seeking today is only enhancing the claim, of course

subject to provisions of Section 73 of the Contract Act.

6. Ms. Paranjape submitted that after 30 years, this

application is filed for enhancement and therefore, ex-

facie the increased amount is barred by limitation. Ms.

Paranjape submitted that though the settled position in

law is that courts are generally liberal with pre-trial

amendment, when ex-facie claim appears to be barred by

limitation, the court should not permit the amendment.

7. What one should keep in mind is this figure of Rs.

400,01,00,000/- can tomorrow go up or go down.

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Plaintiffs are only estimating it to be the amount which

according to plaintiffs, is the loss which they would

suffer. Whether that is the right estimate can be decided

only at the time of trial. Even in para 12 of the plaint

plaintiff has stated “…….suffered loss and damages

which they estimate at……….” In prayer clause -(b)(v)

plaintiff pray “…….. or such other sum as this Honourable

Court may deem just and proper……” Further, if this

figure of Rs. 1,01,00,000/- is not amended as prayed in

this Notice of Motion, defendant will object the attempt of

plaintiff to claim more as damages saying plaintiff cannot

go beyond what is averred in the plaint. Due to situation

beyond the control of plaintiff, this suit has remained

pending for almost 32 years. Chances of suffering greater

prejudice is more if the amendment is not allowed. It is

clarified that plaintiff will still have to prove every penny

it is claiming as damages.

xxx xxx xxx

10. Admittedly, the trial is yet to begun though issues

have been framed long ago.

11. In the circumstances, keeping open rights and

contentions of defendants to raise the issue of limitation

which the court will decide at the time of trial, Chamber

summons allowed in terms of prayer clause -(a) and

accordingly disposed.”

36. While affirming the aforesaid order, the High Court in Appeal (L)

No. 499 of 2018 held as under:

“4. Undisputedly, trial is yet to commence. The

amendment has been allowed by the learned Single

Judge by giving cogent and sound reasons. Merely

because the Plaintiffs are permitted to amend the plaint

does not mean that the claim which has been made by

the Plaintiffs by way of amendment would be granted by

the Court. Defendants can always file an additional

Written Statement to contest the claim of the Plaintiffs. In

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such additional Written statement, Appellants can also

raise a ground with regard to limitation which will have

to be gone into by the learned Single Judge. In any case,

in the present case, Appellants have also filed additional

Written Statement so as to meet the grounds brought on

record by way of amendment.

5. In that view of the matter, we do not find that this is a

fit case to interfere with the discretion exercised by the

learned Single Judge. Appeal is therefore rejected.”

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA (SUPRA)

37. We now proceed to give a fair idea, as regards the judgment

rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Life

Insurance Corporation of India (supra) dated 24.10.2017.

38. The said appeal before this Court arose out of the judgment of

the High Court of Bombay dated 22.08.2014 in and by which the

Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein Life

Insurance Corporation of India (for short, ‘LIC’) thereby affirming the

order of the Single Judge in the Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014

by which the respondent No. 3 therein was impleaded as the plaintiff

No. 3 in the Suit No. 894 of 1986.

39. It appears from the pleadings, more particularly, the facts

recorded in the judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench that in

the year 2014, the respondent No. 3 therein, namely, the Kedia

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Construction Company Ltd. filed the Chamber Summons No. 187 of

2014 stating that subsequent to the filing of the suit for the specific

performance of contract, with the consent of the respondent No. 2,

plaintiff No. 1/respondent No. 1 had assigned its interest to the

respondent No. 3 for a consideration of Rs. 23,31,000/ - by an

agreement for sale dated 24.08.1987. The chamber summon s was

filed to implead the respondent No. 3 therein as the plaintiff No. 3

with a prayer to amend the plaint pursuant to the agreement of sale

in its favour. The appellant herein (LIC) had opposed the chamber

summons on the ground that the respondent No. 3 therein was not

a bona fide assignee or a necessary party and that the issues in the

suit were framed on 31.01.2014 and there had been an inordinate

delay on 27 years in filing the application which had not been

properly explained.

40. In the aforesaid set of facts, this Court while allowing the appeal

filed by the appellant herein (LIC) held as under:

“11. The stand of Respondent 3 is that it claims as an

assignee of the rights of Respondents 1 and 2 and that it

has the right to continue the suit under Order 22 Rule 10

CPC and the provisions of limitation, do not apply to such

an application. To appreciate merits of this contention, we

may usefully refer to Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, which reads

as under:

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Order 22 — Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties

“10. Procedure in case of assignment before

final order in suit.—(1) In other cases of an

assignment, creation or devolution of any

interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit

may, by leave of the court, be continued by or

against the person to or upon whom such

interest has come or devolved.

(2) The attachment of a decree pending an

appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an

interest entitling the person who procured such

attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).”

Under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, when there has been an

assignment or devolution of interest during the pendency

of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the court, be continued

by or against person to or upon whom such interest has

been assigned or devolved and this entitles the person

who has acquired an interest in the subject-matter of the

litigation by an assignment or creation or devolution of

interest pendente lite or suitor or any other person

interested, to apply to the court for leave to continue the

suit. When the plaintiff assigns/transfers the suit during

the pendency of the suit, the assignee is entitled to be

brought on record and continue the suit. Order 22 Rule 10

CPC enables only continuance of the suit by the leave of

the court. It is the duty of the court to decide whether

leave was to be granted or not to the person or to the

assignee to continue the suit. The discretion to implead or

not to implead parties who apply to continue the suit must

be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.

12. The High Court was not right in holding that mere

alleged transfer/assignment of the agreement would be

sufficient to grant leave to Respondent 3 to continue the

suit. From the filing of the suit in 1986, over the years,

valuable right of defence accrued to the appellant; such

valuable right of defence cannot be defeated by granting

leave to the third respondent to continue the suit in the

application filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC after 27

years of filing of the suit. The learned Single Judge was

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not right in saying that impleading Respondent 3 as

Plaintiff 3 would cause no prejudice to the appellant and

that the issues can be raised at the time of trial.

13. In a suit for specific performance, application for

impleadment must be filed within a reasonab le time.

Considering the question of impleadment of party in a suit

for specific performance after referring to various

judgments, in Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh

Apartments (P) Ltd. [Vidur Impex and Traders (P)

Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384 :

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] the Court summarised the principles

as under : (SCC p. 413, para 41)

“41. Though there is apparent conflict in the

observations made in some of the

aforementioned judgments, the broad principles

which should govern disposal of an application

for impleadment are:

41.1. The court can, at any stage of the

proceedings, either on an application made by

the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of

any person as party, who ought to have been

joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose

presence before the court is necessary for

effective and complete adjudication of the issues

involved in the suit.

41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought

to be joined as party to the suit and in whose

absence an effective decree cannot be passed by

the court.

41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence

would enable the court to completely, effectively

and properly adjudicate upon all matters and

issues, though he may not be a person in favour

of or against whom a decree is to be made.

41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or

necessary party, the court does not have the

jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the

wishes of the plaintiff.

25

41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the court

can order impleadment of a purchaser whose

conduct is above board, and who files

application for being joined as party within

reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge

about the pending litigation.

41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of

contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a

clandestine transaction or a transaction made

by the owner of the suit property in violation of

the restraint order passed by the court or the

application is unduly delayed then the court will

be fully justified in declining the prayer for

impleadment.”

In light of the above principles, considering the case in

hand, in our view, the application filed for impleading

Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 was not filed within

reasonable time. No explanation is offered for such an

inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in view

by the High Court.

14. Be it noted that an application under Order 22 Rule

10 CPC seeking leave of the court to continue the suit by

the assignee/third respondent was not actually filed.

Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2 014 was straightaway

filed praying to amend the suit which would have been

the consequential amendment, had the leave to continue

the suit been granted by the court.

15. As pointed out earlier, the application was filed after

27 years of filing of the suit. Of course, the power to allow

the amendment of suit is wide and the court should not

adopt hypertechnical approach. In considering

amendment applications, court should adopt liberal

approach and amendments are to be allowed to avoid

multiplicity of litigations. We are conscious that mere

delay is not a ground for rejecting the amendment. But in

the case in hand, the parties are not rustic litigants; all

the respondents are companies and the dispute between

the parties is a commercial litigation. In such facts and

26

circumstances, the amendment prayed in the chamber

summons filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC ought not to

have been allowed, as the same would cause serious

prejudice to the appellant. In our view, the impugned

order, allowing Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 filed

after 27 years of the suit would take away the

substantial rights of defence accrued to the appellant and

the same cannot be sustained.

16. In the result, the impugned judgment [LIC v. Sanjeev

Builders (P) Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4811] is set

aside and the appeal is allowed. Chamber Summons No.

187 of 2014 in Suit No. 894 of 1986 stands dismissed.

No order as to costs.”

41. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that a coordinate Bench

of this Court took the view that impleading the respondent No. 3

therein as the plaintiff No. 3 would cause a serious prejudice to the

appellant. This Court took the view that no explanation was offered

for an inordinate delay of twenty-seven years, which was overlooked

by the High Court. Even while allowing the appeal filed by the

appellant herein, the coordinate Bench of this Court observed that

mere delay would not be a ground for rejecting the amendment.

However, in the facts of the case, since the parties not being rustic

litigants and all the respondents therein being companies and the

dispute being a commercial litigation, the amendment could not have

been permitted after twenty-seven years of the suit, as it would take

27

away the substantial rights of defence accrued in favour of the

appellant (LIC).

42. We are of the view that the judgment and order passed by the

coordinate Bench of this Court in the Life Insurance Corporation

of India (supra) has no application so far as the present appeal is

concerned. The appellant herein cannot succeed in the present

appeal merely on the strength of the judgment and order passed by

this Court in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra).

ORDER II RULE 2 OF THE CPC

43. In the present appeal, the principal argument of the learned

counsel appearing for the appellant is that the amendment

application should have been rejected by the courts below applying

the principle of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.

44. The said provision is set out below:

"Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

2. Suit to include the whole claim.-(1) Every suit shall

include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is

entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a

plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order

to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

28

(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.-Where a plaintiff

omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes,

any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in

respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.-A person

entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same

cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but

if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for

all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief

so omitted.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this rule an obligation

and a collateral security for its performance and

successive claims arising under the same obligation shall

be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of

action.

Illustration

A lets a house to B at a yearly rent of Rs. 1200. The rent

for the whole of the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 is due

and unpaid. A sues B in 1908 only for the rent due for

1906. A shall not afterwards sue B for the rent due for

1905 or 1907."

45. The expressions "omits to sue" and "intentionally relinquish any

portion of his claim" give an indication as to the intention of the

legislature in framing the said rule. The term 'sue' can mean both the

filing of the suit and prosecuting the suit to its culmination,

depending on the context of the provision. In the present case, the

legislature thought it fit to debar a plaintiff from suing afterwards for

any relief which he/she has omitted without the leave of the court or

from suing in respect of any portion of his claim which he

29

intentionally relinquishes. Order II Rule 2(1) provides that every suit

shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to

make in respect of the cause of action.

46. The provision of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC has been well

discussed by the Privy Council in the case of Mohd. Khalil Khan &

Ors. v. Mahbub Ali Mian & Ors., AIR 1949 PC 78, held as under:

“The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed

may be thus summarized :

(1.) the correct test in cases falling under Or. 2, r. 2, is

“whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, founded on

a cause of action distinct from that which was the

foundation for the former suit.” (Moonshee Buzloor

Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum.) (2.) The cause of

action means every fact which will be necessary for the

plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right

to the judgment. (Read v. Brown.) (3.) If the evidence to

support the two claims is different, then the causes of

action are also different. (Brunsden v. Humphrey.) (4.)

The causes of action in the two suits may be considered

to be the same if in substance they are identical.

(Brunsden v. Humphrey.) (5.) The cause of action has no

relation whatever to the defence that may be set up by

the defendant, nor does it depend on the character of the

relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers “to the media

upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a

conclusion in his favour.” (Muss. Chand Kour v. Partab

Singh.) This observation was made by Lord Watson in a

case under s. 43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to Or.

2, r. 2), where plaintiff made various claims in the same

suit.”

30

47. In Upendra Narain Roy v. Rai Janoki Nath Roy, AIR 1919

Cal 904, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had an occasion

to consider this question. Woodroffe, J. has observed:

".....As regards the other point it has more ingenuity than

substance. It proceeds on the erroneous assumption that

the amendment was prohibited by Or. II, r. 2. This Rule

does not touch the matter before us. It refers to a case

where there has been a suit in which there has been an

omission, to sue in respect of portion of a claim, and a

decree has been made in that suit. In that case a second

suit in respect of the portion so omitted is barred. That is

not the case here. In the present case the suit has not

been heard but a claim has been omitted by, it is said,

inadvertence. To hold that in such case an amendment

should not be allowed would be to hold something which

the Rule does not say and which would be absurd. The

Rule says “he shall not afterwards sue,” that is, it

assumes that there has been a suit carried to a decision,

and a sub-sequent suit. It does not apply to amendment

where there has been only one suit. As the Plaintiff had

in law a right to apply for an amendment before the

conclusion of his suit, it cannot be said that any rights of

the Respondent in the Pabna suit are affected. Such a

contention is based on the erroneous assumption that

nothing could be done by way of amendment of the

Calcutta suit to remove the objection that the claims on

the previous mortgage or charge were not sustainable. A

case would fall within Or. II, r. 2, only if a Plaintiff fails to

apply for amendment before decree, and then brings

another suit. The Plaintiffs are not doing that but asking

for amendment in the one and only suit they have

brought. This is, therefore, not a case in which the

amendment either affects rights to the other party, or

otherwise prejudices him."

(emphasis supplied)

31

48. A Constitution Bench of this Court, considering the scope and

applicability of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, in the case of Gurbux

Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810, held as under:

“6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3)

of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant

who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second

suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on

which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of

that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than

one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one

relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court

omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had

been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the

defendant would have to establish primarily and to start

with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous

suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the

cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and

that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there

would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt,

a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be

traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by

no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical

bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be

presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is

for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under

Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code can be

established only if the defendant files in evidence the

pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the

Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits.

It is common ground that the pleadings in CS 28 of 1950

were not filed by the appellant in the present suit as

evidence in support of his plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of

the Civil Procedure Code. The learned trial Judge,

however, without these pleadings being on the record

inferred what the cause of action should have been from

the reference to the previous suit contained in the plaint

as a matter of deduction. At the stage of the appeal the

learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in the

32

appellant's case and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly

that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the

record, a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil

Procedure Code was not maintainable.”

49. So far as, Gurbux Singh (supra) is concerned, we may clarify

that the entire consideration in the said case by this Court was to

the fact that there was a relinquishment of a claim by the plaintiff

therein, but the relevant point which was considered by this Court

was that the relief had become time barred. The ratio of the said

judgment is that the relief being barred by limitation, the Order II

Rule 2 of the CPC only came in as an adjunct. However, Gurbux

Singh (supra) makes it clear that the bar of Order II Rule 2 of the

CPC applies only to the subsequent suits.

50. In the light of the principles discussed and the law laid down by

the Constitution Bench as also the other decisions discussed above,

we are of the view that if the two suits and the relief claimed therein

are based on the same cause of action then the subsequent suit will

become barred under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC. However, we do not

find any merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant

herein that the amendment application is liable to be rejected by

applying the bar under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC. Order II Rule 2 of

33

the CPC cannot apply to an amendment which is sought on an

existing suit.

51. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to with approval a

decision rendered by the High Court of Delhi in the case of Vaish

Cooperative Adarsh Bank Ltd. v. Geetanjali Despande & Ors.,

(2003) 102 DLT 570. Paras 17 and 18 resply indicate that the bar

under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC is only for a subsequent suit. These

paras read as under:

"17. Reverting to the preliminary objections raised by the

appellant against the maintainability of the application

for amendment, one would come across with a peculiar

plea of proposed amendment being barred under Order II

Rule 2 CPC. General rule enacted under Order II Rule 2.(1)

CPC is that every suit must include the whole of the claim

which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the

cause of action. Order II Rule 2.(2) precludes a

subsequent suit on any part of claim, which had been

omitted or intentionally relinquished by the plaintiff in an

earlier suit based on the same cause of action. Similarly,

where the plaintiff is entitled to more than one relief in

respect of the same cause of action but omits, except with

the leave of the court, to sue for all such reliefs, he is

debarred in view of the Order II Rule 2(3) CPC from suing

afterwards for any relief so omitted.

18. A plea of bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC is

maintainable only if the defendant makes out (i) that the

cause of action of the second suit is the same on which

the previous suit was based, (ii) that in respect of that

cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one

relief and (iii) that the plaintiff without leave obtained

34

from the Court omitted to sue earlier for the relief for

which the second suit is filed.(see “Gurbux

Singh v. Bhooralal”, AIR 1964 SC 1810). Clearly, Order II

Rule 2 CPC enacts a rule barring a second suit in the

situation indicated above. Identity of cause of action in

the former and subsequent suits is essential before the

bar contemplated under Order II Rule 2 CPC is set to

operate. Thus, where the claim or reliefs in the second suit

are based on a distinct cause of action, Order II Rule 2

CPC would have no application. Order II Rule 2 CPC

operates as a bar against a subsequent suit if the

requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied

and the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond

its purview. The plea of amendment being barred under

Order II Rule 2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence

negatived. ”

(emphasis supplied)

52. We are also not impressed by the contention raised on behalf of

the appellant herein that the amendment application is hit by the

principle of constructive res judicata. The principle of constructive

res judicata has no application in the instant case, since there was

no formal adjudication between the parties after full hearing. The

litigation before this Court has come up at the stage when the courts

below allowed the amendment of plaint for the purpose of enhancing

the amount towards damages in the alternative to the main relief of

specific performance of the contract.

35

SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963

53. The above takes us now to consider the proviso to Section 21(5)

and Section 22(2) of the Act 1963.

54. The Act 1963 contemplates that in addition to or in substitution

of a claim for performance, a plaintiff is entitled to claim

compensation. Section 21 of the Act 1963 provides as follows:

“21. Power to award compensation in certain cases.

–(1) In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the

plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach [in

addition to] such performance.

(2) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific

performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a

contract between the parties which has been broken by

the defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled to

compensation for that breach, it shall award him such

compensation accordingly.

(3) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific

performance ought to be granted, but that it is not

sufficient to satisfy the justice of the case, and that some

compensation for breach of the contract should also be

made to the plaintiff, it shall award him such

compensation accordingly.

(4) In determining the amount of any compensation

awarded under this section, the court shall be guided by

the principles specified in section 73 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

(5) No compensation shall be awarded under this

section unless the plaintiff has claimed such

compensation in his plaint:

36

Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any

such compensation in the plaint, the court shall, at any

stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on

such terms as may be just, for including a claim for such

compensation.

Explanation.-The circumstances that the contract has

become incapable of specific performance does not

preclude the court from exercising the jurisdiction

conferred by this section.”

55. Under sub-section (2) of Section 21, the court is empowered to

award compensation for breach where it holds that there is a contract

between the parties which was broken by the defendant but in the

event, it decides that specific performance ought not to be granted.

Sub-section (3) of Section 21 empowers the court to grant

compensation for breach in addition to a decree for specific

performance where it is of the view that specific performance alone

would not satisfy the justice of the case. Sub-section (5), however,

stipulates that compensation cannot be awarded under the section

unless the Plaintiff has claimed such compensation in the plaint.

This provision is mandatory.

56. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 dilutes the rigours

of the main provision by allowing the plaintiff who has not claimed

such compensation in the plaint to amend the plaint at any stage of

the proceedings and the court, it has been provided, shall at any

37

stage of the proceedings allow an amendment for including a claim

for such compensation on such terms as may be just. In Shamsu

Suhara Beevi v. G. Alex & Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 569, for instance,

this Court held that the High Court erred in granting compensation

under Section 21, in addition to the relief of specific performance in

the absence of a prayer made to that effect either in the plaint as

originally filed or as amended at any stage of the proceedings

57. Section 22 of the Act 1963 contains the following provisions:

"22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition,

refund of earnest money, etc. -(1) Notwithstanding

anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908), any person suing for the

specific performance of a contract for the transfer of

immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for-

(a) possession, or partition and separate possession,

of the property, in addition to such performance;

or

(b) any other relief to which he may be entitled,

including the refund of any earnest money or

deposit paid or (made by) him, in case his claim

for specific performance is refused.

(2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section

(1) shall be granted by the Court unless it has been

specifically claimed:

Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any

such relief in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of

the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such

terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief.

38

(3) The power of the Court to grant relief under clause

(b) of sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice to its

powers to award compensation under section 21."

58. Section 22 has a non-obstante provision which overrides the

CPC. A plaintiff who claims specific performance of a contract for the

transfer of immovable property, may in an appropriate case ask for

possession, partition and separate possession of the property, in

addition to specific performance. The plaintiff may also claim any

other relief including the refund of earnest money or deposit paid, in

case the claim for specific performance is refused. Corresponding to

the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 21, sub-section (2)

of Section 22 stipulates that such relief cannot be granted by the

court unless it has been specifically claimed. However, the proviso

requires that the court shall at any stage of the proceedings allow the

plaintiff to amend the plaint to claim such relief where it has not been

originally claimed on such terms which may appear just.

THE SPECIFIC RELIEF (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2018

59. The Act 1963 was amended in the year 2018 and in Section 21

of the Principal Act, in sub-section (1) the words “either in addition

39

to, or in substitution of” were deleted and the words “in addition to”

were substituted in their place. As a result, damages are now

available only in addition to specific performance and not in lieu

thereof. This is a consequence of other amendments to the Act 1963

whereby the amending act has eliminated the discretion of courts by

substituting Sections 10 and 20 resply of the Principal Act.

60. The aforesaid provisions of the Act 1963 were duly considered

by the Bombay High Court in the case of Kahini Developers Pvt.

Ltd. v. Mukesh Morarjipanchamatia & Ors., reported in (2013) 3

Mah LJ 440, Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, (as His Lordship then

was), speaking for the Bench, very lucidly and in the most erudite

manner explained as under:

“9. The object of the legislature in introducing the proviso

to sub-section (5) of section 21 and to sub-section (2) of

section 22 was to obviate a multiplicity of th e

proceedings. In Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525:

AIR 1982 SC 818 the Supreme Court noted that the

legislature “has given ample power to the Court to allow

amendment of the plaint at any stage.” (At para 20 page

825). This, the Supreme Court held, would include even

the stage of execution. The Supreme Court also held that

a mere contract for sale or for that matter, a decree for

specific performance does not confer title on the buyer

and that title would pass only upon execution of the

decree. While discussing the issue of limitation, the

Supreme Court held as follows:

40

“If once we accept the legal position that neither a

contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis

for specific performance of the contract gives any

right or title to the decree-holder and the right and

the title passes to him only on the execution of the

deed of sale either by the judgment-debtor himself or

by the Court itself in case he fails to execute the sale

deed, it is idle to contend that a valuable right had

accrued to the Petitioner merely because a decree

has been passed for the specific performance of the

contract. The limitation would start against the

decree-holders only after they had obtained a sale in

respect of the disputed property. It is, therefore,

difficult to accept that a valuable right had accrued

to the judgment-debtor by lapse of time. Section 22

has been enacted only for the purpose of avoiding

multiplicity of proceedings which the law Courts

always abhor.” (At para 21 page 825)

10. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in a

later judgment in Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1

SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604:

“So far as the proviso to sub-section (5) is concerned,

two positions must be kept clearly distinguished. If

the amendment relates to the relief of compensation

in lieu of or in addition to specific performance where

the plaintiff has not abandoned his relief of specific

performance the Court will allow the amendment at

any stage of the proceeding. That is a claim for

compensation falling under section 21 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963 and the amendment is one under the

proviso to sub-section (5). But different and less

liberal standards apply if what is sought by the

amendment is the conversion of a suit for specific

performance into one for damages for breach of

contract in which case section 73 of the Contract Act

is invoked. This amendment is under the discipline

of R.17, 0.6, C.P.C. The fact that sub-section (4) in

turn, invokes section 73 of the Contract Act for the

principles of quantification and assessment of

41

compensation does not obliterate this distinction.” (At

para 10 page 1608)

In the decision in Shamsu Suhara Beevi (supra), while

holding that the High Court had erred in granting

compensation under section 21, in addition to the relief of

the specific performance in the absence of a prayer to that

effect, the Supreme Court held that a prayer could have

been made to that effect either in the plaint or by

amending the plaint at any later stage of the proceeding

to include the relief of compensation in addition to the

relief of a specific performance. The plaint, however, in

that case, was never amended and the order of the High

Court was, therefore, held to be in error. These principles

have also been noticed in a judgment of a learned Single

Judge of this Court in Manohar Dhundiraj

Joshi v. Jhunnulal Hariram Yadao, 1983 Mh.L.J. 369.

11. Since the Court is informed that an appeal has been

filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge

in Harinarayan G. Bajaj (supra), we are not expressing

any opinion on the correctness of that decision. We are,

however, of the view that since the legislature has

contemplated that an amendment within the meaning of

the provisos to section 21(5) and section 22(2) of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 can be made at any stage of the

proceeding, such an amendment would not be barred by

limitation. Even as a matter of first principle, an

application for amendment must be distinguished from

the cause of action which is sought to be set up by the

amendment. As a matter of general principle, though an

application for amendment is allowed, the question as to

whether the cause of action is within limitation would

have to be determined and adjudicated upon. While

allowing an amendment, it is always open to a Civil Court

to direct that the amendment shall not relate back to the

institution of the proceeding. The Court would therefore

have to determine at trial whether the cause of action is

within limitation or is barred. Where the legislature has

contemplated that the plaint can be amended at any

stage of the proceeding as stipulated in the provisos to

42

section 21(5) and section 21(2). Such an amendment of

the nature contemplated by those provisions can indeed

be brought about at any stage of the proceedings."

(emphasis supplied)

61. In the case of B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai

& Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 712 relying upon the cases of A.K. Gupta

(supra) and Ganesh Trading Co. (supra), this Court held that the

court should adopt a liberal approach in the matter of amendment

and only when the other side had acquired any legal right due to

lapse of time, the amendment should be declined. It has been held

as follows:

“…..All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed

which are necessary for determination of the real

controversies in the suit provided the proposed

amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of

action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or

defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations

in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually

destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to

be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings.

Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to

the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No

amendment should be allowed which am ounts to or

results in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite

party on account of lapse of time. The delay in filing the

petition for amendment of the pleadings should be

properly compensated by costs and error or mistake

which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for

rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or

written statement.”

43

62. In Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC

647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604, this Court had the occasion to deal with the

provisions of Section 21 of the Act 1963. While analysing the

aforesaid provisions, this Court laid down that if the amendment

relates to the relief of compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific

performance where the plaintiff has not abandoned his relief of

specific performance the court should allow the amendment at any

stage of the proceedings since that is a claim for compensation falling

under Section 21 of the Act 1963 and the amendment is one under

the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21. This Court, however,

issued a note of caution by laying down that different and less liberal

standards would apply if what is sought by the amendment is

conversion of a suit for specific performance into one for damages for

breach of contract, in which case Section 73 of the Indian Contract

Act, 1872 would get invoked, and then the said amendment would

be under the discipline of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. This Court

further held that when the plaintiff by his option had made specific

performance impossible then Section 21 does not entitle him to seek

damages. It is also held that in Indian Law when the contract, for no

44

fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible of performance Section 21

enables award of compensation in lieu and substitution of specific

performance.

63. The legal position, therefore, in respect of scope and ambit of

Section 21 of the Act 1963 is clear and made so more by the ratio of

the aforesaid decision of this Court.

64. The plaintiffs in the original plaint claimed for compensation in

addition to a decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell.

Therefore, strictly speaking the provisions of Section 21 of the Act

1963 are not attracted to the facts of the present case. The intention

of the plaintiffs in seeking for amendment of the plaint appears to be

to get an enhanced amount of compensation than what was originally

claimed in the original plaint which was restricted only to Rs.

1,01,00,000/-. The aforesaid intention becomes apparent when the

averments made in the application praying for amendment are looked

into inasmuch as, the plaintiffs have stated that in view of the fact

that in last 30 years there had been a tremendous escalation of the

value of the suit property which has an adverse effect on the quantum

of damages, compensation, relief sought for the breach of contract by

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the appellant/defendant. According to the plaintiffs the raising of the

amount of compensation to Rs. 400,01,00,000/- from Rs.

1,01,00,000/- as claimed in the original plaint has been necessitated

in view of undue delay in the prosecution of the suit which was not

earlier foreseen, which in turn has caused more damage to the

plaintiffs through the years and therefore, they have sought to raise

the amount of compensation to the present value as stated above

from Rs. 1,01,00,000/-.

65. However, the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the

appellant in regard to the two provisos referred to above, is quite

curious. The argument is that the power of the court to permit the

plaintiff to amend the plaint in a suit filed for the spec ific

performance of contract flows from Sections 21 and 22 resply of the

Act, 1963 & the proviso to the sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Act

1963 may entitle the plaintiff to amend the plaint, provided the

plaintiff has inadvertently or otherwise omitted to pray for

compensation. The argument proceeds on the footing that in the

present case, as the plaintiff specifically prayed for compensation in

the plaint, later if he seeks to amend that part of the relief, the sub-

46

section (5) of Section 21 of the Act 1963 would be an embargo for the

court to do so. We do not find any merit in this argument of the

learned counsel appearing for the appellant.

66. The two provisos referred to above, deal with the question of

permitting the plaintiff to amend his plaint. It is not, as if, in the

absence of these two provisos, it is not permissible in law for the

plaintiff to carry out an amendment in his pleading by introducing a

relief for enhanced compensation. Rule 17 of Order VI of the CPC

does confer power on a Court to allow a party to alter or amend his

pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just. This

rule does not stop at that, but it further says that all such

amendments should be made as may be necessary for the purpose of

determining the real question in controversy between the parties. It

is pertinent to note that this provision which empowers the court in

its discretion to permit a party to amend his pleadings, was already

on the statute book, when the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was enacted.

It can, therefore, be presumed that when the latter legislation was on

the anvil, the Parliament was aware of this power of the court to

permit amendment of pleadings. Therefore, it cannot be successfully

47

urged that a suit for specific performance falling under the provisions

of the Act, 1963 would not be governed by the provisions of the CPC.

It is, therefore, clear that to such a suit the provisions contained in

Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC would apply and a plaintiff who has

earlier failed to incorporate the reliefs for compensation or who has

incorporated the reliefs for compensation but seeks amendment in

the same, could seek the permission of the court to introduce these

reliefs by way of amendment.

67. It is important to note that sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the

Act 1963 was originally introduced to resolve the confusion over

whether the court had the power to grant compensation in a claim

for specific performance in absence of any pleading to that effect

under the provisions of the Act 1963. Prior to the enactment of the

Act 1963 the Law Commission in its 9

th Law Commission Report

while referring to the diverse opinions expressed by the High Courts

recommended that in no case should compensation be decreed

unless it is claimed by a proper pleading.

68. In The Arya Pradeshak Pritinidhi Sabha, Sindh, Punjab &

Bilochistan v. Lahori Mal & Ors., (1924) 6 Lah LJ 286 : AIR 1924

48

Lah 713, the Lahore High Court had held that the court has the

power to award damages in substitution of or in addition to specific

performance even though the plaintiff has not specifically claimed the

same in its plaint and written submissions. As against, the Madras

High Court in Somasundaram Chettiar v. Chidambaram

Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 282 held that the court could not award

damages in absence of a specific claim for damages.

69. In Somasundaram Chettiar (supra), the Madras High Court

held that the rationale for not allowing a claim for damages in a suit

for specific performance without a specific pleading is based on the

principle that the plaintiff must establish its claim for damages and

the defendant must be put on notice and correspondingly have an

opportunity to adduce evidence that the damages claimed are

excessive or that the plaintiff has not suffered any damages.

70. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus:

(i) Order II Rule 2 CPC operates as a bar against a

subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for

application thereof are satisfied and the field of

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amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview.

The plea of amendment being barred under Order II

Rule 2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence

negatived.

(ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are

necessary for determining the real question in

controversy provided it does not cause injustice or

prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is

apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter

part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

(iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed

(i) if the amendment is required for effective

and proper adjudication of the controversy

between the parties, and

(ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided

(a) the amendment does not result in injustice

to the other side,

(b) by the amendment, the parties seeking

amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear

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admission made by the party which confers a right

on the other side and

(c) the amendment does not raise a time barred

claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a

valuable accrued right (in certain situations).

(iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required to be

allowed unless

(i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is

sought to be introduced, in which case the fact

that the claim would be time barred becomes a

relevant factor for consideration,

(ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit,

(iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or

(iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid

defence.

(v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of

pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical

approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal

especially where the opposite party can be

compensated by costs.

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(vi) Where the amendment would enable the court to

pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in

rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for

amendment should be allowed.

(vii) Where the amendment merely sought to introduce

an additional or a new approach without introducing

a time barred cause of action, the amendment is liable

to be allowed even after expiry of limitation.

(viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is

intended to rectify the absence of material particulars

in the plaint.

(ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a

ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of

delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be

allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately

for decision.

(x) Where the amendment changes the nature of the

suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely

new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the

amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the

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amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in

the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already

pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is

required to be allowed.

(xi) Where the amendment is sought before

commencement of trial, the court is required to be

liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in

mind the fact that the opposite party would have a

chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As

such, where the amendment does not result in

irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest

the opposite party of an advantage which it had

secured as a result of an admission by the party

seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be

allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary

for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main

issues in controversy between the parties, the

amendment should be allowed. (See Vijay Gupta v.

Gagninder Kr. Gandhi & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del

1897)

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71. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that we

should not disturb the impugned order passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court, affirming the order passed by the learned Single

Judge allowing the amendment application filed at the instance of

the plaintiffs.

72. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no

order as to costs.

73. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

….…..…………………J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

…………………………J.

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

New Delhi;

September 1, 2022.